Hall v

State, 283 Ga. App. 266, 16-13-31 641 S.E.2d 264, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 31 (2007). Mere presence at residence insufficient for drug conviction. — Defendant was entitled to reversal of the convictions for possession with intent to distribute and trafficking drugs because the defendant was merely present at a residence, which the defendant did not own or lease, when a search warrant was executed, there was no evidence the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the drugs, and there was no evidence the defendant was a party to these crimes. Scott v. State, 326 Ga. App. 115, 756 S.E.2d 220, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 133 (2014). Pager insufficient evidence of drug involvement. — Evidence was not sufficient to convict the defendant after the defendant “acted a little nervous” at the scene, scene, a pager was found in the glove compartment, and that in the defendant’s wallet was a list “full of different phone numbers” as the state adduced no evidence to connect the pager, the phone numbers, or the digits with dollar signs to telltale signs of criminality. Hughes v. State, 215 Ga. App. 6, 449 S.E.2d 547, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1099 (1994). Trial court did not abuse the courts discretion by permitting similar transaction evidence. — Given the substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt, a trial court did not abuse the courts discretion by permitting evidence showing the commission of similar transactions, in the nature of two out-of-state traffic stops which led to searches and discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia on the defendant, because there was no reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different had the evidence been excluded. Goldsby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 523, 615 S.E.2d 592, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 561 (2005). Controlled buys demonstrated reliability of informant. — With regard to drug-related convictions, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the search warrant was 426 supported by probable cause in that the confidential informant took a position against penal interest by reporting to officers that the informant bought drugs from the defendant, the officer stated that the information supplied by the confidential informant was confirmed by conducting three controlled drug purchases from the defendant, and the controlled buys strongly corroborated the reliability of the informant and demonstrated a fair probability that contraband would be found in the defendant’s house. Reid v. State, 321 Ga. App. 653, 742 S.E.2d 166, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 367 (2013). Sentencing Sentence reduction provision not unconstitutionally vague. — Term “substantial assistance” in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)), regarding reduced sentences for those convicted of drug trafficking, is not too vague for persons of ordinary intelligence to understand. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 533 (1986). Sentence does not violate Fifth Amendment rights. — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)), regarding reduced sentences for those convicted of drug trafficking, does not compel a defendant to exchange the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights for a chance at a reduced sentence as it only requires the defendant to provide information about other persons involved in the same crime for which the defendant has already been convicted. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 533 (1986). Legislative intent. — Most reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1) was to supplant the general punishment provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) with a specific and potentially more harsh punishment provision for manufacturing methamphetamine. Richards v. State, 290 Ga. App. 360, 659 S.E.2d 651, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 239 (2008). Separate offenses may be subject to only one punishment. — If separate offenses charged in one indictment were 16-13-31 committed at the same time and place as parts of a continuous criminal act, and inspired by the same criminal intent, they are susceptible of only one punishment. York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 79 (2000). Discussion of relationship between sentencing provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-31 and 17-10-2, dealing with presentence hearings. — See Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 623 (1981). Conviction, not indictment, controls sentence. — It is the conviction of the specific trafficking offense which authorizes a particular sentence and not the language of the indictment. The defendants’ sentence was within the maximum sentence for the offense and was therefore not invalid or illegal. Moon v. State, 194 Ga. App. 777, 392 S.E.2d 19, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 312 (1990). General sentencing provision superfluous. — In view of the specific sentences required for a specified offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, subsection (f) (now (g)) is a general provision and in large part a superfluity. Steward v. State, 182 Ga. App. 659, 356 S.E.2d 890, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2652 (1987). Construction with probated and suspended sentence provisions. — Mandatory sentence provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) (now (f)), by its express terms, is removed from the application of the probated and suspended sentence provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a). Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2931 (1984). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(1), the trial court lacked the authority to probate or suspend sentences imposed against two defendants in unrelated criminal actions, and neither the 2004 nor the 2006 amendments to the general sentencing provisions under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(1) were relevant; moreover, because O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-6.2 were statutes that defined certain categories of crimes and provided the sentencing guidelines for those categories, it did not appear that the list of these two exceptions normally would have 427 Sentencing (Cont’d) included § 16-13-31 or any other specific criminal statute, and any omission would be significant only with regard to a statute that defined classes or categories of crimes. Gillen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 616, 649 S.E.2d 832, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 836 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1780, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 809 (Ga. Oct. 29, 2007). O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) (now (f)) does not conflict with parole authority of State Board of Pardons and Paroles granted under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II). Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 623 (1981). Power to move for sentence reduction not reserved for district attorney alone. — Acts constituting “substantial assistance” as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)) may be brought to the attention of the sentencing court by motion of either the district attorney or the defendant, or the sentencing court may make its own inquiry into the matter. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 339 S.E.2d 244, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 533 (1986); Swantner v. State, 244 Ga. App. 372, 535 S.E.2d 343, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 717 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1700, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 748 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2000). Judge not required to reduce or suspend sentence. — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(2) (now (f)(2)) does not by its terms require the judge to impose a reduced or suspended sentence in the event a defendant has rendered such assistance but instead merely authorizes the judge to do so. Lastohkein v. State, 199 Ga. App. 555, 405 S.E.2d 554, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 576 (1991). Sentence within statutory limit. — Because the defendant’s 25-year sentence for trafficking in cocaine was within the statutory limit, the defendant presented no basis upon which to vacate the sentence of imprisonment. Brown v. State, 353 Ga. App. 559, 839 S.E.2d 21, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 39 (2020). Sentencing deal for codefendant not shown. — Defendant failed to prove a Brady violation in the state’s failure to 16-13-31 reveal a deal the state made with a codefendant in exchange for the codefendant’s substantial assistance because the defendant presented no evidence that there was a deal but merely argued that there must have been one because of the codefendant’s sentence; all of the evidence showed there was no deal. Pihlman v. State, 292 Ga. App. 612, 664 S.E.2d 904, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 826 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1954, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 977 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2008). Recidivist sentence proper. — Recidivist sentence imposed upon the defendant was upheld on appeal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-7(a) and 16-13-31(a)(1)(A) and (h), based on evidence of the defendant’s 1993 convictions; hence, the defendant was properly sentenced to the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the offense, and ordered to serve the mandatory minimum of 10 years. Smith v. State, 282 Ga. App. 317, 638 S.E.2d 440, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1374 (2006). Deviation from mandatory minimum sentence appropriate. — When the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 15 years in prison for three drug offenses, the trial court did not err in failing to sentence the defendant below the mandatory minimum because the trial court’s statements during the sentencing hearing clearly indicated an awareness that the court had the discretion to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence; there was nothing in the trial court’s statement that indicated the court was applying a mechanical policy or that there was an outright refusal to consider the defendant’s request to deviate; and the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in concluding that the interests of justice factor did not weigh in favor of deviating from the mandatory minimum sentence. Reed v. State, 342 Ga. App. 466, 804 S.E.2d 129, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 357 (2017). There was no affirmative showing that the trial judge was unaware of the discretion to deviate from the sentencing range, and given the state’s argument that deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence was not warranted because the defendant never accepted responsibility for 428 the defendant’s actions, the defendant failed to show entitlement to a sentence that deviated from the mandatory minimum. Gage v. State, 358 Ga. App. 855, 856 S.E.2d 440, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 142 (2021). Recidivist sentence inappropriate. — Defendant’s case was remanded for resentencing after a conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine because the trial court considered an uncertified Arkansas docket sheet in aggravation of sentence and a Tennessee conviction that might not qualify as a prior felony in Georgia under the recidivist statute. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga. App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 669 (2005). Cocaine 1. In General Impact of 1985 amendment on defendant convicted of cocaine possession. — Since at the time of the offense, O.C.G.A § 16-13-31(a) defined two methods of committing the crime of trafficking in cocaine, one dealing with pure cocaine and the other with mixtures containing cocaine, by amending the trafficking statute in 1985 to define the crime as “actual possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine,” the legislature demonstrated an intent to repeal that portion of the trafficking statute which defined the crime as “actual possession of 28 grams or more . . of any mixture containing cocaine . . . ,” and a defendant convicted thereafter of trafficking in a mixture is being held under an illegal sentence and must be discharged in a habeas corpus proceeding. Bassett v. Lemacks, 258 Ga. 367, 370 S.E.2d 146, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 339 (1988). Form of cocaine. — Offense “trafficking in cocaine” is committed whether cocaine is delivered in a pure form or whether the cocaine is present in a mixture containing other substances, as long as the quantity of the mass containing cocaine is more than 28 grams. Belcher v. State, 161 Ga. App. 442, 288 S.E.2d 299, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 1909 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in Robinson v. State, 256 Ga. 564, 350 S.E.2d 16-13-31 464, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 954 (1986); Godett v. State, 205 Ga. App. 545, 423 S.E.2d 34, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1254 (1992). Any salt of cocaine sufficient. — Indictment charging the defendant with trafficking in cocaine is not at fatal variance with proof at trial that a powder found in the defendant’s suitcase was cocaine hydrochloride, a salt of cocaine, because under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-26 the definition of cocaine includes any salt of cocaine. Britt v. State, 186 Ga. App. 418, 367 S.E.2d 298, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 370 (1988). Ownership of the contraband is not an element of the offense of trafficking in cocaine. Reeves v. State, 192 Ga. App. 12, 383 S.E.2d 613, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 895 (1989). “Intent to distribute” not required. — There is no requirement in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 that the state either allege or prove that defendant had an intent to distribute cocaine. Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2931 (1984). Knowledge of possession by other defendant. — Mere fact that a defendant is traveling with someone who is convicted for possessing cocaine does not establish that the defendant is a party to the crime of possession even if the defendant may have known that the defendant’s companion is carrying drugs. Haxho v. State, 186 Ga. App. 393, 367 S.E.2d 282, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (1988). Defendant’s knowledge of quantity. — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 requires as the mens rea that the defendant know that the defendant possesses cocaine but it does not require that the defendant know that the substance possessed weighs at least 28 grams. Cleveland v. State, 218 Ga. App. 661, 463 S.E.2d 36, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 849 (1995). 