# Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo — Overruling Chevron Deference

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 2024, is the Supreme Court's landmark decision overruling Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 1984 — ending forty years of judi

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## Facts
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## Article

*Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), is the Supreme Court's landmark decision overruling *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council* (1984) — ending forty years of judicial deference to federal agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Under *Chevron*'s two-step framework, courts reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation would first ask whether Congress had directly addressed the question; if the statute was ambiguous (step two), the court would defer to the agency's interpretation if it was "reasonable." *Chevron* deference had become the most cited administrative law precedent in American history, underpinning the authority of agencies ranging from the EPA and OSHA to the SEC, FDIC, and every other major regulatory body to interpret the statutes they administer. Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in *Loper Bright* held that *Chevron* was wrong from the start: under the Administrative Procedure Act's mandate that reviewing courts "shall decide all relevant questions of law" (5 U.S.C. § 706), courts must independently determine what a statute means — they cannot defer to an agency's interpretation simply because the statute is ambiguous. *Loper Bright* returns the law to *Marbury v. Madison*'s first principle: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Combined with the major questions doctrine (*West Virginia v. EPA*, 2022), *Loper Bright* substantially restructures the relationship between courts, agencies, and Congress — making agency action more vulnerable to judicial challenge and increasing pressure on Congress to legislate with greater specificity.

## Current Law (2026)

| Parameter | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Case citation | *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) |
| *Chevron* status | Overruled — agency deference to statutory interpretations no longer available |
| New standard | Courts determine statutory meaning de novo — independently, without deference to agency interpretation |
| APA basis | 5 U.S.C. § 706: courts "shall decide all relevant questions of law" in reviewing agency action |
| Prior decisions | *Chevron*-era decisions remain valid precedents on specific statutory questions; prior *Chevron*-era holdings are not automatically overruled |
| Major questions doctrine | Separately requires clear congressional authorization for rules of major economic significance; operates alongside *Loper Bright* |
| Skidmore deference | Agencies' interpretations may still receive *Skidmore* deference (deference based on persuasiveness, not mere ambiguity); not overruled |

## Legal Authority

- **5 U.S.C. § 706** — APA standard of review: courts shall "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action" and shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . not in accordance with law"
- **5 U.S.C. § 553** — APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements; the procedural framework within which agencies interpret statutes and promulgate rules
- **16 U.S.C. § 1853** — Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; the statute at issue in *Loper Bright*; whether NMFS could require fishing vessels to pay for federal monitors aboard their boats
- ***Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)** — *Chevron* overruled; courts determine statutory meaning de novo; agencies' interpretations may still be persuasive but are not entitled to controlling deference merely because a statute is ambiguous
- ***Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)** — Overruled; the two-step deference framework: (1) is the statute clear? if yes, apply it; (2) if ambiguous, is the agency's interpretation reasonable? if yes, defer
- ***West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697 (2022)** — Major questions doctrine: agencies must show clear congressional authorization for rules of vast economic and political significance; companion to *Loper Bright* operating at the statutory authorization level
- ***Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)** — Pre-*Chevron* deference standard: agency interpretations are entitled to deference based on their persuasive power, consistency, and expertise — this pre-*Chevron* approach is revived post-*Loper Bright*
- ***Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce*, 603 U.S. 494 (2024)** — Companion case decided same day, same result; same statutory (Magnuson-Stevens Act) and constitutional question

## Key Mechanics

*Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo* (2024) overruled *Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC* (1984) and held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their own judgment in determining the meaning of statutes that agencies administer — courts may not defer to an agency's interpretation simply because Congress left ambiguity. The underlying dispute was narrow (whether NMFS could require fishing vessels to pay the salary of federal monitors aboard their boats, approximately $700/day) but the Court used it to resolve a question it had been circling for years: whether *Chevron* deference was consistent with the APA's mandate that courts "decide all relevant questions of law." Chief Justice Roberts's majority held it was not — *Chevron* was a judicial creation that had gradually expanded beyond anything the APA's text or administrative law tradition supported. Post-*Loper Bright*, the framework for judicial review of statutory interpretations is: (1) courts interpret statutes de novo, using traditional tools of statutory construction; (2) agency interpretations may still be considered for their persuasive value (*Skidmore* deference — proportional to the agency's expertise, the consistency of its position, and the quality of its reasoning); (3) the major questions doctrine (*West Virginia v. EPA*, 2022) operates as a threshold rule requiring clear congressional authorization for significant agency actions. The practical effects are ongoing: agencies face higher litigation risk for statutory interpretations they previously defended under *Chevron*; ambiguous statutes are resolved by courts rather than by agencies; and Congress must write clearer delegations if it wants agencies to fill statutory gaps.

