(1) Notwithstanding the fact that no review of a conviction of crime was sought by appeal within the time prescribed therefor, or that a judgment of conviction was affirmed upon appeal, every person convicted of a crime is entitled as a matter of right to make applications for postconviction review. Except as otherwise required by subsection (1.5) of this section, an application for postconviction review must, in good faith, allege one or more of the following grounds to justify a hearing thereon:
(a) That the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
(b) That the applicant was convicted under a statute that is in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution of this state, or that the conduct for which the applicant was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) That the court rendering judgment was without jurisdiction over the person of the applicant or the subject matter;
(d) That the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law;
(e) That there exists evidence of material facts, not theretofore presented and heard, which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to or learned of by the defendant or his attorney prior to the submission of the issues to the court or jury, and which requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(f) (I) That there has been significant change in the law, applied to the applicant's conviction or sentence, allowing in the interests of justice retroactive application of the changed legal standard.
(II) The ground set forth in this paragraph (f) may not be asserted if, prior to filing for relief pursuant to this paragraph (f), a person has not sought appeal of a conviction within the time prescribed therefor or if a judgment of conviction has been affirmed upon appeal.
(g) Any grounds otherwise properly the basis for collateral attack upon a criminal judgment; or
(h) That the sentence imposed has been fully served or that there has been unlawful revocation of parole, probation, or conditional release.
(1.5) An application for postconviction review in a class 1 felony case where a sentence of death has been imposed shall be limited to claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel; except that, for any sentence of death imposed on or after the date upon which the Colorado supreme court adopts rules implementing the unitary system of review established by part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S., any application for postconviction review in such case shall be governed by the provisions of part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S.
(2) (a) Except as otherwise required by paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), procedures to be followed in implementation of the right to postconviction remedy shall be as prescribed by rule of the supreme court of the state of Colorado.
(b) In any class 1 felony case where a sentence of death has been imposed, the district court shall expeditiously consider an application for postconviction remedy. It is the general assembly's intent that the district court give priority to cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed.
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), an appeal of any order by the district court granting or denying postconviction relief in a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed shall be to the Colorado supreme court as provided by section 13-4-102 (1)(h), C.R.S. The procedures to be followed in the implementation of such review shall be in accordance with any rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court in response to the legislative intent expressed in section 16-12-101.5 (1), C.R.S.
(b) In any class 1 felony case in which a sentence of death is imposed on or after the date upon which the Colorado supreme court adopts rules implementing the unitary system of review established under part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S., the procedures for appealing any order by the district court granting or denying postconviction relief and review by the Colorado supreme court of such order shall be governed by the provisions of part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S., and by such rules adopted by the supreme court.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 402, � 1. C.R.S. 1963: � 40-1-510. L. 73: p. 533, � 2. L. 75: (1)(f) amended, p. 211, � 28, effective July 16. L. 94: IP(1) and (2) amended and (1.5) and (3) added, p. 1474, � 2, effective July 1. L. 97: (1.5) and (3) amended, p. 1583, � 5, effective June 4.
Cross references: For limitations on collateral attacks, see � 16-5-402; for similar provisions concerning postconviction remedies, see Crim. P. 35.
18-1-410.5. Relief from improperly entered guilty pleas - legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly finds that:
(a) A criminal defendant cannot challenge an unconstitutional guilty plea when that plea has been withdrawn and the underlying charges dismissed following the successful completion of a deferred judgment or the dismissal of charges pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3) prior to its repeal in 2010;
(b) Based on the statutory language of sections 18-1.3-102 and 18-18-404 (3), together with the written deferred judgment agreement and court colloquy that accompanies such agreements, many noncitizen defendants did not understand that the guilty plea would continue to constitute a conviction for immigration purposes and result in adverse immigration consequences, despite the subsequent withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the charges upon successful completion of the deferred judgment or dismissal pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3); and
(c) In the absence of an appropriate mechanism, many noncitizen defendants have been unfairly deprived of the opportunity to challenge guilty pleas that were entered in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state that resulted in adverse immigration consequences.