2. Procedure Indictment based on actual possession. — Because the evidence was that the defendant was in actual possession of cocaine buried in the defendant’s backyard, the defendant could not claim harmful error arising out of the superior court’s charge indicating that the jury could convict upon a finding of actual, 429 16-13-31 Cocaine (Cont’d) 2. Procedure (Cont’d) joint, or constructive possession thereof notwithstanding the defendant’s indictment upon actual possession alone. Williams v. State, 247 Ga. App. 88, 543 S.E.2d 402, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1424 (2000). Error in indictment as to purity of cocaine. — When an indictment incorrectly charged the defendant with possession of a substance composed of a purity of one-tenth of a percent of cocaine, and the defendant moved at trial to dismiss the indictment, the trial court properly refused and constructively amended the indictment before the jury to read “ten percent.” By waiting until trial to complain of the form of the indictment, the defendant was too late; motions to quash must be entered before trial, or the motions are waived. Arena v. State, 194 Ga. App. 883, 392 S.E.2d 264, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 382 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C0912, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 750 (Ga. Apr. 18, 1990). Habeas relief warranted for invalid indictment. — Denial of habeas relief was reversed after conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was based on an indictment alleging “a conspiracy to commit the crime of possessing a sufficient amount of a substance containing cocaine”: this indictment was invalid as a matter of law. Gonzalez v. Abbott, 986 F.2d 461, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 5200 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 894, 114 S. Ct. 257, 126 L. Ed. 2d 210, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 6109 (1993). Absence of the word “purity” from an indictment charging trafficking in cocaine did not render the indictment void as the Georgia Supreme Court itself has omitted the word when describing the crime prohibited by the statute. Clark v. State, 266 Ga. App. 334, 596 S.E.2d 783, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (2004). Purity not required element in criminal attempt to traffic cocaine. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment accusing the defendant of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and 16-13-31(a)(1); purity did not have to be alleged in an attempt case, particularly since there was no cocaine involved in the instant case, the indictment satisfied O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) by tracking the applicable statutes in a manner that was easily understood and by apprising the defendant of both the crime and the manner in which it was alleged to have been committed, and if the defendant admitted the allegations precisely as set forth in the indictment, the defendant would have been guilty of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1169 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0282, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 75 (Ga. Jan. 22, 2007). State not required to prove intent to distribute. — Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). The state was not required to prove an intent to distribute, and the determination of guilt or innocence depended largely on whether the jury believed the defendant, who claimed that some drugs were thrown into the defendant’s lap and that the defendant panicked, picked the drugs up, and threw the drugs out of the window. Hancock v. State, 293 Ga. App. 595, 667 S.E.2d 437, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1018 (2008). 3. Evidence Motel safe with cocaine inside. — Sufficient evidence supported the conviction of the defendant for trafficking cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1); during a police search of the defendant’s motel room, to which the defendant consented, police discovered that a safe key on the defendant’s person opened a safe that contained 58.1 grams of cocaine. Nelson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 585, 618 S.E.2d 192, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2005). Evidence sufficient when cocaine found in hotel. — There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the evidence showing more than mere proximity to the cocaine in that the defendant was alone in the hotel room 430 when the defendant heard the knock on the door; no one entered or exited the room prior to the search; paraphernalia commonly used to prepare crack cocaine was openly displayed on the counter; and the jacket in which the cocaine was found was the same jacket the defendant wore during a prior arrest that had been videotaped at which time the defendant was also found to have possessed cocaine. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 164 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. June 1, 2009). Toilet with cocaine and cash. — Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq.; the defendant was found alone in a bathroom in which the toilet contained 90 grams of cocaine and a large amount of cash, and a key to a car, which was later found to contain marijuana, was found in the defendant’s pants. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1004 (2006). Cocaine found in bathroom pipes. — Evidence was sufficient to support a drug trafficking charge because, inter alia, an officer observed a steady flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic around two residences, the officer explained that a suspected seller would enter the first home and then return to the second home to complete a sale, and after completing five or six sales, the suspected seller would return to the first home, the officer observed almost 20 of these transactions and, in executing a search warrant, officers saw the defendant and the spouse leave a bathroom in one of the homes, and officers found cocaine in the pipes of the bathroom’s toilet. Blue v. State, 275 Ga. App. 671, 621 S.E.2d 616, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1079 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0349, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 135 (Ga. Feb. 13, 2006). Cocaine under hood of vehicle. — Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine was supported by sufficient evidence that officers found more than 43 grams of cocaine under the hood of the 16-13-31 vehicle the defendant was driving after a drug dog alerted that contraband was located inside the vehicle and a subsequent search based on the alert. Garvin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 242, 641 S.E.2d 176, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1540 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0676, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 329 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2007). Cocaine found in truck bed. — Defendant failed to rebut the presumption of possession of bricks of cocaine found in the defendant’s pickup truck following a road block stop because the defendant claimed that the truck was the defendant’s, the defendant asserted ownership over the contents of the truck, the defendant was the sole occupant of the truck, and there was no showing that others had access to the truck bed. Maldonado v. State, 313 Ga. App. 511, 722 S.E.2d 123, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 8 (2012). Evidence sufficient when drugs thrown from car. — While a defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to exclude the possibility that the cocaine belonged solely to the defendant’s passenger, the testimony of the passenger that the passenger dropped the drugs out of the truck after the defendant threw