## How It Works

### The *Chevron* Framework and Its Dominance

*Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council* (1984) arose from the EPA's interpretation of the word "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act. EPA had defined the term to include a "bubble" concept — treating an entire plant as a single source, allowing pollution trading within the plant. The D.C. Circuit struck down the interpretation; the Supreme Court reversed.

Justice Stevens's unanimous *Chevron* opinion established a two-step framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretations:

**Step One**: Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? If yes — if the statute is clear — that is the end of the matter; courts give effect to the unambiguous will of Congress.

**Step Two**: If the statute is ambiguous (has a gap or is silent on the question), the court asks whether the agency's interpretation is "a permissible construction of the statute." If reasonable, the court defers to the agency's view — even if the court itself would interpret the statute differently.

The logic of *Chevron* deference: Congress, when it legislates ambiguously, implicitly delegates gap-filling authority to the agency charged with administering the statute. Agencies have subject-matter expertise; they are democratically accountable through the President; they can develop sophisticated, adaptive interpretations as conditions change. Courts, *Chevron* reasoned, lack both the expertise and the democratic accountability to fill in statutory gaps — that authority belongs to agencies.

Over forty years, *Chevron* became the most cited administrative law case in history, cited in thousands of judicial decisions. It underpinned virtually every significant federal regulatory program: EPA air quality rules, OSHA workplace safety standards, SEC securities regulations, FDA drug approval processes, IRS tax code interpretations, NLRB labor regulations, and much more. Agencies operating under ambiguous or broadly worded statutes ("reasonable," "practicable," "appropriate") could take expansive regulatory positions, confident that courts would defer if the interpretation was not unreasonable.

### The Challenge to *Chevron*

*Chevron* had been under sustained criticism for years — from the right (it concentrates power in unelected agencies) and the left (it is unpredictable, as deference depends on which administration interprets the statute) and from the academy (it is inconsistent with the APA's text).

The cases that became *Loper Bright* and its companion *Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce* involved the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) interpreted the statute to require fishing vessels — specifically, small family-run herring fishing businesses in New England — to pay the salaries of federal observers required to be aboard their vessels (approximately $710 per day). The statute required observer programs but did not explicitly address cost allocation. The fishers argued the statute did not authorize NMFS to pass costs to vessel owners.

The D.C. Circuit and First Circuit had upheld the cost-allocation rule under *Chevron* step two — NMFS's interpretation was reasonable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and used them to reconsider *Chevron* itself.

### Roberts's Majority: *Marbury* Over *Chevron*

Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion (joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) squarely overruled *Chevron*:

**The APA's text**: Section 706 of the APA — enacted in 1946 and designed to standardize judicial review of agency action — directs that reviewing courts "shall decide all relevant questions of law." This is not a directive to defer to agencies; it is a directive to courts to do what courts do: interpret statutes. The *Chevron* framework of deferring to agency interpretations when statutes are ambiguous is inconsistent with this command. Courts do not get to defer to agencies on questions of law any more than courts can defer to litigants on questions of law.

**The *Marbury* principle**: *Marbury v. Madison* established that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Statutory interpretation is the province of courts, not agencies. The claim that Congress "implicitly delegated" interpretive authority to agencies when it legislated ambiguously is a fiction — statutory ambiguity may reflect congressional inadvertence, lack of foresight, or deliberate compromise, but it is not an implicit grant of agency lawmaking power.

**Expertise and accountability**: The *Chevron* justification — that agencies are more expert and more accountable than courts — does not justify judicial abdication. Courts regularly interpret technical statutes in areas they lack subject-matter expertise; the solution is careful reasoning and appropriate weight given to agency arguments, not blanket deference. And agencies are not more democratically accountable than Congress; Congress is where democratic accountability for statutory meaning should rest.

**Prior decisions**: Roberts explicitly stated that the Court was not casting doubt on prior *Chevron*-era decisions on specific statutory questions. Those decisions used *Chevron* as a methodology to reach a specific holding about a specific statute; the holding about that statute remains valid. "The statutory questions before us may be settled under those decisions, which are entitled to statutory stare decisis."

### What Replaces *Chevron*: De Novo Review and *Skidmore*

After *Loper Bright*, courts reviewing agency statutory interpretations apply:

**De novo review**: Courts determine the best meaning of the statute independently, without deference to the agency's view. Courts use all traditional tools of statutory interpretation — text, structure, history, purpose, canons of construction. The agency's interpretation is one input, not a controlling factor.

**Skidmore deference**: Agency interpretations may still be persuasive. *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.* (1944) — the pre-*Chevron* standard — held that agency interpretations are entitled to "respect" proportional to "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." *Skidmore*'s sliding-scale approach — more deference for more careful, consistent, and expert agency reasoning — survives and is revived.

