The court shall forthwith cause the report of the commissioners or the verdict of the jury to be entered upon the records of the court, and, where possession of the property has been previously taken by the petitioner pursuant to section 38-1-105 (6), it shall add to the amount of any such award interest at the rate established pursuant to section 5-12-106 (2), C.R.S., on and after the date of such possession until the date such award of the commissioners or verdict of the jury is filed with the clerk of the court. No interest shall be allowed on that portion of the award which the owner and others interested received or could have received as a partial payment by withdrawal from the deposit as provided in section 38-1-105 (6), nor shall interest be allowed for the period wherein the trial of the case is delayed or continued by or at the request of the respondent.
Source: L. 61: p. 375, § 7. CRS 53: § 50-1-20. L. 63: p. 477, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 50-1-19. L. 66: p. 31, § 4. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 1194, § 4, effective June 6.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Collecting Pre- and Post- Judgment Interest in Colorado: A Primer", see 15 Colo. Law. 753 (1986). For article, "An Update of Appendices from Collecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest in Colorado", see 15 Colo. Law. 990 (1986).
When interest on award accrues. Where the authorization to take possession of property is contingent on a deposit, the date of possession for purposes of entitlement to interest on the award is the date of deposit. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Hayutin, 40 Colo. App. 559, 583 P.2d 296 (1978).
When the landowner, with the consent of the other interested parties, could have withdrawn funds deposited by the petitioner pursuant to § 38-1-105 (6), the exception to the interest accrual requirement under this section applies and no interest is allowed on the funds. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. 455 Co., 997 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1999).
No conflict with general interest statute. There is no conflict between this section, which provides for six percent interest from the date of possession until the date the commission's award is filed with the court, and the general interest statute, § 5-12-102, pertaining to interest thereafter, since once the amount of the valuation award has been ascertained, the result is like any other judgment. And, since the condemnation statutes are silent on the matter of interest for the period after judgment, the general statute on interest applies. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Hayutin, 40 Colo. App. 559, 583 P.2d 296 (1978); E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. 455 Co., 997 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1999).
No interest accrues on the amount of an immediate possession deposit made under § 38-1-105. By depositing funds into the court registry, a petitioner relinquishes control of the funds and transfers to the property owner the right to withdraw and use the funds, and the petitioner is no longer responsible for the productive use of the funds. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. 455 Co., 997 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1999).
Interest under this section to be compounded annually. Although this section does not specifically state that interest is to be compounded annually, since the rate of interest under this section is determined by reference to the rate established in § 5-12-106 (2), which provides for annual compounding of interest, this section implicitly provides that interest be compounded annually. State Dept. of Hwys. v. Interstates-Denver W., 781 P.2d 176 (Colo. App. 1989).
Trial court appropriately denied award of pre-judgement interest in inverse condemnation case. There was no order authorizing the municipality to take possession of the property prior to trial. Moreover, the evaluation date used by each of the parties, without objection from either, was the date of the hearing, and the jury was specifically instructed to determine the value of the property taken as of that date. Accordingly, because the property was valued as of the date of the trial and not as of some earlier date, no award of pre-judgment interest was authorized. Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).
Denial of interest on attorney fees and costs was proper because this section has nothing to do with attorney fees and costs but instead allows prejudgment interest to a landowner who has been awarded just compensation for a taking for the sole purpose of compensating the owner for any possible difference between the value of the property as of the date that the condemning authority took possession of it and any payment made to the owner at that time. Sinclair Transp. Co. v. Sandberg, 2014 COA 75M, 350 P.3d 915.
Applied in State Dept. of Hwys. v. Copper Mt., Inc., 624 P.2d 936 (Colo. App. 1981).