Where an inverse condemnation proceeding is instituted by the owner of any right, title, or interest in real property because of the alleged taking of his property for any program or project for which federal financial assistance will be available to pay all or any part of the cost of the program or project, the court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in such proceeding and awarding compensation for the taking of property or the attorney for the acquiring agency effecting a settlement of any such proceeding shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as will, in the opinion of the court or such attorney, reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees actually incurred because of such proceeding.
Source: L. 71: p. 678, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 69-10-16.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Inverse Condemnation — A Viable Alternative", see 51 Den. L. J. 529 (1974). For article, "Inverse Condemnation Claims after Knick The Promise and Peril of Litigating in Federal Court", 36 Colo. Law. 30 (May 2020).
Judgment within range of evidence is not excessive. Where competent evidence in the record fixes the value both higher and lower than that awarded, the judgment cannot be overturned on the ground that it is excessive. Hayden v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 41 Colo. App. 102, 580 P.2d 830 (1978).
Fact that federal funding had not been awarded at time of damage to plaintiff not determinative since statute addresses future awards and federal funding was subsequently awarded to the city. Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 829 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1993).