**The major questions doctrine**: *West Virginia v. EPA* (2022) separately requires that agencies point to "clear congressional authorization" for rules of major economic and political significance. *Loper Bright* and the major questions doctrine operate at different analytical levels: *Loper Bright* governs ordinary statutory interpretation (courts determine the best reading de novo); the major questions doctrine governs extraordinary regulatory assertions (agencies need explicit authorization, not just a plausible reading, for major rules).

### The Practical Impact

*Loper Bright*'s practical consequences are substantial:

**Existing rules**: Regulations adopted by agencies under *Chevron*-era interpretations that were previously upheld by courts remain valid — those prior decisions are precedents on the specific statutory questions. But regulations that have not yet been litigated, or that face new challenges, are now more vulnerable: courts will independently assess whether the statutory basis for the rule supports it, not merely whether the agency's reading was "reasonable."

**Agency rulemaking**: Agencies must now draft rules that can survive de novo judicial scrutiny of the statutory interpretation underlying the rule. Aggressive interpretations of broad, general statutory language — previously defensible if "reasonable" — are more exposed to invalidation when a court independently assesses the best reading. Agencies will need to build more careful textual arguments, document statutory authority more rigorously, and rely more heavily on legislative history and clear statutory text.

**Congressional delegation**: *Loper Bright* creates pressure on Congress to legislate with greater specificity when it wants agencies to have interpretive flexibility. Broadly worded statutory mandates ("protect public health," "adopt reasonable rules") no longer carry the same deference cushion. Congress that wants agencies to have discretion must say so explicitly.

**Regulatory state stability**: *Loper Bright* will produce a period of litigation as parties challenge *Chevron*-era regulations under the new de novo standard. The scope of that litigation depends on whether courts apply the same reasoning de novo that the agency used under *Chevron* — in which case little changes — or apply stricter textual analysis that yields different results.

## How It Affects You

**If you are a regulated business or industry**: *Loper Bright* is the most significant regulatory law development in a generation. Regulations adopted under expansive agency interpretations of broad statutory authority — particularly in environmental, financial, healthcare, and labor law — are now more legally vulnerable. You can challenge agency rules you previously had to accept because courts would defer to "reasonable" agency interpretations. Work with counsel to identify regulations where the agency's statutory interpretation was not the best reading of the text — those are candidates for challenge under *Loper Bright*. At the same time, note that regulations previously upheld in court under *Chevron* have stare decisis protection on the specific statutory question; direct challenge requires a new legal theory or changed circumstances, not just a showing that *Chevron* no longer applies.

**If you are a federal agency official or regulatory attorney**: *Loper Bright* transforms how you defend agency action in court. You can no longer rely on *Chevron* deference as a backstop for reasonable-but-contestable statutory interpretations. Every regulatory action must be supportable on de novo review: identify the best reading of the statutory text, document the textual and contextual arguments for the agency's position, and ensure the rule is defensible as the correct — not merely permissible — interpretation. For major rules, the additional burden of the major questions doctrine requires explicit statutory authorization. Build the legislative record; cite specific statutory text; avoid relying on "gaps" or "ambiguities" as the sole justification for authority. Consider pre-enforcement coordination with DOJ on the strength of statutory authority before promulgating significant rules.

**If you are a congressional staffer or legislative drafter**: *Loper Bright* is a powerful signal to draft more specific statutory delegations. Agency authority is now as broad as the statute's text supports when read by a court independently, not as broad as an agency can reasonably argue. If Congress wants EPA to have authority to regulate a new category of pollutants, it should say so explicitly rather than relying on broad language that an agency can reasonably interpret to cover the new category. Specific delegation is more durable; ambiguous delegation creates litigation risk on both sides. Include clearer standards, explicit grants of interpretive authority where desired, and specific examples of authorized action when you want regulatory flexibility.

**If you are a law student, legal scholar, or appellate litigant**: *Loper Bright* represents a fundamental shift in administrative law — one whose full implications will take years to work out. Key questions now in play: How will courts define the "best reading" of ambiguous statutes? Will *Skidmore* deference effectively replicate much of *Chevron* for well-reasoned agency positions? Which *Chevron*-era holdings are most vulnerable to challenge under de novo review? How does *Loper Bright* interact with the major questions doctrine, the non-delegation doctrine, and other administrative law doctrines? What is the scope of "statutory stare decisis" for prior *Chevron*-era holdings? These questions will define administrative law for the next decade and provide rich opportunities for both scholarship and litigation.

