O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30

State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 638 S.E.2d 773, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1301 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0427, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 203 (Ga. Feb. 26, 2007). Passenger’s testimony, stating that the defendant passed marijuana to the passenger and told the passenger to discard the marijuana, was sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to support a ﬁnding of guilt of possession of more than an ounce of marijuana under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30; the marijuana found near the defendant was packaged the same way as the marijuana found outside the car, and it could, therefore, be inferred that the marijuana found outside the car had previously been in the back seat beside the defendant. Curtis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 638 S.E.2d 773, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1301 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0427, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 203 (Ga. Feb. 26, 2007). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, possession of marijuana, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) after smoking marijuana, the defendant attacked the victim, pulled a gun from the defendant’s pocket, and shot the victim four times; (2) the victim told the police that the defendant did it; (3) the victim died; (4) a knife was found near the victim, the defendant had a stab wound and the defendant claimed self-defense; and (5) witnesses one and two saw the defendant pull the gun but did not see the victim with a knife. Hill v. State, 291 Ga. 160, 728 S.E.2d 225, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 500 (2012). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana because the evidence showed that the defendant had marijuana in the defendant’s possession when arrested. Smith v. State, 323 Ga. App. 668, 747 S.E.2d 859, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 712 (2013). Possession of methamphetamine proven. — Evidence was sufficient for a jury to ﬁnd defendant guilty of possession 16-13-30 of methamphetamine, as defendant leased a house in which a widespread methamphetamine manufacturing operation took place, which created a strong chemical smell immediately apparent upon entering the house, and defendant tested positive for methamphetamine in the defendant’s system, circumstantially linking defendant to the manufacturing process and undermining the claim that defendant was unaware of the activity. Kirby v. State, 275 Ga. App. 216, 620 S.E.2d 459, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 933 (2005). Because the defendant, who was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police, and the vehicle’s driver had different responses when the arresting officers asked them where they were going, and a bag containing about three pounds of methamphetamine was found between the passenger’s and driver’s seats, and the defendant ﬂed the scene, and the packaging of the methamphetamine was very similar to the packaging of the cocaine, marijuana, and cash found at the defendant’s residence two months earlier, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in methamphetamine and of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Salinas-Valdez v. State, 276 Ga. App. 732, 624 S.E.2d 278, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1367 (2005). Because a jury could ﬁnd that the defendant was aware of the methamphetamine that fell from the defendant’s pants and that the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the methamphetamine, the evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Hayes v. State, 276 Ga. App. 268, 623 S.E.2d 144, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1225 (2005). There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), as methamphetamine was found in pants from which the defendant retrieved a key and in which the defendant’s wallet was found, and methamphetamine was found in the 332 defendant’s wallet. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 7, 635 S.E.2d 278, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 983 (2006). Because the trial court properly found that testimony tending to show that the defendant’s daughter possessed the methamphetamine the defendant was charged with possessing was hearsay, and testimony from the defendant’s grandson was irrelevant, the defendant’s conviction for possession was affirmed on appeal. Corbin v. State, 287 Ga. App. 194, 651 S.E.2d 101, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 871 (2007). Sufficient evidence was established to support a defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute since the evidence seized from the defendant’s vehicle included the division of the drugs in small plastic baggies, which was evidence of intent to distribute, as well as possessing methamphetamine weighing 24.75 grams, which was inconsistent with personal use. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 928 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0176, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 179 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2008). There was evidence that the defendant affirmatively stated to police officers that the methamphetamine was defendant’s and not another individual’s drug. The defendant testiﬁed at trial that the defendant had previously been convicted of possession of methamphetamine and that the defendant had used methamphetamine in the house; thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the defendant was in possession of the methamphetamine. Shoemaker v. State, 292 Ga. App. 97, 663 S.E.2d 423, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 709 (2008). Officer found methamphetamine in a portion of a truck where the defendant kept personal belongings and the defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. The defendant’s testimony denying possession of the drugs and stating that others had equal access to the truck did not establish under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine. Bryson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 392, 667 S.E.2d 170, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 946 (2008). 16-13-30 There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine based on the contraband being found under the passenger seat in which the defendant was sitting and an officer observing the defendant reach under the seat. Further, a syringe was found in the defendant’s pocket; thus, there was more evidence than just spatial proximity to support the conviction. McBee v. State, 296 Ga. App. 42, 673 S.E.2d 569, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 120 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of possession of methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), because the state presented sufficient evidence that the defendant lived at the property, and the jury could, therefore, presume that the defendant had greater access and control to the closet in the house where methamphetamine was found than that of a mere occupant; when the defendant was arrested, the defendant admitted to police that the defendant previously sold methamphetamine, and the officers discovered a large amount of currency on the defendant’s person. Scales and syringes were also found at the property, and the individuals who the defendant claimed lived in the home and possessed the methamphetamine were not discovered at the property. Turner v. State, 298 Ga. App. 107, 679 S.E.2d 127, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 618 (2009). Evidence supported a conviction of possession of methamphetamine when an ofﬁcer testiﬁed that the officer twice observed the defendant smoke methamphetamine, identiﬁed the pipe the defendant used, and explained, from the officer’s narcotics training, how the pipe was used to smoke the methamphetamine; there was also methamphetamine recovered from the desk where the defendant was sitting. While the defendant complained that the pipe was not tested for the presence of methamphetamine, in drug possession cases the state was not required to present expert testimony scientiﬁcally identifying the substance or to introduce the drugs into evidence; moreover, the officer’s testimony as to a conclusion of fact that could be within the officer’s knowledge had been admitted 333 Possession (Cont’d) without objection and thus could not be attacked as incompetent. Burg v. State, 298 Ga. App. 214, 679 S.E.2d 780, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 627 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) because the jury was justiﬁed in concluding that a wallet containing methamphetamine belonged to the defendant based on a deputy’s testimony that the wallet was found on the defendant’s person during a pat-down search incident to the defendant’s arrest for driving with a suspended license. McGhee v. State, 303 Ga. App. 297, 692 S.E.2d 864, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine because the totality of the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to reject as speculative and unreasonable the hypothesis that someone else discarded the drugs in a patrol car; the defendant possessed a homemade smoking pipe containing methamphetamine residue, there was similar transaction evidence, and the patrol officer testiﬁed that the officer had exclusive control of the officer’s patrol car, the officer stayed with the officer’s car whenever the car was serviced by third parties, the officer searched the backseat immediately after the defendant exited from the car, and the officer discovered the drugs directly up under the seat where the defendant had been sitting. Taylor v. State, 305 Ga. App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 807 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of marijuana as the evidence sufficed to support the jury’s ﬁnding that the defendant possessed the drugs found under a mattress because the drugs were located under the mattress directly underneath where the defendant sat; and the defen- 16-13-30 dant possessed digital scales that appeared to have drug residue on the scales. Smith v. State, 331 Ga. App. 296, 771 S.E.2d 8, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 162 (2015), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Evidence that two bags of drugs were found in the apartment over a garage belonging to the defendant’s mother where the defendant was present, and another individual only testiﬁed to bringing one bag, allowed the jury to ﬁnd that the defendant had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the methamphetamine found in the apartment as required for a conviction for possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. Mantooth v. State, 335 Ga. App. 734, 783 S.E.2d 133, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 124 (2016), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Lipstick evidence insufficient to establish constructive possession of methamphetamine. — Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine as the defendant did not have constructive possession of the drugs found inside of a ﬂower pot in a residence that was neither owned nor occupied by the defendant because there was no evidence that the residue on a pipe was actually lipstick; even if it was lipstick, there was no evidence that the defendant owned any lipstick, let alone the particular lipstick found on the pipe; the mere presence of a pipe with lipstick on it in the vicinity of a female did not constitute direct evidence of possession by that female; and there was no DNA or ﬁngerprint evidence linking the defendant to the drug-laced pipe. Poteet v. State, 358 Ga. App. 82, 853 S.E.2d 671, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 4 (2021). Evidence sufficient to support conviction of sale and trafficking in methamphetamine. — Evidence that a defendant sold an undercover officer methamphetamine on two occasions, with one sale of more than 28 grams, and that the defendant participated in a later, larger drug deal, supported the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in 334 methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), and sale of methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-26(3)(B) and 16-13-30(b). Culajay v. State, 309 Ga. App. 631, 710 S.E.2d 846, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 420 (2011). Evidence that defendant was actively attempting to dispose of methaqualone by ﬂushing the methaqualone down the toilet authorized defendant’s conviction. Anderson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 459, 304 S.E.2d 550, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3242 (1983). Evidence sufficient for conviction. — See Smith v. State, 168 Ga. App. 92, 308 S.E.2d 226, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3376 (1983); Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 468, 330 S.E.2d 406, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2717 (1985); Lewis v. State, 174 Ga. App. 613, 330 S.E.2d 810, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2734 (1985); Clarington v. State, 178 Ga. App. 663, 344 S.E.2d 485, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2554 (1986); Boles v. State, 178 Ga. App. 508, 343 S.E.2d 729, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2542 (1986); Brown v. State, 178 Ga. App. 691, 344 S.E.2d 509, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2563 (1986); Houston v. State, 180 Ga. App. 267, 349 S.E.2d 228, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2708 (1986); Bradley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 386, 349 S.E.2d 263, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2729 (1986); Black v. State, 181 Ga. App. 540, 353 S.E.2d 4, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1477 (1987); Freeman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 654, 356 S.E.2d 718, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2654 (1987); Pittman v. State, 183 Ga. App. 12, 357 S.E.2d 855, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2678 (1987); Bentley v. State, 183 Ga. App. 112, 358 S.E.2d 274, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2682 (1987); Howard v. State, 185 Ga. App. 215, 363 S.E.2d 621, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2861 (1987); Lewis v. State, 186 Ga. App. 349, 367 S.E.2d 123, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 317 (1988); Wright v. State, 189 Ga. App. 441, 375 S.E.2d 895, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1438 (1988); Doe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 793, 377 S.E.2d 546, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (1989); Reeves v. State, 194 Ga. App. 539, 391 S.E.2d 35, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 191 (1990); Smith v. State, 197 Ga. App. 609, 398 S.E.2d 858, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1379 (1990); Nelson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 898, 399 S.E.2d 748, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1505 (1990); 16-13-30 Shiropshire v. State, 201 Ga. App. 421, 411 S.E.2d 339, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1383 (1991); Ross v. State, 206 Ga. App. 1, 424 S.E.2d 308, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1992); Turner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 77, 443 S.E.2d 703, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 456 (1994); Moreland v. State, 213 Ga. App. 638, 445 S.E.2d 388, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 682 (1994); Teasley v. State, 214 Ga. App. 646, 448 S.E.2d 904, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 996 (1994); Thomas v. State, 222 Ga. App. 337, 474 S.E.2d 631; Lang v. State, 226 Ga. App. 729, 487 S.E.2d 485; Tate v. State, 230 Ga. App. 186, 495 S.E.2d 658, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 83 (1998); King v. State, 230 Ga. App. 301, 496 S.E.2d 312; Johnson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 507, 496 S.E.2d 785 (1998); Grant v. State, 239 Ga. App. 608, 521 S.E.2d 654; Heath v. State, 240 Ga. App. 492, 522 S.E.2d 761; Brackins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 788, 549 S.E.2d 775, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 630 (2001); Wood v. State, 264 Ga. App. 787, 592 S.E.2d 455, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1568 (2003); In the Interest of A.A., 265 Ga. App. 369, 593 S.E.2d 891, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 120 (2004), cert. dismissed, No. S04C1099, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. June 7, 2004). Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Kinney v. State, 199 Ga. App. 354, 405 S.E.2d 98, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 473 (1991). Dividing drugs is sufficient evidence for distribution. Evidence showing that cocaine found in the defendant’s possession was divided between more than 30 small glassine or clear plastic packages indicated a manner of packaging commonly associated with the sale or distribution of such contraband and would authorize any rational trier of fact to infer that the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute. Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 544, 405 S.E.2d 539, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (1991). Defendant’s convictions for malice murder, aggravated battery, burglary, and violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., by unlawfully possessing cocaine and marijuana were supported by sufficient evidence; the defendant walked into a neighbor’s house with a butcher knife in 335 Possession (Cont’d) each hand and stabbed two people, knives found in the woods behind the defendant’s apartment matched the descriptions of those used in the stabbings and had deoxyribonucleic acid matching the defendant’s, two knives were missing from a knife block in the defendant’s apartment, marijuana and cocaine were found in the apartment, the defendant told a friend that the defendant had “hurt some people really bad,” and three eyewitnesses identiﬁed the defendant as the assailant. Swanson v. State, 282 Ga. 39, 644 S.E.2d 845, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 351 (2007). There was sufficient evidence of possession to support a defendant’s convictions of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of marijuana, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime since: the defendant sped off when police tried to stop the defendant for running a stop sign; narcotics and a gun were found in the passenger side of the car; the passenger’s story that the passenger had ﬂagged down the defendant for a ride and that the passenger was unaware of the drugs and the gun was corroborated by the passenger’s girlfriend; the defendant’s sister, who owned the car, testiﬁed that there was no contraband in the car before the defendant took the car; the defendant had $1,755 in cash on the defendant’s person; and the defendant had prior drug offenses. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 376 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1169, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 521 (Ga. June 25, 2007), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of two counts of malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of cocaine since: a driver carrying a gun and a bag ran out of a car that had been dragging the body of the car’s owner and that had another dead victim in the passenger seat; bags of cocaine were on the lap of the victim in the passenger seat; one victim had been shot with a .44 caliber weapon; a canine unit located a .44 caliber revolver, 16-13-30 cash, a man’s clothes with cocaine in them, and a shoulder bag in the woods into which the driver had ﬂed; the defendant came out of the woods wearing only underwear; and the defendant admitted to shooting the victims. Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 477 (2007). Given that two officers testiﬁed that the officers saw the defendant, in plain view, packaging 35 grams of cocaine and 94 grams of marijuana into smaller packages, and the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, the defendant’s convictions for trafﬁcking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute were upheld on appeal. King v. State, 289 Ga. App. 461, 657 S.E.2d 570, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 120 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to uphold defendant’s conviction for drug possession as the evidence established that the defendant attempted to sell drugs during a controlled buy situation set up by the police and a gray pouch containing numerous small red bags of marijuana as well as one medium-sized bag of cocaine were found on the defendant’s person. Further, at trial, the defendant admitted to possessing the marijuana and, although defendant insisted that the officers put the cocaine in the gray pouch, three officers participating in the arrest denied that the cocaine and the pouch had been planted. Habersham v. State, 289 Ga. App. 718, 658 S.E.2d 253, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 190 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine and marijuana, both with intent to distribute, and defendant’s conviction was not based only on circumstantial evidence as there was direct evidence that the defendant sold cocaine based on the defendant being observed in the bathroom of the residence doing something at the toilet in response to the police entry; a large quantity of cocaine and marijuana were found in the toilet tank; a witness linked defendant to those drugs; several digital scales were found around the house; and two witnesses testiﬁed that no one else in the house sold drugs but defendant. Howard v. State, 291 Ga. App. 386, 336 662 S.E.2d 203, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 513 (2008). Convictions of drug possession pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-2, 16-13-28, and 16-13-30 were supported by sufficient evidence under circumstances in which, following a stop, an officer found a bag of marijuana in the defendant’s pocket, and, after arresting the defendant, the officer also found $858 in the defendant’s pockets and a bottle containing 16 pills of Alprazolam under the dashboard of the car the defendant had been driving; the pills were what remained of a 90-pill prescription issued ﬁve days before to a different person. Further, a bag of cocaine was later found in the patrol car where the defendant was held before backup officers arrived. Noellien v. State, 298 Ga. App. 47, 679 S.E.2d 75, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (2009). Any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of methylenedioxyamphetamine, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt because based on the evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant threw a plastic bag containing drugs out the passenger side window of the defendant’s car; the state presented evidence that a deputy saw the defendant actually possessing the bag of illegal narcotics as the defendant held the bag in the car before the defendant threw the bag out the passenger’s window, and another deputy assigned to the drug suppression task force testiﬁed, without objection, that the amount of cocaine in the bag was more than a user would have in a user’s possession and that would be the amount that a mid-level dealer would have in a dealer’s possession. McCombs v. State, 306 Ga. App. 64, 701 S.E.2d 496, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 798 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of oxycodone and less than one ounce of marijuana, and driving while the defendant’s license was suspended because the defendant knew the defendant’s license to drive was suspended, and because the defendant knowingly had both the power and intention to 16-13-30 exercise dominion or control over the controlled substances found in the backpack and was in constructive possession of those substances, as the defendant was driving the car in which the backpack was located, and the defendant was linked to the backpack by the defendant’s control of the car and evidence that the backpack contained a copy of a fake driver’s license the defendant gave to an officer. Armstrong v. State, 325 Ga. App. 690, 754 S.E.2d 652, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 51 (2014). Because the record showed that trace amounts of both marijuana and cocaine were found in the defendant’s possession, and neither statute criminalizing possession of those substances required more, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for possession. Francis v. State, 345 Ga. App. 586, 814 S.E.2d 571, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 242 (2018). Evidence sufficient for cocaine. — Defendant’s presence in the vicinity of cocaine, defendant’s participation in an attempt to elude possession, the ﬁnding of cocaine at the defendant’s feet and the presence of cocaine in the defendant’s bodily system as evinced by drug tests were sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to infer that the defendant possessed cocaine with intent to distribute. Jones v. State, 207 Ga. App. 46, 427 S.E.2d 40, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 57 (1993). Defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 et seq., was supported by sufficient evidence; the defendant admitted that a passenger in the defendant’s vehicle had purchased crack cocaine, and a pipe found in the vehicle tested positive for cocaine residue. Bevis v. State, 259 Ga. App. 269, 576 S.E.2d 652, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 75 (2003). Evidence of the defendant’s possession of cocaine was sufficient when the evidence consisted of a police officer’s testimony that the officer saw the defendant discard a glass tube while ﬂeeing the officer and a forensic chemist’s testimony that the tube contained trace amounts of cocaine. Jones v. State, 260 Ga. App. 487, 337 Possession (Cont’d) 580 S.E.2d 278, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 411 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, as a police officer saw defendant commit traffic offenses, pursued defendant’s car for those offenses, saw defendant throw a white substance out of the driver’s side window, the substance was later identiﬁed as an amount of cocaine consistent with the distribution and personal use of cocaine, and defendant had a large amount of cash on defendant at the time defendant’s car was ﬁnally stopped; the evidence was sufﬁcient under the Jackson standard to support each element of defendant’s conviction although a remand was required to make a ﬁnding regarding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Talbot v. State, 261 Ga. App. 12, 581 S.E.2d 669, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 512 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine when the state introduced blood test results showing a metabolite of cocaine in the defendant’s blood after the defendant refused to spit out the substance the defendant was chewing. Millsap v. State, 261 Ga. App. 427, 582 S.E.2d 568, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 650 (2003). Evidence held sufficient for possessing cocaine, possessing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a housing project, and attempted bribery, where police officers observed the defendant engaging in what appeared to be a drug transaction, the officers thereafter found cocaine on the sidewalk where the defendant had been standing and cocaine in the defendant’s pockets, and the defendant told a police officer who was counting the defendant’s money to take it and the defendant’s watch, and that the defendant would pay the officer more in a week if the officer would let the defendant go. Hester v. State, 261 Ga. App. 614, 583 S.E.2d 274, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 722 (2003). Testimony of the officers alone held sufﬁcient to support convictions of selling cocaine as the credibility and weight to be given to the witnesses was within the 16-13-30 province of the jury. Sutton v. State, 261 Ga. App. 860, 583 S.E.2d 897, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 790 (2003). There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant possessed cocaine since the defendant resided in the bedroom where the cocaine was discovered, a friend testiﬁed that the friend heard the defendant admit the cocaine was found in the defendant’s room, the defendant’s mother pointed out the room as defendant’s, and after the cocaine was discovered, the defendant went into hiding, and the argument of equal access by the defendant’s mother and brother to the cocaine was unavailing when other evidence linked the defendant to the cocaine. Truitt v. State, 266 Ga. App. 56, 596 S.E.2d 219, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 299 (2004). Defendant’s acts, including telephoning a known drug dealer about purchasing cocaine and driving to an agreed location to make the transaction sufficiently constituted a substantial step to convict defendant of attempting to possess cocaine. Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 600 S.E.2d 437, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 690 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions of possession of controlled substances, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), and possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), when two witnesses testiﬁed that the substance in a bag carried by the defendant appeared to be crack cocaine, and a ﬁeld test indicated that the substance was crack cocaine. Riddle v. State, 267 Ga. App. 630, 600 S.E.2d 709, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 738 (2004). Evidence that an undercover police officer tried to purchase drugs from a third person, that the third person said the person would have to get the drugs from “his source,” and that the officer was present when defendant gave a package to a third person shortly before the third person delivered cocaine to the officer was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Serrate v. State, 268 Ga. App. 276, 601 S.E.2d 766, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (2004). 338 Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) as cocaine was a controlled substance under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-26(1)(D) and the defendant had an additional 2.2 grams of cocaine in the defendant’s pocket when the defendant was arrested for trafficking in cocaine found in a cooler. Salgado v. State, 268 Ga. App. 18, 601 S.E.2d 417, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine as cocaine was found in the defendant’s pocket during a search of the defendant’s clothes while being arrested on other charges. Finney v. State, 270 Ga. App. 422, 606 S.E.2d 637, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1467 (2004). Defendant’s cocaine possession conviction was affirmed as defendant’s statement that defendant and two other men went to the victim’s house to buy cocaine, that the victim came out of the victim’s house with the cocaine and gave it to defendant, and that defendant split the cocaine with defendant’s accomplices, was corroborated by proof that cash was found on the victim’s bed next to several bags of a substance that later tested positive for crack cocaine. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 424, 606 S.E.2d 871, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1456 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine as the evidence showed that the defendant kept cocaine in the office and that the defendant alone controlled access to the defendant’s office as a sign on the office door made it plain that the office was the defendant’s office and that the office was off limits to everyone except the defendant. Simmons v. State, 271 Ga. App. 330, 609 S.E.2d 678, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 49 (2005). Conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute was sufficiently supported by evidence showing that 1.5 grams of cocaine were found in the defendant’s pocket and that an electronic scale, small plastic baggies, and over $2,600.00 in cash were found in the defendant’s residence. Copeland v. State, 273 Ga. App. 850, 616 S.E.2d 189, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 638 (2005). 16-13-30 Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) as: (1) the informant testiﬁed that the defendant procured crack cocaine for the informant for $300.00; (2) detectives witnessed the defendant enter and exit the bar where, according to the informant, defendant obtained the cocaine; and (3) the substance tested positive for cocaine, a controlled substance under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-26(1)(D); the credibility of the informant, which, according to the defendant, was allegedly impaired by the informant’s prior criminal conduct, was an issue for the jury. Ross v. State, 275 Ga. App. 137, 619 S.E.2d 809, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 905 (2005). Circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, as the defendant was approached by two undercover officers and upon seeing that one of the officers had a badge, the defendant turned around and made a throwing motion with a clenched ﬁst in the direction of a trash barrel; the defendant was in an area known for drug sales, and three pieces of crack cocaine were found in the vicinity of the trash barrel. Woods v. State, 275 Ga. App. 471, 620 S.E.2d 660, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 997 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of simple possession of cocaine where, during the defendant’s ﬂight on foot from an officer, the officer saw defendant take an object from a pocket and ﬂick it away and where the police found a small box containing drugs in the area of the chase, which the officer identiﬁed as the object the defendant discarded. Wilburn v. State, 278 Ga. App. 76, 628 S.E.2d 174, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 252 (2006). Sufficient evidence, including a tape recording of the drug transaction, testimony from three government agents, and the jury’s rejection of the defendant’s defenses of misidentiﬁcation and mere presence at the scene of a crime supported the defendant’s sale of cocaine conviction; the defendant failed to preserve an alleged error in the jury charge regarding the factors 339 Possession (Cont’d) the jury may consider in assessing reliability of identiﬁcation testimony. Bonner v. State, 278 Ga. App. 855, 630 S.E.2d 127, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (2006). Defendant’s convictions of possession of cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), and giving a false name and date of birth, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25, were supported by sufficient evidence that, during a level-one encounter with an officer, the defendant gave the officer a false name and birth date, that, during a subsequent search of the defendant’s person validly consented to by the defendant, the officer found documents that revealed the defendant’s true identity and ﬁve pieces of a substance that the officer suspected was crack cocaine, that the officer’s ﬁeld test of the substance indicated positive for cocaine, that the substance was later tested at a state crime lab which conﬁrmed that it was cocaine, and that there was a sufficient chain of custody for that substance. Postell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 275, 630 S.E.2d 867, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 518 (2006). There was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict ﬁnding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), as the arresting officer testiﬁed that the defendant was in possession of a substance that tested positive for cocaine. Copeland v. State, 281 Ga. App. 11, 635 S.E.2d 283, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 984 (2006). Appellate court upheld the defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on sufficient evidence consisting of testimony from two special agents identifying the defendant, a videotape of a cocaine sale, and positive test results conﬁrming the substance the defendant sold and possessed was cocaine. Henley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 242, 635 S.E.2d 856, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1065 (2006). Upon the defendant’s challenge to the evidence supporting a cocaine possession charge and portions of the state’s closing argument, because sufficient evidence corroborated the accomplice testimony sup- 16-13-30 porting said charge, including that cocaine was found in the vicinity of the vehicle the defendant drove, and the defendant’s ﬂight from police showed a consciousness of guilt, conviction on said charge was upheld; moreover, the defendant waived objection to any argument of future dangerousness, and even if an objection had been made, the prosecutor’s argument was proper, as such urged conviction based on current evidence that the defendant was a drug dealer and could not be seen as urging conviction based on future dangerousness. Carr v. State, 282 Ga. App. 199, 638 S.E.2d 348, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1351 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 despite the passenger’s claim at trial that the passenger, not the defendant, threw the cocaine out the car window; the jury was permitted to reject the passenger’s trial testimony as it conﬂicted with the passenger’s earlier statement that the defendant had thrown the cocaine, and other evidence included the officer’s statement that the cocaine was thrown from the driver’s side where the defendant had been seated, and a substantial amount of cash was recovered from the defendant. Smith v. State, 282 Ga. App. 255, 638 S.E.2d 388, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1355 (2006). Given that the evidence presented against the defendant showed that, as the only passenger in a moving vehicle, the defendant, as that passenger, and not the driver, could have tossed bags of cocaine out of a window, the evidence supported the defendant’s possession conviction. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 425, 641 S.E.2d 655, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 81 (2007). Defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) and O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b), were based on sufficient evidence since the state proved by circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) that the defendant had been walking back and forth to an 340 overturned bucket when people approached from the street in what appeared to be drug transactions, and the drugs were found under the bucket; there was evidence that the amount of drugs recovered were more than one would use for personal use, such that it indicated an intent to distribute, and there was also evidence indicating the proximity of the bucket to a nearby public housing complex. Reason v. State, 283 Ga. App. 608, 642 S.E.2d 236, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 136 (2007). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession did not rest on “mere presence” evidence; an officer’s unobstructed observation of the defendant in the act of throwing a crack pipe onto the ground, combined with the lab testing of the substance removed from the pipe, provided ample direct evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant possessed cocaine. Smith v. State, 285 Ga. App. 399, 646 S.E.2d 499, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 533 (2007); Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. App. 86, 648 S.E.2d 674, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 696 (2007). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion for a new trial, and there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and that defendant’s drug possession was not for personal use, based on the ﬁnding of 25 pieces of crack cocaine, totaling 1.68 grams being found on defendant’s person, and an officer testifying that the officer investigated crack cocaine sales in the area for over a year and was familiar with the price of crack cocaine, how the cocaine was packaged, how buyers and sellers interact, and how sellers often use a twoway radio, such as was found on the defendant, to conduct the transactions. Defendant’s contention that the defendant was addicted to crack cocaine was further contradicted by no crack pipe being found on the defendant’s person, nor was there any evidence that the defendant was under the inﬂuence of any drug at the time of the search. Griffin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 618, 662 S.E.2d 171, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1469, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 709 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2008). Additional evidence other than a defendant’s ownership of the premises demon- 16-13-30 strated the defendant’s possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The cocaine was found in an office containing the defendant’s personal items; entry into the office had been made more difficult by installation of a steel padlocked door, which was locked when officers arrived to conduct the search; the defendant admitted to installing surveillance equipment; numerous items used to measure, prepare, and ingest cocaine were found in the office; and the defendant admitted to an officer that pill bottles of cocaine belonged to the defendant. Bailey v. State, 294 Ga. App. 437, 669 S.E.2d 453, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (2008), overruled, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine based on the police observing the defendant making a throwing motion with the defendant’s hands after the police commanded the defendant to come and thereafter ﬁnding in the area where the defendant was standing three rocks of dry crack cocaine even though it had been raining, and no one else was in the area. Ware v. State, 297 Ga. App. 400, 677 S.E.2d 423, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 because a sheriff’s deputy and the arresting officer testiﬁed that cocaine was found on the defendant’s person and the expert testimony of the state crime lab technician conﬁrmed that the seized substance was cocaine. Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 696 S.E.2d 381, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 527 (2010). Testimony from both of the arresting officers that the officers personally witnessed the defendant with what looked like crack cocaine rocks in the defendant’s mouth and further testimony that the officers saw the defendant spit out some pieces of the suspected cocaine, which the officers retrieved and which later tested positive for cocaine, supported a conviction for possession of cocaine. Jordan v. State, 326 Ga. App. 78, 755 S.E.2d 882, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 123 (2014). 341 Possession (Cont’d) Evidence that the defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the ex-girlfriend’s aunt saw the defendant place a plastic bag containing what they believed to be marijuana onto a scale before taking it out the back door and the defendant sat alone on the back steps until police arrived and found plastic bags of marijuana and cocaine side-byside behind a panel beside the steps where the defendant sat, showed more than spatial proximity, and was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of cocaine. Johnson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 796, 783 S.E.2d 156, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 86 (2016). Sufficient evidence of manufacturing and trafficking in methamphetamine. Even assuming the lab results regarding methamphetamine were non-probative hearsay, the detailed testimony by the officers provided the requisite evidence to convict defendant of manufacturing and trafficking in methamphetamine. Bilow v. State, 262 Ga. App. 850, 586 S.E.2d 675, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 785 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0048, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 42 (Ga. Jan. 12, 2004). Cocaine on piece of paper sufficient. Evidence that, inter alia, an officer observed the defendant drop a piece of paper which later tested positive for cocaine was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of cocaine. Griffin v. State, 266 Ga. App. 50, 596 S.E.2d 405, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 296 (2004). Evidence sufficient for methamphetamine conviction. Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine as an accomplice’s statement that the defendant was involved in a drug transaction was supported by the defendant’s admission that the defendant was at the accomplice’s house to buy drugs, the defendant’s possession of a digital scale of the type used in drug transactions, and cash in an amount an expert testiﬁed was typical of that charged for an eightball of methamphetamine. Lewis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 547, 602 S.E.2d 278, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 962 (2004). 16-13-30 Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine because a police officer testiﬁed the methamphetamine was taken from the defendant’s wallet. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 219 (2005), aff’d, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 119 (2006), overruled in part, State v. Slaughter, 289 Ga. 344, 711 S.E.2d 651, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 470 (2011). Conviction for possession by ingestion of methamphetamine was supported by a positive preliminary urine test for amphetamines conducted by the defendant’s supervising probation officer and a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test performed on the sample by the state forensic toxicologist, which conﬁrmed the presence of methamphetamine. Poston v. State, 274 Ga. App. 117, 617 S.E.2d 150, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 679 (2005). There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug related objects when the defendant admitted telling officers that the defendant owned a pipe that had methamphetamine residue on the pipe, but said that the admission had been made under pressure and that a purse in which drug-related items were found was a “community purse” used by employees of the convenience store where the defendant worked; it was for the jury to resolve conﬂicts in the testimony and to weigh the evidence. Doyal v. State, 287 Ga. App. 667, 653 S.E.2d 52, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 894 (2007). Convictions of manufacture, distribution, and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), possession of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.3(b)(1), and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4) were supported by the evidence. A panel van belonging to the defendant had been modiﬁed as a methamphetamine lab, was located on the defendant’s property, and was powered by an electrical cord running from the defendant’s trailer; everything necessary to support the production of methamphetamine was present in the 342 vicinity of the vehicle; the defendant’s name and that of the defendant’s spouse had been scrawled on an interior panel of the vehicle; the defendant offered to provide any methamphetamine that a house guest wanted; uncured methamphetamine and enough ephedrine was present at the scene to make 30 to 33 grams of methamphetamine; and the defendant admitted to giving methamphetamine to others and to owning the sawed-off shotgun recovered from the panel van. Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute with regard to the police ﬁnding the contraband in the defendant’s vehicle, despite the defendant’s contention that the state failed to show that the defendant was in possession of the drug and failed to show an intention to distribute, based on the defendant’s intentional use of the vehicle. Further, there was testimony from a witness that the witness had recently ingested methamphetamine that was procured from the defendant and the codefendants and that the defendant provided the transportation that facilitated the procurement of the methamphetamine that was ingested. Armstrong v. State, 298 Ga. App. 855, 681 S.E.2d 662, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 805 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) because the defendant occupied and controlled a trailer where the drugs were found. Peacock v. State, 301 Ga. App. 873, 689 S.E.2d 853, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 12 (2010). No right to know identity of informant in cocaine case. — When the defendant’s possession of a vehicle was not the sole evidence of defendant’s possession of drugs and a conﬁdential informant’s testimony was not material to the defense, the defendant was not entitled to know the informant’s identity and the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the charges of possession of cocaine. Respress v. State, 267 Ga. App. 654, 600 S.E.2d 727, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 743 (2004). 16-13-30 Cocaine in hotel room. Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine as police searched a hotel room where the defendant was with a girlfriend and cocaine residue and paraphernalia was found. Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 359, 609 S.E.2d 703, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 41 (2005). Videotape of drug transactions. Although a videotape of the transaction provided helpful conﬁrmation of an undercover officer’s identiﬁcation of the defendant as the seller of cocaine, the testimony of the officer, by itself, was sufficient to support the jury’s determination of guilt. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 633, 627 S.E.2d 196, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 166 (2006). Juvenile convicted of possession. As the defendant admitted at trial that the defendant was in possession of a gun and cocaine when the defendant was stopped by the police and that the defendant was 16 years old at the time, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of possession of cocaine, possession of a ﬁrearm while in the commission of a felony, and possession of a pistol by a person under the age of 18. Olive v. State, 291 Ga. App. 538, 662 S.E.2d 308, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 560 (2008). Evidence sufficient for convictions of felony murder and possession of cocaine. — A person ﬁtting the defendant’s description, wearing black clothing and carrying a black garbage bag, ran from the store where the victim worked; within an hour of the shooting, the defendant, who lived three blocks away, gave a neighbor’s child “cigars without tobacco” and lottery tickets from a black garbage bag, and said that the defendant had “hit a lick”; packages of tobacco tubes were found on the ground between the store and the defendant’s apartment complex; the victim’s wallet was found in a trash receptacle at the complex, and a police dog followed the scent on the wallet to the defendant’s apartment; officers searching the defendant’s apartment found cocaine, a handgun, black clothing, a black stocking, and a novelty dollar bill of the sort that 343 Possession (Cont’d) had been given to the victim the night before the shooting; and the bullet that killed the victim was ﬁred from the handgun in the defendant’s room. Jones v. State, 284 Ga. 672, 670 S.E.2d 790, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 1021 (2008). Evidence was sufficient for conviction of cocaine and marijuana possession. — An officer testiﬁed that the officer found a plastic bag containing the drugs in the location where the officer saw a person identiﬁed as the defendant pull out an object and then replace the object; the defendant’s arguments regarding the identiﬁcation testimony, which was contradicted by defense witnesses, went to the weight and credit to be given the evidence and not to the evidence’s sufficiency. Smith v. State, 297 Ga. App. 658, 678 S.E.2d 496, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 507 (2009). Evidence sufficient for constructive possession of cocaine. Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of constructive possession of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) given that an extended stay motel room where an undercover officer purchased cocaine was rented to the defendant, the defendant was in the room, and drugs and paraphernalia were in plain view on the table. A jury could infer that the defendant was aware of the cocaine, was in control of the cocaine, and was in sole or joint constructive possession of the cocaine. Conyers v. State, 302 Ga. App. 95, 690 S.E.2d 233, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 65 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0909, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 439 (Ga. June 1, 2010). Presumption of drug ownership when owner of home. Since the defendant was the owner of the house where the ephedrine and pseudoephedrine were found, the defendant was presumed to have possessed all of the contents and, thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s possession conviction. Taylor v. State, 320 Ga. App. 596, 740 S.E.2d 327, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 244 (2013). Parent’s convictions for son’s possession. Evidence that the defendant’s son spent most of the son’s 16-13-30 time in the downstairs of the defendant’s house smoking marijuana and selling the marijuana to a regular stream of customers and that the defendant was not surprised when a safe in the son’s bedroom was opened and drugs and paraphernalia were found there supported the defendant’s conviction for possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. Kirchner v. State, 322 Ga. App. 275, 744 S.E.2d 802, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 495 (2013), overruled, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Drugs found on night stand. