(1) No inmate who on three or more occasions has brought a civil action based upon prison conditions that has been dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, groundless, or malicious or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, shall be permitted to proceed as a poor person in a civil action based upon prison conditions under any statute or constitutional provision.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, an inmate may proceed as a poor person in a civil action if the judge finds that the action alleges sufficient facts which, if assumed to be true, would demonstrate that the inmate is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
(3) (a) A copy of any court order that dismisses an inmate's civil action on the grounds that it is frivolous, groundless, or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief shall be mailed by the court clerk to the Colorado attorney general, whether or not the attorney general entered an appearance in the civil action, and whether or not the civil action involved a state correctional facility or state defendant. The attorney general shall monitor the dismissals described in this paragraph (a).
(b) The attorney general shall inform the state judicial department or the chief judge of each judicial district whenever the attorney general becomes aware that an inmate has been assessed three or more dismissals as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3). Each judicial district shall maintain a registry of such information. An inmate listed in the registry who brings a civil action shall be subject to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section.
Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 247, § 2, effective April 13. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 289, § 2, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
This section does not violate an inmate's right to access the courts as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
Proceeding in forma pauperis in a civil case is a privilege, not a right, fundamental or otherwise. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
The three-strike rule does not prohibit an inmate from filing suit; it merely prohibits an inmate from doing so without paying the filing fee that all civil plaintiffs must pay. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
The right of access to the courts does not guarantee anyone a right of access in all circumstances. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
Congress is no more compelled to guarantee free access to federal courts than it is to provide unlimited access to them; thus, imposition of a modest filing fee on prisoners is reasonable. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
A district court reviewing a motion and complaint under this section and § 13-17.5-103 must determine whether the imminent danger exception applies. The court should review the initial filings for assertions that, if taken as true, would demonstrate the inmate is in imminent danger of serious physical injury and would thus trigger the exception in subsection (2). Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, 546 P.3d 1199.
The plain language of this section demonstrates that the district court is not required to make specific factual findings regarding the imminent danger exception in every case. However, if the district court determines that the exception applies, then it should make whatever findings are appropriate under the facts of the case. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, 546 P.3d 1199.
To successfully allege subsection (2)'s imminent danger exception, (1) the allegation of serious physical injury must be specific; (2) the specifically alleged danger must be imminent; and (3) there must be allegations showing a nexus between the claims for relief and the allegation of imminent serious physical injury. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, 546 P.3d 1199.
Dismissal of a complaint for at least one reason expressly identified by this section qualifies as a dismissal under this section. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
The avenue for challenging dismissals under this section is direct appeal, not collateral attack. Allowing collateral attacks would greatly expand the litigation, in direct contravention of the general assembly's stated goal to reduce prisoner litigation. Farmer v. Raemisch, 2014 COA 3, 320 P.3d 394.
A lawsuit brought and subject to the "three strikes" provision of this section does not have to be based solely on prison conditions. It is enough that the civil action is based in part on prison conditions for the three strikes provision to apply. Rueb v. Rich-Fredericks, 2020 COA 168, 486 P.3d 435.