## State Variations

*Loper Bright* governs judicial review of federal agency action under the federal APA. State administrative law is governed by state APAs and state court decisions; most states have their own versions of *Chevron* deference doctrine:

**State Chevron equivalents**: Most states have adopted some form of deference to state agency statutory interpretations, often modeled on *Chevron*. Some state supreme courts (Michigan, Wisconsin, others) had previously overruled their own *Chevron*-equivalent doctrines before the federal *Loper Bright* decision. Others continue to apply some form of agency deference doctrine. *Loper Bright* does not directly affect these state doctrines, but it may accelerate their reconsideration.

**State regulatory review**: State courts assessing state agency rules under state statutes apply state deference doctrine — which varies significantly by state. A federal *Loper Bright* analysis of a federal regulation is separate from state-law analysis of an analogous state regulation. In areas of concurrent state-federal regulation (environmental, labor, securities), a federal agency's interpretation may be overturned under *Loper Bright* while a state agency's analogous interpretation survives under state deference doctrine, or vice versa.

**State non-delegation doctrine**: Several states have also reinvigorated their non-delegation doctrines — imposing limits on legislative delegation to state agencies similar to what the federal nondelegation doctrine might impose on Congress. *Loper Bright* is part of a broader reorientation of the courts' relationship to administrative agencies that has state-law parallels.

## Pending Legislation

- **REINS Act**: The Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny Act would require congressional approval of any major federal rule before it takes effect. *Loper Bright* increases the pressure for such legislation by demonstrating judicial skepticism about broad agency interpretive authority; the REINS Act would go further by giving Congress explicit veto power over major regulations. Has passed the House; not enacted as of 2026.
- **Regulatory review reform**: Various proposals to reform the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, require cost-benefit analysis for major rules, or impose additional judicial review requirements have been introduced. *Loper Bright* raises the stakes for this legislation by making final rules more vulnerable to judicial challenge on statutory grounds.
- **Post-*Loper Bright* statutory cleanup**: Some agencies and their congressional counterparts have begun reviewing existing statutory delegations to determine whether specific statutory text adequately supports current regulatory programs. This "cleanup" legislation — clarifying or expanding specific statutory grants of authority — represents a legislative response to *Loper Bright*'s demand for textual support.

**H.R. 67, Modernizing Retrospective Regulatory Review Act of 2025**: This bill would require federal agencies to conduct structured retrospective reviews of existing regulations. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform ordered the bill reported on May 21, 2025. The Congressional Budget Office issued a cost estimate for the bill, published January 26, 2026, assessing its fiscal impact. The legislation represents a direct congressional response to *Loper Bright*'s pressure on agencies to justify existing statutory interpretations, by institutionalizing periodic review of whether current rules remain within statutory authority as courts now construe it. [(CBO, Jan. 26, 2026)](https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62043)

## Recent Developments

- **2022** — *West Virginia v. EPA*: Major questions doctrine announced; EPA's Clean Power Plan generation-shifting struck down for lack of clear statutory authorization. This decision foreshadowed *Loper Bright* and reduced *Chevron*'s practical scope for major rules even before the formal overruling.
- **2024** — *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo* and *Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce*: *Chevron* overruled in companion cases decided on June 28, 2024. The fishing vessel cost-allocation rule was remanded for reconsideration under the new standard. The decision produced a 6-3 split along partisan lines (Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett in the majority; Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson dissenting).
- **2024** — *Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors*: Decided the same term as *Loper Bright*, *Corner Post* held that the APA's six-year statute of limitations for challenging agency rules runs from when a plaintiff is first injured by the rule — not from when the rule was promulgated. Combined with *Loper Bright*, this opens *Chevron*-era rules to challenge by new market entrants on a rolling basis, substantially expanding the window for regulatory challenge.
- **2024-2026** — Lower court *Loper Bright* litigation: Hundreds of regulatory challenges have been filed in federal courts relying on *Loper Bright* to challenge existing agency rules under de novo statutory review. Cases challenging EPA climate rules, SEC disclosure requirements, NLRB labor regulations, FDA drug approval conditions, and immigration enforcement policies all invoke *Loper Bright*. Courts are working through how to apply de novo review to the massive body of existing *Chevron*-era regulation.
- **2025** — Trump administration regulatory agenda: The second Trump administration used *Loper Bright* as justification for withdrawing or modifying agency interpretations from the Biden era. Where Biden agencies had relied on broad statutory interpretations to expand regulatory scope, Trump agencies invoked *Loper Bright* to argue those expansive readings were no longer valid.

## Sources
- [Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo — Overruling Chevron Deference on PolicyRisk](https://policyrisk.com/wiki/loper-bright-enterprises)

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Source: PRIA, https://policyrisk.com/wiki/loper-bright-enterprises (as of 2026-11-01).