§3334e–1 Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA

Summary

The Director of National Intelligence must, within 90 days after December 18, 2025, make a policy—after talking with other intelligence leaders as needed—that stops parts of the intelligence community from buying products made with synthetic DNA or RNA unless the products meet strict U.S. sourcing and processing rules. The policy must bar buying such products unless the final assembly and all major processing happen in the United States and almost all parts or ingredients come from the United States or an allied country. It also must block contracts with Chinese biotechnology suppliers or Chinese-controlled U.S. suppliers that the Director finds are security or supply-chain risks. The Director may set up a waiver process that lets agency heads get an exception only if they follow any conditions the Director requires. Definitions (one line each): biotechnology — use of living systems or biology for making things, research, or medicine; Chinese biotechnology supplier — a biotech supplier under the laws or control of the People’s Republic of China; Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary — a U.S. biotech supplier mostly owned or controlled by the People’s Republic of China; synthetic DNA or RNA — nucleic acid sequences made new by chemical or enzymatic synthesis.