Limiting clause

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-307, under SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-307

Nothing in this part 3 shall be construed to require the issuance of a search warrant in cases in which such warrant is not required by law. This statute does not modify any statute inconsistent with it, regulating search, seizure, and the issuance and execution of search warrants in circumstances for which special provision is made.

Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 202, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-3-307.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 16-3-307 is similar to repealed § 39-2-6, C.R.S. 1963, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

In order for a warrantless search to be excused under exigent circumstances, probable cause must exist at the moment the arrest or the search is made. People v. Thompson, 185 Colo. 208, 523 P.2d 128 (1974).

Strictness of probable cause requirements. Although the constitutional warrant requirement may be excused under exigent circumstances, the probable cause requirements are at least as strict in warrantless searches as in those pursuant to a warrant. People v. Thompson, 185 Colo. 208, 523 P.2d 128 (1974).

Because both probable cause and exigent circumstances must be present in order to justify a warrantless search into a defendant's home and trial court found only that police entered defendant's home in the absence of exigent circumstances without first making a probable cause determination, case was remanded to trial court to determine first whether defendant informed detective that drugs were in his home, giving detective probable cause, and then to determine whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into the defendant's home. People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1999).

A consent search is outside the ambit of traditional fourth amendment warrant requirements. People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974).

But officers may not coerce occupant into waiving constitutional rights. To secure a consent search, however, the officers may not use any methods which coerce the occupant into waiving fourth amendment rights. People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974).

Whether or not the consent which is given in a particular case is voluntary is a question to be determined by the court in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding that consent, and the overriding inquiry is whether the consent is intelligently and freely given. People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974).

That defendant's wife was told a warrant would be sought if her consent to search their home was not obtained does not negate the evidence which strongly supports the trial court's finding of consent. People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974).

Where trial court evaluated conflicting testimony and evidence relevant to the issue of consent to search home without a warrant and determined that defendant did not consent to a search of his home, absent lack of evidence in the record to support the trial court's factual findings, reviewing court is bound to uphold the trial court's conclusion of lack of consent and unlawful search. People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1999).

The search of a vehicle which is made substantially contemporaneously with an arrest is permissible as an incident to such arrest. People v. Olson, 175 Colo. 140, 485 P.2d 891 (1971).

For, if there is probable cause to obtain a warrant to search a car, police officers have the right to stop and search it without a warrant. People v. Chavez, 175 Colo. 25, 485 P.2d 708 (1971).

Contraband discovered in defendant's car during inventory procedure was lawfully seized. People v. Roddy, 188 Colo. 55, 532 P.2d 958 (1975).