In cases where, by the common law, any person may be or become seized in fee tail of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments by virtue of any devise or conveyance, or by any other means whatsoever, such person, instead of becoming seized in fee tail thereof, shall be deemed and adjudged to be seized of such lands, tenements, and hereditaments in fee simple.
Source: R.S. p. 107, § 6. G.L. § 165. G.S. § 203. R.S. 08: § 674. C.L. § 4875. CSA: C. 40, § 7. CRS 53: § 118-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 118-1-6. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 1467, § 1, effective May 25.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For comment on Sconce v. Neece, 129 Colo. 267, 268 P.2d 1102 (1954), appearing below, see 31 Dicta 239 (1954), and 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 121 (1954). For article, "Some Rules of Future Interests Can be Used to Clear Titles", see 12 Colo. Law. 1229 (1983).
Legislative intent. The manifest intention of the general assembly was to get rid of estates tail and not to revive conditional fees and to substitute for the fee tail a life estate in the grantee, with remainder in fee simple to those who would take such remainder by the terms of the grant. Sconce v. Neece, 129 Colo. 267, 268 P.2d 1102 (1954).
Fee simple conditional and estate tail distinguished. The major difference between the fee simple conditional and the estate tail is that the former is freely alienable after birth of the required issue while the latter lacks this characteristic and its alienability is extremely limited. Sconce v. Neece, 129 Colo. 267, 268 P.2d 1102 (1954).