Least Cost Exception Act
Sponsored By: Representative Flood, Mike [R-NE-1]
In Committee
Summary
Lets the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pick a non‑least‑cost resolution to limit further concentration in global systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs). It creates a formal exception to the least‑cost rule and sets rules for when the FDIC may accept higher short‑term costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund in order to avoid or limit GSIB transactions, plus standards for payments, caps, and reporting.
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- The FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve must conclude, after consulting the Secretary of the Treasury, that the expected benefit of limiting GSIB concentration outweighs added risks to the Deposit Insurance Fund. The FDIC must issue a rule within 1 year setting the maximum allowable cost to the DIF for such decisions.
- If a resolution involves another person buying assets or assuming deposits, that buyer must pay an assessment over at least 5 years equal to the difference between the chosen alternative and the covered GSIB alternative, with a rule to account for discounting and bad bids.
- The bill requires a report to Congress within 30 days after choosing an alternative that analyzes the economic difference versus the least‑cost GSIB sale. It also defines "covered alternative" and who counts as a GSIB for these rules.
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Bill Overview
Analyzed Economic Effects
1 provisions identified: 0 benefits, 0 costs, 1 mixed.
FDIC could limit big-bank takeovers
This bill would let the FDIC pick a resolution option that is not the least costly in some failed-bank cases. The FDIC would only do this if it and the Federal Reserve Board, after consulting the Treasury, determine the benefits of limiting further concentration in large global banks outweigh the extra risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund. The chosen option would have to be the least costly among alternatives that avoid a sale to a global systemically important banking organization and that do not cost more than liquidation. Not later than 1 year after enactment, the FDIC would adopt a rule setting the maximum extra DIF cost it can accept. If a buyer purchases assets or assumes deposits, that buyer would pay an assessment over at least 5 years equal to the allowable cost difference. The FDIC would have to report to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee within 30 days after selecting a non-least-cost option. The bill would also define covered alternatives and global systemically important banking organizations by referencing 12 CFR 217.402, and it would say section 13(c)(4)(H) does not apply to these amendments.
Sponsors & CoSponsors
Sponsor
Flood, Mike [R-NE-1]
NE • R
Cosponsors
Rep. Foster, Bill [D-IL-11]
IL • D
Sponsored 12/16/2025
Rose
TN • R
Sponsored 12/16/2025
Rep. Moskowitz, Jared [D-FL-23]
FL • D
Sponsored 12/18/2025
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
NY • R
Sponsored 1/12/2026
Roll Call Votes
No roll call votes available for this bill.
View on Congress.gov