(2) Notwithstanding the time limitation contained in section 16-5-402, at any time following the withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the charges upon successful completion of a deferred judgment, or upon the dismissal of charges pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3) prior to its repeal, a criminal defendant may challenge the guilty plea on the grounds set forth in subsection (3) of this section. The court in which the guilty plea was originally entered has jurisdiction and authority to decide the motion.
(3) A defendant moving to vacate a guilty plea that has already been withdrawn following the successful completion of a deferred judgment or upon the dismissal of charges pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3) prior to its repeal must, in good faith, allege the following:
(a) As a result of the guilty plea, the defendant has suffered, is currently suffering, or will suffer, an adverse immigration consequence; and
(b) The guilty plea was obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state under one or more of the following grounds:
(I) The defendant was not informed that the guilty plea would continue to result in adverse immigration consequences despite the subsequent withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the charges with prejudice;
(II) The defendant was not adequately advised of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea; or
(III) The guilty plea was constitutionally infirm for any other reason set forth in section 18-1-410 (1).
(4) (a) Upon receipt of the motion, the court shall direct the prosecution to respond within twenty-one days or request additional time for good cause shown. If a response is not filed, the motion is deemed unopposed and the court shall grant the motion. If the prosecution opposes the motion, it shall allege, in good faith, the facts upon which it bases its opposition. If the response raises an issue of material fact, the court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
(b) Unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will not suffer an immigration consequence or that the guilty plea was constitutionally entered, the court shall grant the motion.
(c) For claims raised pursuant to subsection (3)(b)(I) of this section, the prosecution can neither raise an issue of material fact to obtain an evidentiary hearing nor defeat a claim at the hearing by relying on written documents, such as a deferred judgment agreement, plea paperwork, or transcript of a court colloquy, unless those documents clearly show that the defendant was informed that the immigration consequences resulting from a guilty plea would remain despite the subsequent withdrawal of that guilty plea and the dismissal of the charges with prejudice.
(5) If the defendant succeeds in challenging a guilty plea under subsection (3) of this section, the court shall vacate the guilty plea as constitutionally infirm. The order constitutes an additional independent basis for the vacatur of the guilty plea and does not result in the reinstatement of charges.
Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (SB 19-030), ch. 301, p. 2770, � 1, effective May 28.
18-1-410.6. Relief from improperly entered guilty pleas for certain misdemeanor and municipal offenses - legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly finds that:
(a) Since the Colorado supreme court decision in People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987), noncitizen defendants in Colorado have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel that requires defense counsel who knows the client is a noncitizen to inform itself of relevant immigration law. The United States supreme court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) further held that defense counsel must inform a client of the immigration consequences of a plea.
(b) Many noncitizen defendants received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding immigration consequences of a guilty plea;
(c) Many pro se noncitizen defendants received inadequate advisements that did not explain that the right to counsel includes the right to be advised of immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Consequently, many pro se noncitizen defendants did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their right to counsel when entering a guilty plea.
(d) Many noncitizen defendants have been unfairly deprived of the opportunity to challenge an unconstitutional guilty plea due to a time limitation contained in section 16-5-402, a municipal ordinance, or a municipal court rule of procedure, despite valid claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or an invalid waiver of the right to counsel; and
(e) Protecting the constitutional rights of all Coloradans and ensuring that all defendants are treated consistently in their opportunity to affirm their constitutional rights is a matter of statewide concern.
(2) Therefore, the general assembly declares that noncitizen defendants must have the opportunity to meaningfully challenge an unconstitutionally entered guilty plea for certain class 1 misdemeanors, class 2 misdemeanors, class 3 misdemeanors, traffic misdemeanors, petty offenses, and municipal offenses.
(3) (a) Notwithstanding a limitation contained in section 16-5-402, a municipal ordinance, or a municipal court rule of procedure, at any time following the entry of a guilty plea, a criminal defendant may challenge the guilty plea on the grounds set forth in subsection (4) of this section to a:
(I) Class 1, class 2, or class 3 misdemeanor as classified at the time the guilty plea was entered that is not defined in section 24-4.1-302 (1);
(II) Municipal offense that is not substantially similar to an offense defined in section 24-4.1-302 (1);
(III) Traffic misdemeanor; or
(IV) Petty offense.
