(1) Except as provided in section 13-21-101, C.R.S., where there is no written agreement as to the rate of interest, creditors shall receive interest as follows:
(a) If a judgment for money in a civil case is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is affirmed, interest, as set out in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, shall be payable from the date of entry of judgment in the trial court until satisfaction of the judgment and shall include compounding of interest annually.
(b) If a judgment for money in a civil case is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial court, interest, as set out in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, shall be payable from the date a judgment was first entered in the trial court until the judgment is satisfied and shall include compounding of interest annually. This interest shall be payable on the amount of the final judgment.
(2) (a) The rate of interest shall be certified on each January 1 by the secretary of state to be two percentage points above the discount rate, which discount rate shall be the rate of interest a commercial bank pays to the federal reserve bank of Kansas City using a government bond or other eligible paper as security, and shall be rounded to the nearest full percent. Such annual rate of interest shall be so established as of December 31, 1982, to become effective January 1, 1983. Thereafter, as of December 31 of each year, the annual rate of interest shall be established in the same manner, to become effective on January 1 of the following year.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (2), the rate of interest shall be no lower than the percentage authorized in section 5-12-102 (4)(b).
(3) The rate at which interest shall accrue during each year shall be the rate which the secretary of state has certified as the annual interest rate under subsection (2) of this section.
Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 226, § 1, effective January 1, 1983. L. 84: (1) and (2) amended, p. 287, § 1, effective July 1.
ANNOTATION
Law reviews. For article, "Rates of Interest on State and Federal Court Judgments: An Update", see 12 Colo. Law. 446 (1983). For article, "Collecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest in Colorado: A Primer", see 15 Colo. Law. 753 (1986). For article, "An Update of Appendices from Collecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest in Colorado", see 15 Colo. Law. 990 (1986). For article, "Recovery of Interest: Parts I and II", see 18 Colo. Law. 1063 and 1307 (1989).
The right to interest, absent an agreement to pay it, is purely statutory, and is limited to those circumstances set forth in the statute. Indian Mtn. Metro. Recreation & Park Dist. v. J.P. Campbell & Assoc., 921 P.2d 65 (Colo. App. 1996); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Dolores County v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 12 P.3d 1219 (Colo. App. 2000).
Where there is no "judgment" entered in a "trial court" to which subsection (1) could apply, a claim for post-judgment interest pursuant to subsection (1) is properly rejected. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Dolores County v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 12 P.3d 1219 (Colo. App. 2000).
Claim for postjudgment interest on attorney fees was properly rejected where the attorney fees were paid voluntarily and accepted before a judgment or court order could be entered because there was no judgment upon which interest could accrue. Sinclair Transp. Co. v. Sandberg, 2014 COA 75M, 350 P.3d 915.
Court cannot divide a single unsatisfied judgment into two or more parts for the purpose of computing interest. Bassett v. Eagle Telecomms., 750 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1987).
Interest is payable upon that portion of the judgment that is ultimately affirmed by the appellate court. Bassett v. Eagle Telecomms., 750 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1987); In re Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136 (Colo. 2006).
A judgment confirming an arbitration award is enforceable in the same manner as any other judgment. Therefore, the district court did not err in ordering post-judgment interest on the unpaid portion of the judgment. Barrett v. Inv. Mgmt. Consultants, 190 P.3d 800 (Colo. App. 2008).
An appealing judgment debtor must pay post-judgment interest when the appeal is affirmed and the funds are inaccessible to the creditor; further, there is no requirement that interest must be specifically requested. This section makes no exception for attorney fees; post-judgment interest on attorney fees is required when the judgment is affirmed on appeal. Furthermore, it is of no import whether the judgment award for attorney fees is made directly to the attorney or to the party. In re Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136 (Colo. 2006).
While the statute does not define "satisfaction", a party satisfies a debt when the creditor has been paid and the debtor is no longer obligated to pay that portion of the amount due. Thus, if debtor deposits the funds in a court registry, the judgment is not satisfied until the funds are accessible to the creditor, and only at that point does the obligation to pay interest terminate. In re Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136 (Colo. 2006).
Appeal of judgment debtor is considered a single unsuccessful appeal for purposes of this section where judgment debtor insurer prevailed on appeal at the court of appeals but trial court's judgment was subsequently reinstated by the supreme court on appeal by the insured. Accordingly, insurer was required to pay post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment in the trial court. Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 549 (Colo. App. 2000).
Because the trial court's failure to include an award of post-judgment interest was due to an oversight, it could amend the judgment at any time to add the award. Jennings v. Ibarra, 921 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1996).
An order entered by the public utilities commission is equivalent to a judgment by a trial court, and the interest on the award accrues from the date of entry of the commission order not the judgment of the district court. Lake Durango Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 P.3d 12 (Colo. 2003).
This section does not apply to a situation covered by the prompt payment statute. To the extent there is a conflict, the more specific prompt payment statute prevails over this section. New Design Constr. Co. v. Hamon Contractors, Inc., 215 P.3d 1172 (Colo. App. 2008).
Applied in Weston v. Mincomp Corp., 698 P.2d 274 (Colo. App. 1985).