(1) It is declared to be the policy of this state:
(a) To provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of this state;
(b) To deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on such highways to persons who by their conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of this state, the orders of its courts, and the statutorily required acts of its administrative agencies; and
(c) To discourage repetition of criminal acts by individuals against the peace and dignity of this state and its political subdivisions and to impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of the traffic laws.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2158, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.
ANNOTATION
Classification not violative of equal protection. The classification under the habitual traffic offender statute has a rational basis and does not violate the requirement of equal protection of the law. People v. Scott, 200 Colo. 365, 615 P.2d 680 (1980).
Categorization of alcohol-related driving offenses is reasonably related to governmental interest. To the extent that one might consider as a classification the categorization of alcohol-related driving offenses, in §§ 42-2-122 (1)(g) and (i) and 42-2-202 (2)(a)(I), such classification is reasonably related to the expressed governmental interest of providing maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highway. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884 (1980).
The legitimate legislative purpose of removing from the highway those drivers who have demonstrated repeatedly the inability or unwillingness to conform to the traffic laws provides a rational basis for including several different types of traffic offenses of varying degrees of seriousness as predicate convictions for a finding of habitual traffic offender status. Crocker v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).
Mandated punishment not cruel and unusual. Punishment mandated by this part is not so disparate to the gravity of the offense as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. People v. Scott, 200 Colo. 365, 615 P.2d 680 (1980).
Applied in Reyher v. State, Dept. of Rev., 39 Colo. App. 510, 571 P.2d 729 (1977); People v. Able, 200 Colo. 115, 618 P.2d 1110 (1980); People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981); People v. Dooley, 630 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1981).