Proof of handwriting

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-104, under Evidence - General Provisions.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-104

Comparison of a disputed writing, with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses in all trials and proceedings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.

Source: L. 1893: p. 264, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2492. C.L. § 6538. CSA: C. 63, § 4. CRS 53: § 52-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 52-1-4.

ANNOTATION

An expert in handwriting may depose as to the authenticity of the handwriting in question, though he acquires his knowledge of the writing of the person to whom it is ascribed merely by examination of specimens proven or admitted to be his genuine handwriting, such specimens being produced in court and the witness comparing them and stating his conclusions as to their similarity or dissimilarity. Salazar v. Taylor, 18 Colo. 538 (1893); Ausmus v. People, 47 Colo. 167, 107 P. 204 (1910).

It is not necessary that an expert testify as to the authenticity of the writing. If there is a genuine writing which may be used to compare the handwriting of the disputed handwritings, then such disputed writings are admissible into evidence. Lewis v. People, 174 Colo. 334, 483 P.2d 949 (1971).

Anyone can identify handwriting by comparison. The rule is that when a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person's may be admitted in evidence for the mere purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute, whether the latter is susceptible of or supported by direct proof or not; but before any such writing shall be admissible for such purpose, its genuineness must be found as a preliminary fact by the presiding judge, upon clear and undoubted evidence. Wilson v. Scroggs, 85 Colo. 537, 277 P. 784 (1929).

Preliminary determination of genuineness of writing. This section requires that before a disputed writing is admissible for comparison purposes, the court shall make a preliminary determination that the writing is genuine. In order for the court to make such a determination, the party offering the evidence must make a prima facie showing of genuineness based on clear and competent evidence. People v. Taylor, 197 Colo. 161, 591 P.2d 1017 (1979).

For proof of extraneous writing as genuine, see Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157, 43 P. 1013 (1896); Brindisi v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924).

Something must connect the authors of the two writings. Before such standards of comparison are admissible, there must be something to connect the author of them with the writing, the authenticity of which is in dispute. Wilson v. Scroggs, 85 Colo. 537, 277 P. 784 (1929).

If shown to be authentic it is admissible as standard of comparison. Where the genuineness of a signature is an issue, the court should allow all evidence which tends to establish the genuineness of a signature offered in evidence as a basis of comparison, and should then determine as a matter of law whether the authenticity of such signature has been established, and if this has been done to his satisfaction, then the proven signature should be admitted as a standard of comparison to be used by witnesses and jurors in determining the issue. Wilson v. Scroggs, 85 Colo. 537, 277 P. 784 (1929).

Disputed signature need not be admitted to be genuine if comparison shows it is. In an action involving a disputed signature, it is not the law that before an alleged genuine signature may be admitted in evidence as a standard of comparison, it must be admitted to be genuine. If the evidence establishes the signature to be genuine to the satisfaction of the court, it is admissible. Wilson v. Scroggs, 85 Colo. 537, 277 P. 784 (1929).

The words "the same" appearing in this section refer to "writing proved" as well as to "disputed writing" and the words "and such writings" may well have been stricken from the original bill as superfluous. Brindisi v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924).

This section is not applicable to a prosecution for forgery in a federal court. Withaup v. United States, 127 F. 530 (8th Cir. 1903).

Applied in People v. Todd, 189 Colo. 117, 538 P.2d 433 (1975).