the drugs in the passenger’s lap was adequately corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the facts that the defendant had more than $2,000 in the defendant’s pocket and that the defendant was the owner and driver of the truck from which the drugs were thrown; the defendant was, thus, properly convicted of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) and possession of cocaine as a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. Wingfield v. State, 297 Ga. App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 454 (2009). Evidence of defendant’s knowledge of weight of drugs sufficient. — Knowledge of the weight of cocaine in a case of cocaine trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) was shown by evidence that crack cocaine packaged for resale, a 72.65-gram slab of crack cocaine beside a mirror and cutting tools, 37 individual packets of powder cocaine, digital scales, sandwich bags, and loaded handguns, were in a home defendant rented. Scott v. 431 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) State, 331 Ga. App. 395, 771 S.E.2d 93, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1120, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 477 (Ga. June 15, 2015). Circumstances of the possession, including the defendant driving the car from which the cocaine was thrown, the presence of a very large quantity of narcotics in the car, the display of nervousness during the stop, the inconsistent statements made, the scales found on the passenger floorboard, the defendant’s spontaneous admissions, and the weight provided sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for trafficking to show knowing possession of more than 200 grams of the drug. Robinson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 872, 772 S.E.2d 223, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 258 (2015). Possession of mixture in conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. — State proved the conspiracy to traffic cocaine charge by showing that the defendant knowingly possessed 28 grams or more of cocaine and that one of the conspirators took an overt act to possess the cocaine. The conviction was not invalid on the ground that the indictment alleged the defendant possessed pure cocaine, but the evidence showed that the cocaine was a mixture, as the crime could be proved by either showing that a defendant possessed pure cocaine or cocaine mixtures, and the state was not required to prove every substantive element of the offense since the defendant was charged with conspiracy to traffic, not trafficking itself. Allison v. State, 259 Ga. App. 775, 577 S.E.2d 845, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 165 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0904, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 512 (Ga. May 5, 2003). Use of similar transaction evidence in drug possession case. — With regard to the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of a drug related object, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by allowing the state to introduce evidence of the defendant’s 2003 drug possession incident because both incidents involved the possession and concealment of cocaine 16-13-31 and, during both incidents, the defendant described the process by which the drugs were obtained. Stover v. State, 322 Ga. App. 142, 744 S.E.2d 119, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 467 (2013). Warrantless search of parolee. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized after an automobile search given that law enforcement had reliable information that the defendant was transporting drugs, specifically, cocaine, as: (1) the defendant was on parole, and that as a condition thereof, had specifically consented to a warrantless search; (2) the information received from the informant about the defendant’s actions was reliable; and (3) no evidence was presented that the officers acted in bad faith or to harass the defendant. State v. Cauley, 282 Ga. App. 191, 638 S.E.2d 351, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1349 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0420, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 148 (Ga. Feb. 5, 2007). Evidence sufficient to support conviction of selling cocaine. — See Dixon v. State, 177 Ga. App. 506, 339 S.E.2d 775, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2425 (1986); Hamilton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 284, 349 S.E.2d 230, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2703 (1986); Wilson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 183, 387 S.E.2d 413, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1389 (1989); Roberson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 379, 393 S.E.2d 516, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (1990); Ross v. State, 206 Ga. App. 1, 424 S.E.2d 308, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1992). Accomplice’s testimony combined with a videotape of defendant in the front seat of a car while talking to a confidential police informant during a drug buy was sufficient corroboration to justify defendant’s convictions for selling cocaine. Etchison v. State, 266 Ga. App. 528, 597 S.E.2d 583, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (2004). Despite a sufficiency of the evidence challenge based solely on an issue of the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the defendant’s conviction for the sale of cocaine was affirmed on appeal because the issue surrounding the credibility of the witness making such identification was for the jury, and not the Court of Appeals of Georgia, to determine, while resolving any inconsistencies in the testi- 432 mony presented for or against the guilt of the accused. Cosby v. State, 289 Ga. App. 36, 656 S.E.2d 186, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1323 (2007). State’s uncontradicted evidence showed that the idea to sell cocaine to an informant originated with the defendant, and the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime without any undue persuasion, incitement, or deceit by the state, and therefore supported the defendant’s conviction for the sale of cocaine and the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on the defense of entrapment. Lightsey v. State, 289 Ga. App. 181, 656 S.E.2d 852, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 33 (2008). Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the defendant’s conviction for selling cocaine because unrefuted testimony from an undercover agent identifying the defendant as the seller of the cocaine purchased in a controlled buy conducted by the agent was corroborated by an audio tape and the testimony of other officers at the scene. Thompson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 387, 657 S.E.2d 296, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 88 (2008). Selling cocaine. — Witness’s testimony established that the defendant sold cocaine to the victim, later struggled with the victim and the victim was shot, and the defendant threatened the witness not to tell the police; the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., and of concealing a death under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 278, 609 S.E.2d 207, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 26 (2005). Cocaine found in backpack. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing or attempting to elude based on the defendant’s involvement in a police chase that included speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a residential area and the defendant’s attempt to flee on foot; a backpack that the defendant was carrying while running from the police and which was recovered from the roof of the house around which the defendant had 16-13-31 disappeared had drugs and a pistol in the backpack. Hinton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 473 (2009). Videotape of cocaine sale sufficient evidence. — Because a videotape of a cocaine sale provided independent evidence of the defendant’s participation in the transaction, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for selling cocaine. McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 859, 619 S.E.2d 367, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 845 (2005). Pat-down search resulting in cocaine. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine found by an officer after a precautionary pat-down as the officer’s actions in responding to a suspicious-person complaint and immediately encountering the defendant were reasonable and neither arbitrary nor harassing; hence, the seizure was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 654, 637 S.E.2d 70, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1193 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0216, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 77 (Ga. Jan. 22, 2007). Police search of a defendant’s bag and person which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers’ lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. Green v. State, 302 Ga. App. 388, 691 S.E.2d 283, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 135 (2010). Testimony by agent. — Court properly allowed an agent to testify on direct examination as to the agent’s conversations with a coconspirator as part of the res gestae. What the coconspirator said, as related by the agent, did not refer to the defendants or directly implicate the defendants but concerned instead the quantity of cocaine being negotiated for sale. Lawrence v. State, 187 Ga. App. 211, 369 S.E.2d 531, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 557 (1988). Aiding and abetting possession. — Whether or not the defendant had physical possession of cocaine, the 433 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) defendant aided and abetted the cocaine’s actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and 16-13-31 as a party to the crime. Barrett v. State, 183 Ga. App. 729, 360 S.E.2d 400, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2742 (1987), cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905. Intentional aiders and abettors. — Jury could find the defendant mother and her son guilty of joint actual possession of cocaine either directly or as intentional aiders and abettors or intentional encouragers. As to the indirect roles, there was ample evidence that at the least, the mother was permitting direct committers to use her apartment for trafficking, providing a haven, and her son was intentionally encouraging the trafficking by himself being a direct receiver. Heath v. State, 186 Ga. App. 655, 368 S.E.2d 346, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 426 (1988). Evidence of similar transaction properly admitted. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of the defendant’s 2004 arrest for trafficking in cocaine as a similar transaction since, despite the defendant’s claims, sufficient similarities existed between the prior offense and the crime charged because the prior transaction involved the defendant’s possession of a trafficking amount of cocaine and the defendant’s intent and bent of mind to traffic in cocaine were at issue in the crime charged. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 164 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. June 1, 2009). Proof of joint constructive possession. — Because the defendant’s brother was prosecuted in federal court for possession of a cocaine mixture in an apartment, the state was permitted to prove the state’s case against the defendant by proof of joint constructive possession; the state did not prosecute the brother for the brother’s joint constructive possession of the cocaine mixture in the apartment, but the United States did 16-13-31 prosecute the brother in federal court. Holiman v. State, 313 Ga. App. 76, 720 S.E.2d 363, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1078 (2011), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013). Undisputed evidence that the defendant was driving the car in which the cocaine was found gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defendant had possession and control over the drug and the presumption could not be rebutted by citation to the equal access rule when both the defendant and the passenger were charged with joint constructive possession. Robinson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 872, 772 S.E.2d 223, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 55 (2015). Actual or constructive possession supports trafficking offense. — Defendant may be convicted under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 of trafficking in cocaine based on a finding of either actual or constructive possession. Cheeks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 446, 507 S.E.2d 204, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1277 (1998). Constructive possession of cocaine. — Testimony by two of the defendant’s cohorts that the defendant directed one of them to pull the cocaine from under the front seat and hide the cocaine in a cup was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s constructive possession of the cocaine to support a trafficking conviction. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. App. 493, 583 S.E.2d 207, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (2003). Conviction for cocaine trafficking reversed following confrontation rights violation. — Despite sufficient evidence existing to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the conviction was reversed because the trial court violated the defendant’s right to confrontation by admitting the out-of-court statements of a confidential informant that the informant purchased crack cocaine from the defendant, which was arguably the only direct or non-circumstantial evidence that the defendant was involved in the illegal drug activity occurring at the residence. Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 706 (2014). Insufficient evidence to convict passenger of cocaine offense. — Since the circumstantial evidence failed to 434 establish a connection between the defendant and the cocaine other than the fact that the cocaine was found hidden in a package on the floor behind the driver’s seat in a car in which the defendant was riding in the front passenger seat, a conviction for knowingly possessing more than 400 grams of a mixture containing at least 10 percent cocaine was reversed. Hodges v. State, 277 Ga. App. 174, 626 S.E.2d 133, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 18 (2006). Equal access defense rejected. — Evidence was sufficient to authorize a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) as the evidence showed that, during a traffic stop, a sheriff’s deputy found a package containing cocaine in a car owned and driven by the defendant. While the defendant argued that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under the equal access rule because the sole evidence of the defendant’s possession of the cocaine was the defendant’s ownership and possession of the car and because others had equal access to the part of the car where the cocaine was found, the equal access rule was inapplicable as the state charged all three occupants of the car with possession of cocaine; thus, the state was