# 2025-15809: FCC Cracks Down on Robocalls with Strict Caller ID Rules

2025-15809, Call Authentication Trust Anchor, is a Federal Register rule from Federal Communications Commission published 2025-08-19 (as of 2026-06-11).

- Canonical: https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2025-15809
- As of: 2026-06-11
- Plain-text twin of the page above; the HTML and this file carry the same facts.

## Facts
- Document number: 2025-15809
- Title: Call Authentication Trust Anchor
- Type: Rule
- Agencies: Federal Communications Commission
- Citation: 90 FR 40241
- Published: 2025-08-19
- Effective: unknown
- Comments close: not stated
- Significant: no
- Touches household money: no
- Regulation identifier numbers: none
- Last updated: 2026-06-11

## In one line

FCC Cracks Down on Robocalls with Strict Caller ID Rules

## Summary

The FCC is making caller ID safer by setting clear rules for phone companies that use helpers to verify calls. Providers must stay in charge of confirming caller ID and use their own digital certificates, not their helpers’. They also need to get special tokens and keep records to prove they’re following the rules. This affects all phone providers using STIR/SHAKEN tech and helps fight robocalls without extra costs.

## Abstract

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) adopts rules that strengthen the Commission's caller ID authentication requirements by establishing clear practices for providers that rely on third parties to fulfill their STIR/SHAKEN implementation obligations. The rules authorize providers with a STIR/ SHAKEN implementation obligation to engage third parties to perform the technological act of digitally "signing" calls consistent with the requirements of the STIR/SHAKEN technical standards so long as: the provider with the implementation obligation makes the "attestation- level" decisions for authenticating caller ID information; and all calls are signed using the certificate of the provider with the implementation obligation--not the certificate of a third party. The rules also explicitly require all providers with a STIR/SHAKEN implementation obligation to obtain a Service Provider Code (SPC) token from the STIR/SHAKEN Policy Administrator and present that token to a STIR/SHAKEN Certificate Authority to obtain a digital certificate. Additionally, the rules include recordkeeping requirements for third- party authentication arrangements to enable the Commission to monitor compliance with and enforce Commission rules.

## Effects PRIA read

- Providers must control attestation decisions: cost, low. If a phone provider relies on a third party to help verify calls under STIR/SHAKEN, the provider itself must make the ‘attestation‑level’ decisions that determine how caller ID is authenticated. This rule applies to any provider with a STIR/SHAKEN implementation obligation.
- Calls must use provider's digital certificate: cost, low. All calls that are signed under STIR/SHAKEN must be signed using the digital certificate of the provider with the implementation obligation, not using a third party’s certificate. Providers with STIR/SHAKEN obligations must ensure their certificate is used for signing.
- Must obtain SPC token and certificate: cost, low. Providers with a STIR/SHAKEN implementation obligation must obtain a Service Provider Code (SPC) token from the STIR/SHAKEN Policy Administrator and present that token to a STIR/SHAKEN Certificate Authority to obtain a digital certificate. This is a required step for obtaining the certificate used…
- Recordkeeping for third‑party arrangements: cost, low. The rules require providers to keep records of any third‑party authentication arrangements so the FCC can monitor compliance and enforce its rules. Providers with STIR/SHAKEN obligations must maintain these records.
- Third parties may sign calls under conditions: benefit, low. The FCC authorizes providers with STIR/SHAKEN obligations to engage third parties to perform the technical act of digitally signing calls, provided the provider keeps attestation‑level control and the provider’s certificate is used to sign. Providers may use third parties for signing only under tho…

## Related documents

- [2026-20591](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2026-20591): Information Collection Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission Under Delegated Authority, 2026-10-08
- [2026-20590](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2026-20590): Information Collection Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission, 2026-10-08
- [2026-20676](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2026-20676): Information Collection Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission Under Delegated Authority, 2026-10-08
- [2026-20607](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2026-20607): Information Collections Being Submitted for Review and Approval to Office of Management and Budget, 2026-10-08
- [2026-20681](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2026-20681): Information Collection Being Submitted for Review and Approval to Office of Management and Budget, 2026-10-08
- [2026-20486](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2026-20486): Information Collections Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission, 2026-10-06

## Sources
- [2025-15809 on federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/19/2025-15809/call-authentication-trust-anchor)
- [2025-15809 as published (PDF)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-19/pdf/2025-15809.pdf)

## Related
- [Previous: 2025-15802, Special Local Regulations; Marine Events Within the USCG East District (Formerl…](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2025-15802)
- [Next: 2025-15839, Airworthiness Directives; Siam Hiller Holdings, Inc.](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2025-15839)
- [All Federal Register documents](https://policyrisk.com/federal-register)

Source: PRIA, https://policyrisk.com/federal-register/2025-15809 (as of 2026-06-11).