If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, it shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.
Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1424, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-205.
ANNOTATION
A special or specific provision of a statute prevails over a general provision only if the provisions are in conflict and the conflict is irreconcilable. Ohlson v. Weil, 953 P.2d 939 (Colo. App. 1997).
Statute requiring the costs of conducting an election be a county charge prevails over more general statute pertaining to state reimbursement of county expenditures generally. Even though statute pertaining to reimbursement of county costs is more recent than the election statute, there is no manifest intent that it prevail in a conflict with the other statute. Statute requiring that the costs of conducting an election be a county charge, § 1-5-505 (1), and the statute requiring state reimbursement to counties for costs associated with an increased level of service, § 29-1-304.5 (1), are in irreconcilable conflict. However, § 1-5-505 (1), which pertains only to election funding, is more specific than § 29-1-304.5 (1), which broadly applies its reimbursement requirement to most existing state programs. Although § 29-1-304.5 (1) was adopted after § 1-5-505 (1), there is no manifest intent that it should prevail in a conflict with the other statute. Rather, the intent of the legislature was to prioritize citizens' access to free and fair elections over convenience or cost savings to counties. Thus, § 1-5-505 (1) should prevail over § 29-1-304.5 (1), notwithstanding that this increase in service may create additional costs to the county. Gessler v. Doty, 2012 COA 4, 272 P.3d 1131.
Applied in Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976); Casselman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 39 Colo. App. 306, 568 P.2d 84 (1977), rev'd, 195 Colo. 241, 577 P.2d 293 (1978); People v. Donahue, 41 Colo. App. 70, 578 P.2d 671 (1978); Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979); Dayhoff v. State, Motor Vehicle Div., 42 Colo. App. 91, 595 P.2d 1051 (1979); Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319 (Colo. App. 1982); Sw. Catholic Credit Union v. Charnes, 665 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. State Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1985); Pacino v. Sanchez, 807 P.2d 1231 (Colo. App. 1990); Husson v. Meeker, 812 P.2d 731 (Colo. App. 1991); People in Interest of E.Z.L., 815 P.2d 987 (Colo. App. 1991); People v. Munoz, 857 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. One 1968 Chevrolet 2-Door, 895 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1995); County Comm'rs of Douglas County v. Bainbridge, 929 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1996); People v. Smith, 932 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1996); In re Pickering, 967 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1997); People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2001); Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo. 2001); In re Ferris, 75 P.3d 1170 (Colo. App. 2003); In re Hillstrom, 126 P.3d 315 (Colo. App. 2005); Ricchio v. Colo. Sec. Comm'r, 2022 COA 35, 512 P.3d 1058.