No action or proceeding whatsoever shall be brought or maintained by any person to enforce or procure any right or title accorded to the purchaser under any contract for the purchase and sale of real property if such person is not in possession of the real property described in and the subject of such contract of purchase and sale unless such action or proceeding is commenced within ten years of the day or the happening of the event appointed in said contract for the delivery by the seller of a deed of conveyance of the property therein agreed to be purchased and sold. If no day is appointed in such contract for the delivery of such conveyance, then such action or proceeding shall be commenced within ten years of the day on which the last and final installment of the purchase price would have been paid but not thereafter.
Source: L. 53: p. 205, § 1. CRS 53: § 118-7-16. C.R.S. 1963: § 118-7-16. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 225, § 85, effective July 16.
ANNOTATION
Application of section's bar precluded. Since the owner of a mineral estate does not lose possession or title by mere nonuse and since ownership and occupancy of the surface does not constitute possession of the mineral estate, absent evidence that the fee simple owner of the surface actually dispossessed plaintiffs of the mineral estate by drilling or exploration for minerals, plaintiffs retained the requisite possession of a mineral interest so as to preclude application of the bar of this section. Brian v. Valley View Cattle Ranch, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 428, 535 P.2d 237 (1975).
Where person, as a purchaser not in possession, was attempting to enforce his right or equitable title pursuant to the contract of sale, this section was the most specific and the most applicable, and not § 38-41-101 or former § 13-80-114. Bent v. Ferguson, 791 P.2d 1241 (Colo. App. 1990).
A question of fact remained on claim to quiet title where this section allowed purchaser to bring an action to enforce any right or title he may have under a contract within ten years from the date of delivery of general warranty deed and parties intent concerning when delivery of the deed was to take place required determination. Bent v. Ferguson, 791 P.2d 1241 (Colo. App. 1990).