(1) Any person who suffers injury because of an unfair labor practice has a right of action, jointly and severally, against all persons participating in said practice for damages caused to the injured person thereby.
(2) If, in accordance with this article or otherwise, persons otherwise unwilling to do so are induced to violate contracts of employment or for services or materials, any person injured thereby shall be entitled to recover and have judgment therefor at law against the persons, jointly and severally, so inducing the violation of such obligations.
Source: L. 43: p. 416, § 22. CSA: C. 97, § 94(22). CRS 53: § 80-5-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 80-4-19.
ANNOTATION
I. General Consideration.
II. Unfair Labor Practices.
III. Violation of Contract.
IV. Damages.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Liability for damages existed prior to legislation. Prior to the enactment of legislation, state and national, designed for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes and controversy, one interfering with a work project of another would be held liable to the extent of all damages caused by such intrusion, and unless by the enactment of legislation the right to be so protected has been eliminated, modified, or otherwise circumscribed, it still exists. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
But there is nothing under the labor peace act which allows either interest or attorney fees. Denver Bldg. & Constr., Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
Applied in Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887 (D. Colo. 1982).
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.
Damages for tortious labor conduct are recoverable in any court of competent jurisdiction, whether state or federal. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
Even where the national labor relations board establishes a violation, recovery of damages for the resulting injury is left to any court of competent jurisdiction. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
Violation of § 8-2-116 is an unfair labor practice and thus damages are recoverable under this section. Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982).
III. VIOLATION OF CONTRACT.
There is nothing inherently illegal in requiring a labor organization to live up to its written contracts. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
And so where the members of a union violate their contract and walk off a job, individually refuse to cross a picket line, and, supported by the union, refuse to furnish union members to operate machines, completely immobilize and render entirely useless all of the machinery to the same extent as though it had been retained in their possession and actually impounded, it is simply a method of depriving the employer of the use of his property and is ineffective to relieve them of liability for their breach of contract. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).
IV. DAMAGES.
Damages, as used in this section, includes those damages recoverable in a common law tort action. Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 585 F. Supp. 1393 (D. Colo. 1984).
Damages where heavy equipment is kept idle is its fair rental value. It is impossible to allocate to each of several heavy machines on a job the proportion of the overall profit attributable to the agency of each thereof, and so where, through unlawful or wrongful acts, heavy equipment is kept idle and the work expected to be accomplished thereby delayed, the fair rental value of such equipment during the period of prevention of its use is generally adopted as a proper measure for determination of the extent of damage. This loss of use rule is in keeping with the general rule that damages should be calculated in such manner as is most favorable to the party liable, and it is logical that the rental cost or value of a machine would be less than the amount expected to be derived from its use - if it can be rented for a sum equal to the amount it will return in use, why use it; if one should rent a machine to do a specific job, would he not expect to make a profit for himself over and above the rental he would have to pay? Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955).