(b) The court in which the guilty plea was originally entered has jurisdiction and authority to decide the motion.
(4) A defendant moving to vacate a guilty plea to a class 1, class 2, or class 3 misdemeanor as classified at the time the guilty plea was entered; a traffic misdemeanor; a petty offense; or a municipal offense, must, in good faith, allege the following:
(a) As a result of the guilty plea, the defendant has suffered, is currently suffering, or will suffer an adverse immigration consequence; and
(b) The guilty plea was obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state on one or more of the following grounds:
(I) The defendant was not adequately advised of the adverse immigration consequences of the guilty plea by defense counsel;
(II) The defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel because the defendant was not advised that the right to counsel includes the right to be advised regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea; or
(III) The guilty plea was constitutionally infirm for any other reason set forth in section 18-1-410 (1)(a) to (1)(d).
(5) (a) Upon receipt of the defendant's motion, the prosecution shall respond within sixty-three days or request additional time for good cause shown. If a response is not filed, the defendant's motion is deemed unopposed, and the court shall grant the defendant's motion. If the prosecution opposes the defendant's motion, it shall allege, in good faith, the facts upon which it bases its opposition. If the response raises an issue of material fact, the court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing within twenty-one days.
(b) Unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will not suffer an adverse immigration consequence or that the guilty plea was constitutionally entered, the court shall grant the defendant's motion.
(c) For claims raised pursuant to subsection (4)(b)(II) of this section, the prosecution shall not rely solely on written documents, such as a deferred judgment agreement, plea paperwork, or transcript of a court colloquy, to raise an issue of material fact to obtain an evidentiary hearing or defeat a claim at the hearing unless the documents clearly show that the defendant was informed by the court that the right to counsel included the right to be advised regarding the immigration consequences resulting from a guilty plea and that the defendant then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right.
(6) If the defendant succeeds in challenging a guilty plea pursuant to this section, the court shall vacate the guilty plea as constitutionally infirm and set the case for an arraignment.
Source: L. 2022: Entire section added, (SB 22-103), ch. 105, p. 487, � 1, effective April 18. L. 2025: (2), (3)(a), and IP(4) amended, (SB 25-276), ch. 240, p. 1211, � 5, effective May 23.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 25-276, see section 1 of chapter 240, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.
18-1-410.7. Vacating certain criminal convictions for victims of human trafficking. (1) (a) An individual may file a motion with the court where a conviction was obtained against the individual requesting that the conviction be vacated if the underlying offense resulting in the conviction was committed as a result of the individual being a victim of human trafficking. The individual shall serve a copy of the motion on the district attorney's office or municipal attorney's office that obtained the conviction.
(b) This section applies to all state and municipal convictions for crimes except for crimes defined in section 24-4.1-302 (1).
(c) This section does not apply to a conviction if the individual raised an affirmative defense described in section 18-7-201.3 or 18-3-504 (2.5) at trial and was still convicted after raising the defense.
(d) Official documentation is not required for an individual to seek or be granted relief pursuant to this section, but if the individual provides official documentation from a federal, state, local, or tribal government agency indicating that the individual was a victim of human trafficking at the time of the offense, the documentation creates a rebuttable presumption that the individual was a victim of human trafficking at the time of the offense and is eligible for relief pursuant to this section.
(2) The district attorney's office or municipal attorney's office that obtained the conviction must file a response within thirty-five days from receiving a copy of the motion. If the district attorney's office or municipal attorney's office opposes the motion or the court determines a hearing is necessary, the court shall set the motion for hearing.
(3) (a) If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the offense was committed as a result of the individual being a victim of human trafficking at the time of the offense, the court shall vacate the conviction.
(b) A conviction vacated pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section is deemed vacated due to a substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents the individual from applying for any other relief allowed by law.
(5) (a) If the court issues an order vacating the conviction, the court shall send the order to the Colorado bureau of investigation and the bureau shall remove the conviction from the individual's record.
(b) If the court issues an order vacating the conviction pursuant to this section, the individual may petition to have the other related records sealed pursuant to the procedure in section 24-72-707.
Source: L. 2024: Entire section added, (HB 24-1345), ch. 317, p. 2125, � 10, effective May 31.