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine because the police found the cocaine on defendant’s night stand next to defendant’s wallet and the victim testiﬁed that it belonged to defendant. Freeman v. State, 365 Ga. App. 332, 878 S.E.2d 578, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 440 (2022). Evidence sufficient for codeine possession conviction. — Trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of codeine as the evidence at trial supported an inference that the defendant possessed a prescription bottle that was in another person’s name and that the liquid in the bottle contained codeine; and the state was not required to show that the codeine fell speciﬁcally within Schedule V as a description in an indictment to a speciﬁed controlled substance by reference to a particular Schedule in the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., was mere surplusage. Evans v. State, 330 Ga. App. 241, 766 S.E.2d 821, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 823 (2014), cert. dismissed, No. S15C0653, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 207 (Ga. Mar. 30, 2015). Trial court determines credibility and resolves conﬂicts. — In a bench trial, because conﬂicts in the evidence were for the trial court as the trier of fact, and not the court of appeals to resolve, the defendant’s convictions for theft by taking a motor vehicle and possessing cocaine were not subject to reversal on appeal based on the conﬂicts. Marshall v. State, 344 286 Ga. App. 86, 648 S.E.2d 674, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 696 (2007). Defendant failed to demonstrate search warrant inadequately described car where cocaine found. — Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and properly entered a judgment of conviction against defendant for possession of cocaine, as the evidence sufficiently showed that defendant possessed cocaine which police found in a search of defendant’s home and vehicle parked on a street just outside a fence that defendant and the wife owned; the motion to suppress was properly denied since defendant did not show that the search warrant inadequately described the car in which the cocaine would be found. Heller v. State, 275 Ga. App. 637, 621 S.E.2d 591, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1064 (2005). Drugs within vehicles. — Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury’s ﬁnding that defendant was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine, marijuana, and a pistol found inside the driver’s car because the drugs were in plain view inside a car that smelled of raw marijuana, defendant was nervous about the impending search and gave evasive answers to the officers, defendant was in possession of an unusually large amount of cash and was in a position to see the pistol when the driver took the driver’s proof of insurance from the glove box and, given the trafficking amount of cocaine found, the jury was authorized to infer that the driver and defendant possessed a loaded handgun to protect their illegal drug trade; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s ﬁnding that defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 257 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0933, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 583 (Ga. June 2, 2003). When narcotics officers observed the defendant attempt to destroy a white substance against the side of the defendant’s vehicle, and by rubbing the defendant’s hand against a beer can, when coupled 16-13-30 with a positive ﬁeld test of both areas for cocaine, provided sufficient direct evidence to sustain a possession of cocaine conviction. Davis v. State, 260 Ga. App. 853, 581 S.E.2d 380, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 493 (2003). When the evidence was sufficient to conclude that the defendant saw, had access to, and control over a plastic bag of cocaine sitting on a vehicle’s front passenger seat, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s acquittal motion. Felder v. State, 264 Ga. App. 583, 591 S.E.2d 471, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1517 (2003). Rational trier of fact was authorized to ﬁnd that both defendants burglarized the victims’ residence; that, once inside, they took money, clothing, and other personal property by use of a gun; that the ﬁrst defendant also committed an aggravated assault on the female victim by striking her in the head with a handgun and was, therefore, in possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime; and that both defendants, along with their cohorts, had been in possession of the cocaine which was tossed out the vehicle they were riding in and found along the roadway. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 221, 590 S.E.2d 192, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1441 (2003). Defendant was properly convicted of possession of cocaine after a crack pipe with cocaine residue was found in defendant’s car because although defendant claimed that the pipe belonged to a friend, defendant admitted knowing of the pipe’s presence in defendant’s car. Walker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 449, 594 S.E.2d 678, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (2004). There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because defendant was lawfully stopped for a trafﬁc violation due to having only one operational headlight, a canine alerted to the passenger side of the vehicle, and a search of defendant’s person and of the truck revealed cocaine and cash in such amounts as to lead a reasonable person to conclude that defendant had been selling the drugs. Barnett v. State, 275 Ga. App. 464, 620 S.E.2d 663, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 994 (2005). 345 Possession (Cont’d) Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., because a passenger in the defendant’s truck testiﬁed that the defendant purchased crack cocaine from an individual in a high drug area, a rock of crack cocaine was found in the defendant’s truck, and a police officer corroborated that testimony pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) with the officer’s own observations that the individual that the defendant was talking to had money in the individual’s hand as it was lowered from the defendant’s truck window. Millsap v. State, 275 Ga. App. 732, 621 S.E.2d 837, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1104 (2005). Since there was direct testimony that the defendant possessed the cocaine found in a car, corroborated by circumstantial evidence that a police officer saw the defendant take something from the defendant’s pants and place it on the ﬂoor of the car, the defendant was properly found guilty of possession of cocaine. Depree v. State, 276 Ga. App. 499, 623 S.E.2d 701, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1290 (2005). Evidence that there were plastic bags of drugs in the driver’s side door of a vehicle in which the defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat, along with plastic bags recovered from the defendant’s pocket that matched the bags containing the drugs, was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute. Mackey v. State, 299 Ga. App. 851, 683 S.E.2d 899, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1006 (2009). Evidence that a cigarette pack containing methamphetamine and cocaine was found at the defendant’s feet on the ﬂoor of a car after a traffic stop, along with evidence that the others in the car had just picked up the defendant to buy drugs from the defendant, was sufficient to allow a jury to ﬁnd constructive possession in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a). Howard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 124, 684 S.E.2d 297, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1097 (2009). 16-13-30 Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession of marijuana, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b), because the circumstantial evidence established a meaningful connection between the defendant and the contraband, evidence which showed the defendant exercising power and dominion over the drugs found inside the wheel well on the front passenger’s side of a car; the jury could infer that the drugs had been recently placed in the wheel well, and because the defendant had ﬂed from the police, had been caught within arm’s reach of the drugs, and had a large amount of cash in the defendant’s pockets, the jury could infer that the defendant was a drug dealer and that the defendant had placed the drugs in the wheel well to avoid being prosecuted for possessing the drugs. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 332, 690 S.E.2d 654, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 56 (2010). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j) because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to show that the defendant was in sole constructive possession of the contraband when the defendant alone was charged with possessing the marijuana although the passenger in the defendant’s car had equal access to the drugs, and the only legal evidence linking the defendant to the marijuana in the back seat was the defendant’s spatial proximity to the marijuana; an officer’s testimony concerning scales that were found in the car, to the extent it suggested some deception on the passenger’s part, that deception did not give rise to the sole, reasonable inference that defendant was in sole constructive possession of the marijuana, and because the inference did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of defendant, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in sole constructive possession of the marijuana. Rogers v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346 65, 690 S.E.2d 437, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 47 (2010), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013). Possession of car and possession of drugs. — Trial court did not err in denying either a motion for directed verdict or a motion for new trial based on sufficiency grounds because the evidence supported the ﬁnding that the defendant was in possession of bags of cocaine and marijuana found in the cargo area of the car when stopped and, although the defendant did not own the car, the fact that the defendant was driving the car gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant possessed the drugs found within the car, which the defendant failed to rebut. Cromartie v. State, 348 Ga. App. 563, 824 S.E.2d 32, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 47 (2019). Insufficient evidence of possession in vehicle. — There was insufficient evidence of constructive possession to support a conviction of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute; although a brown paper bag of cocaine was found under the passenger seat where the defendant had been sitting for over three hours, there was no evidence that the defendant knew of the contents of the bag or that the defendant had hid the bag, and the defendant’s spatial proximity to the cocaine over a long period of time could not sustain the defendant’s conviction. Gillis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 199, 645 S.E.2d 674, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 474 (2007). Evidence was insufficient for adjudication as a delinquent for acts that would have constituted cocaine possession if committed by an adult because the circumstantial evidence of defendant’s spatial proximity to cocaine found in a car’s console did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than constructive possession. In the Interest of J.S., 303 Ga. App. 788, 694 S.E.2d 375, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 399 (2010). Drugs thrown from vehicles. — While a defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to exclude the possibility that the cocaine belonged solely to the defendant’s passenger, the testimony of the passenger that the 16-13-30 passenger dropped the drugs out of the truck after the defendant threw them in the passenger’s lap was adequately corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the facts that the defendant had more than $2,000 in the defendant’s pocket and that the defendant was the owner and driver of the truck from which the drugs were thrown; the defendant was, thus, properly convicted of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) and possession of cocaine as a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. Wingﬁeld v. State, 297 Ga. App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 454 (2009). Evidence sufficient for conviction of possession of methaqualone with intent to distribute. — See Johnston v. State, 178 Ga. App. 219, 342 S.E.2d 706, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2516 (1986). Evidence insufficient to establish actual or constructive possession of cocaine or methamphetamine. — See Dawson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 94, 357 S.E.2d 891, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1897 (1987); Ridgeway v. State, 187 Ga. App. 381, 370 S.E.2d 216, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 695 (1988); Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 583, 538 S.E.2d 481, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1015 (2000). Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute as there was no evidence connecting the defendant to the drugs other than the defendant’s own equal access. The drugs and paraphernalia were not found in an area exclusively used by the defendant, and the defendant’s cousin had the same access to the drugs and paraphernalia. Xiong v. State, 295 Ga. App. 697, 673 S.E.2d 86, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 96 (2009), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013). Evidence sufficient to support conviction for possession with intent to distribute. — Given the items found in the defendant’s pockets, including large amounts of drugs, cash, two cell phones, and a residue-laden razor blade, coupled with the evidence regarding the text messages between the defendant and 347 Possession (Cont’d) other individuals, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute the drugs. Glispie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 177, 779 S.E.2d 767, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 748 (2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 300 Ga. 128, 793 S.E.2d 381, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 736 (2016), vacated in part, 341 Ga. App. 817, 801 S.E.2d 910, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 286 (2017). Evidence of res gestae admissible as relevant. — Because the defendant was charged with possessing cocaine, and other evidence showed that the defendant purchased cocaine from a man who was outside of a game room, evidence that the man dropped crack cocaine into a trash can immediately after the transaction as police detectives appeared, and that cash was found on the man, was relevant as part of the res gestae of the crime that the defendant was charged with committing; denial of the defendant’s motion for mistrial was proper. Millsap v. State, 275 Ga. App. 732, 621 S.E.2d 837, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1104 (2005). Knowing possession of cocaine. — There was no evidentiary basis upon which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in knowing possession of cocaine. Evidence showed only that a certain amount of crack cocaine was found on the ﬂoorboard between the seat and the door on the passenger side of the car near where defendant had been sitting and that defendant denied seeing the owner of the car with any drugs that day. Reid v. State, 212 Ga. App. 787, 442 S.E.2d 852, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 397 (1994), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013). Intent to possess not found. — State failed to establish that a defendant knowingly possessed khat with the knowledge that it contained cathinone as the state’s expert witness testiﬁed that cathinone converted into cathine, another chemical that the defendant was not charged with possessing, after some period of time and that cathinone was undetectable without the use of scientiﬁc 16-13-30 testing equipment. Additionally, the evidence showed that the khat in the case was harvested more than two days before its subsequent arrival in Georgia, the defendant testiﬁed that the defendant believed the chemical “went out” of the khat after two days, and there was no evidence that the defendant made any attempt to conceal the nature of the package in which the khat was found by, for example, evading police or showing false identiﬁcation. Mohamed v. State, 314 Ga. App. 181, 723 S.E.2d 694, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 144 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1038, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 616 (Ga. June 18, 2012). Defendant was entitled to reversal of a conviction for possession of cathinone, a Schedule I substance, because the state failed to establish that the defendant knowingly possessed cathinone; a state crime lab chemist who tested the khat concluded that cathinone was not detectable by sight, although scientiﬁc testing revealed detectable amounts. Amin v. State, 317 Ga. App. 685, 732 S.E.2d 340, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 795 (2012). Delivery and Distribution Construed with O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5. — Convictions for selling cocaine (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30) and selling cocaine within 1000 feet of a public housing project (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5) did not merge because the latter statute contains a speciﬁc non-merger provision and the intent thereof is simply to increase the punishment for violating both statutes. Harper v. State, 213 Ga. App. 611, 445 S.E.2d 300, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 672 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1579, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1028 (Ga. Sept. 29, 1994). Admission, in trafficking trial, of evidence of prior possession conviction. — In trial for trafficking in cocaine, there was no error in admission of evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for possession, since evidence of possession of a bag or container containing residue or traces of cocaine (which is the evidence upon which the prior conviction was based) does not demand the conclusion that defendant used, rather than sold or distributed, the 348 cocaine which had at one time been in the bag. Stephens v. State, 208 Ga. App. 291, 430 S.E.2d 29, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 444 (1993). Knowledge shown. — Although circumstantial, evidence that the products the defendants were selling were pre-packaged in small quantities, yet sold for unusually large amounts, and that clerks observed customers come in multiple times a day to purchase them, along with smoking papers, and the customers often returned in an altered state, was sufficient to support a ﬁnding the defendants knew the products contained a controlled substance. Awtrey v. State, 346 Ga. App. 892, 815 S.E.2d 655, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 433 (2018). Pregnant woman not guilty for transporting drugs to fetus. — Legislature did not intend to include transmission of controlled substances to fetuses in the conduct prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 419 S.E.2d 32, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 796 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1020, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 467 (Ga. June 4, 1992). Delivery of marijuana and distribution of marijuana are both distinct violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) and they are not included but each may be committed exclusive of the other. Buford v. State, 162 Ga. App. 498, 291 S.E.2d 256, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2197 (1982). Included offenses. — Sale and delivery under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) are not separate and distinct crimes because a sale necessarily includes a delivery of goods for a price and the sale is complete upon delivery. Robinson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 652, 297 S.E.2d 751, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3338 (1982). When the trial court charged the entirety of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 even though the indictment alleged only possession of marijuana “with intent to distribute,” sufficient remedial instructions were given which properly conﬁned the charge to the particular portion of the section applicable to the offense charged in the indictment, and defendant was not harmed thereby. Caithaml v. State, 163 Ga. App. 429, 294 S.E.2d 674, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2518 (1982). 16-13-30 Expert opinions. — Although the police officer who made an investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle was not formally tendered as an expert witness, because the state laid the foundation for that officer’s opinion by eliciting the testimony about the officer’s experience and training in drug enforcement, and the defendant never objected to the officer’s opinion that the amount of marijuana the defendant possessed was more consistent with distribution rather than personal use, the evidence was admissible. Daniels v. State, 278 Ga. App. 263, 628 S.E.2d 684, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 303 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1248, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 430 (Ga. June 12, 2006). Smell of marijuana on person in own driveway. — After the defendant exited a vehicle parked in the defendant’s driveway, police smelled an odor of raw marijuana on the defendant’s person and, after searching the vehicle with the driver’s consent, found marijuana residue. Therefore, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of marijuana. Minor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 391, 680 S.E.2d 459, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1744, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 771 (Ga. Nov. 9, 2009). Intent to distribute inferred from evidence. — After police officers found ten grams of cocaine, two “chunks” of hashish, and two bags containing approximately one pound of hashish in defendants’ automobiles, the quantity of the contraband found, as well as the presence of a cocaine analysis ﬁeld kit, cocaine-tainted spoons, rolling papers and related drug paraphernalia, gave rise to a reasonable reference that defendants had the intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine. Holbrook v. State, 177 Ga. App. 318, 339 S.E.2d 346, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2951 (1985). Evidence that the defendant was in possession of nine rocks of crack cocaine, did not have a smoking device, and did not appear to be under the inﬂuence at the time of the defendant’s arrest, and an expert’s testimony that someone with that amount of cocaine had the cocaine for the purpose of distributing the cocaine, established the defendant’s intent to distribute cocaine. Palmer v. State, 210 Ga. App. 717, 349 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) 437 S.E.2d 490, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1331 (1993). Defendant’s possession of 11 rocks of cocaine combined with the officer’s expert testimony that such quantity far exceeded that possessed for personal use sufficed to sustain a conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Myers v. State, 268 Ga. App. 607, 602 S.E.2d 327, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 970 (2004). Because two experienced police officers involved in defendant’s arrest testiﬁed that the packaging of the marijuana found on defendant’s person was consistent with preparing it for sale as opposed to personal use, and defendant conceded that the officers’ testimony concerning their training and experience in drug cases laid a proper foundation for their opinion testimony that the packaging of the marijuana was consistent with distribution, sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. Marshall v. State, 270 Ga. App. 663, 607 S.E.2d 258, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1571 (2004). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because the defendant stipulated that cocaine and marijuana were found under a sink and behind wall paneling in the house where the defendant lived, showing the defendant’s constructive possession, and the amount of the drugs, and other indicia of distribution such as currency, baggies, razor blades, and scales, showed the defendant’s intent to distribute. Marshall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 17, 614 S.E.2d 169, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 396 (2005). Officer’s testimony that the amount of cocaine in a bag in the defendant’s possession was inconsistent with personal use, and that the cocaine was packaged for distribution, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Best v. State, 279 Ga. App. 309, 630 S.E.2d 900, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 533 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) in 16-13-30 the possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 case; the defendant was seen ﬂeeing into the woods wearing an unmarked black hat, a dog smelled the defendant on the same hat that was found near the defendant and that contained cocaine, and the defendant was not wearing a hat when the defendant was found. Riggins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 266, 635 S.E.2d 867, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1075 (2006). Despite the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute that conviction was upheld on appeal given that: (1) the marijuana found in the defendant’s vehicle was packaged in 17 small zip-lock bags, commonly known as a dime bags and used for the purchase and selling of marijuana; (2) no evidence was presented which connected any other person to their possession; and (3) the jury could infer the defendant’s intent from the individual packaging and number of bags found. Gerlock v. State, 283 Ga. App. 229, 641 S.E.2d 240, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 18 (2007). Because: (1) the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a ﬁnding that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine seized, as the defendant was in possession of a large amount of cash and 12.12 grams of cocaine divided into 33 individual packages; and (2) the arresting officer, who had been involved in thousands of drug arrests, testiﬁed that the small bags of crack cocaine ordinarily sold for $20 each, the jury was authorized to infer and ﬁnd that the defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute the drugs. Harper v. State, 285 Ga. App. 261, 645 S.E.2d 741, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 505 (2007). Given the evidence seized from an athletic bag taken from the back of the vehicle searched, which the defendant was driving, as well as the scales used to weigh the substance out, sufficient evidence existed to authorize a ﬁnding that the defendant intended to sell the narcotics stashed in the bag with the cocaine, which included methamphetamine. Stroud v. State, 286 Ga. App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (2007). 350 Given a police officer’s testimony that the drugs found at the scene came from a bag which the defendant removed from a pants pocket, the jury was authorized to ﬁnd that the defendant trafficked in cocaine, possessed cocaine with intent to distribute, and possessed less than one ounce of marijuana; moreover, the amount of cocaine at issue, as well as the defendant’s possession of digital scales typically used to weigh drugs for distribution, permitted the jury to discount the defendant’s own testimony and ﬁnd an intention to distribute the drugs. Lipsey v. State, 287 Ga. App. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1112 (2007). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction of being a party to the crimes of possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and 16-13-30 because the defendant was holding large quantities of drugs for an accomplice in a running car outside a hotel with knowledge that the accomplice was at the hotel to make a sale. Haywood v. State, 301 Ga. App. 717, 689 S.E.2d 82, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1431 (2009). Evidence sufficient to support conviction for sale of controlled substance.— Testimony from the narcotics officers and an informant, as well as the methamphetamine and money used in the exchange, provided sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of sale of a controlled substance. Yeomans v. State, 369 Ga. App. 15, 891 S.E.2d 540, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 389 (2023). Evidence sufficient to show intent to distribute cocaine. — Officer’s opinion that the amount of cocaine in the defendant’s possession was greater than that normally kept for personal use and was separately packaged for distribution authorized the jury to ﬁnd that the defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to distribute. Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 881 (2012). Opinion evidence not allowed if it invades jury’s province. — Admission of police officer’s testimony identifying the defendant in photographs of alleged drug 16-13-30 deals established a fact that jurors could decide for themselves was inadmissible and reversible error. Mitchell v. State, 283 Ga. App. 456, 641 S.E.2d 674, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 86 (2007), superseded by statute as stated in Goforth v. State, 360 Ga. App. 832, 861 S.E.2d 800, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 400 (2021), superseded by statute as stated in Anderson v. State, 313 Ga. 178, 869 S.E.2d 401, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 33 (2022). Irrelevant evidence properly excluded. — In a prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, while the defendant was entitled to introduce relevant and admissible testimony tending to show that another person committed the crime, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in excluding evidence that an individual the defendant went to go visit on the night of the arrest was a known drug dealer and had been arrested on drug charges as there was no evidence tending to connect that person to the marijuana found in the defendant’s vehicle; hence, the evidence failed to raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence, and did not directly connect the other person with the corpus delicti, or show that the other person recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature. Gerlock v. State, 283 Ga. App. 229, 641 S.E.2d 240, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 18 (2007). Evidence sufficient for conviction of selling heroin. — See Russell v. State, 226 Ga. App. 574, 486 S.E.2d 704. Evidence sufficient for conviction of selling cocaine. — See Bagby v. State, 178 Ga. App. 282, 342 S.E.2d 731, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2513 (1986); Hubert v. State, 181 Ga. App. 684, 353 S.E.2d 612, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2569 (1987); Golden v. State, 184 Ga. App. 434, 361 S.E.2d 703, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2282 (1987); Flournoy v. State, 186 Ga. App. 774, 368 S.E.2d 538, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 513 (1988); Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 368 S.E.2d 737, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 248 (1988); Barrow v. City of Atlanta, 188 Ga. App. 400, 373 S.E.2d 88, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1054 (1988); Cleveland v. State, 192 Ga. App. 659, 386 S.E.2d 169, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1113 (1989); Dublin v. State, 194 351 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) Ga. App. 606, 391 S.E.2d 451, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 274 (1990); Woods v. State, 210 Ga. App. 172, 435 S.E.2d 464, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1097 (1993); Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 77, 447 S.E.2d 74, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 775 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1738, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1146 (Ga. Oct. 28, 1994); Sorrells v. State, 218 Ga. App. 413, 461 S.E.2d 904, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 749 (1995); Jackson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 207, 477 S.E.2d 347, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1101 (1996); Copps v. State, 223 Ga. App. 518, 478 S.E.2d 390; Jones v. State, 229 Ga. App. 63, 493 S.E.2d 224; Clay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 541, 502 S.E.2d 267; Beard v. State, 242 Ga. App. 742, 531 S.E.2d 168, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2000); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. App. 374, 533 S.E.2d 437, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 467 (2000). Defendant who told an undercover officer that the defendant could procure crack cocaine, took the officer’s the money, and attempted to procure the cocaine could be reasonably found to have been a party to the sale. Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 498 S.E.2d 284, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 290 (1998). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for sale of a controlled substance, cocaine, as ample evidence supported the jury’s verdict that the defendant made a sale of cocaine to a conﬁdential informant and that the substance was cocaine. Dixon v. State, 252 Ga. App. 385, 556 S.E.2d 480, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1289 (2001). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for selling cocaine because, regardless of the name the defendant used, the fact remained that the conﬁdential informant identiﬁed the defendant as the man who sold the cocaine on two occasions and the white powdered substance that was immediately turned over to police after each buy was scientiﬁcally analyzed and determined to be cocaine. Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 452, 576 S.E.2d 911, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (2003). Defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, was supported by sufficient 16-13-30 evidence as testimony by a police officer indicated that the defendant acted as a lookout during drug sales and took the money from the sales; the jury was free to discount testimony by another person involved in the sales that the defendant knew nothing about the sales. Arnold v. State, 260 Ga. App. 287, 581 S.E.2d 601, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 341 (2003). Evidence held sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for selling cocaine when the evidence showed that the defendant directed an undercover agent to a place where a drug sale could be made, that one of the two passengers with the defendant took money from the undercover agent and gave the undercover agent crack cocaine in return, both passengers in the defendant’s car testiﬁed that the money from the sale was given to defendant, and the money used in the sale, identiﬁable because the money had been photocopied, was found in the defendant’s pockets during the defendant’s arrest a short time after the sale. Zinnamon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 170, 582 S.E.2d 146, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 567 (2003). Comments which an informant made on tape shortly after the defendant sold drugs to the informant and left the informant’s car were part of the res gestae; the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by admitting those comments during the defendant’s trial or by allowing the jury to read transcripts of the tape recording police made, and evidence showing that the defendant was the person who sold drugs to the informant was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Lyons v. State, 266 Ga. App. 89, 596 S.E.2d 226, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 307 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions on two counts of selling cocaine as the evidence showed that the ﬁrst sale was made after an undercover officer approached the defendant’s employee and the employee could only facilitate the transaction after conferring with the defendant and going into the defendant’s office with defendant; it also showed that the second, separate sale was made by the defendant when the undercover officer dealt with the defendant directly and that the sale would go forward 352 after the defendant was satisﬁed that the undercover officer had cash to facilitate the transaction. Simmons v. State, 271 Ga. App. 330, 609 S.E.2d 678, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 49 (2005). Because the police officer witnessed the conﬁdential informant and defendant engage in a hand-to-hand exchange and the informant returned to the officer with a rock of crack cocaine that the informant did not previously possess, sufficient evidence supported the selling cocaine conviction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, even though neither the defendant nor the informant was found with $20.00 that was provided to the informant for the purchase as this went to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 565, 612 S.E.2d 854, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 327 (2005). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for two counts of selling cocaine, based on two controlled buys conducted by a conﬁdential informant, wherein the defendant was given cash in exchange for cocaine; even assuming that a concealed audio recording device produced a tape which was inadmissible on one such occasion, the evidence was still sufficient for purposes of conviction. Brown v. State, 274 Ga. App. 302, 617 S.E.2d 227, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 726 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1902, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 734 (Ga. Oct. 24, 2005). Conviction for sale of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 was supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant could not argue that the defendant acted as an informant when the defendant had no reason to believe that the buyers were law enforcement officers and knowingly gave the buyers cocaine with the intent to obtain remuneration. Enoch v. State, 277 Ga. App. 164, 626 S.E.2d 160, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 21 (2006). Conviction for selling cocaine was upheld on appeal because sufficient evidence was established, via a positive ﬁeld test, that defendant was in possession of cocaine that the defendant attempted to sell to an undercover officer and there was no requirement that the state should have tested the substance again at the crime 16-13-30 lab. Collins v. State, 278 Ga. App. 103, 628 S.E.2d 148, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 241 (2006). Because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and there was no requirement that an actual exchange of money for drugs be witnessed by more than one person or be recorded on videotape, the defendant’s sale of cocaine conviction was upheld on appeal, based on a law enforcement agent’s actions of handing the defendant $40 in exchange for two pieces of a substance that tested positive for cocaine. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 217, 635 S.E.2d 830, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1053 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction of selling cocaine after testimony by an undercover agent that the defendant sold the agent cocaine was corroborated by a videotape; moreover, as the defendant had been charged as a party to the crime, the state had to prove only that the defendant, as opposed to a passenger in the defendant’s car and a codefendant, facilitated the sale, and the defendant did not challenge the evidence proving facilitation. Woods v. State, 287 Ga. App. 268, 651 S.E.2d 188, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 932 (2007). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of selling crack cocaine after a conﬁdential informant testiﬁed at trial that the defendant had twice sold the informant crack cocaine, a police officer checked the informant before and after the videotaped sales, and a forensic chemist testiﬁed that the substance sold was cocaine. Ingram v. State, 286 Ga. App. 662, 650 S.E.2d 743, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 843 (2007), overruled, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020). Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., by selling cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), based on an undercover officer’s testimony as well as a corroborative tape recording of the drug sale transaction with the defendant; there was no requirement that the audio recording conclusively identify the 353 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) defendant’s voice. McSears v. State, 292 Ga. App. 804, 665 S.E.2d 890, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 866 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of selling cocaine rather than merely being present while the defendant’s stepsibling sold the cocaine because both conﬁdential informants testiﬁed that the informants negotiated the purchase of cocaine from defendant, not from the defendant’s stepsibling, and this was reﬂected in a videotape of the transaction that was played for the jury. Additionally, the stepsibling testiﬁed that the defendant gave the stepsibling the cocaine to give to the informants, and that the defendant received the money. Duffie v. State, 301 Ga. App. 607, 688 S.E.2d 389, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1419 (2009). Defendant abandoned any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to defendant’s conviction for selling cocaine because the defendant offered no substantive argument to support the defendant’s argument as required under Ga. Ct. App. R. 25(a)(3) and (c)(2); nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of selling cocaine. Quarterman v. State, 305 Ga. App. 686, 700 S.E.2d 674, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 793 (2010). Defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions because the state relied on hearsay testimony of a forensic scientist who did not personally conduct the chemical tests failed because, even assuming the testimony was inadmissible, the state submitted sufficient evidence, including testimony from the police, the informant, and the defendant, establishing that the drugs recovered, with one exception, constituted cocaine. Cooper v. State, 324 Ga. App. 451, 751 S.E.2d 102, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 863 (2013). Conﬁdential informant working for law enforcement in an undercover operation purchased crack cocaine from the defendant on two separate occasions. Therefore, the evidence was clearly sufficient to allow the jury to convict the defendant of selling and possessing cocaine. McDougler v. 16-13-30 State, 323 Ga. App. 828, 748 S.E.2d 475, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 756 (2013). Aiding and abetting sale of cocaine. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant because the defendant aided and abetted the sale of cocaine to the undercover officer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; the defendant approached an undercover officer, the defendant took money from the officer and went into a hotel room, and the defendant later returned and gave the officer cocaine. Ware v. State, 308 Ga. App. 24, 707 S.E.2d 111, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 29 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0941, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 441 (Ga. May 31, 2011). Evidence sufficient for conviction of selling cocaine and marijuana. — See Smith v. State, 178 Ga. App. 19, 341 S.E.2d 901, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2492 (1986). Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of conspiracy to distribute methaqualone. — See Skinner v. State, 182 Ga. App. 370, 355 S.E.2d 726, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1706 (1987). Evidence sufficient to convict for sale of and trafficking in cocaine. — See Thomas v. State, 184 Ga. App. 318, 361 S.E.2d 280, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2768 (1987). Evidence that the defendant agreed to sell drugs to an informant was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for selling and trafficking in cocaine. Carter v. State, 261 Ga. App. 204, 583 S.E.2d 126, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 586 (2003). Evidence sufficient for conviction of trafficking and possession of controlled substances. — See Clark v. State, 184 Ga. App. 380, 361 S.E.2d 682, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2777 (1987). Because the state presented recorded conversations between the defendant and a conﬁdential informant (CI) to set up a drug buy, and evidence that the defendant drove to the meeting place and that the CI dropped the money for the drugs in the defendant’s seat, while the defendant did not participate in the actual transaction, there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was a party to the transaction, and sufficient evidence to authorize the conviction. Murphy v. State, 272 Ga. App. 287, 612 S.E.2d 104, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 269 (2005). 354 Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled painkiller as the defendant was hiding 35 painkiller pills in a plastic zip-lock bag without a label indicating a valid prescription in the waistband of the defendant’s pants and the defendant gave one pill to the driver of a car; though the defendant might have been authorized to possess the painkiller, the defendant was not authorized to distribute the drug. Atkinson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 635, 634 S.E.2d 828, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 922 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for the sale of a controlled painkiller as the jury rejected a third party’s testimony that the defendant had given the third party four painkiller pills and believed a police officer’s testimony that on the evening of the incident, the third party told the officer that the third party paid the defendant $20 for the four painkiller pills. Atkinson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 635, 634 S.E.2d 828, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 922 (2006). Convictions of manufacture, distribution, and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), possession of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.3(b)(1), and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4) were supported by the evidence. A panel van belonging to the defendant had been modiﬁed as a methamphetamine lab, was located on the defendant’s property, and was powered by an electrical cord running from the defendant’s trailer; everything necessary to support the production of methamphetamine was present in the vicinity of the vehicle; the defendant’s name and that of the defendant’s spouse had been scrawled on an interior panel of the vehicle; the defendant offered to provide any methamphetamine that a house guest wanted; uncured methamphetamine and enough ephedrine was present at the scene to make 30 to 33 grams of methamphetamine; and the defendant admitted to giving methamphetamine to others and to owning the sawed-off shotgun recovered 16-13-30 from the panel van. Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (2008). Because a police officer properly stopped defendant’s car for a suspended registration, saw what appeared to be a weapon in defendant’s fanny pack, and the suspected methamphetamine was found in plain view during a limited protective search and while the officer was engaged in a lawful arrest; accordingly, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated, and defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and 16-13-31(e). Eaton v. State, 294 Ga. App. 124, 668 S.E.2d 770, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1118 (2008). Because probation officers were authorized to investigate an allegation that the defendant’s son possessed drugs in violation of the son’s probation, and because the officers were authorized to seize contraband falling in plain view, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and trafﬁcking in methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and 16-13-31(e)(1). Prince v. State, 299 Ga. App. 164, 682 S.E.2d 180, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 851 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of sale of a controlled substance because the person who sold the drugs to the informant for the defendant gave a detailed account of the sale, including the defendant’s planning and execution of the crime, the person’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the informant, and the testimony was further corroborated by the four trash pulls at the defendant’s residence, which yielded pill bottles, full prescriptions, and the doctor’s notes, and the search of the defendant’s residence, which yielded a large number of prescription pills. Thompson v. State, 349 Ga. App. 1, 825 S.E.2d 413, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 97 (2019). Evidence sufficient for conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. — See Copeland v. State, 228 Ga. App. 734, 492 S.E.2d 723, 1997 355 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) Ga. App. LEXIS 1251 (1997); Morgan v. State, 230 Ga. App. 608, 496 S.E.2d 924, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 237 (1998); Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 747 (1998); McNair v. State, 240 Ga. App. 324, 523 S.E.2d 392, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1333 (1999). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after the defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant and a search of the defendant’s residence and person revealed cocaine, which according to the state’s expert was packaged for distribution, a razor blade, baggies of the type used to package cocaine, and a cell phone. Taylor v. State, 267 Ga. App. 588, 600 S.E.2d 675, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 714 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after: (1) an informant provided information that defendant was in a certain hotel room waiting for a ride, which was corroborated; (2) the informant also stated that defendant had cocaine that defendant wished to sell; (3) when police officers stopped a car in which defendant was riding, the defendant refused to show the officers defendant’s hands, and as the officers thought that defendant was reaching for a weapon, the officers subdued defendant; and (4) a pill bottle in defendant’s pocket contained crack cocaine cut into small rocks for distribution, along with cash. Mew v. State, 267 Ga. App. 454, 600 S.E.2d 397, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 681 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because there was more evidence than the defendant’s mere presence in the apartment, which was actually rented by the defendant’s sister, that linked the defendant to the cocaine: (1) the jury could infer that the defendant actually lived in the apartment because the defendant claimed ownership of a television and a video game in the apartment; (2) it was a onebedroom apartment to which the defendant had a key; (3) the defendant was 16-13-30 sleeping in the bedroom when the police arrived; (4) the defendant’s own statements provided additional evidence demonstrating the defendant’s possession of the cocaine hidden in the kitchen cabinets; and (5) the defendant had a lot of cash on the defendant’s person with large numbers of denominations that was typically used to purchase drugs. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 840 (2004). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because two investigators saw the defendant put a plastic bag under a beer bottle in the woods, the plastic bag was found to contain crack cocaine, and one investigator testiﬁed that the amount in question exceeded that possessed for personal use. Tise v. State, 273 Ga. App. 201, 614 S.E.2d 832, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 454 (2005). Because: (1) the defendant failed to sufﬁciently prove an entrapment defense, and hence, the need for disclosure of an informant’s identity; (2) no error resulted in refusing to strike a juror for cause; and (3) the trial court’s entrapment instruction was legally correct and did not mislead the jury, the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and two counts of use of communication facilities in committing a felony drug offense, under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3, were affirmed on appeal. Griffiths v. State, 283 Ga. App. 176, 641 S.E.2d 169, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1516 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0652, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 333 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to support two defendants’ convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute after officers found a large amount of cash on the ﬁrst defendant’s person, including a recorded bill used in a controlled buy, as well as scales, small plastic bags, and scattered bags of drugs, including ﬁve individually wrapped pieces of cocaine. Beck v. State, 286 Ga. App. 553, 650 S.E.2d 728, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 283 Ga. 352, 658 S.E.2d 577, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 247 (2008), vacated in part, 293 Ga. App. 356 854, 668 S.E.2d 479, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1281 (2008). Defendant’s convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant’s live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2007). Despite the defendant’s equal access claim, because: (1) the evidence sufficiently showed the defendant’s ownership and possession of the vehicle where the contraband was found; (2) the similar transaction evidence showed that the defendant previously admitted possessing an almost identical array of drugs and drug processing paraphernalia; (3) the informant was a mere tipster and not a material or necessary witness; and (4) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, the defendant’s possession of cocaine with intent to distribute conviction was upheld on appeal; thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Cauley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 701, 652 S.E.2d 586, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (2007). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute: (1) crack cocaine and plastic bags were found at a hotel room where the defendant was; (2) a witness testiﬁed that the witness and the witness’s cousin had gone to the hotel room and begun looking for someone to bring them cocaine; (3) the defendant brought crack cocaine there; and (4) after some was smoked, the cousin, the defendant, and another person packaged the crack into the small bags found at the scene. Gassett v. State, 289 Ga. App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 110 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute when the defendant 16-13-30 was the only person who ran when officers approached a home, an officer saw the defendant toss cocaine into the kitchen, and the defendant was the only person in the house who had a signiﬁcant amount of money. Although two witnesses testiﬁed that the witnesses had tried to buy cocaine from the defendant earlier that evening and had been told by the defendant that the defendant had none, the jury was authorized to believe the officer’s testimony over the witnesses. Thomas v. State, 291 Ga. App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 646 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant distributed cocaine based on the defendant providing a conﬁdential informant cocaine in exchange for cash. Beck v. State, 292 Ga. App. 472, 665 S.E.2d 701, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 714 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1863, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 922 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2008). Defendant was properly convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), as the following evidence was sufficient to prove the cocaine found by police belonged to the defendant rather than a companion: (1) police found two large pieces of cocaine about four feet from where defendant placed the defendant’s right hand after police ordered the defendant to lie on the ground; (2) the companion testiﬁed that the defendant bought the cocaine just before the police arrived; and (3) the defendant confessed to selling drugs. Neugent v. State, 294 Ga. App. 284, 668 S.E.2d 888, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1171 (2008). Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute was proper as an accomplice’s testimony identifying defendant as the owner of a purse containing the cocaine was corroborated. Smith v. State, 296 Ga. App. 160, 674 S.E.2d 42, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 150 (2009). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of distribution of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) and in denying the defendant’s motion for directed verdict because it was not an abuse of discretion to admit a deputy’s lay opinion testimony identifying the defendant on a surveillance videotape 357 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) since the testimony was probative of a fact in issue and based on the deputy’s observations of the defendant at the time the surveillance photograph was taken; because the deputy’s testimony was sufficient to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of distribution of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Strickland v. State, 302 Ga. App. 44, 690 S.E.2d 638, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), because the evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the cocaine, and the state established by overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the defendant was in either constructive or actual possession of the cocaine; the defendant was found kneeling over the contraband, the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant had been “ﬁdgeting” with a piggy bank in which 37 small bags of cocaine were hidden, and pants with the defendant’s driver’s license and cash were found in the same corner of the bedroom as the cocaine. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to authorize the ﬁnding that the defendant was guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because evidence that cocaine was found on the ground where the defendant had been observed dropping what appeared to officers to be cocaine permitted a rational trier of fact to infer that the defendant had been in possession of the cocaine and had the intent to distribute the cocaine, which the defendant dropped when the defendant was apprehended; moreover, immediately before the defendant’s apprehension, an officer had witnessed the defendant appearing to sell crack cocaine to another person. Bush v. State, 305 Ga. App. 617, 699 S.E.2d 899, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 763 (2010). 16-13-30 Evidence was sufficient to support the defendants’ conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and marijuana with intent to distribute because: (1) police officers, while executing a search of the defendants’ home, found crack cocaine, marijuana, a large number of plastic baggies, digital scales which had cocaine residue on them, a police scanner, and a handgun; (2) one of the defendants told an officer that all of the narcotics belonged to that defendant; (3) a police lieutenant, who was accepted by the trial court as an expert in the ﬁeld of street level narcotics, opined, based on the large number of packaging supplies that were found, the large amounts of marijuana and crack cocaine that were found, as well as the handgun and police scanner that were found, that the defendants possessed the crack cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of distributing the drugs; and (4) evidence of one defendant’s prior arrest and conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was introduced as a similar transaction. Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 889, 714 S.E.2d 593, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 484 (2011). Evidence that the defendant possessed enough crack-cocaine for 30 individual hits, which was consistent with distribution rather than personal use, the defendant was in possession of a scale, and the scale was coated in residue that appeared to be crack-cocaine was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 439, 810 S.E.2d 333, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 48 (2018). Evidence insufficient for conviction of possession with intent to distribute. — Evidence consisting of a reference to a hearsay tip from an unidentiﬁed source that defendant was selling drugs and the opinion testimony of the arresting police officer, not qualiﬁed as an expert, that 1.2 grams of cocaine would not normally be an amount held by a user was not sufficient to support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute. James v. State, 214 Ga. App. 763, 449 S.E.2d 126, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1046 (1994). After the state introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior guilty pleas for possession with intent to distribute cocaine 358 and the sale of cocaine, but this evidence was offered to impeach the defendant when the defendant took the stand, not as evidence of similar transactions whereby the jury could infer similar motive or bent of mind, the evidence was held insufficient to support a conviction of intent to distribute. Bethea v. State, 220 Ga. App. 800, 470 S.E.2d 328, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 351 (1996). Evidence showing merely that defendant possessed two bags of marijuana and had a prior conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine was not sufficient for conviction. Parris v. State, 226 Ga. App. 854, 487 S.E.2d 690, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 801 (1997). Trial court was not authorized to ﬁnd the defendant intended to distribute drugs since the state produced no evidence that defendant had scales, guns, cash, drug packaging materials, or a large quantity of marijuana, and did not introduce any evidence of prior drug sales by the defendant, or any testimony that the defendant was observed selling or attempting to sell drugs. Clark v. State, 245 Ga. App. 267, 537 S.E.2d 742, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 939 (2000). State failed to prove defendant was guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as to a substance found in defendant’s car; thus, defendant’s conviction was reversed since: (1) defendant did not state that the substance was cocaine in defendant’s post-arrest statement; (2) the police expert did not identify the substance as cocaine, but as suspected cocaine; (3) no tests were performed on the substance; (4) the photographs admitted into evidence did not establish that the substance was cocaine; and (5) codefendant’s testimony and the purported statement by the conﬁdential informant did not identify the substance found in defendant’s car. Cooper v. State, 258 Ga. App. 825, 575 S.E.2d 691, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1535 (2002), cert. denied, No. S03C0553, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 343 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 888, 124 S. Ct. 270, 157 L. Ed. 2d 160, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6399 (2003). Evidence did not support the defendant’s conviction for possession of mari- 16-13-30 juana with intent to distribute as the mere fact that a package of marijuana was addressed, but not delivered, to an apartment leased by defendant did not tie the defendant to the drugs; the evidence was circumstantial and it was equally plausible that the codefendants were independently dealing in marijuana. Patten v. State, 275 Ga. App. 574, 621 S.E.2d 550, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1040 (2005). There was insufficient evidence of intent to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, as there was no evidence that the cocaine had been divided and packaged for individual sale or as to a personal use quantity; thus, the circumstantial evidence did not permit a rational trier to exclude the reasonable hypothesis, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), that the defendant intended to use the cocaine. Florence v. State, 282 Ga. App. 31, 637 S.E.2d 779, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1306 (2006). While the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine found in a pill bottle in the defendant’s vehicle, it was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) because the state produced no evidence that the defendant had scales, cutting implements, weapons, a large amount of cash, a customer list, or drug packaging materials; there was no evidence of prior convictions of drug possession with intent to distribute, no testimony that the defendant was seen selling or trying to sell drugs, no expert testimony that the amount of drugs seized was inconsistent with personal use, and no evidence as to the amount of cocaine seized. Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), storing drugs in a pill bottle, and possessing an unidentiﬁed number of sales-size pieces of the drug, without more, equally supported the hypothesis that the person found with the drugs was a user rather than a dealer. Hicks v. State, 293 Ga. App. 830, 668 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1226 (2008). Codefendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 359 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b), was unsupportable as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom were insufficient to connect the codefendant to the cocaine, which was found in an upstairs bedroom occupied by the codefendants; no evidence was introduced to show that the codefendant resided in the apartment where the cocaine was found, which could authorize an inference that the codefendant possessed the property therein. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (2010). Evidence that the defendant kicked in a door and entered an occupied apartment with others, the defendant provided the guns used, the defendant placed a gun to one victim’s head, a victim’s wallet and key were taken, and marijuana, digital scales, and a device used to grind marijuana were found at the defendant’s house was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for four counts of aggravated assault, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count each of armed robbery, burglary, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 (2013). Defendant was entitled to reversal of the convictions for possession with intent to distribute and trafficking drugs because the defendant was merely present at a residence, which the defendant did not own or lease, when a search warrant was executed, there was no evidence the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the drugs, and there was no evidence the defendant was a party to these crimes. Scott v. State, 326 Ga. App. 115, 756 S.E.2d 220, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 133 (2014). Since the evidence only showed that the defendant had been a visitor at the resi- 16-13-30 dence where the drugs were found and there was no evidence that the officers found drugs, cash, or other evidence on the defendant’s person linking the defendant to the contents of the residence in question, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for trafficking, possession, and possession with intent to distribute the drugs. Morales v. State, 332 Ga. App. 794, 775 S.E.2d 168, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 400 (2015). Evidence was insufficient to support the second defendant’s convictions of trafficking methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute as circumstantial evidence of knowledge and approval of the criminal activity was not enough to prove that the second defendant was in constructive possession of the contraband found in the residence; and an officer’s limited testimony of conduct susceptible of multiple interpretations, without more, did not show that the second defendant intentionally aided or abetted the crime. Bustos v. State, 365 Ga. App. 433, 878 S.E.2d 774, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 456 (2022). Supplying drugs for sex with minor supported conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of distribution of cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 because the 15-year-old victim admitted that, on several of the occasions when having sex with defendant, the defendant had supplied the victim with crack cocaine, which they had smoked together. Watson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 619, 691 S.E.2d 378, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 195 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 932, 131 S. Ct. 328, 178 L. Ed. 2d 213, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 7482 (2010). Evidence sufficient to support convictions for both sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. — Because the state presented sufficient evidence through: (1) the testimony of an informant and the agent conducting a controlled buy from the defendant involving the informant; (2) the ﬁeld tests done on the substance purchased and seized as a result of a search warrant; and (3) the results of the state’s crime lab tests, the defendant’s convictions for the sale of cocaine and 360 possession with intent to distribute cocaine were upheld on appeal. Moreover, the latter conviction was further supported by testimony from the agent that the quantity and unique packaging of the cocaine found in the location searched were inconsistent with mere personal consumption. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 206, 656 S.E.2d 861, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (2008). Similar transaction evidence properly admitted. — In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence as the evidence showed that the defendant previously admitted possessing an almost identical array of drugs and drug processing paraphernalia. Cauley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 701, 652 S.E.2d 586, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (2007). Defendant’s three prior drug offenses involved the sale of $20 worth of crack cocaine to undercover officers or informants during drug investigations in the same neighborhood. Therefore, these similar transactions were admissible to show the defendant’s bent of mind, course of conduct, and intent to sell cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Morrison v. State, 300 Ga. App. 405, 685 S.E.2d 413, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1187 (2009). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in admitting similar transaction evidence that the defendant had sold cocaine to a conﬁdential informant because the trial court expressly found that the similar transaction was admissible for the purpose of showing the defendant’s intent, that the defendant had committed the similar transaction, and that there was sufficient connection between the similar transaction and the charged offense, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Wright v. State, 313 Ga. App. 829, 723 S.E.2d 59, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 86 (2012). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in admitting similar transaction evidence because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine 16-13-30 with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), even without the similar transaction evidence; the defendant testiﬁed on direct examination that the defendant was on parole at the time of a traffic stop and had previously pled guilty to a drug charge, and the trial court properly instructed the jury to limit the jury’s consideration of the similar transaction evidence to the appropriate purpose. Wright v. State, 313 Ga. App. 829, 723 S.E.2d 59, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 86 (2012). New trial ordered after evidence improperly admitted. — Because the seizure of cash found on the defendant’s person was conducted based on a lawful arrest for a domestic violence act of assault, given information by the defendant’s girlfriend, the girlfriend’s obvious injuries, and the defendant’s attempt to ﬂee, the trial court properly denied suppression of the evidence; however, because the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding the defendant’s residence, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, suppression of cocaine found in that area was erroneously denied, and as such the defendant was erroneously denied a new trial. Rivers v. State, 287 Ga. App. 632, 653 S.E.2d 78, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1046 (2007). Custodial statement by defendant properly admitted. — Custodial statement in which the defendant admitted having turned over an electric meter used in the manufacture of drugs was properly admitted at the defendant’s trial and did not improperly introduce character evidence against the defendant since even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial. Ward v. State, 285 Ga. App. 574, 646 S.E.2d 745, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 583 (2007). Conﬂicting descriptions of the defendant in officer’s report. — Conﬂicting descriptions of the defendant given by a deputy in reports summarizing incidents where the deputy purchased drugs affected the weight of the deputy’s 361 Delivery and Distribution (Cont’d) testimony, not the testimony’s admissibility, and the jury was entitled to overlook the discrepancies and believe the deputy when the deputy testiﬁed that the deputy bought cocaine from the defendant. Mathis v. State, 265 Ga. App. 541, 594 S.E.2d 737, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 176 (2004). Even though an officer had not been qualiﬁed as an expert at trial, the officer’s testimony was admissible to prove that the substance found in the defendant’s pickup truck was marijuana because at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the officer who discovered the substance in the defendant’s truck was certiﬁed to recognize the odor of marijuana and to identify and test marijuana, and the officer was subject to cross-examination by defense counsel; it was then for the jury to decide the weight and credibility the jury would give to the officer’s testimony. Bass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 601, 710 S.E.2d 818, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (2011). Chain of custody of methamphetamine sufficiently established. — Because the state met the state’s burden in establishing a chain of custody by sufficiently demonstrating that the evidence seized was the same as that which was admitted at trial, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict as to a charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute based on this ground. Cook v. State, 287 Ga. App. 81, 650 S.E.2d 757, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 879 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1874, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. Jan. 28, 2008). Evidence sufficient to support conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. — Defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute was upheld on appeal since sufficient evidence showed that: (1) the trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence despite addressing all of the Williams factors, but preserving the defendant’s confrontation rights; (2) the defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective; and (3) no Brady violation occurred. Hinton v. State, 290 Ga. App. 16-13-30 479, 659 S.E.2d 841, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 353 (2008). Evidence that when a defendant’s vehicle was stopped, the defendant was in possession of 14 grams of methamphetamine packaged in small plastic bags, other illegal drugs, and a digital scale, along with testimony from an experienced officer that the packaging indicated an intent to sell the methamphetamine, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Driscoll v. State, 295 Ga. App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1332 (2008). State presented evidence that the officers found about 14 grams of methamphetamine crystals hidden in the defendant’s shoe, which was a large amount of methamphetamine, and the state showed the defendant’s intention to sell or distribute the methamphetamine; the defendant also gave a statement to a police officer admitting that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine and intended to sell the methamphetamine. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Boyd v. State, 300 Ga. App. 455, 685 S.E.2d 319, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1120 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0309, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 204 (Ga. Mar. 1, 2010). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) because testimony of drug enforcement agents and co-indictees as well as drugs, money, and drug paraphernalia obtained during a search established that the defendant engaged in three sales of this contraband. Williamson v. State, 300 Ga. App. 538, 685 S.E.2d 784, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1218 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0387, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 191 (Ga. Mar. 1, 2010). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) because methamphetamine was found in a trailer on the defendant’s property, which the 362 16-13-30 defendant occupied and controlled, a known drug dealer was found on the defendant’s premises, who had been “fronting” the defendant and the defendant’s spouse methamphetamine on a weekly basis, and the defendant’s spouse kept a book regarding their sales from the drugs supplied by the dealer. Peacock v. State, 301 Ga. App. 873, 689 S.E.2d 853, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 12 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), conspiring to possess methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-3, and possessing methamphetamine, § 16-13-30(a) because the state was not required to show that the defendant was in sole or actual possession of the methamphetamine but could establish the element of possession by showing that the defendant was in joint constructive possession of the contraband; the evidence allowed for a ﬁnding that the defendant lived at the residence where the methamphetamine was found, that methamphetamine was found in the master bedroom atop the same dresser as a driver’s license bearing the defendant’s name and the residential address, that stored in a lockbox underneath the bed in that room were recipes for producing methamphetamine or a similar substance, along with digital scales associated with the drug trade, and that the defendant’s residential premises was being used as a clandestine methamphetamine lab. Edwards v. State, 306 Ga. App. 713, 703 S.E.2d 130, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1034 (2010). Evidence sufficient to show sale of controlled pills. — Combined evidence established that the defendant actively participated in and was a party to the three separate sales of a controlled substance based on the defendant freely and voluntarily admitting that during the last controlled drug buy, the defendant supplied an informant with 500-600 pills, the pills tested positive for triﬂuoromethylphenyl piperazine, and that the defendant acted the same during all of the controlled purchases. Walker v. State, 323 Ga. App. 685, 747 S.E.2d 691, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 707 (2013). Sufficient evidence prison guard intended to distribute drugs in prison. — Evidence supported convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and crossing a prison guard line with drugs when the defendant, a corrections officer, was found with a cookie box containing drugs. Although the defendant claimed to be unaware of the contents of the package, none of the people the defendant named as being involved in the transaction were proven to exist, and the jury was authorized to infer that it was unreasonable for a corrections officer to take a suspicious package from an unknown person into a prison to give to an unknown recipient; furthermore, given the large amount and variety of contraband, the contraband’s high street value, and that the defendant was taking the contraband inside a heavily guarded prison facility, the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant intended to distribute the contraband to others instead of using the contraband personally. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 737, 665 S.E.2d 428, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 850 (2008). Marijuana “Manufacture.” — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) applies to the cultivation or planting of marijuana, and it is therefore error for a trial court to conclude that “one cannot manufacture marijuana by growing same.” State v. Hunt, 201 Ga. App. 327, 411 S.E.2d 273, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1362 (1991), cert. denied, No. S92C0094, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 987 (Ga. Nov. 21, 1991). Marijuana is not a controlled substance for the purpose of a prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 for possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a “crime involving the possession, manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administering, selling, or possession with intent to distribute any controlled substance.” Asberry v. State, 220 Ga. App. 40, 467 S.E.2d 225, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 82 (1996). 363 Marijuana (Cont’d) Question of whether marijuana is a harmful drug is essentially a scientiﬁc one. Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886, 204 S.E.2d 597, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1269 (1974). If marijuana is a dangerous drug, state has right to make the drug’s sale and use criminal. Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886, 204 S.E.2d 597, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1269 (1974). Legal capability of certain pharmacists to sell marijuana to certain customers is not an element of the offense of selling marijuana. May v. State, 179 Ga. App. 736, 348 S.E.2d 61, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2002 (1986). To authorize felony punishment, jury must ﬁnd possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. — When the evidence is in dispute as to the amount of marijuana defendant possessed, the jury must be instructed that to authorize felony punishment the jury must ﬁnd possession of more than one ounce. Jones v. State, 151 Ga. App. 560, 260 S.E.2d 555, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2637 (Oct. 1, 1979). Weight of plants. — Testimony of expert as to the weight of the marijuana produced by a given quantity of marijuana plants which were seized, together with photographs of the plants, is sufficient to establish the weight of the plants which had been destroyed upon conﬁscation. Evans v. State, 176 Ga. App. 818, 338 S.E.2d 48, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2907 (1985). Proof of weight. — To discharge the burden of proving that the weight of the marijuana exceeded one ounce, it is not necessary for the state to come forward with evidence of how many grams equal an ounce, even if the state’s witnesses testify about the weight of the marijuana in terms of grams; when O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b) refers to an “ounce” of marijuana, the statute refers, as a matter of law, to an avoirdupois ounce, which is the equivalent of, when rounded up to the nearest hundredth of a gram, 28.35 grams, and the number of grams in an ounce is not something that varies from case to case or is open to reasonable dispute. Gaudlock v. State, 310 Ga. App. 16-13-30 149, 713 S.E.2d 399, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 453 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1610, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 851 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011). Identiﬁcation of marijuana. — Identiﬁcation testimony regarding the identity of illegal drugs, when made by experienced officers, is admissible, and expert testimony based on scientiﬁc tests is not required to establish that a substance is marijuana. Jones v. State, 268 Ga. App. 246, 601 S.E.2d 763, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 897 (2004). During testimony, the defendant referred to a substance as marijuana, and this, together with an officer’s testimony, established the evidence was marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt and was sufficient for the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana. Dulcio v. State, 297 Ga. App. 600, 677 S.E.2d 758, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 488 (2009). Sufficiency of evidence. — Conviction of a second defendant for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 was affirmed after: (1) evidence that the second defendant expected to receive $1,000 to receive a package for a person authorized the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was aware the package contained contraband; (2) a mistrial was not warranted since curative instructions were given by the court regarding the irrelevancy of remands by the ﬁrst defendant’s attorney; and (3) the package was admissible since it was easily identiﬁable, securely packed, and there was no evidence of tampering. Sandoval v. State, 260 Ga. App. 61, 579 S.E.2d 75, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 309 (2003). