Mitchell v

State, 176 Ga. App. 32, 335 S.E.2d 150 (1985). Court may require counsel to limit interrogation to matters dealing directly with specific case to be tried. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 657, 200 S.E.2d 454 (1973). Although examination of prospective jurors by counsel is very broad under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, the trial judge still retains the discretion to limit the examination to questions dealing directly with the specific case and to prohibit general questions. Jenkins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 310, 277 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Specific questions covered by general question not barred. — Question seeking to elicit, from an individual juror on the juror’s voir dire, specific facts or circumstances which are clearly within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 should not be proscribed simply because more general questions dealing with the same subject matter have been previously addressed to the entire panel of prospective jurors. Craig v. State, 165 Ga. App. 156, 299 S.E.2d 745 (1983). Questions should illustrate prejudice or interest. — Right to examine each juror individually after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the court is a broad right. But, this right is not unlimited, and such examination in its broadest scope should not go beyond matters which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause. Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 165 S.E.2d 150 (1968). Counsel should confine counsel’s questions to those which may illustrate any prejudice of the juror against the accused or any interest of the juror in the cause. Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615, 208 S.E.2d 625 (1974). Discretion of trial judge to limit examination. — Court has wide discretion in permitting interrogation of the jurors. Leggett v. Brewton, 104 Ga. App. 580, 122 S.E.2d 469 (1961). 102 While this Code section permits an individual examination of each juror, there must be some limitation upon its extent, so the examination is conducted under the supervision and direction of the trial court, and what questions may or may not be asked are left largely to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which will not be interfered with by an appellate court unless clearly abused. Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963). Language of this Code section is broad, but the trial judge still retains the discretion to limit the examination to questions dealing directly with the specific case and to prohibit general questions. Hill v. State, 221 Ga. 65, 142 S.E.2d 909 (1965); Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 165 S.E.2d 150 (1968); Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 173 S.E.2d 186 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2861, 33 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1972); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 187 S.E.2d 271 (1972); King v. State, 230 Ga. 581, 198 S.E.2d 305 (1973); Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974); Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615, 208 S.E.2d 625 (1974); McGinnis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 843, 219 S.E.2d 485 (1975); Frazier v. State, 138 Ga. App. 640, 227 S.E.2d 284 (1976); Griffeth v. State, 154 Ga. App. 643, 269 S.E.2d 501 (1980); Chastain v. State, 255 Ga. 723, 342 S.E.2d 678 (1986); Starks v. Robinson, 189 Ga. App. 168, 375 S.E.2d 86 (1988); Ross v. State, 194 Ga. App. 285, 390 S.E.2d 429 (1990). Questions which may be propounded to prospective jurors under the provisions of this section are largely within the discretion of the court, and only if that discretion is abused will the appellate court interfere. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 953, 87 S. Ct. 336, 17 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1966). Trial court has the discretion to limit the examination of jurors to questions which are phrased or designed so as to elicit or reveal any actual bias or prejudice against the defendants or any interest in the cause and to prohibit general questions. Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 264 S.E.2d 516 (1980). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion after the court refused to allow 15-12-133 the defense to ask, during voir dire, what prospective jurors would think of a failure of the defendant to testify. Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816, 289 S.E.2d 22 (1982). Control of voir dire examination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts should not interfere unless it is shown to have been manifestly abused. Lawton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 116, 381 S.E.2d 106 (1989). Trial court did not abuse its discretion to restrict the scope of voir dire in the limited manner it did because although defense counsel was prohibited from questioning panel members about a specific method of corporal punishment with a belt, the trial court did not preclude questioning about the entire subject matter and defense counsel was permitted to inquire of specific members whether allegations of corporal punishment of a child would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 751 S.E.2d 408 (2013). Discretion in distinguishing proper and improper questions. — Since the distinction between questions which ask jurors how the jurors would decide issues of a case if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether jurors can start the case without bias or prior inclination is not always crystal clear, the control of the voir dire examination is vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial judge and will not be interfered with by this court unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983); Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987). This section does not permit inquiry as to every matter and every thing. The court has wide discretion in permitting interrogation of the jurors. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975). Questions requiring impartiality. — If a contested juror was an assistant district attorney’s parent, the juror’s initial 103 Matters of Inquiry (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) doubt as to impartiality did not demand that the juror be removed in the absence of a defense motion. Shiver v. State, 276 Ga. 624, 581 S.E.2d 254, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1007, 124 S. Ct. 538, 157 L. Ed. 2d 414 (2003). Questions requiring prejudgment of case. — Considerable latitude may be allowed counsel in questioning jurors; however, the trial judge has authority to prohibit the jurors being asked such questions as would require the jurors in effect to prejudge the case. Bowens v. State, 116 Ga. App. 577, 158 S.E.2d 420 (1967). No question should require a response from a juror which might amount to prejudgment of the case. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983); Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987). Parties are entitled on voir dire to ascertain whether prospective jurors have formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. However, the parties are not entitled to ask jurors to prejudge the case. Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 762, 374 S.E.2d 199 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S. Ct. 2089, 104 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1989). Trial court abused the court’s discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from asking prospective jurors whether the jurors had strong feelings about child molestation, and if those feelings would impair the jurors’ judgment or make it difficult for the jurors to judge the case; but, this error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt regarding the numerous acts of sodomy that the defendant engaged in with the daughter, the scientific evidence which linked the defendant’s DNA to the semen found in the victim’s mouth, and the defendant’s attempt to allude the authorities until the defendant was apprehended in Tennessee. Meeks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 836, 605 S.E.2d 428 (2004). In a child abuse case in which the defense counsel asked the panel of potential 15-12-133 jurors whether the nature of the case would have made it difficult for anyone to serve on the jury and the trial court sustained the state’s objection on the ground that the defense counsel impermissibly asked potential jurors to prejudge the case in violation of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, defendant was not prejudiced by any error, as the state asked a similar question under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-164(a)(2), and potential jurors were asked whether they had children or grandchildren, had foster children or operated a daycare center, or had received special training with respect to caring for children. Withrow v. State, 275 Ga. App. 110, 619 S.E.2d 714 (2005). Even if a question posed by the defense counsel did not seek a prejudgment of the case, the question’s exclusion was not reversible error, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, as the substance of the excluded question was covered by other questions asked to potential jurors; further, it was highly probable that the limitation upon voir dire did not contribute to the verdict and that no harm occurred to the defendant. McKee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 646, 621 S.E.2d 611 (2005). Long, confusing, argumentative, general, and hypothetical questions. — Judge may prohibit questions that are long and confusing or unduly argumentative, or general and hypothetical. Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707, 225 S.E.2d 224 (1976). Confusing and overly broad question which appeared to ask an opinion as to a matter of law was properly refused. McCoy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 703, 500 S.E.2d 611 (1998). Opinion of evidence. — Neither the defendant nor the state has the right simply to outline the evidence and then ask a prospective juror the juror’s opinion of that evidence, nor is it permissible to ask a juror to describe the kind of case that, in the juror’s opinion, would warrant a death sentence. