(1) The requirement of filing security and proof of financial responsibility for the future pursuant to section 42-7-301 does not apply:
(a) To any person who qualifies as a self-insurer under section 42-7-501 or who operates a motor vehicle for a self-insurer under section 42-7-501;
(b) To any person who has been released from liability, or finally adjudicated not liable, prior to the date the director would otherwise suspend a license or a nonresident's operating privilege under section 42-7-301 (4);
(c) To the state of Colorado or any political subdivision thereof or any municipality therein;
(d) To the operation by any employee of the federal government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of such employment;
(e) Repealed.
(f) To the operator or owner if such owner had in effect at the time of such crash an automobile liability policy with respect to the motor vehicle involved in such crash;
(g) To the operator, if not the owner of such motor vehicle, if there was in effect at the time of such crash an automobile liability policy or bond with respect to the operation of motor vehicles not owned by that person;
(h) To the operator or owner if the liability of such operator or owner for damages resulting from such crash is, in the judgment of the director, covered by any other form of liability insurance policy or bond or deposit as provided in section 42-7-418;
(i) To the owner of a motor vehicle if at the time of the crash the vehicle was being operated without the owner's express or implied permission, or was parked by a person who had been operating such motor vehicle without such permission.
(2) In determining whether any person is exempt from the requirements of section 42-7-301, the director shall rely upon reports or other information submitted and, when requested by any person affected by a crash to make a finding of fact, shall consider the report of the investigating officer, if any, the crash reports, and any affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2477, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (1)(e) repealed, p. 1210, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2026: IP(1), (1)(f), (1)(g), (1)(h), (1)(i), and (2) amended, (HB 26-1237), ch. 117, p. 490, § 78, effective August 12.
ANNOTATION
Constitutionality. Placing the burden upon the uninsured motorist of showing that there is not a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him is constitutional. Sandoval v. Heckers, 350 F. Supp. 127 (D. Colo. 1972).
The language "the director finds to be free from any fault" means a finding that there is not a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against the person whose conduct is being considered. Sandoval v. Heckers, 350 F. Supp. 127 (D. Colo. 1972).
Meaning of phrase "free from fault". "Free from fault" in subsection (1)(e)(III) means that there is not a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against the person whose conduct is being considered. Rael v. Motor Vehicle Div., 42 Colo. App. 66, 589 P.2d 515 (1979).
Uninsured motorist has burden of bringing himself within exception of this section. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270, 499 P.2d 1169 (1972).
Subsection (1)(b) refers to a finding that there is no reasonable possibility of judgment being rendered against person whose conduct is being considered. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270, 499 P.2d 1169 (1972).
Although finding of freedom from fault goes beyond finding as to reasonable possibility of judgment. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270, 499 P.2d 1169 (1972); Rael v. Motor Vehicle Div., 42 Colo. App. 66, 589 P.2d 515 (1979).
While a hearing officer must take comparative negligence into account when deciding whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being entered against an owner or operator, this does not require specific percentage findings on each party's negligence. Rael v. Motor Vehicle Div., 42 Colo. App. 66, 589 P.2d 515 (1979).