Title 22 — Foreign Relations and IntercourseRelease 119-73

§3361 Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan

Title 22 › Chapter CHAPTER 48A— - TAIWAN ENHANCED RESILIENCE › Subchapter SUBCHAPTER II— - COUNTERING PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS › § 3361

Last updated Apr 6, 2026|Official source

Summary

The Secretary of State, working with the Director of National Intelligence, must create and carry out a plan within 180 days after December 23, 2022, and then update it once a year for the next five years. The plan must fight two things: secret, coercive, or corrupt actions tied to the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front efforts about Taiwan (including actions by the United Front Work Department and related groups); and PRC/CCP-backed disinformation, cyberattacks, and other propaganda aimed at people or organizations in Taiwan. The plan must describe how it will help Taiwan spot and expose propaganda, help build a full response to sharp-power tactics like election interference, provide media training for targeted officials and groups, assess how much influence the PRC/CCP has over Taiwan’s parties, banks, media, and other institutions, support exchanges and legal assistance to strengthen Taiwan’s legal system, and run Global Engagement Center programs to reveal CCP misinformation.

Full Legal Text

Title 22, §3361

Foreign Relations and Intercourse — Source: USLM XML via OLRC

(a)Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—

(1)covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and

(2)information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b)The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1)the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A)assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

(B)assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C)media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2)the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3)support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; and

(4)programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.

Reference

Citations & Metadata

Citation

22 U.S.C. § 3361

Title 22 — Foreign Relations and Intercourse

Last Updated

Apr 6, 2026

Release point: 119-73