(1) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall enforce the provisions of this article.
(2) (a) Whenever the commissioner has reasonable cause to believe a violation of this article 80 or a rule adopted pursuant to this article 80 has occurred and immediate enforcement is necessary, the commissioner may issue a cease-and-desist order, which may require a person to cease the violation. The cease-and-desist order must set forth the provisions alleged to have been violated, the facts alleged to have constituted the violation, and the requirement that all actions cease forthwith. The person may request, at the person's discretion, a hearing to determine whether the violation occurred, which request must be made within thirty days after issuance of the order to cease and desist. The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to article 4 of title 24 and shall be conducted promptly.
(b) In the event that any person fails to comply with a cease-and-desist order within twenty-four hours, the commissioner may bring a suit for a temporary restraining order and for injunctive relief to prevent any further or continued violation of this article.
(c) No stay of a cease-and-desist order shall be issued before a hearing thereon involving both parties.
(3) Whenever the commissioner possesses sufficient evidence satisfactorily indicating that any person has engaged in or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this article or any rule adopted under this article, the commissioner may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction to temporarily or permanently restrain or enjoin the act or practice in question and to enforce compliance with this article or any rule or order issued under this article. In any such action, the commissioner shall not be required to plead or prove irreparable injury or the inadequacy of the remedy at law. Under no circumstances shall the court require the commissioner to post a bond.
Source: L. 94: Entire article added, p. 1307, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2025: (2)(a) amended, (HB 25-1084), ch. 24, p. 148, § 186, effective August 6. L. 2026: (2)(a) amended, (HB 26-1183), ch. 203, p. 1157, § 7, effective August 12.
ANNOTATION
The commissioner is not required to plead or prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of a remedy at law when seeking either a temporary restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunctive relief upon showing that a person has engaged in or is about to engage in a violation of this act. Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997).
The court abused its discretion by placing an unlicensed facility in a more advantageous position than a facility that has initiated a license application and demonstrated eligibility to hold a license prior to receiving and housing animals. Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997).
In the judicial enforcement proceeding under this act, the normally applicable irreparable injury and posting of security requirements under C.R.C.P. 65 do not apply. The usually applicable discretion to postpone the effective date of agency action under the State Administrative Procedure Act, which the court may issue upon a finding of irreparable injury pending judicial review, does not apply to this statute. Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997).
The district court incorrectly utilized the balancing of the equities and public interest factors set forth in Rathke v. McFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982), which resulted in the continued operation of an unlicensed facility contrary to the act. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the public interest, and equitable considerations having to do with that interest, favored enforcement of the statutory licensure requirement. Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997).