In an action for libel or slander, it shall not be necessary to state in the complaint any extrinsic facts for the purpose of showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the cause of action arose. It shall be sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff; and, if such allegation is controverted, the plaintiff shall establish on the trial that it was so published or spoken.
Source: L. 1887: p. 114, § 68. Code 08: § 74. Code 21: § 74. Code 35: § 74. CRS 53: § 52-1-25. C.R.S. 1963: § 52-1-25.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "The Law of Libel in Colorado", see 28 Dicta 121 (1951). For article, "Emotional Distress, The First Amendment, and ‘This kind of speech’: A Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell", see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 315 (1989).
Annotator's note. For statements by officers within scope of duties as an absolute privilege, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) and Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
Identity of party who committed libel may be generally pleaded. It has been held under a similar statute that even where the person against whom the libelous charge is made is so ambiguously described that, without the aid of extrinsic facts, his identity cannot be ascertained, it is sufficient to state generally that it was published concerning the plaintiff and that the averments and colloquium which were formerly necessary to connect the libel with the plaintiff may be dispensed with. Craig v. Pueblo Press Publ'g Co., 5 Colo. App. 208, 37 P. 945 (1894).
It is proper for the injured party to plead that the defamatory words were spoken by the master, although in fact they were uttered by his employee. In such a situation the acts of the servant are the acts of the master, where the defamatory words were spoken or published by the authority or with the consent of the latter. Kendall v. Lively, 94 Colo. 483, 31 P.2d 343 (1934).
Evidence of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to a right of action for a libelous charge of attempt to commit murder. Republican Publ'g Co. v. Miner, 12 Colo. 77, 20 P. 345 (1888).
Effect of retraction demand. Whether a demand to the publisher for retraction of an allegedly false statement should be a condition precedent to the commencement of an action for libel is more properly within the legislative ambit than the subject of initial judicial purview. Walker v. Colo. Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982).
Certain foreseeable "self-publication" can impose responsibility for publication on an originator, when the originator of the defamatory statement has reason to believe that the person defamed will be under a strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement to a third party. Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988) (decided prior to enactment of § 13-25-125.5).