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a codefendant testiﬁed that the marijuana belonged to defendant, and no other evidence showed that the large amount of marijuana, contained in ﬁve bags total, was for defendant’s personal use. Pitts v. State, 260 Ga. App. 553, 580 S.E.2d 618, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 419 (2003). When marijuana allegedly possessed by the defendant was tested by the state crime lab but then was lost and was not 364 presented at trial, the evidence presented, including the defendant’s admissions and the arresting officers’ identiﬁcation of the marijuana, was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s possession conviction. Jones v. State, 268 Ga. App. 246, 601 S.E.2d 763, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 897 (2004). Convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute were supported by sufficient evidence which showed that defendant was the sole lessee and resident of an apartment where nearly 500 grams of cocaine were found, along with several bags of marijuana packaged for resale, and that defendant had recently sold cocaine, which came from a blue bag holding 111 grams of cocaine, which was also found in the apartment. Vance v. State, 268 Ga. App. 556, 602 S.E.2d 276, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 956 (2004). Evidence supported the defendant’s possession of marijuana conviction because: defendant ﬂed from the police, kicked two officers, and had marijuana, BC packets, and a cell phone, and the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA on the beer can. Lewis v. State, 271 Ga. App. 744, 611 S.E.2d 80, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 157 (2005). There was sufficient evidence to support convictions of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of a handgun during commission of a crime after an undercover officer met the defendant in the defendant’s car, the defendant had a handgun beside the defendant, the officer showed the defendant the money that the officer showed brought to buy ten pounds of marijuana, and the defendant showed the officer a sample of the marijuana and told the officer that the marijuana was in a nearby van; after the transaction was called off because the officer would not give the defendant the money before receiving the marijuana, police found ten pounds of marijuana in the van and the handgun in the defendant’s car. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 460, 646 S.E.2d 342, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (2007). In a prosecution for two counts of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, evidence of the defendant’s three prior convictions for the same offense was 16-13-30 properly admitted. Given that the defendant denied possessing marijuana in two of the prior cases and in the case at bar, the prior transactions were probative of the defendant’s bent of mind and course of conduct. Neal v. State, 297 Ga. App. 223, 676 S.E.2d 864, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 414 (2009). Evidence that a defendant showed officers a can in the defendant’s kitchen cupboard with a false bottom that concealed 33.18 grams of cocaine and 19.8 grams of marijuana was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(j)(1) and 16-13-31(a)(1)(A). The jury was charged on equal access and clearly rejected the defendant’s defense that a conﬁdential informant working as a handyman at the defendant’s home could have placed the drugs there. Daniel v. State, 306 Ga. App. 48, 701 S.E.2d 499, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 816 (2010). Even though an officer had not been qualiﬁed as an expert at trial, the officer’s testimony was admissible to prove that the substance found in the defendant’s pickup truck was marijuana because at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the officer who discovered the substance in the defendant’s truck was certiﬁed to recognize the odor of marijuana and to identify and test marijuana, and the officer was subject to cross-examination by defense counsel; it was then for the jury to decide the weight and credibility the jury would give to the officer’s testimony. Bass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 601, 710 S.E.2d 818, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-2(b) and 16-13-30(j) because the state adduced evidence at trial that the defendant had possession of 28.8 grams of marijuana, which was, by deﬁnition, more than one ounce of marijuana. Gaudlock v. State, 310 Ga. App. 149, 713 S.E.2d 399, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 453 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1610, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 851 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant 365 Marijuana (Cont’d) guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of armed robbery, armed robbery, and conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., through a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1), because: (1) the defendant and another buyer met with the victim and another seller where the defendant and the other buyer inspected marijuana which the victim and the other seller had for sale; (2) after some discussion about price, the victim told the defendant what the price was and that the defendant could take it or leave it; (3) the defendant said that the defendant would take it, pulled a gun from the defendant’s waistband, and fatally shot the victim; and (4) there was conﬂicting testimony as to whether the defendant took the marijuana and ran away with the marijuana after shooting the victim. Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 715 S.E.2d 110, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 671 (2011). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of distribution of marijuana, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4); the testimony of a party to the transaction was corroborated by the observations of the detectives, the marijuana taken into evidence, the written statements of the parties regarding the defendant’s involvement, and the defendant’s own statement to a detective. Arnett v. State, 311 Ga. App. 811, 717 S.E.2d 312, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 859 (2011). When the police discovered marijuana as the result of an illegal arrest, evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possessing less than one ounce of marijuana. Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 727 S.E.2d 257, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 399 (2012). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for felony possession of marijuana based on the parties’ stipulation that the marijuana in question 16-13-30 in the case was scientiﬁcally determined to be marijuana and that it weighed 29.3 grams and the testimony of an officer that the officer saw the defendant trying to hide the marijuana, that the defendant asked for mercy, and the officer identiﬁed the marijuana and the bag as the one the officer recovered from the defendant’s car during the traffic stop. Davis v. State, 318 Ga. App. 166, 733 S.E.2d 453, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 872 (2012). Evidence that the defendant lived at the residence where the drugs were found gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant possessed the contraband and supported the defendant’s convictions of possession with intent to distribute and possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. Evans v. State, 318 Ga. App. 706, 734 S.E.2d 527, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 979 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Evidence there was a path between the closest residence and the marijuana plants; one of the tires on the vehicle the defendant drove was the same as the tire the plants were grown in; the defendant had a relationship with the owner of the house near which the plants were found; the owner denied knowing marijuana was growing there; and the defendant’s car contained rolling papers, fertilizer, and a book about marijuana authorized the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of manufacturing marijuana. Ross v. State, 323 Ga. App. 28, 747 S.E.2d 81, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 647 (2013). Defendant’s admission to staying at the apartment with the defendant’s girlfriend, and the presence of the defendant’s clothing and a picture of the defendant and girlfriend in a bedroom supported the jury’s determination that the defendant committed the offenses of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, and the defendant’s experience in handling cocaine established that the defendant knew the weight of the cocaine was more than 28 grams. Griffin v. State, 331 Ga. App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 41 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1138, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 473 (Ga. June 15, 2015). Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in 366 cocaine or possession of marijuana with intent to distribute as the state failed to show that the defendant owned or rented the house where the drugs were found, lived at the house, occupied the master bedroom or kept personal belongings there, had keys to the house, or received mail at the house. Holland v. State, 334 Ga. App. 600, 780 S.E.2d 40, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 689 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to purchase marijuana because the defendant had previously gone to the seller’s home to purchase marijuana, the defendant accompanied the codefendant to the seller’s home when the latter went to purchase marijuana, the defendant entered the neighbor’s porch with the codefendant where the seller was selling marijuana, drugs and money were visible on the porch, the defendant remained with the seller and the codefendant as they discussed the sale of marijuana for $20 and $10, and the defendant blocked the seller’s friend’s exit as the friend was leaving the residence. Hunter v. State, 355 Ga. App. 520, 844 S.E.2d 858, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (2020). Evidence of almost a pound of marijuana, zip-lock baggies, digital scales, and a large quantity of United States currency was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Kennedy v. State, 371 Ga. App. 163, 899 S.E.2d 803, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 138 (2024). Urine sample with marijuana metabolites sufficient. On appeal from the trial court’s judgment convicting the defendant of possession of marijuana, the appellate court refused to affirm the defendant’s conviction on the basis of seeds, stems, and residue that were found in the defendant’s bedroom because those items were not tested scientiﬁcally and a forensic toxicologist who testiﬁed could not state beyond a reasonable doubt that the items were marijuana, but the appellate court held that the toxicologist’s testimony that the toxicologist found marijuana metabolites in a urine sample the defendant gave to police was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Cargile v. State, 261 Ga. App. 319, 582 16-13-30 S.E.2d 473, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 531 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1360, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 808 (Ga. Sept. 22, 2003). Constructive possession. — Because the state showed that, in addition to a juvenile’s close proximity to a bag of marijuana, the juvenile confessed to an intent to purchase the marijuana, and had money equal to the marijuana’s approximate street value, such established a sufficient connection between the juvenile and the marijuana to support an adjudication for the marijuana’s constructive possession, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30. In the Interest of B.J.C., 281 Ga. App. 228, 635 S.E.2d 833, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1058 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school, despite an argument on appeal that no evidence of either actual or constructive possession was presented as: (1) sufficient additional evidence, albeit circumstantial, tied the defendant to those crimes and established more than the defendant’s mere presence to the drugs seized; and (2) the proved facts excluded any reasonable hypotheses that a crime could have been committed by anyone else. Slaughter v. State, 282 Ga. App. 276, 638 S.E.2d 417, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1365 (2006). Evidence supported an adjudication of juvenile delinquency based on possession of marijuana; an officer saw the juvenile defendant searching the ﬂoorboard of a car, and marijuana was later found on the ﬂoorboard in the area where the defendant had been searching. In the Interest of Q.P., 286 Ga. App. 225, 648 S.E.2d 731, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 740 (2007). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendants of felony possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the defendants had equal access to and joint constructive possession of the marijuana that was found in a minivan and that the defendants participated as parties to the drug possession offense; the 367 Marijuana (Cont’d) defendants, who were passengers in the back of the minivan, knew that marijuana was inside the minivan, and the driver informed an officer that the passengers were hiding marijuana inside the minivan. Dennis v. State, 313 Ga. App. 595, 722 S.E.2d 190, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 31 (2012). Deﬁnition of marijuana under § 16-13-25. — Since a prosecution for misdemeanor possession of marijuana cannot be instituted on the basis of a blood or urine test which shows “positive” for marijuana, because such positive showings will be based upon the presence of THC “without the morphological features” of the marijuana plant and are thus excluded from the deﬁnition of “marijuana” under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-25, prosecutions for possession of marijuana based upon positive blood or urine samples must be brought as a felony prosecution for possession of a Schedule I drug, i.e. THC. Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 511 S.E.2d 899, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 168 (1999). Marijuana and THC distinguished. — Georgia law distinguishes marijuana from THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) as O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21(16) provides that marijuana means all parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis, whereas O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) and (j) separately addresses any controlled substance and marijuana. C. W. v. Department of Human Services, 353 Ga. App. 360, 836 S.E.2d 836, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 698 (2019). Jury need not make special ﬁnding as to amount where evidence not in conﬂict. — When evidence is not in conﬂict as to amount, it is not necessary for the court to charge the jury that the jury must ﬁnd amount specially. Coffey v. State, 141 Ga. App. 254, 233 S.E.2d 243, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1857 (1977). Pleading amount of marijuana possessed and ﬁrst offender status. — While it is necessary to plead amount of marijuana possessed and whether the defendant is a ﬁrst offender when trial is to be had in an inferior court having jurisdiction over misdemeanors only, there is no requirement to plead this 16-13-30 matter in an indictment or accusation when trial is to be had in a superior court which has concurrent jurisdiction over felonies and misdemeanors. Stinnett v. State, 132 Ga. App. 261, 208 S.E.2d 16, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1666 (1974). When the jury asked the court to distinguish possession of marijuana from the sale of marijuana, and the trial court responded that the defendant was accused of selling marijuana and then read O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) to the jury, it was held that it is not usually cause for a new trial that an entire Code Section is given, even though a part of the charge may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence, and the conviction of selling marijuana was affirmed. McBurse v. State, 182 Ga. App. 759, 357 S.E.2d 144, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1811 (1987). Proof that proffered marijuana same as that seized. — State showed with “reasonable certainty” that marijuana offered into evidence was same as that seized. Williams v. State, 165 Ga. App. 708, 302 S.E.2d 609, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1993 (1983). Testimony of arresting officer sufficient for felony possession of marijuana sufficient. — Defendant was properly convicted of felony possession of marijuana as a deputy sheriff testiﬁed that the defendant admitted that the marijuana found in the trunk of a rental car belonged to the defendant. Even though the defendant denied saying this, or possessing the drugs, the credibility of witnesses was for the jury to determine, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish the facts. McKinney v. State, 293 Ga. App. 419, 667 S.E.2d 210, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 958 (2008). As a defendant’s landlord could not give valid consent to search the defendant’s trailer to ﬁnd the subject of an arrest warrant who did not live there, and no emergency required the subject’s immediate arrest, an officer’s warrantless entry into the defendant’s trailer violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the plain view doctrine did not apply, and the officer could not seize marijuana plants found in the trailer. Looney v. State, 293 Ga. App. 368 639, 667 S.E.2d 893, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1039 (2008). Evidence sufficient for conviction of possession of marijuana. — See Johnston v. State, 178 Ga. App. 219, 342 S.E.2d 706, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2516 (1986); Kelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 605, 353 S.E.2d 92, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2554 (1987); Akins v. State, 184 Ga. App. 441, 361 S.E.2d 707, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2798 (1987); Rich v. State, 188 Ga. App. 287, 372 S.E.2d 670, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 956 (1988); Crawford v. State, 233 Ga. App. 323, 504 S.E.2d 19, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1998); Driver v. State, 240 Ga. App. 513, 523 S.E.2d 919, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1395 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0321, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 205 (Ga. Feb. 25, 2000); Brown v. State, 244 Ga. App. 440, 535 S.E.2d 785, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 752 (2000). When there was more evidence to connect defendant to the marijuana than that of mere spatial proximity or presence as the marijuana was hidden during the transport in the patrol vehicle to the station by one of the three codefendants, and when defendant admitted that defendant knew the owner of the marijuana, although the defendant refused to identify such person and there was evidence that marijuana had been used in defendant’s vehicle and that defendant had recently used marijuana there was sufficient evidence to ﬁnd defendant guilty of joint constructive possession, or at least as a party to the crime. Harvey v. State, 212 Ga. App. 632, 442 S.E.2d 478, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 328 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1123, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 739 (Ga. May 27, 1994). Based on the defendant’s statements regarding the “dope” in the defendant’s apartment and the fact that the defendant waived the defendant’s claim that the state failed to prove that the substance was marijuana by failing to object to the state’s alleged failure to lay a foundation for the officer’s testimony that it was marijuana, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession-of-marijuana. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 840 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for possession of 16-13-30 marijuana and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; officers testiﬁed that they recovered the 34 bags of cocaine and one bag of marijuana that the defendant threw out the window of a car, as well as two bags of cocaine the defendant still had and that such a large amount of cocaine individually wrapped was consistent with an intent to distribute. Mayo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 282, 626 S.E.2d 245, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 62 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction of bringing stolen property to Georgia, eluding an officer, and possessing marijuana as a party, if not as a conspirator, since: (1) the defendant discussed with the defendant’s boyfriend what would happen if they were apprehended by the police; (2) the boyfriend gave the defendant a handgun after the boyfriend stole a new gun and the defendant packed two guns with the defendant’s personal items and the ski masks; (3) the defendant suspected that the truck was stolen, refused to ask about the truck’s origin, saw the stolen gun on the seat of the truck, observed two gas drive-offs, ate stolen food, smoked shared marijuana repeatedly, and sat next to the glove compartment where the marijuana lay; and (4) the defendant was silent during the police pursuits, saw the defendant’s boyfriend retrieve a stolen handgun just prior to an assault of a police officer, did not hinder the boyfriend or warn the police, lied to the police to cover up the matter, and referred to the entire affair as having “fun for a minute.” Michael v. State, 281 Ga. App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 989 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0097, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 950 (Ga. Nov. 6, 2006), overruled in part, Gibbs v. State, 340 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2017). Evidence sufficient for conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana because the defendant was in possession of clear plastic baggies, smaller baggies of suspected marijuana, a digital scale, and cash, and a police officer testiﬁed that in the officer’s capacity as a marijuana tester for the county sheriff’s office, the officer tested a total of 11 bags, containing 369 Marijuana (Cont’d) approximately 190 grams of a substance that tested positive for marijuana; possession of a scale, baggies, and large amounts of currency along with drugs can constitute circumstantial evidence of intent to distribute. Hardaway v. State, 309 Ga. App. 432, 710 S.E.2d 634, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 353 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because a chemist testiﬁed that in the chemist’s opinion, the substance found in the defendant’s pocket consisted of cocaine; a drug task force officer testiﬁed about a ﬁeld test indicating the presence of cocaine. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 564 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s conviction for possessing more than one ounce of marijuana because the defendant was presumed to have exclusive possession and control of the marijuana that a police officer found in the car the defendant was driving; as the factﬁnder, the jury was entitled to reject the testimony of the defendant’s friend that the marijuana was the friend’s and to determine that the presumption of the defendant’s possession of the marijuana had not been rebutted. Nix v. State, 312 Ga. App. 43, 717 S.E.2d 550, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 880 (2011). Defendant’s convictions for possession of marijuana and a ﬁrearm were affirmed because, although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to show that the weapon was within arm’s reach of the defendant during the commission of a crime. Under the circumstances, the trial court could ﬁnd that, given the close proximity, the defendant passed within reach of the handgun while handling the marijuana. Carter v. State, 319 Ga. App. 609, 737 S.E.2d 714, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 20 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C0836, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 525 (Ga. June 3, 2013). Combined evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of marijuana with 16-13-30 intent to distribute because the owner of the residence where the police found drugs and drug paraphernalia testiﬁed that the defendant brought marijuana to the residence along with digital scales and assisted in picking the stems out of the marijuana; the testimony of a witness who saw the defendant where the marijuana, scales, and marijuana stems were located in plain view and the testimony of the deputies who participated in the execution of the search warrant served to corroborate the owner’s testimony. Kegler v. State, 317 Ga. App. 427, 731 S.E.2d 111, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 726 (2012), overruled in part, Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 756 S.E.2d 507, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2014). Evidence supported ﬁnding of intent to distribute marijuana. — Deputy’s testimony supported a jury’s ﬁnding that a defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1); the deputy testiﬁed that the packaging and amount of marijuana (7 grams), as well as the digital scales in the defendant’s bag, indicated that the defendant was selling the marijuana. Boring v. State, 303 Ga. App. 576, 694 S.E.2d 157, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 370 (2010). Evidence that a defendant participated in a plan for the delivery of a package containing 12 pounds of marijuana to a residence, along with digital scales, a marijuana grinder, and plastic baggies at the residence, and the defendant’s admission that the marijuana was the defendant’s, was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of marijuana, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Salinas v. State, 313 Ga. App. 720, 722 S.E.2d 432, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 58 (2012). Jury was authorized to reject as incredible the defendant’s wife’s testimony that the couple went to Georgia to take a trip because they were having marital issues and the wife’s claim that the defendant had no knowledge of the crimes the wife committed when the wife’s step-brother asked the wife to transport some drugs to Ohio and, thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convic- 370 tions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Calcaterra v. State, 341 Ga. App. 599, 801 S.E.2d 337, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 254 (2017). Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. — See Wiley v. State, 178 Ga. App. 136, 342 S.E.2d 342, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2508 (1986); Rivers v. State, 178 Ga. App. 310, 342 S.E.2d 781, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2510 (1986); Brooks v. State, 190 Ga. App. 430, 379 S.E.2d 228, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 250 (1989); Ward v. State, 195 Ga. App. 166, 393 S.E.2d 21, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 432 (1990); King v. State, 238 Ga. App. 575, 519 S.E.2d 500; Buckholts v. State, 247 Ga. App. 697, 545 S.E.2d 99, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 92 (2001). Presence of the marijuana in defendant’s home, coupled with the quantity of marijuana and the presence of scales used to weigh drugs, was sufficient evidence of possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute. Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. 523, 359 S.E.2d 416, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2036 (1987). When drugs were found in the area of a car where the defendant sat, when the evidence showed that the driver of the car was trying to buy drugs from the defendant, and when the driver denied to an officer that the seized drugs belonged to the defendant, the defendant’s conviction of possessing drugs with intent to distribute was supported by the evidence. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 808, 602 S.E.2d 840, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1024 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute based on the testimony of an officer and a forensic chemist that the leafy substance that was found on the ﬂoorboard of the truck that defendant used was in fact marijuana. Marion v. State, 268 Ga. App. 699, 603 S.E.2d 321, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 989 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute given that the defendant was riding as a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped, the defendant immediately informed the police where individually packaged bags of marijuana 16-13-30 could be found within the car, the defendant had been previously convicted of a similar offense a few months earlier, and the driver indicated that the drugs belonged to the defendant. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 106, 625 S.E.2d 509, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1399 (2005). There was sufficient evidence that the defendant was guilty of possessing with intent to distribute 40.1 pounds of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j); the defendant’s intent to distribute was proved by evidence that the amount of marijuana was far in excess of that possessed for personal use, and the circumstantial evidence showed a connection between defendant and the marijuana other than spatial proximity. Taylor v. State, 285 Ga. App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1515, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 655 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007). In a prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the marijuana found in a car in which the defendant was riding; the defendant admitted to owning the car, marijuana was found where the defendant had been sitting and under the driver’s seat, and a passenger testiﬁed that the defendant had been driving earlier that evening and that the defendant admitted to the passenger that the marijuana was the defendant’s. King v. State, 287 Ga. App. 375, 651 S.E.2d 496, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 976 (2007). Evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to connect the defendant to the house where drugs were found; thus, it was sufficient to support convictions of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Although others might have been present on the property on various unspeciﬁed occasions, the defendant was allowed by the owner to use the house, had been seen at the residence by police on previous occasions, had a vehicle on the premises, and hurriedly walked away from officers when the officers arrived; the evidence also showed that no other persons were present when officers executed the search warrant. Clyde v. State, 298 Ga. App. 283, 680 S.E.2d 146, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 649 (2009). 371 Marijuana (Cont’d) Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because during the execution of a search warrant at the defendant’s residence, police officers seized eighteen baggies of marijuana individually packaged in a manner that was indicative of possession with intent to distribute, and the residence belonged to the defendant, which permitted an inference that the defendant controlled the premises and was in constructive possession of the drug contraband; the circumstantial evidence implied the defendant’s consciousness of guilt and further supported the defendant’s conviction because, when the officers approached the residence, the defendant ﬂed inside to the closet area where the drugs were later located, and when the officers searched the closet, the officers discovered that the jacket the defendant had been wearing was placed over the box containing the drugs. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 321 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(A), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), because the verdict was not insupportable as a matter of law; in addition to evidence that the defendant rented a hotel room where illegal drugs were found, had a key to the suite, and was going to the suite at a time when a great quantity and variety of drugs were in open view, there was other evidence linking the defendant to the contraband found there, including the defendant’s suspicious behavior upon seeing officers near the suite and the presence of the defendant’s personal property inside the suite. Glass v. State, 304 Ga. App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 540 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. 16-13-30 § 16-13-30(j)(1), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a housing project, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b), because it appeared that the jury accepted that version of the events most unfavorable to the defendant after hearing all of the evidence and resolving the credibility of all of the witnesses, and the jury was solely authorized to make such determinations. Bass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 601, 710 S.E.2d 818, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana as over a pound of marijuana was found in the defendant’s vehicle, and the marijuana was found with a trafficking amount of 3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and a loaded weapon, constituting evidence of involvement in the drug trade. Jackson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 272, 724 S.E.2d 9, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 179 (2012). Evidence that the defendant was in possession of the marijuana during a patdown search prior to being transported in the patrol car, but the pat-down failed to discover the marijuana on the defendant’s person, that the defendant placed the marijuana under the backseat while being transported, and the marijuana found in the backseat was packaged in seven individual bags supported a conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Wiggins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 754, 748 S.E.2d 120, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 733 (2013). Evidence sufficient to convict for manufacture of marijuana. — Evidence supported conviction for manufacture of marijuana even though laboratory expert could not deﬁnitively state that certain alleged marijuana plants on the manufacturing premises were marijuana. Burch v. State, 213 Ga. App. 392, 444 S.E.2d 370, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 558 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1446, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 936 (Ga. Sept. 8, 1994). Evidence sufficient to support conviction for selling marijuana. — See Puckett v. State, 178 Ga. App. 143, 342 S.E.2d 487, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 372 2502 (1986); Byrd v. State, 182 Ga. App. 284, 355 S.E.2d 666, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2608 (1987). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for selling marijuana after undercover officers saw the defendant sell marijuana from a distance of 10-15 feet, the buyer dropped a bag of marijuana when arrested, and when officers later approached the defendant, defendant said, “I didn’t sell my man no weed.” McKay v. State, 234 Ga. App. 556, 507 S.E.2d 484, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1300 (1998), cert. denied, No. S99C0220, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 205 (Ga. Feb. 19, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for simple battery and the sale of marijuana were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant spat in the face of another and the undercover officer who the defendant sold the marijuana to testiﬁed regarding the sale; further, the trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence as the evidence was probative of defendant’s bent of mind to become belligerent with police officers when arrested. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 40, 651 S.E.2d 347, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 868 (2007). Evidence insufficient to convict for selling marijuana. — Prior inconsistent statement by marijuana dealer charged with selling marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) that defendants were involved in selling marijuana, and evidence that the defendants were in close proximity to seized marijuana did not establish that the defendants were a party to the crime of violating paragraph (j)(1). Oldwine v. State, 184 Ga. App. 173, 360 S.E.2d 915, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2756 (1987). Evidence insufficient for conviction for possession with intent to distribute. — Although the trial court properly admitted evidence of similar transactions, given the quantity of marijuana and methamphetamine found, the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of possession with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Ryan v. State, 277 Ga. App. 490, 627 S.E.2d 128, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 132 (2006). Evidence insufficient for possession conviction. — Evidence did not support a defendant juvenile’s 16-13-30 adjudication of delinquency for possession of marijuana as: (1) a substance an officer said was marijuana was found in a truck in which the defendant juvenile was riding; (2) the defendant juvenile did not own the truck; (3) the marijuana was not found where the defendant juvenile had been sitting; and (4) the state did not have the bag tested at the crime lab and therefore there was no testimony that the substance found in the truck had actually tested positive for marijuana. In the Interest of C.C., 280 Ga. App. 590, 634 S.E.2d 532, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 905 (2006). Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of possession of marijuana as there was no evidence connecting the defendant to the drugs other than the defendant’s own equal access. The drugs and paraphernalia were not found in an area exclusively used by the defendant, and the defendant’s cousin had the same access to the drugs and paraphernalia. Xiong v. State, 295 Ga. App. 697, 673 S.E.2d 86, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 96 (2009), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013). Evidence sufficient to convict for attempt to possess marijuana. — There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for attempting to possess marijuana based on the evidence that the defendant solicited undercover officers and asked for marijuana and attempted to pay for the marijuana. The defendant’s rejection of the ﬁrst bag the undercover officers gave did not establish abandonment of the crime since the defendant asked for a second bag. Collins v. State, 297 Ga. App. 364, 677 S.E.2d 407, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 434 (2009). Confrontation clause violation was harmless error in light of other evidence of marijuana. — Although a trial court erred in excluding evidence that a witness had pending unrelated drug charges, violating the defendant’s right to confrontation, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s possession of marijuana, scales, and plastic bags in a car the defendant had rented and was driving. Shelton v. State, 323 Ga. App. 373 Marijuana (Cont’d) 798, 748 S.E.2d 278, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 749 (2013). Inconsistent verdict. — Guilty verdict for charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was not inconsistent where the jury simply broke down the verdict into the two primary ﬁndings necessary to ﬁnd defendant guilty of the offense; in any event, simple possession of marijuana is a lesser-included offense of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, and there is nothing improper with a jury ﬁnding a defendant guilty of both the charged offense and a lesser-included offense. Ellison v. State, 265 Ga. App. 446, 594 S.E.2d 675, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 140 (2004), overruled on other grounds, Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 846 S.E.2d 73, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 476 (2020). No speedy trial violation. — Upon the appellate court’s analysis of the four Barker v. Wingo factors, given the negative weight of one of two factors against the state, speciﬁcally, the reason for the delay, and the defendant’s failure to show prejudice and timely assertion of a speedy trial right, no abuse of discretion resulted by the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the indictments ﬁled against the defendant, charging the sale of cocaine and marijuana, on speedy trial grounds. Simmons v. State, 290 Ga. App. 315, 659 S.E.2d 721, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 302 (2008). No double jeopardy violation. — Because the reduced possession of marijuana charge to which the defendant pled guilty in Forsyth County arose from the seizure of 11 pounds of marijuana in the parking lot of a hotel in Forsyth County on the morning of April 4, 2018, while Count 2 of the Fulton County indictment arose from the discovery of additional marijuana at defendant’s home pursuant to the execution of a search warrant later that same day, it was proper to charge each offense separately. Laghaeifar v. State, 360 Ga. App. 843, 861 S.E.2d 808, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 403 (2021). Maximum punishment provisions of section apply to charge of conspiracy. — If defendants are indicted under general conspiracy statute, 16-13-30 maximum punishment provisions of it apply, but if indictment charges, “Conspiracy to Possess and Sell Marijuana,” a violation of provisions of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., is properly charged and the maximum punishment provisions of it apply. Jones v. State, 135 Ga. App. 893, 219 S.E.2d 585, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1864 (1975). Marijuana conviction not aggravated felony under Immigration and Nationality Act. — Because petitioner alien’s O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) conviction for marijuana distribution failed to establish that the conviction involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it was not an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 185 L. Ed. 2d 727, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 3313 (2013). Jury Instructions Jury instruction on substance of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30 and 16-13-31. — When the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana and on the day of the trial ﬁled a request that the “jury be charged with the substance of § 16-13-30 and § 16-13-31,” by seeking an instruction on two entire Code sections the request necessarily included much matter not adjusted to the issues of the case, and for this reason it was not error to fail to give such instructions. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (1988). Jury instruction on actual and constructive possession. — In the absence of a request, a court’s failure to give an instruction deﬁning actual and constructive possession does not constitute reversible error. Black v. State, 167 Ga. App. 204, 305 S.E.2d 837, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3313 (1983). When a jury issue exists as to whether the defendant was exercising actual or constructive possession of cocaine, the lesser offense of possession of cocaine was reasonably raised by the evidence, and the trial court committed prejudicial error in 374 failing to instruct pursuant to the defendant’s written request. Alvarado v. State, 194 Ga. App. 781, 391 S.E.2d 668, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 316, aff’d, 260 Ga. 563, 397 S.E.2d 550, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1990). Because there was evidence that the defendant, at different times, had both actual and constructive possession of marijuana, the trial court’s jury charge on both types of possession was proper and did not impermissibly expand the indictment, which did not specify the manner of possession. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 460, 646 S.E.2d 342, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (2007). Jury instruction on equal access not required. — When a defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, it was not error to fail to give a charge on equal access. The state was not relying upon the defendant’s ownership or control of the home to prove that cocaine in the kitchen belonged to the defendant, but upon direct evidence that the defendant tossed the cocaine into the kitchen after being apprehended by an officer; furthermore, a charge on constructive possession was not tantamount to a charge on the presumption of ownership. Thomas v. State, 291 Ga. App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 646 (2008). In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b)), the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on equal access, which applied only when the sole evidence of possession of contraband found in a vehicle was the defendant’s ownership or possession of the vehicle. There was additional evidence showing that the drugs belonged to the defendant: (1) a large sum of cash on the defendant’s person; (2) the defendant’s prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; and (3) testimony that the defendant conducted another drug transaction on the day of the arrest. Hight v. State, 293 Ga. App. 254, 666 S.E.2d 678, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 839 (2008). Because equal access was not a defendant’s sole defense to a charge of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the 16-13-30 trial court was not required sua sponte to give a charge on equal access after the court gave the jury an instruction on presumption of possession based on ownership of the premises. Bailey v. State, 294 Ga. App. 437, 669 S.E.2d 453, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1212 (2008), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Curative instruction properly given. — Sale of marijuana convictions, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), were upheld, as an officer’s in-court identiﬁcation of defendant was obtained via investigative techniques and was thus not unduly suggestive, and the trial court gave curative instructions to the jury after the officer testiﬁed to pulling defendant’s photograph from an arrest record. Hansberry v. State, 260 Ga. App. 480, 580 S.E.2d 274, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 401 (2003). Because the state presented sufficient evidence showing defendant’s involvement in the sale of cocaine and the sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing project as a party to the crimes, and because the judge’s instruction and explanation after reading the wrong indictment to the jury at trial cured any error, the defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal, and a mistrial based on the latter was properly denied; moreover, the defendant was properly denied a new trial. Walker v. State, 290 Ga. App. 749, 660 S.E.2d 844, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 407 (2008), cert. dismissed, No. S08C1701, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 776 (Ga. Sept. 22, 2008). Jury instruction on further deliberations. — On appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine, because the verdict of “guilty with reasonable doubt” was unclear and had no single element that was necessarily dispositive of the jury’s ﬁnding with regard to ultimate criminal responsibility, the trial court did not err by refusing to accept the verdict and in sending the jury out for further deliberations with proper instructions. Robinson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 214, 638 S.E.2d 370, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1348 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0406, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 152 (Ga. Feb. 5, 2007). Jury instruction insufficient. — Jury charge failed to deﬁne properly the 375 Jury Instructions (Cont’d) offenses of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute because all the jury was told was that it was a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., to traffic or possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine; the instructions given completely failed to inform the jury about the manner in which the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine or the offense of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute may have been committed. As such, the jury did not receive sufficient instructions to guide the jury in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence on these charges. Torres v. State, 298 Ga. App. 158, 679 S.E.2d 757, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 638 (2009). Reversal of a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., through a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1), was required because the trial court failed to provide any limiting instruction informing jurors that the purchaser and the buyer in a drug transaction could not conspire together. Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 715 S.E.2d 110, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 671 (2011). Recharge on “sale” proper in jury instruction. — Trial court did not err in recharging the jury after the jury requested a speciﬁc deﬁnition of “sale” under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 because the court acted within the court’s discretion by simply referring the jury back to the correct charge, rather than giving a lengthy explanation of the absence of a word-for-word deﬁnition in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, and given that the charge was correct as given initially, the recharge did not deprive the defendant of any legitimate defense to the defendant’s actions; the jury appeared to be confused about whether the jury had a proper deﬁnition of a sale, and when the trial court referred the jury to the correct law that had already been given, it sufficiently informed the jury that the jury had the deﬁnition that the jury needed. Ware v. State, 308 Ga. App. 24, 707 S.E.2d 111, 16-13-30 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 29 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0941, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 441 (Ga. May 31, 2011). Jury instructions on lesser included offense. — Instructions on the elements of the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and on the lesser included offense of simple possession given in the language of the Suggested Pattern Jury Charge were sufficient. Burse v. State, 232 Ga. App. 729, 503 S.E.2d 638, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 815 (1998). Defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) because the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, when there was no written request to give a charge on simple possession; even if the trial court erred in not giving the charge, reversal was not required in light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant possessed 432.31 grams of methamphetamine, which clearly constituted trafficking, and, therefore, it was highly unlikely that the failure to give an instruction on simple possession contributed to the verdict. Gonzalez v. State, 299 Ga. App. 777, 683 S.E.2d 878, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 970 (2009). Trial court’s failure to charge the jury on manufacturing methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), as a lesser included offense of trafficking methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f), did not contribute to the verdict and was harmless; although the trial court was required to charge the jury on § 16-13-30(b) as a lesser included offense to § 16-13-31(f) since there was evidence that the defendant manufactured methamphetamine as prohibited by § 16-13-30(b), there was no relevant distinction between the two statutes with regard to methamphetamine as applied to the case. Because the evidence established that the defendant manufactured methamphetamine, and the defendant’s admission that the defendant was “cooking” showed that the defendant knowingly manufactured 376 methamphetamine, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of both offenses or not guilty of both. Poole v. State, 302 Ga. App. 464, 691 S.E.2d 317, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 161 (2010), overruled in part, McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 745 S.E.2d 646, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 594 (2013). Trial counsel was not deﬁcient for failing to object to the trial court’s instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of MDMA (Ecstasy) because the instruction explained the elements of possession of MDMA with intent to distribute and delineated that charge from simple possession of MDMA; the charge substantially covered the principles in the defendant’s request to charge and adequately instructed the jury as to the jury’s consideration of the charged offense and the lesser offense, and since there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, in that the defendant possessed a distribution amount of MDMA, the defendant could not show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the defendant’s trial would have been different. Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. App. 175, 702 S.E.2d 28, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 895 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0258, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 231 (Ga. Feb. 28, 2011). Trial court did not err in instructing the jury to consider the lesser offense of possession of methamphetamine only if the jury did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute because the trial court did not insist upon unanimity with regard to the jury’s decision on the greater offense. Dockery v. State, 308 Ga. App. 502, 707 S.E.2d 889, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 224 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1080, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 577 (Ga. July 11, 2011). Circumstantial evidence charge not necessary when direct evidence is sufficient. — A charge to the jury that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence alone is not warranted unless the proven facts exclude every hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused is not required, even if requested, unless the state’s evidence is entirely circumstantial; when a police officer testiﬁed that the officer saw the defendant in actual 16-13-30 possession of cocaine, and there was other direct evidence of the defendant’s possession of marijuana, including the defendant’s admission that the defendant owned the garment in which some marijuana was found, there was no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the charge. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2689 (1986). Charge on circumstantial evidence not required. — When, in a trial for possessing heroin with intent to distribute, there was direct evidence that defendant was in possession of heroin, it is not error to refuse to charge on circumstantial evidence. Houston v. State, 180 Ga. App. 267, 349 S.E.2d 228, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2708 (1986). Requested charge on mere presence properly denied. — In a trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the court did not erroneously deny the defendant’s request to charge on mere presence, where a police officer testiﬁed that the officer watched the defendant receive money from a third party in exchange for a packet of what appeared to be cocaine, and when the officer arrested the defendant moments later, the officer observed a number of packages of what proved to be cocaine in the front seat of the car in which the defendant was seated. Garner v. State, 199 Ga. App. 468, 405 S.E.2d 299, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 537 (1991). Instruction proper. — Charge regarding constructive possession which closely tracked the language of the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases and which gave a rebuttable inference of possession was not erroneous. Pittman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 211, 430 S.E.2d 141, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 469 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1079, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 763 (Ga. July 15, 1993). In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the court did not err in giving an instruction on the lesser-included charge of possession of cocaine; no injury resulted because the jury found defendant guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) and that verdict was supported by sufficient 377 Jury Instructions (Cont’d) competent evidence. Brown v. State, 243 Ga. App. 632, 534 S.E.2d 98, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 506 (2000). Because it was unlawful under the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., to possess any amount of a controlled substance such as codeine, absent exceptions such as lawful possession, which was charged to the jury, the instruction as given was not misleading as the fact that the violation was an “alleged” violation was implicit given the trial court’s instructions to the jury as to the state’s burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. Furthermore, since the indictment’s reference to codeine as a Schedule V drug was surplusage, the state was required to show that the defendant was in possession of codeine, not that the codeine fell within Schedule V; thus, the failure to instruct the jury regarding a Schedule V substance was not erroneous as it was not a defense to the offense of possession of codeine and to suggest so was misleading. Evans v. State, 330 Ga. App. 241, 766 S.E.2d 821, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 823 (2014), cert. dismissed, No. S15C0653, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 207 (Ga. Mar. 30, 2015). Instruction on entrapment. — In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment as: (1) sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant voluntarily committed the offense upon being given the opportunity to do so; and (2) no evidence was presented to show that the informant employed undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit to induce the defendant into selling drugs; thus, the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present evidence to support an entrapment defense was rejected and did not warrant a new trial. Campbell v. State, 281 Ga. App. 503, 636 S.E.2d 687, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1147 (2006). Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on entrapment because there was no evidence that a deputy’s undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit induced the defendant to sell cocaine or 16-13-30 that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. Quarterman v. State, 305 Ga. App. 686, 700 S.E.2d 674, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 793 (2010). Trial court did not err in failing to deﬁne “intent to distribute” in jury charge. — Trial court’s failure to deﬁne “intent to distribute” when charging on intent to distribute marijuana under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) was not error; the term “distribute” possessed only the ordinary and common dictionary meaning and did not need to be speciﬁcally deﬁned. The defendant failed to object to the charge without the deﬁnition, and the charge as given was not plain error excusing the failure to object under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b). Boring v. State, 303 Ga. App. 576, 694 S.E.2d 157, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 370 (2010). Charge on “speciﬁc intent” not required. — In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the trial court correctly rejected a requested charge necessitating that the state prove a “speciﬁc intent” to commit the crime. Price v. State, 223 Ga. App. 807, 478 S.E.2d 915, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1282 (1996). Necessity of jury instruction on lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession. — Defendant was improperly convicted of purchasing marijuana under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because the trial court should have given a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of less than one ounce of marijuana under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b) as the defendant did not pay for the marijuana and testiﬁed that the defendant did not intend to purchase the marijuana. Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 697, 675 S.E.2d 588, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 317 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1191, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 420 (Ga. June 29, 2009). Objection to jury instruction on possession of ﬁrearm in conjunction with marijuana possession. — Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s jury instruction on possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime that referenced possession of marijuana as a potential predicate felony offense because there was 378 16-13-30 sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s felony conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which could serve as the predicate felony offense for the defendant’s conviction of possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime; and there was not a reasonable probability that, if the trial court had omitted the reference to simple possession of marijuana from the instruction, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to the defendant. McNorrill v. State, 338 Ga. App. 466, 789 S.E.2d 823, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 472 (2016). Jury instruction with reference to marijuana possession. — Although the trial court’s jury instruction included a reference to simple possession of marijuana, the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant’s case because the trial court read the indictment to the jury that charged the defendant with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, instructed the jury that the state had the burden of proving every material allegation of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, instructed the jury that the jury could ﬁnd the defendant guilty if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offenses alleged in the indictment, and provided the indictment to the jury during the jury’s deliberations; thus, the defendant could not succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. McNorrill v. State, 338 Ga. App. 466, 789 S.E.2d 823, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 472 (2016). Jury instructions on mere association and mere presence. — Trial court’s instructions on “mere association” and “mere presence” with regard to charging a defendant as a party to a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) were misstatements of the law and also directly conﬂicted with other closely related instructions, and were harmful error requiring reversal of the defendant’s convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1). Able v. State, 312 Ga. App. 252, 718 S.E.2d 96, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 936 (2011). Sentencing Constitutionality of subsection (d). — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), which mandates a sentence of life imprisonment upon a second conviction for selling cocaine, is not unconstitutional; it does not violate the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 368 S.E.2d 737, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 248 (1988); Rucks v. State, 201 Ga. App. 142, 410 S.E.2d 206, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1267 (1991); Carr v. State, 201 Ga. App. 479, 411 S.E.2d 913, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1426 (1991); Crutchﬁeld v. State, 218 Ga. App. 360, 461 S.E.2d 555, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 713 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1983, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1242 (Ga. Nov. 17, 1995). Mandatory life imprisonment sentence found in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) does not unconstitutionally deprive a defendant of due process of law. Tillman v. State, 260 Ga. 801, 400 S.E.2d 632, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 74 (1991). Mandatory life sentence of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII. Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 332 (1991); Cody v. State, 222 Ga. App. 468, 474 S.E.2d 669. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) does not violate the equal protection or due process guarantees of the Georgia and federal constitutions. Isom v. State, 261 Ga. 596, 408 S.E.2d 701, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 425 (1991). O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) does not violate state or federal constitutional guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment. Isom v. State, 261 Ga. 596, 408 S.E.2d 701, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 425 (1991); Martin v. State, 205 Ga. App. 200, 422 S.E.2d 6, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1106 (1992), cert. dismissed, No. S92C1472, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 802 (Ga. Oct. 2, 1992); Crutchﬁeld v. State, 218 Ga. App. 360, 461 S.E.2d 555, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 713 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1983, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1242 (Ga. Nov. 17, 1995). Sentencing scheme in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) cannot be found 379 Sentencing (Cont’d) unconstitutional for not having a rational basis since the legislature may have perceived repeated violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) with narcotic drugs (for which a life sentence is mandated) as a greater threat to the public health, safety, and welfare than repeated violations with nonnarcotic drugs. Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 429 S.E.2d 917, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 478 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1048, 114 S. Ct. 700, 126 L. Ed. 2d 667, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 169 (1994). Illegal sentence in drug crime. — Written sentence reﬂecting that the defendant was sentenced to seven-years for possession of a controlled substance in Schedule I had to be vacated because the maximum sentence for possession of a controlled substance in a Schedule I offense, under the circumstances of this crime, was three years. Hood v. State, 315 Ga. 809, 884 S.E.2d 901, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 49 (2023). No violations based on a high percentage of African-Americans convicted. — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 does not violate due process or equal protection based on statistical evidence as to the high percentage of African-Americans serving life sentences for drug offenses, nor because it creates an irrational sentencing scheme. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 161, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 849, 116 S. Ct. 144, 133 L. Ed. 2d 90, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5894 (1995). Constitutionality of subsections (b) and (d). — No evidence supported contention that provision mandating life sentence for the second conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute has been unconstitutionally enforced selectively against young, impoverished blacks. Hall v. State, 262 Ga. 596, 422 S.E.2d 533, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 915 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1055, 113 S. Ct. 1956, 123 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 3088 (1993); Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 429 S.E.2d 917, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 478 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1048, 114 S. 16-13-30 Ct. 700, 126 L. Ed. 2d 667, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 169 (1994). Discriminatory enforcement of section. — When the defendant produced, from several sources, various statistics, articles, and charts showing that blacks are more likely to be imprisoned for drug offenses than are whites, but did not offer any evidence speciﬁc to the defendant’s own case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in the prosecution’s decision to charge the defendant, the defendant’s statistics failed to prove an essential element necessary in a selective prosecution case, i.e., that the prosecution engaged in a deliberate selective process of enforcement based on race. Cain v. State, 262 Ga. 598, 422 S.E.2d 535, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 953 (1992). Defendant’s claim that the mandatory life imprisonment provision was applied in a racially discriminatory manner was not properly supported since no evidence was offered that (1) blacks in general or (2) defendant in particular had been selectively prosecuted. Anderson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 872, 463 S.E.2d 502, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 908 (1995). Construed with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. — Both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7 give direction as to the imposition of punishment under speciﬁed aggravated circumstances; however, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) increases the maximum from 15 years to life for the subsequent offense, whereas O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 does not increase the maximum but adds weight in favor of its imposition. Wainwright v. State, 208 Ga. App. 777, 432 S.E.2d 555, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 577 (1993). O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) is interpreted as providing that, although the court may not sentence second time offenders under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(a), it may sentence second time offenders under both § 16-13-30(d) and any remaining provisions of § 17-10-7. Blackwell v. State, 237 Ga. App. 896, 516 S.E.2d 787, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 556 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C1235, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 758 (Ga. Sept. 17, 1999). 380 Because O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 is the only recidivist provision that governs the situation where a defendant, who has a prior felony conviction for armed robbery, is subsequently convicted of a felony for selling cocaine, the trial court correctly applied that section in sentencing defendant. Harden v. State, 239 Ga. App. 700, 521 S.E.2d 829, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1114 (1999). In a prosecution for sale of cocaine, the court was not required to impose a life sentence upon the defendant who had ﬁve previous drug convictions. The court retained the discretion either to impose any sentence within the statutory mandatory minimum and maximum sentence range or else to impose a life sentence. Scott v. State, 248 Ga. App. 542, 545 S.E.2d 709, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 324 (2001). Since the defendant was found guilty of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, the defendant’s third conviction for the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute and the defendant’s ninth felony conviction, the sentencing judge had the discretion to sentence the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) to “any sentence within the statutory mandatory minimum and maximum sentence range or else to impose a life sentence” and was not required to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a). Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 541 S.E.2d 645, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 65 (2001). After the defendant entered a guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the state introduced copies of a prior out-of-state drug conviction and a prior federal drug conviction, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to 30 years under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(a). Papadoupalos v. State, 249 Ga. App. 300, 548 S.E.2d 59, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 493 (2001). Because the defendant’s conviction on count one of the indictment was the second conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), selling a controlled substance, the trial court was not prohibited from sentencing the defendant under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(c). Johnson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 16-13-30 452, 576 S.E.2d 911, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (2003). Trial court’s decision to probate a portion of the sentence imposed on the defendant for the defendant’s second conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, requiring the defendant to serve only seven years, was in direct contravention to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), which stated speciﬁcally that a second time offender was to have been imprisoned for not less than 10 years; by the plain reading of § 16-13-30(d), a defendant must have served at least 10 years in prison, and O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), which applied to a second offense under § 16-13-30(b), required that the time be served without parole. State v. Jones, 265 Ga. App. 493, 594 S.E.2d 706, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 163 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1066, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 591 (Ga. June 28, 2004), overruled in part, Langley v. State, 313 Ga. 141, 868 S.E.2d 759, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 14 (2022). Trial court did not err in stacking two recidivist sentencing provisions by ﬁrst sentencing defendant to life in prison under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), which at the time of defendant’s crime and sentencing required a life sentence for repeat offenders of § 16-13-30(b), and by then sentencing defendant to life without parole under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), which required that upon conviction of a fourth felony, defendant was not eligible for parole. Butler v. State, 277 Ga. App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1364 (2005), aff’d, 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 979 (2006). Court of Appeals properly affirmed the imposition of a life sentence without parole against the defendant, as a recidivist, under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(c), as the defendant was convicted and sentenced before the effective date of the 1996 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), thus making a life sentence the only sentence that the trial court could impose; further, because the instant felony conviction was the defendant’s fourth, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) applied to the sentence by operation of subsection (e) of that statute, as enacted in 1994, so as to require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court 381 Sentencing (Cont’d) without the possibility of parole. Butler v. State, 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 979 (2006). Upon the conviction for the sale of cocaine, the trial court properly sentenced the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) and not O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(1), to the minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), without the possibility of parole, as the defendant had three prior felony convictions. Fortson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1571 (2006), overruled in part, Langley v. State, 313 Ga. 141, 868 S.E.2d 759, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 14 (2022). Because sufficient proof of the necessary prior convictions, even without inclusion of the defendant’s ﬁrst offender plea, existed to authorize punishment under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30 and 17-10-7, the recidivist sentence imposed by the trial court was upheld. Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 724, 644 S.E.2d 544, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 392 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1179, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. July 13, 2007). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s plea withdrawal motion as the court fully informed the defendant that the sentence the court intended on imposing would be without parole, despite failing to advise the defendant of the sentence prior to the acceptance of the plea; moreover, as methamphetamine was a Schedule II non-narcotic drug, the more general provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(e) and 17-10-7, and not O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(c), applied. Thomas v. State, 287 Ga. App. 500, 651 S.E.2d 801, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1003 (2007). Defendant’s sentence of 30 years without parole for trafficking in cocaine was a sentence allowed under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), and hence, not illegal or void. Defendant could not have been sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), or defendant’s sentence would have been 40 years. Because the sentence was not void, it was not subject to modiﬁcation under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(f). State v. Blue, 304 Ga. App. 471, 696 S.E.2d 692, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 561 (2010). 16-13-30 Defendant sentenced to life in prison without parole, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(c), based on the defendant’s prior convictions stemming from guilty pleas, was not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of the defendant’s trial counsel’s failure to review the transcripts of the defendant’s prior plea colloquies because: (1) no per se rule required counsel to review the transcripts; and (2) counsel otherwise adequately investigated the validity of the prior convictions. Barker v. Barrow, 290 Ga. 711, 723 S.E.2d 905, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 294, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 987, 133 S. Ct. 540, 184 L. Ed. 2d 354, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8455 (2012). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b.1), a defendant who has been convicted previously of violating either subsection (a), or (j), or paragraph (i)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 may not be sentenced as a recidivist for a second or any subsequent conviction for violating any of those provisions even if the defendant had never been convicted previously of violating the exact subsection for which the defendant is being sentenced. Mathis v. State, 336 Ga. App. 257, 784 S.E.2d 98, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 157 (2016). Trial court erred because it sentenced the defendant based on the improper assumption that a life sentence was required because of the interplay between O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(c) as the trial judge retained the discretion to sentence the defendant to either ten to forty years or a life sentence for a subsequent violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b). Waller v. State, 365 Ga. App. 693, 879 S.E.2d 865, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 491 (2022). Construed with O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. — Most reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1) was to supplant the general punishment provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) with a speciﬁc and potentially more harsh punishment provision for manufacturing methamphetamine. Richards v. State, 290 Ga. App. 360, 659 S.E.2d 651, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 239 (2008). The 1996 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) giving the trial court 382 greater discretion in imposing a lesser sentence than life was not retroactive. Maddox v. State, 227 Ga. App. 602, 490 S.E.2d 174, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 987 (1997). Trial court erred in imposing mandatory life sentences for crimes committed in 1997, that is, after the legislative enactment making a life sentence discretionary. Moton v. State, 242 Ga. App. 397, 530 S.E.2d 31, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 203 (2000). Special probation. — Plain language of O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35.2(a) requires that a term of special probation be served “in addition to any term of imprisonment” rendered under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d); thus, the two statutes do not conﬂict. Accordingly, a defendant was properly sentenced to a ten-year incarceration followed by special probation, and the defendant’s claim that former O.C.G.A. § 42-8-32.5 was implicitly repealed by the 1996 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 was without merit. Mike v. State, 290 Ga. App. 214, 659 S.E.2d 664, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 283 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1196, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. June 16, 2008), overruled in part, Langley v. State, 313 Ga. 141, 868 S.E.2d 759, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 14 (2022). Defendant’s sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute of 30 years, with the ﬁrst 20 years to be served in conﬁnement and the remainder to be served on probation, along with a special term of probation of three years in addition to the 30-year term, was valid under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 42-8-35.2. Benton v.