AI OVERWATCH Act
Sponsored By: Representative Mast
Introduced
Summary
This bill would impose tight new export controls on high‑performance integrated circuits to block their transfer to certain "countries of concern." It also creates a narrow exemption for verified U.S. entities and builds in stepped-up technical updates and Congressional review.
Show full summary
- U.S. chip makers and exporters would face a new license requirement for defined "covered integrated circuits" sent to entities in listed countries of concern, with no general license allowed and prior licenses to those countries terminated.
- Firms that qualify as a "Trusted United States Person" could be exempted if they meet security, ownership, sourcing, and audit rules, including a limit that no more than 10 percent of ultimate beneficial ownership may be held by any entity primarily domiciled in a country of concern and a 90‑day window for BIS to seek public input on standards.
- Licenses would need a 30‑day certification to relevant congressional committees before approval and could be blocked by an expedited joint resolution; the bill also requires a national security strategy and a DNI FY2026 assessment of China’s CIC capabilities.
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Bill Overview
Analyzed Economic Effects
3 provisions identified: 1 benefits, 1 costs, 1 mixed.
New licenses to send high-end chips abroad
This bill would require a license to export, reexport, or transfer covered high‑end chips to entities in, or ultimately owned from, certain countries. The listed countries would include China (with Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela under Maduro. No general license could be used; any old licenses for these transfers would end on enactment. Agencies would need to send Congress the license file at least 30 days before approval, including ECCNs, technical specs, end users, conditions, and security certifications; Congress could block the deal in that window. All such licenses would be denied until 14 days after a required national security strategy is sent to Congress. Covered chips would include items under ECCN 3A090 or 4A090 (and similar/related items, including certain 5A002.z products) or chips that meet set thresholds: total processing performance of 4,800+; or 2,400+ with performance density 1.6+; or 1,600+ with performance density 3.2+; or DRAM bandwidth 1,400 GB/s+, or interconnect 1,100 GB/s+, or both totaling 1,700 GB/s+. Products that contain such chips would also be covered, unless not designed or marketed for data centers. Calculations would follow Commerce Control List 3A090 as of December 15, 2025, and parameters could change 18 months after the strategy if a policy committee approves by majority vote.
National security plan on advanced chips
The bill would require the Secretary of Commerce to send Congress a national security strategy on access by countries of concern to covered chips, tools, and parts. It would assess how exports change those countries’ military, intelligence, surveillance, and cyber capabilities. The Director of National Intelligence would also deliver a fiscal year 2026 assessment of China’s chip production. That report would say whether access to U.S.‑designed chips would change China’s indigenous output, compare output and capability to the U.S. and allies, and include a quantitative look at AI capability under indigenous‑only production.
Trusted exporter program for advanced chips
If enacted, Commerce would create a "Trusted United States Person" designation within 90 days. Firms could apply, but at most 10% of ultimate beneficial ownership could be tied to a country of concern. A trusted firm could not install a majority of its total covered‑chip processing power outside the U.S. It would need strong physical and cyber security, remote‑access controls, secure repair and disposal, and yearly audits. Some license rules (EAR 742.6, 744.23) would not apply when covered chips go to non‑concern countries and remain owned and controlled by the trusted firm or its subsidiaries once in operation. Commerce would also consider secure ways to extend this relief to close allies.
Sponsors & CoSponsors
Sponsor
Mast
FL • R
Cosponsors
Huizenga
MI • R
Sponsored 12/18/2025
Moolenaar
MI • R
Sponsored 12/18/2025
Kim
CA • R
Sponsored 12/18/2025
Self
TX • R
Sponsored 12/18/2025
Crawford
AR • R
Sponsored 12/18/2025
LaHood
IL • R
Sponsored 12/18/2025
McCaul
TX • R
Sponsored 1/7/2026
Davidson
OH • R
Sponsored 1/8/2026
Kean
NJ • R
Sponsored 1/8/2026
Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large]
GU • R
Sponsored 1/16/2026
Baird
IN • R
Sponsored 1/16/2026
Fine
FL • R
Sponsored 1/16/2026
Moran
TX • R
Sponsored 1/20/2026
Lawler
NY • R
Sponsored 1/20/2026
Miller (OH)
OH • R
Sponsored 1/20/2026
Meeks
NY • D
Sponsored 1/21/2026
Newhouse
WA • R
Sponsored 1/22/2026
Kamlager-Dove
CA • D
Sponsored 1/22/2026
Sherman
CA • D
Sponsored 1/22/2026
Salazar
FL • R
Sponsored 2/2/2026
Del. Radewagen, Aumua Amata Coleman [R-AS-At Large]
AS • R
Sponsored 2/2/2026
Biggs (SC)
SC • R
Sponsored 2/2/2026
Nunn (IA)
IA • R
Sponsored 2/3/2026
Taylor
OH • R
Sponsored 3/4/2026
Fitzpatrick
PA • R
Sponsored 3/16/2026
Haridopolos
FL • R
Sponsored 3/18/2026
Harrigan
NC • R
Sponsored 3/18/2026
Roll Call Votes
No roll call votes available for this bill.
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