(1) (a) Each county, at its own expense, shall provide a suitable courthouse, a sufficient jail, and other necessary county buildings and keep them in repair.
(b) For any penal institution that begins operations on or after August 30, 1999, that is operated by or under contract with a county, the county may establish standards relating to space requirements, furnishing requirements, required special use areas or special management housing, and environmental condition requirements, including but not limited to standards pertaining to light, ventilation, temperature, and noise level. If a county does not adopt standards pursuant to this paragraph (b), the penal institution operated by or under contract with the county shall be subject to the standards adopted by the department of public health and environment pursuant to section 25-1.5-101 (1)(i), C.R.S. In establishing such standards, the county is strongly encouraged to consult with national associations that specialize in policies relating to correctional institutions.
(2) Each county has the power to acquire, by eminent domain, land or buildings, or both, for the provision of court and district attorney facilities, jails, and other necessary facilities specifically related thereto. Any acquisitions by eminent domain shall be made in the manner authorized for cities and towns as set forth in article 6 of title 38, C.R.S.
Source: G.L. § 431. G.S. § 524. R.S. 08: § 1180. C.L. § 8661. CSA: C. 45, § 4. CRS 53: § 36-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 36-1-4. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1203, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 803, § 2, effective May 24. L. 2003: (1)(b) amended, p. 714, § 56, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
A county's duties under this section may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9), of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).
Historically, Colorado law has placed the duty of providing a suitable courthouse upon the county commissioners of each county. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Even though the general assembly indicated its intention to take over from the counties the financial burden of providing judicial facilities, the general assembly has not provided funds for the construction of court facilities in the various counties of the state, and the burden of providing courtroom space and facilities remains with the counties. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).
Counties are charged with the duty to provide public buildings for county offices, and to maintain those buildings. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 655 P.2d 831 (Colo. 1982).
But lack power to acquire office space through eminent domain. The general assembly has not impliedly delegated the power of eminent domain to counties for the purpose of acquiring office space for authorized county purposes. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 655 P.2d 831 (Colo. 1982).
An express grant of eminent domain power to provide facilities to house public offices does not appear in this section. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 655 P.2d 831 (Colo. 1982).
The board of county commissioners was a proper party and entitled to recover damages against the building contractor and his surety under third party beneficiary principles, because in Colorado one may enforce a contractual obligation made for his benefit although he was not a party to the agreement, when such an obligation is apparent from the agreement and the surrounding circumstances. The obligation for the benefit of the county is inherent in the contract documents and circumstances. Under the leasehold agreement, the public building authority's obligation to the county to construct the courthouse building was recognized, and the building plans and specifications were subject to the approval of the county. Under the construction agreement, the county has the right to approve the form of the performance bond. The contractor was not entitled to final payment until completion of the building and final acceptance of work by the authority, the county and the architects. The land belonged to the county and was leased to the authority to have the courthouse built and to lease the land and building back to the county. Thus, the agreements and the circumstances show that the benefit of faithful performance of the construction agreement and the bond were intended to flow to the county. Such contractual benefit to the property owner is enforceable by him. Cox v. Fremont County Pub. Bldg. Auth., 415 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1969).