Hall v

State, 277 Ga. App. 413, 626 S.E.2d 611 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to support both an armed robbery and a burglary conviction as: (1) the defendant admitted to possessing a gun stolen in the robbery and other items used in commission of the crimes; (2) the defendant fled when confronted by police; and (3) the defendant asked another person in the courthouse why that person snitched on the defendant; the state’s failure to produce or ever locate the weapon used by the defendant was immaterial as was the fact that the defendant was acquitted of the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Roberts v. State, 277 Ga. App. 730, 627 S.E.2d 446 (2006). Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault when using the defendant’s mother’s telephone number, the defendant contacted the victim and arranged a meeting to buy shoes, when the victim identified the car the defendant was driving, which was registered to the defendant’s mother, since the victim identified the defendant from a pretrial police photo array and at trial, and since, at the meeting arranged by the defendant, the victim was shot in the face and the defendant then rummaged through the victim’s car where the victim kept the shoes. Waddell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 772, 627 S.E.2d 840 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 731, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9304, 166 L.Ed.2d 567 (2006). Victim’s identification sufficient. — Evidence supported defendant two’s conviction for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault as, notwithstanding the absence of an in-court identification of the defendant and the state’s failure to present fingerprint evidence, a victim’s testimony concerning the victim’s on-the-scene identification supported the finding that the defendant perpetrated the crimes; there was also sufficient evidence that the cash seized from the defendant’s love interest’s house had been put 16-8-41 there by defendant two. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery as: (1) the victims had the opportunity and the ability to identify the defendant; (2) there was sufficient evidence that the gun taken from the defendant’s house was the gun that the defendant carried during the robbery; and (3) fingerprint evidence was not essential to the state’s case. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005). Evidence, including a gun and penny wrappers and a green coin basket found in the defendant’s bedroom, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery and kidnapping after a restaurant was robbed; the basket matched a basket used by the restaurant and the pennies had been exchanged by the same bank that supplied the restaurant. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 66, 619 S.E.2d 759 (2005). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and kidnapping with bodily injury, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41 and 16-5-40, respectively, were supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant robbed a restaurant manager at gunpoint, forced the manager and others into the restaurant freezer, and the defendant caused injury and made threats to the victims; the defendant’s claim that the defendant was forced against the defendant’s will to participate in the crime, which was also committed by three codefendants, was not found credible, and several victims testified that the defendant not only held a gun, but that the defendant also threatened the victims with bodily harm if the victims did not cooperate. Isaac v. State, 275 Ga. App. 254, 620 S.E.2d 483 (2005). Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty of all four counts of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt as the two sets of two victims each from the two different robberies identified the defendant as the perpetrator and the defendant had the victims’ property at the time the defendant was apprehended. Blunt v. State, 275 Ga. App. 409, 620 S.E.2d 572 (2005). 360 Tattoo as factor in identification of armed robbery perpetrator. — Evidence was sufficient to support burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and armed robbery convictions after one of the victims opened the door to the victim’s home when the victim recognized one of the defendant’s accomplices, when the defendant and another then pushed the door open and rushed inside, and when the defendant grabbed the first victim, pointed a gun at the first victim’s head, took money from the second victim’s wallet, kept the gun pointed at both victims during the entire incident, ripped the telephone cord out of the wall, and instructed the accomplices to bind and blindfold the victims, which they did; the victims both identified the defendant as the gunman from a police photo array and made an in-court identification at trial, and any conflict between the victims’ testimony that the gunman had a tattoo on the gunman’s arm and a trial demonstration revealing no tattoo on the defendant’s arm was a matter for the jury to resolve and did not affect the suplastifficiency of the identification. Kates v. State, 269 Ga. App. 8, 603 S.E.2d 342 (2004). In addition to the second codefendant’s testimony, the state showed that, shortly after the murder, the defendant was in possession of the victim’s cab, that the victim’s blood was found in the vehicle and on the defendant, and that the defendant made incriminating admissions to others; thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of malice murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Wicks v. State, 278 Ga. 550, 604 S.E.2d 768 (2004). Recognition of voice as sufficient. — Evidence that a store employee recognized one of the robbers’ voices as belonging to the defendant, that the defendant’s car was found behind the store with proceeds of the robbery and a loaded pistol, and that the defendant was found in a dumpster behind the store was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment and armed robbery. Woods v. State, 16-8-41 266 Ga. App. 53, 596 S.E.2d 203 (2004). Uncorroborated identification of defendant. — Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of armed robbery even though the victim’s identifications of the defendant in a photographic lineup and at trial were uncorroborated; the victim testified that defendant held a handgun to the victim’s head while an accomplice took the victim’s money and wallet, which authorized the jury to convict the defendant. Eady v. State, 273 Ga. App. 261, 614 S.E.2d 868 (2005). Expert testimony that a shell casing at the crime scene came from a pistol found in the defendant’s apartment, along with two witnesses’ identifications of the defendant, and expert testimony that a bullet extracted from a victim’s head possibly came from the defendant’s pistol, although it was too damaged to say with complete certainty, sufficiently supported the defendant’s convictions for murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Escobar v. State, 279 Ga. 727, 620 S.E.2d 812 (2005). Identification of gun and defendant. — Defendant’s conviction for two counts of armed robbery was upheld on appeal because the evidence showed that the defendant was identified by one of the victims shortly after the robbery spree of a dry cleaners and a beauty shop and, while another victim was not able to identify the defendant, the victim was able to identify the gun used, which was the same gun found in the defendant’s vehicle after the robberies, as was a mask and other criminal tools. Butler v. State, 276 Ga. App. 161, 623 S.E.2d 132 (2005). Identification by love interest. — As a robber’s unique shirt was recorded by a convenience store security camera, and the defendant’s love interest identified it as the defendant’s shirt, and as the defendant could not say exactly where the defendant was that evening, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. App. 169, 626 S.E.2d 128 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported convictions of felony murder, armed robbery, 361 Identification (Cont’d) aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony where, upon pulling into an apartment complex to turn around and ask for directions, the victims were approached by the defendant and another person, the defendant pulled out a gun and told the victims to ‘‘give it up,’’ when one of the victims hesitated, the defendant shot the victim, the defendant then stole that victim’s money and jewelry, and later, the gunshot victim died; the second victim described the defendant, who was wearing a specific jersey at the time of the crimes, and two witnesses who knew the defendant testified that the defendant robbed and shot the victim while wearing that jersey. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006). Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, false imprisonment, and hijacking a motor vehicle were supported by sufficient evidence since a perpetrator identified as the defendant robbed a pizza restaurant at gunpoint, ordered everyone into a cooler, and took the restaurant manager’s vehicle, after which an officer discovered the defendant the next day driving the manager’s vehicle and wearing a hat identical to that worn by the perpetrator, and since a customer at the restaurant identified the defendant as the robber in a photo line-up and at trial; while three of the four crimes arising out of the incident were committed after the customer, who was the only witness to identify the defendant, was ordered into the cooler, only one robber entered the restaurant and the jury was authorized to infer that the person identified by the customer also committed the crimes committed after the customer was in the cooler. Head v. State, 279 Ga. App. 608, 631 S.E.2d 808 (2006). While the trial court’s act of including ‘‘level of certainty’’ language in the court’s pattern jury charge on eyewitness identification was erroneous, the error was harmless, given that the victim was able to describe the physical characteristics of the armed robber, and there was evidence 16-8-41 other than the victim’s identification connecting the defendant to the crime, specifically, the victim’s description of the car the armed robber used to get away and the defendant’s presence at a nearby store shortly after the robbery; hence, it was highly probable that the ‘‘level of certainty’’ jury charge did not contribute to the judgment. Pasco v. State, 281 Ga. App. 5, 635 S.E.2d 269 (2006). Identification of defendant in photo array. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because the victim gave a detailed description of the defendant, the victim identified the defendant in a photographic array and in court, and the defendant admitted to the robbery. White v. State, 250 Ga. App. 783, 552 S.E.2d 927 (2001). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s two armed robbery conviction as defendant’s challenge to those convictions was meritless; the defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient had to be rejected because it was premised on the argument that the victims’ identification of the defendant as a perpetrator was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup and the photographic lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. Evans v. State, 261 Ga. App. 22, 581 S.E.2d 676 (2003). When the defendant’s victim identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial as the person who forced the victim to open the vaults in the fast-food restaurant where the victim worked, then duct-taped the victim’s limbs and repeatedly struck the victim as the victim lay face down on the floor, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to allow the jury to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004). Because the defendant admitted to knowing about a robbery beforehand, to being present at the robbery, and to telling one of the victims to get on the floor, all three of the defendant’s accomplices put the defendant inside the home where the robbery occurred during the commission 362 of the crime, and the defendant’s car was driven to and from the scene, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Jones v. State, 270 Ga. App. 368, 606 S.E.2d 592 (2004). Testimony provided by two accomplices, together with inside information which the defendant learned about the location of the robbery, the security camera on the premises, the people that worked there, how many people worked there, who was in the back area, and about the safe, when coupled with the fact that the gunman was not captured on the security camera, provided some evidence, though slight, that the robber had such inside information; under the circumstances, the accomplices’ testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty. Ziegler v. State, 270 Ga. App. 787, 608 S.E.2d 230 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1019, 126 S. Ct. 656, 163 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2005). Defendant’s multiple convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury were supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant and another robbed a store while holding the two owners at gunpoint, the defendant led police on a high-speed car chase, and the defendant broke into and robbed two homes, one of which had an occupant that the defendant beat; only one store owner’s testimony was needed to establish the facts to support the aggravated assault conviction. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005). In a prosecution for armed robbery and offenses related thereto, the trial court did not improperly allow hearsay evidence of identification, and hence, it was not error to allow a police officer to testify as to who the victims identified in the photo arrays as a law enforcement officer could testify to a pre-trial identification if the person who actually made the identification testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Monfort v. State, 281 Ga. App. 29, 635 S.E.2d 336 (2006). As a cashier was only two feet from two robbers during the crime, which lasted about a minute, and the cashier looked at their faces, the fact that the cashier iden- 16-8-41 tified the defendant twice from photo arrays, and once at trial as the robber who had held the gun was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery. Shabazz v. State, 293 Ga. App. 560, 667 S.E.2d 414 (2008). Armed robbery convictions entered against both the first and second defendants were upheld on appeal, given sufficient identification evidence, making an erroneous ‘‘level of certainty’’ instruction harmless error, and because counsel for the first defendant was not ineffective. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. App. 469, 638 S.E.2d 869 (2006), cert. dismissed, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 135 (Ga. 2007). Evidence, which included uncontroverted testimony from an eyewitness who saw a defendant order a store employee into the street shortly before the employee was shot, the testimony of two other eyewitnesses, and the fact that calls had been made from the employee’s stolen cellular phone to the defendant’s mother, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and a number of other associated crimes. Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 642 S.E.2d 659 (2007). Because sufficient evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of an armed robbery was presented by: (1) the convenience store clerk that was robbed at knife point; (2) the store’s owner, who testified to seeing the defendant in the store at least ten times in the year prior to the robbery; and (3) the store’s surveillance videotape, which matched the owner’s description, the defendant’s armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal. Clark v. State, 283 Ga. App. 884, 642 S.E.2d 900 (2007). Identity of perpetrator is issue for trier of fact. — Defendant’s armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) issues related to the identity of the perpetrator were for the trier of fact, not the Court of Appeals of Georgia; and (2) identification testimony by a witness the defendant challenged was relevant, and thus admissible, and was not rendered inadmissible merely because such placed the defendant’s character in issue. Buice v. State, 289 Ga. App. 415, 657 S.E.2d 326 (2008). 363 Identification (Cont’d) There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because the state met the state’s burden of proving that the defendant took the property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon; the state offered the testimony of the bus counter clerk as to the facts of the robbery and as to the identification of the defendant as the gunman. That testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Range v. State, 289 Ga. App. 727, 658 S.E.2d 245 (2008). No likelihood of misidentification. — Because: (1) victim’s identification of defendant was based upon independent memory which victim fairly accurately recalled in developing the composite sketch; (2) there was an independent basis for the victim’s identifications; and (3) there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting the identification evidence and the trial court’s finding that there was no likelihood of misidentification was supported by the record. Price v. State, 289 Ga. App. 763, 658 S.E.2d 382 (2008). Trial court properly convicted the defendant of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle because: (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish the defendant committed the crimes based on the testimony of the victim, who identified the defendant as the individual who approached the victim’s vehicle, pointed a gun, and demanded the vehicle; (2) two officers testified as to observing the defendant driving the stolen vehicle the same night; and (3) the victim’s cell phone was found on the defendant’s person when the defendant was arrested. Culver v. State, 290 Ga. App. 321, 659 S.E.2d 390 (2008). Because the evidence showed that the victim sufficiently identified the defendant as the perpetrator of an aggravated assault and armed robbery (1) to officers at the scene, (2) by means of a photographic lineup, and (3) at trial, the appeals court rejected the defendant’s sufficiency challenge as to that element. Wallace v. State, 289 Ga. App. 497, 657 S.E.2d 874 (2008). 16-8-41 Victim identification sufficient. — There was no merit to a defendant’s argument that the evidence did not support an armed robbery conviction because the victims’ identifications were unreliable. The victims’ encounter with the defendant lasted up to three minutes and took place at a well-lit tennis court; the victims had a clear view of the defendant’s face; one victim was close enough to the defendant to hand the defendant the victim’s wallet; the descriptions the victims gave matched the defendant’s height, build, age, and hairstyle; and the victims identified the defendant the same evening as the incident. Olive v. State, 291 Ga. App. 538, 662 S.E.2d 308 (2008). While the state failed to produce a weapon, fingerprints, or other physical evidence tying the defendant to the crimes, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the jury was authorized to accept the cashier’s identification testimony; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. Clowers v. State, 299 Ga. App. 576, 683 S.E.2d 46 (2009). Single witness identification of defendant sufficient. — Sufficient evidence was presented to support a defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because the victim, a taxi driver, identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators based, inter alia, on the victim’s knowledge of the defendant from living in the same townhome complex; a single witness’s testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Troutman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836 (2009). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), aggravated sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b), kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), and aggravated sodomy, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a)(2), involving four different victims on three separate dates; both the husband and the wife, the victims in the first criminal incident, identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crimes. Two sepa- 364 rate DNA analyses testified to by two forensic biologists showed that the defendant’s sperm was present in the vaginas of the other two female victims. Robins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 70, 679 S.E.2d 92 (2009). Jury determines accuracy of eyewitness identification. — Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to support the convictions; regardless of any inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, it was for the jury to assess witness credibility, and the jury chose to believe the victim’s identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the crimes. Williams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (2009). Testimony of an armed robbery victim and the victim’s love interest, who were eyewitnesses to the defendant’s crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault, and who separately identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery and assault, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of armed robbery of a restaurant, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because sufficient evidence corroborated an accomplice’s testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery; the driver corroborated that the driver picked the defendant up and dropped the defendant and the accomplice off at the defendant’s residence near the restaurant about two-and-one-half hours before the robbery, the driver overheard the defendant speaking to the accomplice about committing a robbery, and two more witnesses confirmed that the two were together that evening. Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to exclude the in-court identification by each of the armed rob- 16-8-41 bery victims because each of the victims’ identification of the defendant had an independent origin; each of the victims observed the defendant face to face in full daylight and identified the defendant’s photograph within days of being robbed, and the first victim identified the defendant as the victim drove by in a car. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) of the victim, a restaurant employee, who was pressure washing the exterior of the restaurant in a lit parking lot. The employee testified that the employee observed the defendant’s face the entire time that the defendant held a gun to the employee’s chest. Battise v. State, 309 Ga. App. 835, 711 S.E.2d 390 (2011). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness’s identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012). Victim’s identification sufficient. — Victim’s testimony that the defendant was one of the two men who came into the victim’s house, beat the victim with fists and a flashlight, and demanded the victim’s keys and money authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of burglary, aggravated battery, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Garmon v. State, 317 Ga. App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (2012). Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault based on the victims’ testimony that guns were used in the commission of the crimes, the testimony of the defendant’s girlfriend, and the presence of a cell phone found near the scene of the crimes, and the victims identifying the defendant’s accent was suffi- 365 Identification (Cont’d) cient for the jury to infer that the defendant was an armed participant in the crimes. Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for two counts of armed robbery with respect to two victims at the first residence, attempt to commit armed robbery with respect to one of the victims at the first residence, and two counts of burglary with respect to the two residences because the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by one of the witnesses, who identified the defendant. Lane v. State, 324 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (2013). Simultaneous lineup not impermissibly suggestive. — With regard to the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and false imprisonment, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the out-of-court identifications of the defendant because the court found that the simultaneous lineup was not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law based on the testimony of the officer who prepared and presented the lineup that the victims were admonished that the suspect may not be in the array. McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery based on the testimony of the employee, who identified the defendant and the codefendants, and a surveillance video, which showed them in the same clothing witnesses had seen them wearing; plus, the defendant’s cell phone records placed the defendant in the area of the robbery at the time the robbery occurred, despite the defendant claiming to be in another city at the time. Carter v. State, 326 Ga. App. 144, 756 S.E.2d 232 (2014). Identification and fingerprint evidence sufficient. — Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony based on the witnesses’ positive identification of the defendant’s distinctive speech; the ski mask and salad bag found in the defendant’s vehicle from the restaurant robbed; 16-8-41 and the sudden, labored, and sweaty appearance of the defendant immediately after the robbery and high speed chase. Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 765 S.E.2d 599 (2014). Since the admission of the victim’s identification of the defendant was not improper, the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on that identification failed and the jury was authorized, based on the identification and the existence of the defendant’s fingerprints on the victim’s van, to find that the defendant committed both armed robbery and aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 500, 782 S.E.2d 287 (2016). Identification of defendant. — Evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the armed robbery was sufficient; the defendant’s spouse admitted to helping to plan the robbery, driving the defendant to the bank, waiting for the defendant, driving away after the defendant jumped in the open trunk and spending the money, the defendant’s parent testified that defendant told the defendant’s parent the defendant committed the robbery and the defendant’s fingerprints were on the envelope containing the note the defendant gave the teller demanding the money. Keller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 546, 499 S.E.2d 713 (1998). When the victim identified the defendant less than 15 minutes after a robbery, had been face-to-face with the robber for three or four seconds, gave the police a substantially correct description of the defendant’s person, and demonstrated a high degree of certainty in the identification, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, even though no physical evidence tied the defendant to the robbery; the fact that the defendant was handcuffed during the ‘‘showup’’ identification did not make the identification unreasonably or unfairly conducted, and the credibility of the victim was a jury question. Tiggs v. State, 287 Ga. App. 291, 651 S.E.2d 209 (2007). Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s armed robbery conviction when an accomplice, who was wearing a mask and holding a gun when the accom- 366 plice entered the victim’s bedroom, testified that the defendant had given the accomplice the mask and the gun and that the accomplice had shouted downstairs to the defendant during the robbery; the testimony was corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the victim’s recognition of the defendant’s voice from the shouted conversation during the robbery and by the defendant’s resistance and flight when police arrived. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007). Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the effectiveness of trial counsel, and the absence of reversible error in excepting the lead detective from sequestration, instructing the jury, admitting similar transaction evidence, and admitting the defendant’s custodial statement, the defendant’s armed robbery and possession of a firearm convictions were upheld on appeal. Morgan v. State, 287 Ga. App. 569, 651 S.E.2d 833 (2007). Indictment Contents of indictment not fatal to conviction. — An over-inclusive list of items alleged to have been taken in an indictment for armed robbery is not fatal to the validity of a conviction. Booker v. State, 242 Ga. App. 80, 528 S.E.2d 849 (2000). Despite the defendant’s contention on appeal that two armed robbery convictions were void because the indictment failed to allege the essential element of intent to commit a theft because the defendant’s contention amounted to a motion in arrest of judgment, the claim lacked merit as the indictment was not absolutely void. Beals v. State, 288 Ga. App. 815, 655 S.E.2d 687 (2007). Whether the misnomer of an armed robbery victim constituted a defect in the indictment was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant filed no demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment contending that the indictment was void, nor did the defendant interpose any objection to the victim testifying; even if the alleged error had been preserved, the misnomer of the victim in the indictment was not a fatal error because the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim revealed 16-8-41 that the defendant was aware of the victim’s identity as one of the robbery victims and was prepared to cross-examine the victim. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010). Error in indictment charging felony murder. — In a prosecution for felony murder by aiding and abetting in an armed robbery, an indictment alleging that the defendant acted in concert with the perpetrator and relinquished control over money pursuant to their prearranged agreement negated an essential element of robbery — that the relinquishment of possession was the result of force or intimidation. State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 476 S.E.2d 579 (1996). Form of indictment. — An overinclusive list of items alleged to have been stolen in an indictment for armed robbery did not result in a variance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial so severe that it affected defendant’s substantial rights, prejudiced the preparation of defendant’s defense, or exposed defendant to the possibility of subsequently having to stand trial for the same charge. Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 443 S.E.2d 300 (1994). Because the indictment filed against the defendant set out all the essential elements of the offense of armed robbery, and the defendant could not admit to those allegations without being guilty of a crime, the indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer; moreover, to the extent the defendant’s attack on the indictment could be considered a special demurrer, seeking greater specificity, that demurrer was waived by the failure to interpose it prior to pleading to the indictment. Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007). Indictment with variation in victim’s identification. — Fact that armed robbery indictment alleged that the money taken by the defendant was the property of one person, when the evidence showed that it was the property of that person’s daughter, did not deny the defendant’s right to be definitely informed as to the charges against the defendant to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense. Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 300 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 367 Indictment (Cont’d) 865, 104 S. Ct. 199, 78 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1983). Defendant could be convicted of robbing each of two bank tellers during a single incident; each employee who was robbed was a victim, regardless of who owned the money. McCluskey v. State, 211 Ga. App. 205, 438 S.E.2d 679 (1993). Proof of exact date of crime not necessary. — When the defendant was accused of committing armed robbery on or about September 15, 2001, the defendant was tried in August 2002, and the defendant testified that the robbery occurred ‘‘last fall,’’ the evidence supported a finding that the crime was committed during the fall of 2001, which was within the seven-year statute of limitations for armed robbery pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(b) and 17-3-1(b); as the exact date of the commission of the crime was not a material allegation of the indictment, the commission of the offense could be proved to have occurred any time within the limitations period. Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 383, 599 S.E.2d 325 (2004). Inappropriate conjunction in indictment not fatal. — Indictment which stated that the defendant took property of another from the person and immediate presence was merely the use of an inappropriate conjunction and not a fatal variance. Dobbs v. State, 204 Ga. App. 83, 418 S.E.2d 443 (1992). Use of Weapon Scissors. — Evidence that the defendant took money from the second victim while holding scissors, without evidence that the second victim owed the defendant money, supported the armed robbery conviction. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013). Rock covered by sock. — Evidence the defendant took a purse and a car from a woman after telling the woman to drive or die while pointing a sock covered rock at the woman supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. Hughes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 4, 746 S.E.2d 648 (2013). Sufficient evidence supported the defen- 16-8-41 dant’s conviction for armed robbery based on the victim identifying the defendant as the person who hit the victim on the head, an accomplice’s testimony, the victim’s car keys were found in a bag that the defendant had been holding when stopped by an officer, and the defendant fled from the officers when the officers attempted to arrest the defendant. Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688 (2013). Meat Cleaver. — Evidence the defendant entered the gift shop wielding a meat cleaver, made repeated demands for money, and the two victims were present and held in fear when the money was taken from the cash register and a video poker machine was sufficient to support the defendant’s robbery convictions as to those two victims. Bradford v. State, 327 Ga. App. 621, 760 S.E.2d 630 (2014). Evidence from a victim that the defendant robbed the victim of cash, cell phones, and a GPS unit at knifepoint was sufficient pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8 to establish that the defendant committed armed robbery with a knife in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and 16-11106(b)(1), although the defendant testified that the victim gave the defendant these items for drugs. Sanders v. State, 324 Ga. App. 4, 749 S.E.2d 14 (2013). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery based on the evidence showing that the defendant was found by police hiding after a high speed chase, was in a car with two men who fit the description of the two men who robbed the restaurant, and the car contained a deposit slip identified by a restaurant worker. Martin v. State, 324 Ga. App. 252, 749 S.E.2d 815 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and burglary because three black males robbed the store, one of whom pointed a gun at the store manager; after the defendant was apprehended, the defendant made incriminating statements that the defendant took the stuff to pay bills and that the defendant did not know where the other two individuals were; and the bags found in the defendant’s vicinity consisted of six cooler totes containing approximately $700 in merchandise from the store and a plastic bag containing money and the de- 368 posit slip from the store’s safe. Brooks v. State, 324 Ga. App. 352, 750 S.E.2d 423 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the state presented evidence that the defendant used force against the victim before taking the victim’s money as the theft was completed after the defendant stabbed the victim to death with a knife. Bates v. State, 293 Ga. 855, 750 S.E.2d 323 (2013). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery, aggravated assault against the manager and cashier, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery because the law allowed the defendant to be charged with and convicted of the same offenses as the codefendant since the evidence showed that the defendant drove the codefendant to the fast food restaurant that was robbed and waited as the getaway driver. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, although the two passengers of the car committed the actual armed robbery, there was evidence that the defendant, the driver of the car, knew that the two passengers were armed and that the defendant ‘‘kind of sort of ’’ knew what they were going to do, which supported a finding that the defendant participated in the robbery as the getaway driver. Smith v. State, 325 Ga. App. 745, 754 S.E.2d 788 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the four armed robberies as a party as the accomplice testified that the robberies were executed pursuant to a plan orchestrated and aided by the defendant; the accomplice never pointed the weapon at the defendant, nor demanded the defendant’s property; and, although the defendant had successfully fled the property, the defendant circled back to the residence — while the accomplice was still there — and attempted to steal electronic equipment. Styles v. State, 329 Ga. App. 143, 764 S.E.2d 166 (2014). Victim’s testimony that the defendant 16-8-41 pointed a gun at the victim, gave the gun to an accomplice, and took the victim’s possessions, and that the victim was 100% sure the defendant was one of the robbers was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery. Hogan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 596, 768 S.E.2d 779 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21, 16-5-41, 16-8-41, and 16-11-106, based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank, defendant’s clothing, a text message between the defendant and the defendant’s accomplice, and the defandant’s accomplice’s testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015). Evidence that the defendant took a laptop during the burglary, including a codefendant’s statement that the codefendant saw the defendant emerge from the victim’s home with the laptop under the defendant’s arm, and the fact that the defendant appeared with a camcorder taken from the victim the day after the murder and the gun used in the murder was found in defendant’s home was sufficient to support an armed robbery conviction. Pitchford v. State, 294 Ga. 230, 751 S.E.2d 785 (2013), overruled on other grounds, State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the victim arranged to purchase a car from the defendant for $4000; the victim met the defendant and got into the defendant’s car to go see the car for sale; when the defendant pulled into a driveway and unlocked the car doors, eight or nine masked people dressed in black with handguns and shotguns grabbed the victim, pulled the victim out of the car, beat the victim, and then robbed the victim of the $4000 cash the victim had to purchase the car, another $300 in cash the victim had, the victim’s cell phone, and the victim’s flip-flops; and the defendant told one of the men holding a gun to the victim’s head not to shoot the victim. Logan-Goodlaw v. State, 331 Ga. App. 671, 770 S.E.2d 899 (2015). 