A statute which is reenacted, revised, or amended is intended to be a continuation of the prior statute and not a new enactment, insofar as it is the same as the prior statute.
Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1424, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-208.
ANNOTATION
Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.
The program of revision and publication of statutes is based upon laws that exist as enacted by the general assembly and as construed and defined by the courts. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
And not on laws as they were originally enacted if they have been repealed by construction of the courts or by the general assembly. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
In such circumstances they do not exist at all. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
But any law or statute which is reenacted, amended or revised, so far as it is the same as that of a prior law, shall be construed as a continuation of such law and not as a new enactment or provision. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961); Estes Park Bank v. Shanks, 794 P.2d 1108 (Colo. App. 1990).
And so far as it is the same in substantial intent, effect and meaning, it shall be given effect as though continuation of such law. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
Also where a statute is reenacted in the substantial form of a preexisting statute without change of legal effect, it is effective or not effective as of its original and preexisting status. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law. Robles v. People, 811 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991); Douglas County Bd. of Eq. v. Fidelity Castle Pines, 890 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1995); Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007).
This presumption is rebuttable, but, in a criminal case controlled by an earlier version of statute that was not ambiguous, there was no room for interpretation; prior statute would be applied according to its terms regardless of subsequent amendment that assertedly "clarified any ambiguity" but was found to change meaning of statute. Robles v. People, 811 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991); Douglas County Bd. of Eq. v. Fidelity Castle Pines, 890 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1995).
This presumption may be rebutted only by a showing that the general assembly intended to clarify an existing ambiguity in that law. Thus, if an amendment clarifies such an ambiguity, the law remains unchanged by the amendment, and it may provide convincing evidence of the general assembly's intent to apply the amendment retroactively. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007).
To determine whether an amendment clarifies or changes a statute, the court must examine the plain language used by the general assembly, the legislative history surrounding the amendment, and any ambiguity in the provision before it was amended. Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007).
The amendment of a statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a change in the law was intended. When more specific sections, however, are added to a general statutory provision, the addition may indicate a legislative intent to clarify the existing statute or to resolve an ambiguity in the former law. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bethesda Care Ctr., Inc., 867 P.2d 4 (Colo. App. 1993); People ex rel. T.T., 128 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005).
And where such a reenacted statute has been construed, the force and effect of such construction remains an integral part of the reenacted statute. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961); Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987); Messler v. Phillips, 867 P.2d 128 (Colo. App. 1993).
And where statutes are reenacted the construction previously placed upon them is deemed to have been approved by the general assembly in making the enactments and with the understanding the former construction will be adhered to. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961); Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).
Because contemporaneous construction of legislation, acquiesced in for many years by the authorities charged with its enforcement, is entitled to great weight in determining the intent of the framers. Sec. Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, 177 Colo. 455, 495 P.2d 225 (1972).
And in the absence of clear error, such a long established construction should not be overturned or disregarded. Sec. Life & Accident Co. v. Heckers, 177 Colo. 455, 495 P.2d 225 (1972).
Therefore, when the general assembly repeatedly reenacts a statute which has theretofore received a settled judicial construction, there can be no doubt as to the legislative intent. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
It must be considered that the statute is reenacted with the understanding that the former construction will be adhered to. Creacy v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 (1961).
But this statute does not apply to statutory titles. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gilpin Inv. Co., 177 Colo. 132, 493 P.2d 359 (1972).
Failure to cite most recent compilation. While the convenience of all concerned might better be served by citation of the most recent compilation, failure to do so is not fatal to driver's license suspension proceedings. Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 38 Colo. App. 230, 556 P.2d 488 (1976).
Applied in Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194, 510 P.2d 311 (1973); Cagle v. Charnes, 43 Colo. App. 401, 604 P.2d 697 (1979) (both cases decided under present section).