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43, 365 S.E.2d 265 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S. Ct. 183, 102 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1988). There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow defendant to question the prospective jurors regarding the jurors’ opinions as to the evidence that the trial court had ruled to be admissible 104 at trial. Shields v. State, 202 Ga. App. 659, 415 S.E.2d 478 (1992). Hypothetical questions assuming certain facts will be proven. — Hypothetical voir dire questions are not per se improper, but a trial judge should be cautious in allowing counsel to propound questions which ask the juror to assume that certain facts will be proven. Such questions tend to improperly influence jurors. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983). Hypothetical questions involving evidence should be excluded. — While the questions which may be propounded to prospective jurors are largely within the discretion of the court, and may include any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause, or any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias, which the juror may have respecting the subject matter of the suit, nevertheless hypothetical questions involving evidence should be excluded, and no question should be so framed as to require a response from the juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case. Gunnin v. State, 112 Ga. App. 720, 146 S.E.2d 131 (1965); Bransome v. Barton, 154 Ga. App. 799, 270 S.E.2d 55 (1980). Hypothetical questions involving evidence or requiring a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case are improper and should be excluded from the examination of prospective jurors. Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 165 S.E.2d 708 (1969). Under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, the trial judge retains discretion to prohibit those questions of law which the jurors would have to consider and determine from the evidence. Jenkins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 310, 277 S.E.2d 304 (1981). General or argumentative questions. — In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, exclusion of the defense counsel’s voir dire questions, ‘‘What do you say is the biggest problem facing America today?’’ and ‘‘Do you feel like that this country is waging a so-called war on drugs?,’’ was not an abuse of discretion since both questions were 15-12-133 general in scope but the second was argumentative. Dean v. State, 211 Ga. App. 28, 438 S.E.2d 380 (1993). Question about country’s ‘‘ongoing war against drugs.’’ — In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in refusing to allow defense counsel to question a potential juror about the juror’s opinion on the country’s ‘‘ongoing war against drugs.’’ Martinez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82 (2003). Juror’s familiarity with defendant not disqualification — Pretermitting whether a challenged juror would have been disqualified based on a relationship with the defendant, because the testimony from the juror at the new trial hearing did not reveal any bias for or against the defendant, or establish that the relationship affected the verdict, the defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial. Moreover, even if the juror deliberately answered falsely, the defendant failed to show that a new trial was warranted because that juror had an evil motive or acted otherwise as one of the twelve jurors than with the required impartiality. Allen v. State, 290 Ga. App. 604, 659 S.E.2d 900 (2008). 2. Technical Legal Questions General questions and technical legal questions are not proper in voir dire. Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707, 225 S.E.2d 224 (1976). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in precluding questions concerning the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000). Abstract legal questions. — This section does not require the trial court to permit the use of abstract legal questions. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975). Technical questions as to presumption of innocence. — Counsel for accused should not ask technical legal questions in regard to presumption of innocence, but should confine questions to those which may illustrate any prejudice of the juror against the accused, or any interest of the juror in the cause. McNeal 105 Matters of Inquiry (Cont’d) 2. Technical Legal Questions (Cont’d) v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 187 S.E.2d 271 (1972); Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975); Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305, 223 S.E.2d 498 (1976); Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 264 S.E.2d 516 (1980). Technical legal question concerning presumption of innocence is a subject of instruction by the court and is not a proper area for voir dire examination. Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305, 223 S.E.2d 498 (1976). Questions about the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt may be prohibited. Thomas v. State, 217 Ga. App. 720, 458 S.E.2d 897 (1995). Questions as to belief of innocence. — Court does not err in refusing to allow counsel to ask ‘‘Do you believe defendant innocent?’’ Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 165 S.E.2d 708 (1969). 3. Other Questions Questions on matters contained in general statutory questions. — If there was an indication that the general questions had not been heard, it is not an abuse by the trial court to permit questions on matters contained in the general questions even though some veniremen had been questioned individually. Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 491, 62 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1979). Question as to prejudice against defense counsel. — Although a question posed by defense counsel to determine if any potential jurors were prejudiced against counsel, as a criminal defense lawyer, was within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the trial court’s refusal to allow that question to be addressed to potential jurors was harmless error. Sanders v. State, 204 Ga. App. 37, 419 S.E.2d 24 (1992). Question regarding reaction to evidence of similar transactions. — Trial court properly prohibited defense counsel’s examination of the prospective jurors regarding their possible reaction to evidence of similar transactions. Stell v. 15-12-133 State, 210 Ga. App. 662, 436 S.E.2d 806 (1993). On defendant’s appeal from convictions for forgery and racketeering, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by allowing the state to ask jurors during voir dire about whether the jurors had any knowledge about a similar transaction involving the defendant, and in allowing the state to comment on the parameters of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., during voir dire because contrary to defendant’s contention that the state crafted questions that called for legal arguments and for the prospective jurors to prejudge the case, the record reveals that: (1) the state only mentioned RICO to determine whether prospective jurors had preconceived notions regarding the subject matter of the case; and (2) the question regarding the similar transaction was specifically framed to determine only whether the prospective jurors had any prior knowledge about that transaction. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 128, 589 S.E.2d 700 (2003). Questions permitted relating to racial bias. — Refusal to allow interrogation of the jurors as to their racial bias or prejudice is a denial of due process, and essential demands of fairness require that it be done as a part of the guaranty of a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 657, 200 S.E.2d 454 (1973). O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 gives the defendant the right to ask potential jurors questions relating to possible racial bias, and disallowance of such question is ground for reversal of conviction. Mitchell v. State, 176 Ga. App. 32, 335 S.E.2d 150 (1985). O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 encompasses questions regarding possible racial prejudice and bias, even when such questioning would not be constitutionally required. Legare v. State, 256 Ga. 302, 348 S.E.2d 881 (1986), appeal dismissed, 269 Ga. 468, 499 S.E.2d 640 (1998). Restricting defendant’s race bias related questions to whether any juror held the opinion that a white police officer would be more likely to tell the truth than a black defendant was reversible error 106 since the question defendant was permitted to ask did not address ‘‘any inclination, leaning, or bias’’ which a juror might have because of the fact and circumstance that the defendant was a black male and the victim an elderly white widow. Roberts v. State, 195 Ga. App. 808, 395 S.E.2d 54 (1990). Even though the defendant should have been permitted to ask the following question on voir dire: ‘‘Are you racially biased towards blacks in any way?’’, since the defendant otherwise had a fair and adequate opportunity to explore the potential juror’s racial bias, and an opportunity to obtain information on any potential juror’s racial bias from questions posed by the codefendant’s counsel during individual voir dire, any error of the trial court in putting a chill upon the defendant’s right to ask the specific question in issue was harmless. Walker v. State, 215 Ga. App. 790, 452 S.E.2d 580 (1994). In a prosecution for felony murder, aggravated assault, and other crimes, the defendant did not show the defense counsel’s voir dire questions about attitudes regarding racial bias were unduly restricted as, after the trial court sustained the state’s objections to questions about whether jurors had heard derogatory statements about a person of another race or had used a derogatory term regarding someone of another race, the trial court reconsidered and allowed inquiry as to whether a juror had heard or made racial remarks, and, if the answer was in the affirmative, the defense was allowed to ask if the juror’s racial beliefs would make it impossible for the jurors to be impartial. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006). Questions regarding racial stereotypes. — Defendant’s proposed question to prospective jurors asking if anyone had ‘‘formed an opinion that most of the guys that are arrested, because they are young black males, that they are guilty?’’ was forbidden because it called for an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case. Cherry v. State, 230 Ga. App. 443, 496 S.E.2d 764 (1998). Questions regarding defendant’s status. — Trial court should not have 15-12-133 prohibited defendants from raising the issue of their status as prison escapees during voir dire since the issue of defendants’ escape from prison was relevant to the subject matter of the state’s prosecution. Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003). Question as to membership with defendant in racist organizations. — If the record shows that, at sentencing, appellant acknowledged that appellant was a Klansman, and the prosecution questioned jurors whether any of the jurors were members with defendant in any clubs or organizations such as the Southern Knights of the KKK or the Invisible Empire of the KKK, the court held that such questions did not improperly put defendant’s character in issue and that the question asked by the prosecution falls within the right under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 to discover any interest prospective jurors might have in the case. Mize v. State, 190 Ga. App. 166, 378 S.E.2d 392 (1989). Questions as to membership in social groups or organizations. — It was reversible error for the trial court to forbid the defendant to examine prospective jurors as to whether any of the jurors ‘‘belong to any social groups or organizations or clubs, whether you’re actively involved in them or you just pay your membership dues to them.’’ Perry v. State, 216 Ga. App. 661, 455 S.E.2d 607 (1995). Questions regarding political activities properly refused. — Court’s refusal to allow the defendant to question potential jurors regarding their political activities was not an abuse of discretion. Samples v. State, 217 Ga. App. 509, 460 S.E.2d 795 (1995). Question as to employment of jurors’ immediate family members by law enforcement agencies. — Trial court errs in limiting voir dire of the jurors by refusing to allow the defendant to ask the panel whether members of the jurors’ immediate families had ever worked for law enforcement agencies. Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 306 S.E.2d 645 (1983). Regard for testimony of police officer. — It is not error to refuse to allow defense counsel to ask whether a prospective juror would tend to believe or prefer 107 Matters of Inquiry (Cont’d) 3. Other Questions (Cont’d) the testimony of a police officer over other testimony. Blanco v. State, 185 Ga. App. 535, 364 S.E.2d 903 (1988). Question whether rabbi’s profession or religious orientation inclines, leans, or biases the rabbi. — There is no prejudice to the defendant if, instead of merely confirming that a prospective juror is a rabbi, the district attorney queries whether the rabbi’s profession or religious orientation would incline, lean, or bias the rabbi towards a certain party. This is not the same as a juror being asked if the juror as an individual will be more inclined to believe a police officer, for the latter question infringes more on the jury’s right to determine individual credibility, and not on the juror’s leaning, bias, or inclination because of the juror’s own job or associations. Creamer v. State, 168 Ga. App. 790, 310 S.E.2d 560 (1983). Witness status as officer, victim, or party. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in disallowing questions about the credibility of witnesses based on the witnesses’ status as police officers, victims, or parties. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000). Question as to courts’ handling of sex offenses in general. — Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to ask the entire panel of prospective jurors if any of the jurors had an opinion as to whether sex offenses were being handled adequately by the courts because counsel attempted to question the panel with reference to the issue of punishment or final resolution by the courts in general, an improper consideration for the jurors who potentially were merely to decide on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Hunter v. State, 170 Ga. App. 356, 317 S.E.2d 332 (1984). Questions about domestic violence beliefs. — In a prosecution for aggravated battery, allowing questions to prospective jurors about the jurors’ personal beliefs regarding domestic violence issues was not an abuse of discretion. Childers v. State, 228 Ga. App. 214, 491 S.E.2d 456 (1997). Trial court did not abuse the court’s 15-12-133 discretion in disallowing questions about cases involving a man beating a woman. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000). Questions regarding whether child molestation victim should have resisted. — Prosecutor’s voir dire questions in a child molestation case, which included questions such as ‘‘Is there anyone on the panel that believes a child should have to physically resist an adult in order to hold the adult accountable? That they have to fight back? Kick, scream, bite, scratch? Would you feel the same way even if the child went willingly?’’ were properly posed by the state to determine whether the prospective jurors had preconceived notions regarding the subject matter of the case. The questions did not ask the jurors to prejudge the evidence or the factual issues in the case. Collins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (2011). Questions regarding bias based upon child testifying. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s broad discretion by denying the defendant’s voir dire question seeking to expose bias based upon a child testifying because, during the court’s general voir dire questions, the state sought to identify jurors who had a problem with the nature of the case (statutory rape and child molestation) such that a juror questioned the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial; and, after swearing the jury, the trial court posed questions to all of the jurors regarding prejudice or bias against the defendant and explained the need for jurors who could sit and fairly and impartially weigh the evidence, listen to the law, and reach a fair and impartial verdict. Davis v. State, 327 Ga. App. 729, 761 S.E.2d 139 (2014). Questions regarding religious beliefs as to homosexuality. — Jurors’ responses to defense counsel’s proper questions as to their religious beliefs concerning homosexuality were sufficient to establish that such beliefs would not impact on the jurors’ ability to fairly judge defendants’ guilt or innocence. Baker v. State, 230 Ga. App. 813, 498 S.E.2d 290 (1998). Questions about prior employment. — Trial court did not err in refusing to 108 strike a juror for cause based on the juror’s failure to reveal specifics about former employment. Goss v. State, 237 Ga. App. 593, 516 S.E.2d 100 (1999). Question as to previous military service does not relate to any fact or circumstance indicating an inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action; and, therefore, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to permit defendant’s question on voir dire. Brown v. State, 170 Ga. App. 398, 317 S.E.2d 207 (1984). Questions as to association with insurance company. — If interest of the insurance company is admitted, examination as to the insurance affiliations of the jurors is permissible. Parsons v. Harrison, 133 Ga. App. 280, 211 S.E.2d 128 (1974). Restriction on the individual examination of prospective jurors on voir dire as to whether any of the jurors were agents of the insurance company in question, when the trial court had previously asked whether any of the prospective jurors were officers, directors, agents, employees, or stockholders of the insurance company, was proper. Corley v. Harris, 171 Ga. App. 688, 320 S.E.2d 833 (1984). Questions as to insurance matter which is not involved. — If the questions objected to are not specifically permitted by this section, and the questions relate to a matter of insurance which is in no way involved either directly or indirectly, the trial court properly sustains objections of defendant thereto. Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963). Whether juror has been party to personal injury action is circumstance about which party has right to inquire and receive a truthful reply. Pierce v. Altman, 147 Ga. App. 22, 248 S.E.2d 34 (1978). Question whether juror was ever crime victim permitted. — There is no abuse of discretion in permitting the state to inquire whether a prospective juror has ever been the victim of a crime. Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga. App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985). Denial of defendant’s motion to strike for cause a juror who had been the victim of a violent crime was upheld even though 15-12-133 the juror expressed some reservations about the juror’s ability to be impartial and desire to be impaneled since the juror testified that the juror could render a decision based on the evidence. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. App. 871, 583 S.E.2d 914 (2003). Questions relating to size of verdict. — Under the broad sanction of this section, it must necessarily be held that prejudice as to the size of verdicts is as much comprehended under the subject matter of civil actions as the nature of the cause of action. Questions concerning such prejudice should be phrased in the most general terms, and in such a manner that the juror cannot feel that the juror is being pledged to a future action, but only that the juror is being queried on the juror’s present convictions. Atlanta Joint Terms. v. Knight, 98 Ga. App. 482, 106 S.E.2d 417 (1958). While it is permissible under the broad sanction of this section for counsel to examine prospective jurors with respect to prejudice as to the size of verdicts, such questions should be phrased in general terms and no question should be so framed as to require a response from the juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case. Jones v. Parrott, 111 Ga. App. 750, 143 S.E.2d 393 (1965). Questions as to previous jury service. — Juror’s participation in reaching a verdict in a prior case, totally unrelated to the case being tried, is not relevant to the subject matter of the action. McGinnis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 843, 219 S.E.2d 485 (1975). Whether or not the potential juror had previously served on a grand or petit jury would not have been relevant to the subject matter of the action. Frazier v. State, 138 Ga. App. 640, 227 S.E.2d 284 (1976). Questions as to juror’s age. — Trial court does not abuse the court’s discretion in refusing to permit counsel for the accused to ask the prospective jurors their age. White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886, 94 S. Ct. 222, 38 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1973). Denial of the right to query as to marijuana being addictive drug is not error. Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974). 109 Matters of Inquiry (Cont’d) 3. Other Questions (Cont’d) Questions relating to youth taking drugs. — There was no abuse of discretion in allowing an inquiry concerning a prospective juror’s experience with children or students who had taken drugs when the defendant was charged with selling illegal drugs. Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga. App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985). Questions regarding absence of blood test in DUI case. — In a prosecution for driving under the influence in which there was no blood alcohol test result to present because the defendant refused to take such a test, it was appropriate for the state to ask jurors whether the jurors believed that such a test must be produced in order for the defendant to be found guilty. Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 482, 506 S.E.2d 876 (1998). Questions about the effect of alcohol or drugs on a person’s faculties. — State’s voir dire questions regarding the effect of alcohol or drugs on a person’s faculties, particularly if the alcohol or drugs could make a person impulsive or violent, were properly allowed as the questions addressed whether the prospective jurors had any inclination, leaning, or bias respecting the subject matter of the action or the counsel or parties thereto, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133. Quintana v. State, 276 Ga. 731, 583 S.E.2d 869 (2003). Questioning to identify individuals with strong feelings about drugs. — Any error in the trial court’s limit on voir dire was harmless because the defendant was permitted to question the venire as a whole to identify prospective jurors who had strong feelings about individuals involved in the sale of drugs. Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013). Voir dire question concerning robbery training courses of a bank employee is not within scope of this section. Cook v. State, 137 Ga. App. 406, 224 S.E.2d 70 (1976). Questions as to right of self-defense. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in refusing to permit defense counsel to ask the prospective jurors if the jurors believed in the right of 15-12-133 self-defense. Petty v. State, 179 Ga. App. 767, 347 S.E.2d 663 (1986). In a prosecution for felony murder, aggravated assault, and other crimes, defendant did not show the defense counsel’s voir dire questions about attitudes regarding self-defense in response to the actions of a police officer were unduly restricted, as, following the state’s objection to the phrasing of a particular question, defense counsel proposed a question about a juror’s consideration of a citizen’s justification in responding with force against a police officer, the state had no objection to the question as rephrased, and the trial court allowed the question. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006). Questions as to relative merits of various laws. — While a party is entitled to ask whether or not a juror would be able to follow the court’s instructions, the court need not allow questions which ask jurors to weigh the relative merits of various laws. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982). Questions as to favorite color. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in not allowing the defendant to question jurors during voir dire about the jurors’ favorite color. Bedingfield v. State, 219 Ga. App. 248, 464 S.E.2d 653 (1995). Opinion as to appropriate punishment. — Questions dealing with appropriate punishment should defendant be found guilty called for prejudgment of the case and were properly prohibited. Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442, 291 S.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981, 103 S. Ct. 317, 74 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1982). Questions regarding parole in death penalty cases. — Because determining whether parole eligibility is part of the subject matter of the sentencing phase of death penalty trials, criminal defendants and the state are entitled to examine jurors concerning the jurors’ inclinations, leanings, and biases regarding parole; however, the examination should be limited to the jurors’ willingness to consider both a life sentence that allows for the possibility of parole and a life sentence that does not. Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735, 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000). 110 Questions about books, movies, or television programs. — Trial court may exclude questions about books jurors have read or movies and television programs jurors have seen. Thomas v. State, 217 Ga. App. 720, 458 S.E.2d 897 (1995). Question as to whether prospective juror wondered why two individuals were indicted but only one was on trial was not aimed at uncovering the juror’s interest in the case, or any fact indicating the juror’s bias in the subject matter of the case, and was improper. Roland v. State, 266 Ga. 545, 468 S.E.2d 378 (1996). 15-12-133 Questions about sentencing options. — Trial court abused the court’s discretion in prohibiting the defendant from asking voir dire questions of prospective jurors as to whether the jurors would automatically impose the death penalty as opposed to fairly considering all three sentencing options (death, life without parole, and life with the possibility of parole) in a case involving the murder of young children as such questioning was permitted under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133. Ellington v.