This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act".
Source: L. 69: p. 292, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-23-8.
ANNOTATION
Prospective challenge. Prospectively, and not retroactively, a prisoner subject to a detainer under the interstate agreement on detainers will have the right to challenge the procedures to determine whether the interstate compact and the uniform act have been complied with. Moen v. Wilson, 189 Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).
Act implements speedy trial right. The uniform act is one of several Colorado statutes implementing a defendant's right to a speedy trial as provided in § 16 of art. II, Colo. Const. People v. Bean, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982); People v. Lewis, 680 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1984).
Rights under the act. All rights under the act are statutorily and not constitutionally based; thus, waiver of them must be voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent. People v. Martin, 707 P.2d 1005 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd, 738 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1987).
The purpose of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA) is to provide a mechanism for the disposition of detainers; without a detainer, the act has no applicability. People v. Bolin, 712 P.2d 1002 (Colo. 1986).
The primary purpose of the UMDDA and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so that a prisoner's speedy trial rights and any prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoners' benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of these untried charges. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986); People v. Naulls, 937 P.2d 778 (Colo. App. 1996).
Policies of IAD and this article are similar. People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 619 P.2d 72 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982).
The IAD and the UMDDA embody like policies, and, generally, the principles of one may be applied to the other. People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1986); Sweaney v. District Court, 713 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1986).
Policy same as § 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48. The policies underlying § 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48 are the same as those relative to the uniform act. People v. Lopez, 41 Colo. App. 206, 587 P.2d 792 (1978); People v. Boos, 199 Colo. 15, 604 P.2d 272 (1979).
In determining whether to dismiss charges for lack of prompt notification, a court must consider more than the general factors underlying the constitutional right to a speedy trial because the UMDDA effectuates other policies besides the speedy trial rights. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).
A defendant is entitled to the dismissal of charges against him that underlie a detainer as a sanction for violation of the prompt notification requirement of § 16-14-102 (2) of the uniform act unless the prosecution can demonstrate a lack of prejudice to the defendant resulting from that violation. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986); People v. Glasser, 293 P.3d 68 (Colo. App. 2011).
In the absence of an express statutory sanction for violation of the prompt notification requirement, automatic dismissal is not required as a remedy for such a violation. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).
Failure to hold trial within prescribed time period requires dismissal of charges. This article by its express terms is jurisdictional, hence dismissal is required regardless of whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay. People v. Naulls, 937 P.2d 778 (Colo. App. 1996).