All conveyances of real estate and of any interest therein, duly executed and delivered, shall be held to carry with them the right to immediate possession of the premises or interest conveyed, unless a future day for the possession is therein specified.
Source: R.S. p. 107, § 9. G.L. § 168. G.S. § 206. R.S. 08: § 677. C.L. § 4885. CSA: C. 40, § 17. CRS 53: § 118-1-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 118-1-20.
ANNOTATION
Intent to postpone deed's operation not provable by parol evidence. Under this section it is certainly required that the intention to postpone the operation of a deed shall be declared in the instrument, and it cannot be proved by parol. Omaha & Grant Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 21 P. 9256 (1889).
Parol evidence of an agreement that possession should not pass until the purchase money is fully paid is inadmissible. Drake v. Root, 2 Colo. 685 (1875); Omaha & Grant Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 21 P. 925 (1889).
Right to possess both surface and minerals. Conveyance invests grantees with ownership and the right to immediate possession of the real estate, both as to the surface and the minerals. Lambertson v. Thomas, 146 Colo. 539, 362 P.2d 180 (1961).
Possession denied where deed is void. This section does not entitle a grantee to possession if the deed of conveyance is void on its face, and occupancy of the land in controversy would then be a trespass. Williams v. Conroy, 35 Colo. 117, 83 P. 959 (1905); Whitehead v. Callahan, 44 Colo. 396, 99 P. 57 (1908).
Application of section to leasehold. During the term of a lease, a tenant is normally entitled to full possession of the premises, even to the exclusion of the landlord. Rutherford v. Scarborough, 28 Colo. App. 352, 472 P.2d 721 (1970).
Applied in Thomas v. Dunnean, 75 Colo. 216, 225 P. 253 (1924).