(1) No person who has been discharged by order of a court on a habeas corpus shall be again imprisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the same cause, unless he is afterwards indicted for the same offense or unless by the legal order or process of the court wherein he is bound by recognizance to appear.
(2) The following shall not be deemed to be the same cause:
(a) If, after a discharge for a defect of proof or on any material defect in the commitment in a criminal case, the prisoner is again arrested on sufficient proof and committed by legal process for the same offense;
(b) If, in a civil suit, the party has been discharged for any illegality in the judgment or process and is afterwards imprisoned by legal process for the same cause of action;
(c) Generally, when the discharge has been ordered on account of the nonobservance of any of the forms required by law, the party may be a second time imprisoned if the cause is legal and the forms required by law observed.
Source: R.S. p. 355, § 7. G.L. § 1329. G.S. § 1615. R.S. 08: § 2925. C.L. § 6494. CSA: C. 77, § 9. CRS 53: § 65-1-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 65-1-9.
ANNOTATION
When prisoner is discharged by writ of habeas corpus, no court may stay such discharge. Staying a prisoner's discharge by a subsequent order is tantamount to keeping him in custody for the same cause notwithstanding his discharge by a writ of habeas corpus. Such action by a court is forbidden by the law. For it is provided in part by this section that no person who has been discharged by order of a court of judge on a habeas corpus shall be again imprisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the same cause, unless he be afterwards indicted for the same offense, nor unless by the legal order or process of the court wherein he is bound by recognizance to appear. Geer v. Alaniz, 137 Colo. 432, 326 P.2d 71 (1958).
The doctrine of res judicata should not be employed to prevent the correction of errors or cure insufficiencies in extradition proceedings. Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403, 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).
Or when the facts and issues are different. Generally, whether a discharge on habeas corpus of one held for extradition bars a subsequent extradition proceeding depends on whether the court in the second proceeding is required to pass upon the same or different matters from those ruled upon by the court in the first proceeding; if facts and the issues are different from those raised by the first petition, court is not precluded from reaching a different conclusion than it did on the initial petition. Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403, 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).