(1) The paroled inmate, upon an order of the state board of parole, may be returned to the custody of the department according to the terms of his original sentence, and, in computing the period of his confinement, the time between his release and his return to said custody shall not be considered any part of the term of his sentence.
(2) Parole shall not be construed in any sense to operate as a discharge of any inmate paroled under the provisions of law but simply a permit to any such inmate to go outside a correctional facility; and, if, while so at large, he behaves and conducts himself as not to incur his reincarceration, he shall be deemed to be still serving out the sentence imposed upon him by the court and shall be entitled to good time the same as if he had not been paroled, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section. If the said paroled inmate is returned to the department, he shall serve out his original sentence, as provided for in this part 2.
(3) No inmate released on parole on or after July 1, 1981, shall be entitled to a good time deduction from his sentence while on parole. In the event that his parole is revoked, he shall become eligible for any good time deductions authorized pursuant to this article on the date he is returned to the custody of the department.
Source: L. 84: Entire article R&RE, p. 520, § 1, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. Since § 17-22.5-203 is similar to repealed §§ 17-2-205 and 17-2-206, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
Time on parole is not considered to be time which applies against the sentence when the parolee is reincarcerated. Ferchaw v. Tinsley, 234 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1964).
Under this section where a paroled convict returns to prison for violation of his parole, the time between his release on parole and his return to prison shall not be taken to be any part of the time served in computing the period to be served under original sentence. Furlow v. Tinsley, 151 Colo. 280, 377 P.2d 132 (1962).
This statutory refusal to count time spent on parole when sentence is resumed does not violate federal due process. Firkins v. Colo., 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1970).
And is not ground for release on habeas corpus. Where petition for habeas corpus contained allegations that petitioner should have been given credit for time served while on parole, his ground for release was improper as a matter of law. Minor v. Tinsley, 154 Colo. 249, 389 P.2d 850 (1964).
Statute prohibits awarding credits to parolee against his original sentences for time he was later incarcerated awaiting trial on subsequent criminal charges. Santisteven v. Johnson, 751 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1988).
Statute prohibits giving parolee credit for time served prior to his parole revocation, while being held on an unrelated charge. Wiedemer v. People, 784 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1989).
A parolee is subject to restrictions which are not applicable to other citizens. People v. Salvador, 189 Colo. 181, 539 P.2d 1273 (1975).
And he is not free from legal restraint by the penal authorities, but is constructively a prisoner of the state in the legal custody and under the control of the department of institutions. Schooley v. Wilson, 150 Colo. 483, 374 P.2d 353 (1962).
Release on parole in no way alters the fact that appellant is still under sentence; that he is in technical custody; and that he is under supervision. People v. Salvador, 189 Colo. 181, 539 P.2d 1273 (1975).
Parolee is not in custody of department, for purposes of this section, from time parole detainer is lodged against him, where parolee had been arrested and confined for acts of forgery and remained in physical custody of Denver authorities until his parole was revoked. Santisteven v. Johnson, 751 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1988).
Tolling of expiration of parole upon the filing of a violation complaint does not impose additional punishment on parole violator. Goetz v. Gunter, 830 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1992).
The phrase "return to said custody" refers to the time of parole revocation. Wiedemer v. People, 784 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1989).
When a parolee is returned to custody, the time between his or her release and return to custody is not considered part of the term of the sentence. "Return to custody" means the time at which parole is revoked, not the time at which the defendant is reincarcerated. People v. Norton, 49 P.3d 344 (Colo. App. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003).
The probationer has a substantially different status from that of the parolee. The imposition of sentence in his case has been suspended and thus unlike the parolee he is not serving a sentence while on probation. Hutchison v. Patterson, 267 F. Supp. 433 (D. Colo. 1967).
Parole does not operate as a discharge. A paroled prisoner who receives a ticket and leaves the prison as provided by this section is not discharged and can later be restrained as a parole violator. Johnson v. Tinsley, 157 Colo. 539, 404 P.2d 159 (1965) (decided under repealed § 27-20-120).