(1) No license to operate motor vehicles in this state shall be issued to an habitual offender, nor shall an habitual offender operate a motor vehicle in this state:
(a) For a period of five years from the date of the order of the department finding such person to be an habitual offender except as may be permitted by section 42-2-132.5; and
(b) Until such time as financial responsibility requirements are met.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2160, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1)(a) amended, p. 1082, § 11, effective January 1, 2001.
ANNOTATION
Driver is not denied due process by the automatic revocation of his license under this section upon obtaining his third alcohol-related conviction within seven years. The hearing officer is not required to consider any medical condition of alcoholism. Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 (Colo. 1983).
Language of this section plainly mandates termination of an habitual offender's right to operate a motor vehicle for a period of five years. Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979).
The department has no discretion but to revoke a license of an habitual offender for five years. Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 (Colo. 1983).
Language of this section is clear: No individual shall operate a motor vehicle anywhere in the state of Colorado for five years after being revoked as a habitual offender. U.S. v. Fritz, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Colo. 1998).
Constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants need not be provided. The only immediate consequence of a determination that the licensee is a habitual traffic offender is a loss of his driver's license for a period of five years. Thus, the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants need not be provided to the licensee in such a proceeding. People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981).
Failure to warn violator of point accumulation not breach of constitutional protections. The failure to warn a person charged with a traffic offense that he will accumulate a designated number of points against his driving record upon conviction does not breach any constitutional protections. People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1980).
Period of prohibition may not be suspended. No statutory authority exists allowing any suspension of the period of prohibition required under this section. Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).
Department hearing officer has no discretion to issue probationary license. Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979).
Right to counsel. Absent a valid waiver of the right to counsel, a conviction obtained against a defendant who is not represented by counsel may not be used to establish habitual traffic offender status for the purpose of imposing punishment for violation of § 42-2-206. People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1980).
Section not repealed by § 42-2-124. The five-year period of revocation provided in this section is an exception to the general rule of a one-year period promulgated in § 42-2-124, and as such, there is no repeal of this section by implication. Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325, 592 P.2d 402 (1979).
The phrase "financial responsibility requirements" is not unconstitutionally vague when construed together with other provisions of title 42 in light of their common policy goals, the intent reflected by the overall legislative scheme, and the fact that mathematical certainty in drafting of statutes is not required. People v. Revello, 735 P.2d 487 (Colo. 1987).
Revocation of license of habitual traffic offender remains in effect beyond five-year period until statutory conditions for reinstatement of license are met. People v. Purvis, 735 P.2d 492 (Colo. 1987).
Applied in Schmidt v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982).