369 Use of Weapon (Cont’d) Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape, aggravated sodomy, and two counts of armed robbery because the co-defendant, the defendant, and a third man rushed into the apartment and secured the arms and legs of the male victims with duct tape while they ransacked the apartment looking for money and drugs; as the victim entered the bathroom and sat on the toilet, the defendant followed the victim in, stood in front of the victim, and forced the victim at gunpoint to perform oral sex on the defendant; the defendant later bent the victim over a sofa, and had sexual intercourse with the victim; and the victim identified the defendant as the man who sexually assaulted the victim. Traylor v. State, 332 Ga. App. 441, 773 S.E.2d 403 (2015). Testimony of the victim identifying the defendant as the person who robbed the victim and identifying the handgun, and the testimony of the security guard and the bystander which aligned with the victim’s account of the robbery was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Murphy v. State, 333 Ga. App. 722, 776 S.E.2d 657 (2015). Canes. — Sufficient evidence supported convictions of malice murder and armed robbery when during an argument with a 79-year-old victim, the defendant struck the victim in the head several times with the victim’s cane, causing the cane to break and an edge of the cane to cut the victim’s neck, after which the defendant took the victim’s wallet and car and drove to Atlanta. Harvey v. State, 284 Ga. 8, 660 S.E.2d 528 (2008). In defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault in connection with robbery of a fast food restaurant, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s convictions based on a restaurant employee identifying the defendant as one of two perpetrators who confronted that employee and manager at gunpoint and threatened to shoot if the victims did not comply with the defendant’s demand for money; also, evidence showed that the 16-8-41 defendant forced the manager out of the manager’s car at gunpoint, ordered the manager back across the parking lot and into the restaurant, and stole over $300.00 from the restaurant’s safe as well as a cellular phone before fleeing. Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to support armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions. Two masked persons entered a restaurant, pointed a gun at the employees, forced the manager to give the individuals money, including rolls of change, ordered everyone to get on the floor, and then fled; an officer saw two people running, including the defendant, who were wearing the type of boots worn by the robbers; the defendant had a BB gun and $201 in cash, including several rolls of quarters; two restaurant employees identified the gun as the weapon used in the robbery; and a detective testified that when the defendant was arrested, the defendant was wearing the jacket and boots depicted on the surveillance videotape played for the jury. Williams v. State, 291 Ga. App. 279, 661 S.E.2d 658 (2008). Crowbars. — State’s evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant had been in the victim’s store twice on the night of the alleged robbery; (2) the victim identified the masked perpetrator as a Caucasian male wielding a crowbar; (3) trained police dogs followed a scent from a trail immediately behind the store to the residence where the defendant was located; (4) the defendant was the only Caucasian person at that location; (5) in the backyard of that residence, police officers found a crow bar with the victim’s blood on it and a jacket whose pocket contained a receipt evidencing the purchase of a crowbar; (6) surveillance videotape from the location where the purchase of the crowbar was made supported the conclusion that the defendant was the person who purchased the crowbar; and (7) the defendant made a voluntary statement to the police that the jury could easily have interpreted as a confession. Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga. App. 163, 657 S.E.2d 250 (2008). 370 Constitutionality of ‘‘appearance of such weapon.’’ — ‘‘Appearance of such weapon’’ in O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) is not impermissibly vague, and the statute is therefore constitutional. Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 375 S.E.2d 30 (1989). To support conviction of armed robbery, offensive weapon must be used to effectuate robbery. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981). What constitutes an offensive weapon. — See Fann v. State, 153 Ga. App. 634, 266 S.E.2d 307 (1980); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Clark v. State, 221 Ga. App. 273, 470 S.E.2d 816 (1996). Term ‘‘offensive weapon’’ is not one that requires definition absent a request. Meminger v. State, 160 Ga. App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981), rev’d on other grounds, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982), vacated, 163 Ga. App. 338, 295 S.E.2d 235 (1982). Trial counsel’s failure to request a charge on the definition of ‘‘offensive weapon’’ under the armed robbery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The charge given advised the jury of the applicable law, and the trial court was not required to instruct on the meaning of all words used, particularly words of common understanding. Collier v. State, 303 Ga. App. 31, 692 S.E.2d 697 (2010). Hands and feet not weapons. — Defendant’s hands and feet do not constitute offensive weapons for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Wright v. State, 228 Ga. App. 779, 492 S.E.2d 680 (1997); Haugland v. State, 253 Ga. App. 423, 560 S.E.2d 50 (2002). Not necessary that offensive weapon be a gun. — Under the plain words of the statute, it is not necessary to prove the offensive weapon involved was in fact a gun. Montgomery v. State, 208 Ga. App. 763, 432 S.E.2d 120 (1993). It need not be shown that gun used was loaded. — When allegation that shotgun used by accused in effecting robbery was ‘‘loaded’’ related to no element which was a necessary ingredient of offense charged, the word ‘‘loaded’’ can therefore be properly treated as surplusage so that proof thereof was not neces- 16-8-41 sary. Moody v. State, 216 Ga. 192, 115 S.E.2d 526 (1960). Weapon can be instrument of constructive as well as actual force. — Armed robbery is committed if the weapon has been used as an instrument of constructive, as well as actual, force. Maddox v. State, 174 Ga. App. 728, 330 S.E.2d 911 (1985). Manner of weapon’s use determinative of its nature. — Manner in which a weapon is used may determine whether that weapon is an offensive weapon for the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984). Menacing or threatening not required. — An armed robber need not use an offensive weapon in a menacing or threatening manner to accomplish the robbery. The element of ‘‘use’’ of an offensive weapon is satisfied whenever the victim is aware of the weapon, and it has the desired forceful effect of assisting to accomplish the robbery. Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. App. 7, 545 S.E.2d 148 (2001). Toy pistol can be an offensive or deadly weapon under certain circumstances but is not necessarily a deadly weapon. Butts v. State, 153 Ga. App. 464, 265 S.E.2d 370 (1980). Starter pistol used by the defendant had the appearance of an actual handgun, which most assuredly is an offensive weapon. Morgan v. State, 191 Ga. App. 226, 381 S.E.2d 402 (1989); Ledford v. State, 207 Ga. App. 705, 429 S.E.2d 124 (1993). Armed robbery can be committed either with a real weapon or with a toy or replica weapon having appearance of being real. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981). Where the evidence was that the defendant robbed the victim using a replica, article, or device having the appearance of an offensive weapon, so as to create a reasonable apprehension that it was an offensive weapon, the conviction was upheld. Jones v. State, 236 Ga. App. 330, 511 S.E.2d 882 (1999). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery when the defendant walked into a restaurant, opened the defendant’s jacket and 371 Use of Weapon (Cont’d) showed what appeared to be a gun, and demanded money. Gardner v. State, 261 Ga. App. 188, 582 S.E.2d 167 (2003). Nunchucks were weapon. — Set of nunchucks constituted an offensive weapon and, therefore, supported a conviction for armed robbery. Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 506 S.E.2d 165 (1998). Vice grips. — Offensive weapon for purposes of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) includes not only weapons which are offensive per se, such as firearms loaded with live ammunition, but also embraces other instrumentalities not normally considered to be offensive weapons in and of themselves but which may be found by a jury to be likely to produce death or great bodily injury depending on the manner and means of their use; the jury was entitled to conclude that vise grips carried by defendant were a weapon for purposes of armed robbery under § 16-8-41(a) after a victim testified that the vise grips were heavy and that the victim was afraid that defendant would knock the victim out. Phillips v. State, 259 Ga. App. 331, 577 S.E.2d 25 (2003). Ceramic vase is not per se an offensive or deadly weapon. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984). Electric cord. — Jury may find an electric cord to be an ‘‘offensive weapon’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, depending upon the manner and means of its use. Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 340 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 245, 93 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1986). Tire tool stuck in the waistband of defendant’s pants constitutes an offensive weapon. Cook v. State, 179 Ga. App. 610, 347 S.E.2d 664 (1986). Screwdriver. — Evidence was sufficient to show that theft occurred after force was employed where defendant, who had concealed self in the victim’s van, attempted to stab the victim in the neck with a screwdriver and then drove away with the van a few moments after the victim escaped therefrom. Wynn v. State, 228 Ga. App. 124, 491 S.E.2d 149 (1997). There was sufficient evidence to support 16-8-41 defendant’s conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), where defendant went into a store, demanded money from the cash register, showed the clerk a screwdriver, which the clerk thought at the time was an ice pick, and defendant took money and fled; whether defendant pointed the screwdriver at the store clerk was immaterial, as it was found that defendant used the screwdriver to persuade the clerk to comply with defendant’s demand and the robbery was accomplished while the victim was under a reasonable apprehension that defendant was using an offensive weapon. Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 383, 599 S.E.2d 325 (2004). Pellet gun constituted an offensive weapon. Fleming v. State, 233 Ga. App. 483, 504 S.E.2d 542 (1998). Stun gun can constitute an offensive weapon authorizing an armed robbery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). James v. State, 239 Ga. App. 541, 521 S.E.2d 465 (1999). Use of plastic gun sufficient for armed robbery. — Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), there was no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion for directed verdict; although it was impossible to see on the videotape what the defendant held in the defendant’s hand or what exactly was removed from the register, the evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to conclude that the defendant displayed the plastic gun when the defendant removed a hand from the defendant’s pocket and demanded money, consistent with the pattern from the defendant’s earlier robberies in which the defendant either pointed the pocketed hand toward the victim or displayed the plastic gun. Rutledge v. State, 276 Ga. App. 580, 623 S.E.2d 762 (2005). Lit cigarette constituted an offensive weapon when, after the defendant doused the victim, a store clerk, with gasoline, the defendant profanely insisted that the clerk give the defendant ‘‘the money’’ or the defendant would burn the clerk with the cigarette. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (2000). Pillow and sheets as deadly weapons. — When the defendants each raped 372 the victim while keeping a pillow over her face, causing her difficulty in breathing, and after the assault and while still keeping the pillow on her face, the men bound her by rolling her up in a sheet and rummaged through the house, taking her purse and its contents and approximately $300, it could not be said as a matter of law that the way the pillow and sheets were used could not make them into deadly weapons. Eady v. State, 182 Ga. App. 293, 355 S.E.2d 778 (1987). Skillet. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of armed robbery since defendant repeatedly hit the victim with a skillet, and robbed the victim’s cash while the victim was unconscious. Lord v. State, 259 Ga. App. 449, 577 S.E.2d 103 (2003). Tree limb. — Convictions against the defendant for malice murder, burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault were supported by evidence that the defendant entered the victim’s home, hit the victim multiple times about the head and face with a tree limb with a metal piece on it, and wrote a check in defendant’s name from the victim’s checkbook; evidence included witness testimony from the bank where the defendant cashed the check, the defendant’s confession to police, and physical evidence. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009). Height of assailants as evidence. — Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of armed robbery after the victim indicated that the taller of the victim’s two assailants had a gun during the robbery and testimony at trial established that the defendant was taller than the codefendant. Killings v. State, 296 Ga. App. 869, 676 S.E.2d 31 (2009). Bludgeon device used as offensive weapon. — When the testimonies of the victim, a doctor, and other witnesses were a sufficient indication under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) of the severity of the blow to show that a bludgeon device was used as an offensive weapon, there was sufficient competent evidence to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and 16-5-21(a), respectively. Garrett v. State, 263 Ga. App. 310, 587 S.E.2d 794 (2003). 16-8-41 Mere presence of weapon is insufficient. — When a gun, though present and used to threaten another, was not used to take the victim’s property as required under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, an armed robbery has not been perpetrated. Dixon v. Hopper, 407 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Ga. 1976), overruled on other grounds, Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242 (11th Cir. 1984). Weapon retrieved in proximity. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery when the defendant was found hiding in a utility closet in victim’s home after the defendant’s two accomplices fled, a rifle was recovered adjacent to the closet, and a police officer testified the rifle was the same weapon the officer had seen through the window. Edwards v. State, 209 Ga. App. 304, 433 S.E.2d 619 (1993). Robbery with weapon taken from victim. — Defendant committed armed robbery by stealing the victim’s pistol and then stealing her pocketbook. Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 443 S.E.2d 300 (1994). Perception of weapon. — Defendant’s argument that defendant’s ‘‘hands’’ did not constitute an offensive weapon and, therefore, defendant could not have been convicted of armed robbery, was rejected, as the cashier perceived that defendant, who kept one hand in defendant’s coat pocket during the robbery, had a gun; thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. Martin v. State, 264 Ga. App. 813, 592 S.E.2d 483 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery even though the teller involved in the bank holdup did not actually see a gun because the note defendant handed to the teller stated that there was a gun and that the defendant would shoot everyone in the bank if the teller did not give up the money, and where the defendant’s hand was concealed under a shirt. Marlin v. State, 273 Ga. App. 856, 616 S.E.2d 176 (2005). Record showed that the two armed robbery victims were in reasonable apprehension that there was a gun; thus, satisfying the statutory element of apprehension concerning a weapon. Smith v. State, 274 Ga. App. 568, 618 S.E.2d 182 (2005). 373 Use of Weapon (Cont’d) Because the defendant claimed to have a gun, threatened to blow the victim’s head off, and the victim saw a bulge in the defendant’s clothing where the gun was allegedly hidden, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Forde v. State, 277 Ga. App. 410, 626 S.E.2d 606 (2006). When a victim testified that the victim believed the defendant had a gun because of the way the defendant held the defendant’s hand inside a jacket, which the victim demonstrated for the jury, and the victim said the victim was frightened because the victim believed the defendant might have a gun, and gave the defendant the drawer from a cash register, the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade the victim to comply with the defendant’s demand and that the defendant’s acts created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that the defendant was threatening the victim with a gun so the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery. Joyner v. State, 278 Ga. App. 60, 628 S.E.2d 186 (2006). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal regarding an armed robbery with respect to the defendant’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant was armed because the two victims of that robbery testified that the defendant was poking something into the side of one of the victims and that the victim testified that the victim thought the object was a gun. That testimony was sufficient to send to the jury the question of whether the defendant had committed armed robbery. Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery based on the robbery of a Gwinnett County bank by use of a gun, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon because the Gwinnett County bank teller testified that 16-8-41 the defendant threatened to shoot the teller, and the defendant’s stance, with a hand at the defendant’s hip, made the teller believe that the defendant would follow through on that threat; and a bank teller in another county testified that, three days later, the defendant’s gestures, including patting a hip, made that teller believe that the defendant had a gun when the defendant robbed that bank. Johnson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 134, 770 S.E.2d 236 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 377 (Ga. 2015). Defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s armed robbery and felony murder convictions because only the codefendant used a gun was rejected because the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and the defendant also pretended that the defendant’s cellphone was a gun, satisfying O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a)’s language of ‘‘device having the appearance of such weapon.’’ Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 778 S.E.2d 205 (2015). Visibility of weapon. — Presence of a weapon during the commission of a robbery, necessary to a conviction for armed robbery, may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a conviction for armed robbery may be sustained even though the weapon itself is neither seen nor accurately described by the victim. Some physical manifestation of a weapon is required, however, or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred. Hughes v. State, 185 Ga. App. 40, 363 S.E.2d 336 (1987); Tate v. State, 191 Ga. App. 727, 382 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 688 (1989). Evidence that the defendant merely approached the victim with the defendant’s hand in the defendant’s jacket pocket was insufficient to support a conviction of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Tate v. State, 191 Ga. App. 727, 382 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 688 (1989). It is not essential that a weapon be seen or be accurately described by the victim to support a conviction of armed robbery as long as there was some physical manifestation of a weapon or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be 374 inferred. Millis v. State, 196 Ga. App. 799, 397 S.E.2d 71 (1990). Use of concealed offensive weapons ‘‘or other devices,’’ may constitute armed robbery, but the evidence must at least show that there was an offensive weapon or an article having the appearance of one. Talbot v. State, 198 Ga. App. 636, 402 S.E.2d 366 (1991). O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 includes concealed offensive weapons provided there is either a physical manifestation of the weapon or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred. Nicholson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 413, 408 S.E.2d 487 (1991). Evidence showed use of an offensive weapon, where the victim could see ‘‘something’’ underneath defendant’s shirt in the shape of a gun, even though the victim did not actually see it at the moment the victim was robbed. Howard v. State, 201 Ga. App. 164, 410 S.E.2d 782 (1991). Evidence that defendant entered a pharmacy with a black plastic bag over defendant’s hand and told the victim ‘‘I have a gun’’ was sufficient to establish the use of an offensive weapon in contravention of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Brabham v. State, 240 Ga. App. 506, 524 S.E.2d 1 (1999). Sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented authorizing the jury to conclude that the victim reasonably believed defendant had a gun because, even though defendant may not have physically displayed a weapon in view of the victim, defendant’s note to the victim clearly and boldly recited that defendant had a gun and would kill defendant, and evidence was presented that one of defendant’s hands was not visible to the victim during the robbery. Prins v. State, 246 Ga. App. 585, 539 S.E.2d 236 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because the victims’ testimony that the victim’s saw the shape of a gun during the robbery supported the conclusion that the victims were under a reasonable apprehension that the defendant was armed. Colkitt v. State, 251 Ga. App. 749, 555 S.E.2d 121 (2001). 16-8-41 Ample evidence supported defendant’s convictions of two counts of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and one count of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (2), where defendant was identified by defendant’s companions in statements to the police, and also by two victims at trial, as the person who drove with the three companions to a store and, while pointing a gun at the various victims, robbed one person of money and lottery tickets, demanded and obtained money from a second person and shot that person, demanded money from the second person’s spouse, and then fled with the three companions. Bates v. State, 259 Ga. App. 232, 576 S.E.2d 619 (2003). Although defendant did not point a gun at restaurant employees when defendant took money from a cash register, the employees’ testimony that defendant produced a gun and that they did not resist because defendant had a gun was enough to sustain defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. Pritchett v. State, 265 Ga. App. 462, 594 S.E.2d 377 (2004). Sufficient evidence existed to sustain the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) when the victim identified the defendant shortly after the victim’s purse was taken from the victim by gunpoint at a payphone, some of the victim’s personal belongings were discovered in the defendant’s possession, and the defendant led the victim and a police officer to the remainder of the victim’s belongings hidden in the woods and the defendant’s car. Foster v. State, 267 Ga. App. 363, 599 S.E.2d 309 (2004). Weapon need not be seen by victim. — Since the purpose of using any weapon or device having the ‘‘appearance of such weapon’’ is to create a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon is being used, it is immaterial whether such apprehension is created by use of the sense of vision or by any other sense, provided that the apprehension is reasonable under the circumstances. Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 375 S.E.2d 30 (1989); Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 392 S.E.2d 280 (1990); Ramey v. State, 206 Ga. App. 308, 425 375 Use of Weapon (Cont’d) S.E.2d 385 (1992); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. App. 173, 543 S.E.2d 434 (2000). Trial court properly instructed the jury that ‘‘the appearance of such weapon’’, within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), means ‘‘any concept that is obtained through the use of any of the senses.’’ Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 375 S.E.2d 30 (1989). Victim’s testimony that the victim believed the robber had a gun, and that the robber told the victim to ‘‘do as I say or I’ll blow your head off ’’, satisfied the statutory requirement that the robbery had been accomplished ‘‘by use of an offensive weapon.’’ Nicholson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 413, 408 S.E.2d 487 (1991). Presence of an offensive weapon or the appearance of such may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a conviction for armed robbery may be sustained even though the weapon was neither seen nor accurately described by the victim. McCluskey v. State, 211 Ga. App. 205, 438 S.E.2d 679 (1993); Terry v. State, 224 Ga. App. 157, 480 S.E.2d 193 (1996); Mangum v. State, 228 Ga. App. 545, 492 S.E.2d 300 (1997). When the defendant pointed the defendant’s hand, which was covered by a sack, toward the victim and demanded money, such conduct would cause apprehension that the defendant had a gun in any reasonable person. Turner v. State, 237 Ga. App. 642, 516 S.E.2d 343 (1999). ‘‘Appearance’’ of offensive weapon sufficient. — Defendant’s use of an article or device — wrapping defendant’s hand in a shirt — which had the appearance of an offensive weapon and defendant’s temporary control of store register cash drawer were sufficient evidence to convict on charge of armed robbery. Miller v. State, 223 Ga. App. 453, 477 S.E.2d 878 (1996). Pretending to have weapon sufficient if victims have reasonable apprehension of weapon. — Despite defendant’s assertion that defendant only pretended to have a weapon while robbing a restaurant, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motions for a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of armed 16-8-41 robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, as the victims testified that defendant used something that felt and looked like a gun, and one victim, the night manager, testified that defendant threatened to ‘‘blow’’ that victim’s head off if the victim did not open the safe; such testimony sufficiently showed that defendant’s actions created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victims that an offensive weapon was being used. White v. State, 258 Ga. App. 546, 574 S.E.2d 629 (2002). Defendant’s conviction of armed robbery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) was supported by sufficient evidence; defendant admitted that during the robbery defendant used a pipe covered by a sock to make it appear that defendant had a gun, and the evidence authorized a finding that defendant used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade the employee to comply with the defendant’s demand and that defendant’s acts created a reasonable apprehension on the employee’s part that defendant was threatening the employee with a gun. Faulkner v. State, 260 Ga. App. 794, 581 S.E.2d 365 (2003). Lapse of time between use of weapon and robbery. — Evidence was sufficient for armed robbery conviction where the defendant first shot his sister and then, several minutes later, took her money, with the rifle still in his possession; without the shooting, which left the sister in fear of being shot again, defendant’s taking of his sister’s money could not have been accomplished and the relatively brief passage of time between the shooting and the taking did not sever that connection between the two acts. Lowery v. State, 209 Ga. App. 5, 432 S.E.2d 576 (1993). When an armed robbery count was broadly drafted so as to include an averment that the offense of armed robbery was accomplished by the taking of specified property both by means of intimidation and by use of an offensive weapon, it needed to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the taking was accomplished by concomitant use of an offensive weapon; accordingly, in the ab- 376 sence of such a showing, while the circumstances of the taking would have supported a conviction for the lesser included offense of robbery, it would not have supported conviction of the greater offense of armed robbery. Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 430 S.E.2d 105 (1993), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000). Use of weapon subsequent to taking is insufficient. — Former Code 1933, § 26-1902 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41) clearly contemplated that an offensive weapon be used as a concomitant to a taking which involves use of actual force or intimidation (constructive force) against another person. It was not sufficient that force was used against a person subsequent to taking, although it may be part of the same ‘‘continuing transaction.’’ Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974). Evidence showing that defendant took a vehicle without displaying or using a hatchet in defendant’s possession and that the defendant did not use the weapon to maintain possession was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s armed robbery conviction. Nelson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 385, 503 S.E.2d 335 (1998). Shooting victim. — When it is undisputed that the victim was killed with a handgun, the jury is entitled to infer from the evidence that the defendant, with intent to commit theft, took property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, whether the victim was shot before the taking or after the taking. Lipham v. State, 257 Ga. 808, 364 S.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 873, 109 S. Ct. 191, 102 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1988). Offensive weapon fruit of armed robbery. — Defendant cannot be convicted of armed robbery where the offensive weapon used to perpetrate the armed robbery is also the only fruit of the armed robbery itself. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982). Use of gun upgrades attempted robbery to armed robbery. — While defendant’s crime may have begun as attempted robbery by intimidation or attempted robbery by sudden snatching, defendant’s use of a gun to effectuate the 16-8-41 taking upgraded the offense to armed robbery. McKissic v. State, 178 Ga. App. 23, 341 S.E.2d 903 (1986). Whether instrument used constitutes a deadly weapon is properly for jury’s determination. Meminger v. State, 160 Ga. App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981), rev’d on other grounds, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982), vacated, 163 Ga. App. 338, 295 S.E.2d 235 (1982). Threat not part of armed robbery. — Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant separately on the separate conviction for terroristic threats and armed robbery since the evidence was sufficient to show the robbery was complete, when the money from the cash register was in the defendant’s possession before the defendant made the alleged threat to the victim that the defendant would kill the victim if the victim moved. Thus, the threat was not part of the armed robbery, but the evidence was sufficient to show that the threat was made with the purpose of terrorizing the victim. Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 588, 420 S.E.2d 96 (1992). Proof was insufficient to sustain a conviction for armed robbery, where defendant initially snatched money from a store cash register but did not use a weapon to obtain it, the money was retrieved by the store manager, defendant sought to re-acquire it by using defendant’s weapon, the manager refused to yield to defendant’s threat, and nothing of value was obtained by use of an offensive weapon. Gatlin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 500, 405 S.E.2d 118 (1991). Supplying weapon for use. — There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, where there were positive identifications from three robbery victims as well as bystander witnesses, defendant’s clothing and gun matched the description of the robber, defendant was seen standing near the robbery getaway car, and the results of defendant’s polygraph test supported the finding of guilt. Anderson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 428, 594 S.E.2d 669 (2004). Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggra- 377 Use of Weapon (Cont’d) vated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer because the defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that the defendant was a ‘‘federal agent,’’ fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim’s thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same victim’s mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified the defendant as the user of the shotgun, and the defendant’s DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and the defendant’s fingerprints were found on the car. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005). Despite the defendant’s contention on appeal that the state’s evidence was insufficient, specifically, regarding the presence of a gun, given that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of a reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon was being used in an armed robbery, when coupled with the defendant’s admission to possessing a gun at the time of the robbery, the defendant’s armed robbery conviction was upheld; thus, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Fluellen v. State, 284 Ga. App. 584, 644 S.E.2d 486 (2007). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 when the state presented testimony that a codefendant took property from the immediate presence of the victims by use of an offensive weapon, that the defendant encouraged the codefendant, that the defendant was present during the robbery, and that the defendant shared in the proceeds of the crime. Rasheed v. Smith, No. 06-14108, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6197 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2007) (Unpublished). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery as the defendant shot the victim twice in the head from behind, took the victim’s money and marijuana, and divided the money and shared the marijuana with others. Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 667 S.E.2d 62 (2008). 16-8-41 Denial of a directed verdict on an armed robbery charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) was appropriate based on the testimony that the defendant brandished a handgun and threatened to kill the victim before taking several of the victim’s belongings, including a videocassette recorder; the defendant used a weapon, and what was in the victim’s immediate presence could be out of the victim’s physical presence if it was under the victim’s control and the victim was not too far distant. Wesley v. State, 294 Ga. App. 559, 669 S.E.2d 511 (2008). Based on the victim’s testimony that three individuals were walking together before the robbery occurred, positioned themselves around the victim during the robbery, and walked away together, the evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a). Whether the defendant was a party to the crime was a question for the jury, which the jury chose to resolve against the defendant. Scott v. State, 297 Ga. App. 577, 677 S.E.2d 755 (2009). Since the victim was cut and hit by a shotgun during a struggle with defendant in defendant’s attempt to obtain money for drugs, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2), 16-8-41(a), and 16-11-106(b)(1). Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010). Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice’s testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evi- 378 dence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury’s determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motions for directed verdict and new trial because the jury could have determined that a witness’s testimony provided corroboration for the codefendant’s identification of the defendant; further corroboration for the testimony of the witness and the codefendant was provided by a neighbors’ description of the robbery and shooting, by the description of the codefendant’s wife of the codefendant’s demeanor and behavior that day, and by physical evidence found at the scene. Williamson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 473, 708 S.E.2d 57 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, when the defendant planned the robbery, drove the robbers to the scene, supplied the weapon, functioned as a lookout, drove the getaway vehicle, and inquired about the proceeds of the crime. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga. App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (2012). Possession of weapon by accomplice. — In a prosecution for armed robbery, defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on lesser included offenses of theft by taking or robbery by intimidation where robberies were perpetrated by the use of a weapon in the possession of defendant’s accomplice. Jones v. State, 233 Ga. App. 362, 504 S.E.2d 259 (1998). Inconsistent verdicts. — There was no need to reverse the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery in violation of 16-8-41 O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 after the jury acquitted the defendant of possession of a firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-123 as Georgia abolished the inconsistent verdict rule with respect to criminal cases. Oliver v. State, 270 Ga. App. 429, 606 S.E.2d 874 (2004). Robbery by Intimidation Intimidation involves use of violence or threats to influence conduct or compel consent of another. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148). Intimidation is constructive force. Henderson v. State, 209 Ga. 72, 70 S.E.2d 713 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2501). Robbery by intimidation is the same as ‘‘putting in fear’’ at common law, and is constructive force, as when one through fear is induced to part with one’s property. Rivers v. State, 46 Ga. App. 778, 169 S.E. 260 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148). Intimidation consists in putting one in fear in some way. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148). Intimidation is that act by the perpetrator which puts the person robbed in fear sufficient to suspend the free exercise of the person’s will or prevent resistance to the taking, and a threat by a perpetrator to inflict harm constitutes the requisite force of intimidation if that threat of harm induces the victim/possessor of property to relinquish possession. Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003). Intimidation involves creating apprehension which induces one to part with property for safety of person. Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293 (1852) (decided prior to codification of this principle); Jordan v. State, 135 Ga. 434, 69 S.E. 562 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 151). There can be no legal consent given in face of intimidation. Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148). 379 Robbery by Intimidation (Cont’d) Threats by word or gestures are the most usual means of intimidation and of themselves are sufficient to imply violence. Edenfield v. State, 41 Ga. App. 252, 152 S.E. 615 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 148). Robbery by intimidation. — When the defendant during a robbery had defendant’s hand in a jacket pocket and pointed at the victim as though the defendant did have a weapon concealed in the pocket so that the victim thought the defendant had one, and that the victim was ‘‘scared’’ the testimony concerning the defendant’s gestures and demands was sufficient to establish the element of intimidation. Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 392 S.E.2d 280 (1990). When the defendant approached the cashier with defendant’s hand under the defendant’s sweater and demanded money without employment of verbal threats or violence, the evidence was nonetheless sufficient to establish the element of intimidation. Brown v. State, 210 Ga. App. 59, 435 S.E.2d 274 (1993). Victim’s testimony concerning defendant’s gestures and demands at the time defendant approached, and stole, defendant’s vehicle, was sufficient to establish the element of intimidation. Hogan v. State, 210 Ga. App. 122, 435 S.E.2d 494 (1993). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for robbery by intimidation, as it showed defendant: entered a convenience store; gave the clerk a slip of paper that stated defendant had a gun and wanted money; emphasized that defendant was not playing games and that defendant would shoot the clerk; fled after defendant was given money from the store’s register; and was identified by several witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime. Ferguson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 28, 584 S.E.2d 618 (2003). Robbery by intimidation and false imprisonment. — Because the sequential crimes of false imprisonment and robbery by intimidation were complete and independent of each other, each proven by different facts, the crimes did not merge. Lancaster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 752, 637 S.E.2d 131 (2006). 16-8-41 Evidence sufficient for conviction. — Defendant was properly convicted of criminal intent to commit robbery by intimidation under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(2) since the evidence showed that the defendant repeated the request for money, became more aggressive, and banged on the restroom door in order to get an employee out of the bathroom so that the defendant could get money. Brogdon v. State, 262 Ga. App. 673, 586 S.E.2d 344 (2003). Evidence supported the defendant’s robbery by intimidation and false imprisonment convictions and the codefendant’s armed robbery and kidnapping with bodily injury convictions as the defendant lured the victim to the defendant’s apartment where the codefendant struck the victim in the back of the head and robbed the victim at gunpoint. Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 133, 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004). Offensive weapon not used concomitantly with robbery. — When armed robbery count was broadly drafted so as to include an averment that the offense of armed robbery was accomplished by the taking of specified property both by means of intimidation and by use of an offensive weapon, it needed to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the taking was accomplished by concomitant use of an offensive weapon; accordingly, in the absence of such a showing, while the circumstances of the taking would have supported a conviction for the lesser included offense of robbery, it would not have supported conviction of the greater offense of armed robbery. Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 430 S.E.2d 105 (1993), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000). Trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, was proper as there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for kidnapping, rape, and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40, 16-6-1, and 16-8-41, respectively, because the victim positively identified the defendant upon the defendant’s arrest and at trial, there was similar transaction evidence from another victim who was approached and threatened in the same manner, and there was also corroborative physical evidence; the de- 380 fendant threatened the victim, who was at a bus stop, with a gun and robbed the victim, forced the victim to a storage area in a garage, and raped the victim. Sims v. State, 275 Ga. App. 836, 621 S.E.2d 869 (2005). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for robbery by intimidation, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as: (1) the defendant demanded that the victim give the defendant the victim’s purse and then threatened the victim with a gun and told the victim that the defendant would use the gun; (2) feeling that the victim’s life was in danger, the victim ran; (3) the defendant chased the victim and snatched the victim’s purse; (4) two witnesses chased the defendant to an abandoned house, where the victim’s purse was later found; (5) a witness obtained the tag number of the defendant’s vehicle and police traced the vehicle to the defendant’s mother; even assuming that the pre-trial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, the in-court identifications by a witness and the victim were admissible as the identifications were based on independent recollections. Boatwright v. State, 281 Ga. App. 560, 636 S.E.2d 719 (2006). From the defendant’s words, demeanor, companionship, and conduct before and after an armed robbery, a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the state established the requisite intent; the evidence authorized the jury to find that before an armed robbery, the defendant had planned to take money from a convenience store, the defendant’s accomplice went into the store, took the money from the clerk at gunpoint, and then joined the defendant with the money, and that when the cohorts realized moments later that the police suspected the pair of the armed robbery, the defendant disobeyed police commands to stop, acted as the getaway driver in a high speed chase, and then tried to flee the police on foot. Espinosa v. State, 285 Ga. App. 69, 645 S.E.2d 529 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1281, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. 2007). Jury was authorized to find the defen- 16-8-41 dant guilty of robbery by intimidation. An accomplice’s testimony, which included a detailed account of the defendant’s participation in both the planning and execution of the crime, was corroborated by the victim, the actions of the defendant and others when police arrived at an apartment, evidence found inside the apartment, the defendant’s appearance when the defendant encountered police, and, to a certain extent, another witness’s testimony. Clark v. State, 294 Ga. App. 331, 670 S.E.2d 131 (2008). Evidence that defendant and another person burst into a home after they had lured the victim brandishing an automatic gun and wearing black t-shirts that said ‘‘Sheriff,’’ handcuffed the victim, took the victim’s money, and forced the victim to write a bill of sale for the victim’s motorcycle was sufficient to support convictions for robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and impersonating a peace officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-23. Powers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 326, 693 S.E.2d 592 (2010). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because despite the defendant’s trial testimony claiming a friend took the defendant to pick up pizza while the robbery was in progress, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury was authorized to disbelieve the alibi defense the defendant proffered. Gordon v. State, 329 Ga. App. 2, 763 S.E.2d 357 (2014). Included Offenses Merger with aggravated assault. — Conviction for aggravated assault should have been merged with the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because the convictions both required proof of the same elements. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607, 740 S.E.2d 100 (2013). No merger of related offenses. — As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by refusing to merge the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the 381 Included Offenses (Cont’d) felonies. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004). Due to the entry of a guilty plea over 20 years before the filing of a motion to correct alleged illegal sentences, the defendant’s merger claim was waived, and since the sentences imposed were not void, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over said motion for correction. Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006). Trial court did not err in failing to merge aggravated battery and armed robbery convictions. The evidence needed to prove each charge was entirely different as one charge demanded evidence that the defendant shot and seriously disfigured the victim, while the other required proof that the defendant took money from the victim at gunpoint. Smashum v. State, 293 Ga. App. 41, 666 S.E.2d 549 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 952 (Ga. 2008). Merger with other convictions. — Defendant’s aggravated assault convictions were to be merged with armed robbery and kidnapping convictions as the same set of facts were used to prove the offenses. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008). When a defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from a cab driver, the offense of criminal attempt armed robbery was complete, and the defendant’s subsequent acts, including striking the driver on the head, were not necessary to prove that offense; thus, the attempt offense did not merge with aggravated assault offenses for sentencing purposes. Duncan v. State, 290 Ga. App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (2008). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault merged into the defendant’s conviction for attempted armed robbery because the relevant aggravated assault provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the attempted armed robbery as that offense could have been proved under the indictment in the case. Garland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 7, 714 S.E.2d 707 (2011). Mutual exclusivity of theft related crimes. — When the defendant was in- 16-8-41 dicted in Fulton County on charges of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle, but the defendant had been previously convicted in Clayton County of theft by receiving stolen property by retaining the same car on the same day, the defendant’s plea in bar and motion to dismiss the Fulton County indictment was improperly denied as the charges in the Fulton County case were mutually exclusive of the defendant’s prior conviction for theft by receiving because the theft by receiving conviction contained an implicit and necessary finding that the defendant did not steal the car, and the charges of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle each required proof that the defendant actually took the car. Bonner v. State, 339 Ga. App. 539, 794 S.E.2d 186 (2016). Robbery by intimidation is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Griffeth v. State, 154 Ga. App. 643, 269 S.E.2d 501 (1980); Mickle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 206, 300 S.E.2d 210 (1983). Evidence authorizing conviction of robbery by use of offensive weapon authorizes conviction of robbery by intimidation. Holcomb v. State, 230 Ga. 525, 198 S.E.2d 179 (1973); Brown v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 677, 203 S.E.2d 542 (1974). Trial court did not err by charging the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation when defendant was only indicted for armed robbery. Mills v. State, 244 Ga. App. 28, 535 S.E.2d 1 (2000). Trial court properly charged the jury as to the lesser-included offense of robbery by intimidation as O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 unequivocally provided that robbery by intimidation was a lesser-included offense of the offense of armed robbery; thus, in light of the evidence that the defendant robbed the victim by use of a firearm as an offensive weapon, which would authorize a conviction of armed robbery, the robbery by intimidation jury charge and conviction were authorized. Lancaster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 752, 637 S.E.2d 131 (2006). Robbery by intimidation did not have to be considered as a lesser included offense in defendant’s trial for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because, even though defen- 382 dant denied pointing a gun at the victim while demanding the victim’s car, armed robbery only required use of an offensive weapon in committing the robbery and, since defendant did not actually deny having the gun and the victim testified that the victim was persuaded to give up the car because of the gun, there was no evidence that the robbery was committed without the use of a gun. Carter v. State, 257 Ga. App. 620, 571 S.E.2d 831 (2002). Trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury a lesser included instruction on robbery by intimidation in defendant’s armed robbery trial, as the evidence showed the completed offense of armed robbery where defendant displayed a screwdriver during the robbery to a store clerk, and defendant admitted that defendant carried the screwdriver during the robbery. Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 383, 599 S.E.2d 325 (2004). When both robbery victims testified that the defendant wielded a gun during the robbery, and the defendant’s accomplice, in a pretrial statement and in letters to the prosecutor, stated that the defendant used a gun to perpetrate the robbery, and when, even at trial, the accomplice did not deny that a gun was used during the robbery, the defendant in a trial for armed robbery was not entitled to a jury charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Jordan v. State, 278 Ga. App. 126, 628 S.E.2d 221 (2006). Offenses of robbery and armed robbery did not merge as a matter of law, where separate incidents (the simple taking of the pistol and the taking of the other items at gunpoint) involved different actions, different specific objectives or intents, and different victims. Millines v. State, 188 Ga. App. 655, 373 S.E.2d 838 (1988). Unaccepted offer to reduce armed robbery to robbery did not obligate state to reduce charge. — Because armed robbery was punishable by life imprisonment, it was not a transferable offense, and a trial court was without authority to transfer the armed robbery case from superior court to juvenile court. State v. Harper, 271 Ga. App. 761, 610 S.E.2d 699 (2005). Theft by taking as lesser offense of armed robbery. — When a state’s evi- 16-8-41 dence clearly warranted jury instruction on armed robbery, which was given, and there was no evidence of the lesser offense of theft by taking, there was no error in failing to give the requested jury instruction. Shepherd v. State, 234 Ga. 75, 214 S.E.2d 535 (1975). It is not error to fail to charge defendant with theft by taking, as lesser offense included in charge of armed robbery or robbery by intimidation, unless evidence authorizes finding of lesser offense. Sanders v. State, 135 Ga. App. 436, 218 S.E.2d 140 (1975). Evidence showed that the defendant committed robbery either by use of a replica of a handgun or by intimidation and no evidence was presented that intimidation was not used in the robbery; therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of armed robbery and robbery by intimidation. Espinoza v. State, 243 Ga. App. 665, 534 S.E.2d 127 (2000). When the same evidence that was used to prove the armed robbery charges against the defendant was also used to prove the theft by taking charges and the property in question was taken from the victims’ possession in the same incident in a store and constituted a single crime, the theft by taking offenses were lesser included offenses of the armed robbery offenses as a matter of fact pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1) and should have merged into those convictions for sentencing purposes. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003). Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the crimes of armed robbery and theft by taking, and expressly stated that in the event that the jury did not believe that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could convict on the lesser offense of theft by taking, given that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding of guilt on the armed robbery charge, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant’s claim that the victim knowingly assisted in the planning and perpetration of the crime. Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 651 S.E.2d 538 (2007). 383 Included Offenses (Cont’d) In a trial for armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, a charge on the lesser included offense of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 was not warranted under circumstances in which the defendant used force to take the victim’s purse and then the victim’s money; the fact that the purse was not in the victim’s hands during the second taking did not preclude an armed robbery conviction. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. App. 10, 658 S.E.2d 796 (2008). Because theft by receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, a defendant charged with two counts of party to the crime of armed robbery was not entitled to a jury instruction on theft by receiving stolen property. Dean v. State, 292 Ga. App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (2008). Difference in elements between theft by taking and armed robbery. — Although armed robbery requires proof of the use of an offensive weapon and proof that the property was taken from the presence of a person, whereas theft by taking does not, theft by taking does not require proof of any facts separate from those required for armed robbery. Wells v. State, 294 Ga. App. 277, 668 S.E.2d 881 (2008). Theft by taking charge did not merge with an armed robbery charge because under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 theft by taking requires the intent to deprive the owner of property, while armed robbery is a completely separate offense, which under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 is complete once the property is taken. Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42, 329 S.E.2d 252 (1985). When the armed robbery involved the taking of currency at gunpoint from the immediate possession of a convenience store cashier who was attempting to make a nightly bank deposit, while the theft conviction involved the subsequent taking of the cashier’s automobile, the evidence establishing the commission of the one crime is not the same as the evidence which established commission of the other crime, and the defendant’s contention that the theft conviction should have merged with the armed robbery conviction is with- 16-8-41 out merit. Miller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 563, 359 S.E.2d 359 (1987). Crimes of burglary and attempted armed robbery. — Elements and the culpable mental state required of burglary and attempted armed robbery are different; a trial court did not err in refusing to merge defendant’s burglary and attempted armed robbery convictions because the facts which proved each crime were different and because neither of those crimes was included in the other. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 248, 596 S.E.2d 743 (2004). Merger of armed robbery and burglary charges was not required because not only are the elements and the culpable mental state required of these crimes different, but the facts which proved each crime were different. Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 297, 523 S.E.2d 103 (1999). Defendant’s burglary conviction was upheld on appeal, and not subject to reversal merely because of a jury’s acquittal of an armed robbery charge, as: (1) the verdict was inconsistent, not mutually exclusive; and (2) the inconsistent verdict rule was abolished in Georgia two decades ago; furthermore, the rule was not implicated when verdicts of guilty and not guilty were returned. Einglett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 497, 642 S.E.2d 160 (2007). Armed robbery and hijacking. — Defendant’s separate convictions for armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle did not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy as O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(d) provided that hijacking a motor vehicle was a separate offense and did not merge and it therefore superseded the state statutory double jeopardy provision; further, the Georgia Constitution did not prohibit additional punishment for a separate offense that the Georgia legislature had deemed to warrant a separate sanction; the defendant failed to show how the hijacking statute violated the federal double jeopardy clause. Mullins v. State, 280 Ga. App. 689, 634 S.E.2d 850 (2006). False imprisonment does not merge with armed robbery. — Offense of false imprisonment requires proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of armed robbery does not. Consequently, 384 under the ‘‘required evidence’’ test, a defendant’s false imprisonment conviction did not merge into the defendant’s armed robbery conviction. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008). Counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and armed robbery did not merge. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994). Trial court not required to instruct jury on lesser included offense over which it lacks venue. — Court of appeals erred in reversing the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery because the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft by taking since there was no evidence that the included crime was committed in the county in which the defendant was being tried; although the state was unwilling to allow the defendant to waive venue or stipulate that what occurred was a theft by taking that happened entirely in Clayton County, the defendant was free to present evidence and argue to the jury that while the defendant was guilty of committing theft by taking in Clayton County, the defendant was not guilty of armed robbery in DeKalb County. But the defendant could not require the state to agree that the defendant committed theft by taking in Clayton County or require the trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense over which the court lacked venue. State v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 706, 691 S.E.2d 207 (2010). Simple battery is not a lesser offense of armed robbery. Jackson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 487, 297 S.E.2d 502 (1982). Offenses of aggravated battery and armed robbery merged as a matter of fact, where the aggravated battery indictment was drawn to charge the same serious bodily harm inflicted by a knife in the course of an armed robbery, and thus the same facts necessary to prove the aggravated battery charge were used upon proving the armed robbery charge. Whitner v. State, 198 Ga. App. 300, 401 S.E.2d 318 (1991). Offense of aggravated battery and armed robbery did not merge. — Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant’s aggravated battery conviction 16-8-41 into the defendant’s armed robbery conviction because the taking of the victim’s property was not a fact required to establish the aggravated battery offense, and depriving the victim of a member of the victim’s body was not a fact required to establish the armed robbery offense; and, while the aggravated battery and armed robbery were based on the same criminal transaction, aggravated battery, and armed robbery did not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibited entirely different categories of injury — depriving the victim of a member of the victim’s body versus depriving the victim of property. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016). No merger with aggravated assault. — Because: (1) evidence presented against the second of two defendants, jointly charged, that the victim was beaten over the head with a pistol showed a completed aggravated assault prior to the armed robbery, and (2) possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault did not merge with armed robbery, as there was an expressed legislative intent to impose double punishment for conduct which violated both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes, the offenses did not merge. Bunkley v. State, 278 Ga. App. 450, 629 S.E.2d 112 (2006). Defendant-B’s punches to the victim’s face upon defendant-A’s demand for the victim’s property amounted to an assault with attempt to rob, which justified one of defendant-B’s convictions for aggravated assault, the formulation of a plan to rob someone at a convenience store with defendant-A and defendant-A’s aggravated assault in pointing a gun at the victim constituted a second aggravated assault, and an armed robbery of the victim’s property constituted the armed robbery; as each of the three crimes was proven by three different sets of facts, there was no error in the trial court’s failure to have merged defendant-B’s aggravated assault convictions, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, into the armed robbery conviction, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Johnson v.