entitled to rely on the presumption to show that the defendant, as the car’s owner and driver, had possession and control over the cocaine. Warren v. State, 314 Ga. App. 477, 724 S.E.2d 404, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 138 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1072, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 548 (Ga. May 29, 2012). Drugs in plain view of defendant driver results in conviction. — Evidence was sufficient when the cocaine was found in plain view of the defendant in the lap of the front-seat passenger of the car the defendant was driving, scales were found in the car, and there was testimony from an accomplice. Knight v. State, 242 Ga. App. 363, 528 S.E.2d 855, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 99 (2000). Passenger in vehicle convicted of trafficking in cocaine. — Evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine since cocaine was found in a vehicle in which the defendant 16-13-31 was a passenger, the defendant had $1,780 in the defendant’s pockets, and the defendant was accompanied by the defendant’s brother, who had a history of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. McKenzie v. State, 283 Ga. App. 555, 642 S.E.2d 187, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 112 (2007). Drugs found in car sufficient for trafficking conviction. — Evidence that the defendant admitted to driving the car where the drugs were found, that the defendant had been paid to drive drugs from one county to another, that the defendant had transported drugs in the past, the defendant had been told the defendant was transporting marijuana, and a passenger told the defendant that the defendant was transporting four kilos of cocaine only as they saw police officers supported the defendant’s conviction for trafficking cocaine. Martinez v. State, 315 Ga. App. 727, 728 S.E.2d 255, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (2012). Defendant’s conviction of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was affirmed because the defendant was the driver of the car, and the defendant exercised dominion and control over the car throughout the car’s use over the course of several days and the baggy containing the cocaine was in plain view between the defendant’s driver’s seat and the front passenger seat, which showed the defendant’s access to the drugs. Sabb v. State, 317 Ga. App. 537, 731 S.E.2d 399, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 762 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in more than 400 grams of cocaine including evidence that the defendant arranged to use the defendant’s fiancée’s car and allowed another individual to drive it, the defendant and the driver gave differing accounts of their travel that day, and when police found cocaine in the trunk, the defendant was not surprised, but rather disappointed. Cooper v. State, 370 Ga. App. 703, 898 S.E.2d 600, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 57 (2024). Search of vehicle results in trafficking conviction. — When the defendant was free to go after a valid 435 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) traffic stop, was not unreasonably detained or asked numerous questions unrelated to the traffic stop, the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated when a police officer requested consent to search a car and the defendant was subsequently convicted of trafficking in cocaine; the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Daniel v. State, 260 Ga. App. 732, 580 S.E.2d 682, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 471 (2003), aff’d, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 415 (2004). Record supported the trial court’s judgment that a vehicle checkpoint that was established to check drivers’ licenses, registrations, and proof of insurance was established for a legitimate purpose, that a police officer did not violate the defendant’s rights when the officer walked a drug detection dog around the defendant’s car while another officer was checking the validity of the defendant’s driver’s license, and that police had probable cause to search the defendant’s car after the dog alerted on the car; furthermore, the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence which the defendant filed after the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and the defendant was properly convicted of both offenses. McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84, 601 S.E.2d 452, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 851 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendants knowingly possessed cocaine as was required to support the defendants’ convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) for trafficking in cocaine; the defendants’ criminal intention was shown by the fact that when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense and a seat belt violation, the defendants’ stories contradicted each other, the defendants’ car smelled of air freshener, the defendants could not explain who owned the car nor produce a vehicle registration for the vehicle that the defendants were traveling in, and related circumstances from which a jury could infer that the defendants knew 16-13-31 about the large quantity of cocaine that was hidden in a secret compartment in the defendants’ car, despite the defendants’ claims that the defendants did not know about the cocaine. Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 151, 619 S.E.2d 821, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 918 (2005). Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of cocaine and crack pipes found during an inventory search of a car was properly denied as: (1) the police impound was not unlawful; (2) waiting a reasonable time, usually 20 minutes, prior to having the car towed, was not unreasonable as a matter of law; and (3) the officers were not required to call the defendant’s relatives first. Carlisle v. State, 278 Ga. App. 528, 629 S.E.2d 512, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 363 (2006). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking was upheld on appeal as the evidence showed that an excess of twentyeight grams of cocaine, with a purity of over 10 percent, was found in plain view in a car that the defendant was driving, directly in front of the defendant and the defendant was the only person in the car. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 98, 630 S.E.2d 612, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 458 (2006). Defendant’s knowledge that the vehicle in which the defendant was riding had a hidden compartment containing $130,000 in cash and a kilo of cocaine could be inferred from the circumstances including the defendant’s claiming ownership of the car and the conflicting stories told by a codefendant and the defendant regarding their destination. Feliciano v. State, 302 Ga. App. 328, 690 S.E.2d 680, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 113 (2010), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Suppression motion properly denied. — Trial court did not err in dismissing as untimely a defendant’s motion in limine to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence with regard to the defendant being charged with cocaine trafficking for which the defendant was later convicted because the defendant waived formal arraignment and pleaded not guilty, and more than three months 436 later the defendant filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence, arguing that both the cocaine and any testimony regarding the cocaine should be excluded on the ground that both were products of an unlawful search of the home where the defendant and the cocaine were found; the defendant was unable to circumvent the requirements of Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.1 by couching the defendant’s motion to suppress as a motion in limine as the defendant’s failure to file a timely motion to suppress the seized evidence waived any right to claim that the search which produced the evidence was unconstitutional. Fraser v. State, 283 Ga. App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 84 (2007), overruled in part, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020). In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine seized after a valid traffic stop had essentially concluded as a state trooper’s objective observations, when combined with the extensive experience the trooper possessed in drug interdiction and knowledge of drug smuggling patterns, supplied sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant might have been engaged in criminal activity. Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 642 S.E.2d 921, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 255 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C0965, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 456 (Ga. June 4, 2007). In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in denying motions to suppress filed by the two defendants because: the officer (1) had a reasonable and sufficient basis for initiating a traffic stop of the car the defendants were traveling in based on a belief that the license plate on the subject vehicle might have belonged on another car, and hence, was illegally transferred; and (2) did not improperly prolong the stop once the defendants told conflicting stories of their travels and one declined to grant the officer consent to search. Andrews v. State, 289 Ga. App. 679, 658 S.E.2d 126, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 103 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0963, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 507 (Ga. June 2, 2008). In a cocaine trafficking prosecution, although the defendant testified that an 16-13-31 officer kicked in the door to the defendant’s residence, the defendant’s landlord testified that there was no damage to the front door, and the trial court was entitled to believe the officer’s testimony that the door was open, thus, the officer was entitled to seize drugs seen in plain view through the open door and the defendant’s motion to suppress the drugs was properly denied. Reid v. State, 298 Ga. App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 811 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine that was discovered during a search of the rental vehicle the defendant was driving based on evidence from the officer that the defendant consented to the search, although the defendant testified that the defendant did not consent and that the officer just announced that the officer was going to search. Morgan v. State, 311 Ga. App. 740, 716 S.E.2d 821, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 836 (2011). With regard to the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine found on the bus the defendant was driving because the consent to search was obtained approximately 10 minutes after the stop and a prolonged traffic stop was justified based on the information the deputy learned during the course of the traffic stop, such as the inconsistencies in the defendant’s statements and the log book. Rocha v. State, 317 Ga. App. 863, 733 S.E.2d 38, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 830 (2012). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine evidence found in the defendant’s vehicle after a warrantless search because the fact that the officer detected the odor of marijuana emitting from the defendant’s car provided probable cause to believe that the car contained drug contraband, which authorized the search of the car. Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678, 738 S.E.2d 130, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 42 (2013). Evidence sufficient to defeat motion for acquittal. — Evidence that the 817.7 grams of powdery substance seized contained cocaine, without proof 437 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) that the actual cocaine in the substance exceeded 400 grams, defeated a motion for acquittal. Quinn v. State, 171 Ga. App. 590, 320 S.E.2d 827, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2993 (1984). Conviction for possessing cocaine was not inconsistent with acquittal of trafficking in cocaine since the cocaine upon which the possession offense was based was seized at a different time and place from the cocaine upon which the trafficking offense was based. Rogers v. State, 182 Ga. App. 599, 356 S.E.2d 546, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2637 (1987). Constructive possession insufficient to support trafficking conviction. — After the defendant was charged with both trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to distribute, and the instructions given by the court were not separated as to the two counts, the court erred in charging both constructive and actual possession with regard to the trafficking count. While constructive possession will support possession with intent to distribute, it will not support a trafficking conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. Edwards v. State, 194 Ga. App. 571, 391 S.E.2d 137, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 209 (1990) (decided under facts existing prior to 1988 amendment which deleted “actual” preceding “possession”). Possession offenses included in trafficking. — Offenses of possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute were lesser included offenses, as a matter of fact, of the trafficking offense since proof of the two possession offenses was established by “the same or less than all the facts” required to establish the distribution offense; thus, it was error to convict the defendant of all three offenses. Hancock v. State, 210 Ga. App. 528, 437 S.E.2d 610, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1239 (1993). Evidence sufficient to find purity of 10 percent of more. — Although the lab reports were less than explicit on the element of purity of the cocaine, the reports could have reasonably been interpreted to authorize the trial judge to 16-13-31 find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substances described therein were of a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine. Stroud v. State, 286 Ga. App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (2007). Counsel’s deficiency did not warrant a new trial. — While the defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that portion of the state’s closing argument in which the prosecutor referenced a slain officer’s funeral a week prior, as that fact had no relevance to the charges the defendant was facing, based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant’s admission, the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute were upheld on appeal; thus, a new trial was properly denied. Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga. App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 394 (2008). Evidence sufficient to support conviction of possession. — Evidence, although it was for the most part circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one defendant was knowingly in actual possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine and that one other defendant was a party to the crime. Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 370 S.E.2d 348, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 675 (1988). Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was in “possession” of cocaine since the defendant was seen by law enforcement officers holding a grocery sack, which was later found to contain over $5,000 in cash, since cocaine with a street value of over $400 was found in the kitchen garbage basket, and since the defendant was the only person in the kitchen at the time the police entered the apartment. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1989). When the defendant was seen sitting on the living room sofa, under which were found the defendant’s keys and a large stash of cocaine, $423 in cash was found in the defendant’s front pocket, cocaine was found hidden in the defendant’s bedroom closet, cocaine was found carefully hidden 438 in the defendant’s and the codefendant’s bathroom, and a matchbox containing 12 pieces of “crack” or “rock” cocaine was found in the “breast pocket” of the codefendant’s jacket and that a plastic bag containing 43 pieces of “rock” or “crack” cocaine was found on the living room sofa next to the codefendant’s jacket, this evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reasonably find that the defendants were in “actual possession” of the more than 28 grams of pure cocaine. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1989) (decided prior to 1988 amendment). Defendants were observed purchasing several small objects from a codefendant in what the detectives believed to be a drug transaction and when the defendants were pulled over a short time later, the arresting officer saw a napkin, which contained several pieces of crack cocaine fall out of the car. This evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty of possession of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Byers v. State, 212 Ga. App. 110, 441 S.E.2d 290, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 151 (1994). After the defendant was found seated near a bag containing a large quantity of cocaine, had within reach two loaded guns and access to ammunition, was monitoring police traffic using a scanner, and had more drugs and large amounts of money stashed in various places, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant was in knowing, constructive possession of over 28 grams of cocaine. Cobb v. State, 236 Ga. App. 265, 511 S.E.2d 522, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 137 (1999). As the defendant was seen in actual possession of a shoebox containing 241 grams of cocaine, which the defendant disposed of in a dumpster, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. Hubbard v. State, 274 Ga. App. 184, 617 S.E.2d 167, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 704 (2005). Appellate court upheld the defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, based on sufficient evidence consisting of testimony from two special agents identifying the defendant, a 16-13-31 videotape of a cocaine sale, and positive test results confirming the substance the defendant sold and possessed was cocaine. Henley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 242, 635 S.E.2d 856, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1065 (2006). Based on: (1) the evidence presented to the jury about the condition and location of two bags of cocaine found in the grass near a vehicle after the vehicle rolled over with the defendant inside was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the bags were thrown out of the vehicle along with the other items; (2) items thrown from inside the car were traced back to the defendant and a passenger as the only occupants of the vehicle; and (3) receipts found in the vehicle, the jury could infer that the defendant had been in Maryland on one day, in Texas two days thereafter, and in Georgia on the day after that, and that this pattern indicated that the defendant was knowingly engaged in delivering cocaine, sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to support the defendant’s possession and trafficking cocaine convictions. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 315, 645 S.E.2d 753, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 496 (2007). Defendant’s convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant’s live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2007). Adequate corroboration supported trafficking conviction. — Evidence supported a conviction for trafficking in cocaine; even if corroboration of a confidential informant’s testimony was necessary, the informant’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of a police officer and an agent with the Drug Enforcement Agency. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 362, 629 S.E.2d 5, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 64 (2006). Conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. — State put forth sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of conspiracy to 439 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) traffic in cocaine after the state established, through the defendant’s confession, that the defendant arranged the purchase of 28 grams or more of cocaine; the state was not required under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) to prove the purity of the cocaine. Gumbs v. State, 258 Ga. App. 230, 573 S.E.2d 485, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1401 (2002). Evidence insufficient to sustain conviction for trafficking in cocaine. — See Crenshaw v. State, 183 Ga. App. 527, 359 S.E.2d 419, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2028 (1987); Cochran v. State, 190 Ga. App. 884, 380 S.E.2d 319, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 444 (1989); Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 424, 484 S.E.2d 60, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 398 (1997); Stevens v. State, 245 Ga. App. 237, 537 S.E.2d 688, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 925 (2000); Baltazar v. State, 254 Ga. App. 773, 564 S.E.2d 202, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 369 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1168, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 883 (Ga. Sept. 30, 2002). Defendant’s trafficking in cocaine conviction was reversed on appeal, as the state failed to present sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the cocaine found in a house, the defendant had no tie to the house as an occupant or resident, and the act of standing in the front of the house when officers approached the defendant amounted to mere spatial proximity, which on its own, was insufficient to link the defendant to the crime; moreover, because the evidence showed that another individual, who was later incarcerated on drug charges, lived at the residence at that time, such gave rise to an unrebutted reasonable hypothesis that this other individual possessed the drugs in question. Brown v. State, 285 Ga. App. 330, 646 S.E.2d 273, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 433 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1406, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 750 (Ga. Oct. 9, 2007). An officer exceeded the permissible scope of a consent frisk for weapons as nothing indicated that a cigar box that the officer removed from a defendant’s pocket felt like a gun or other weapon, and the officer pointed to no particularized facts that reasonably led the officer to believe 16-13-31 that the defendant might have a weapon. Thus, crack cocaine found in the box was inadmissible, and in the absence of this evidence, there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1010 (2008). Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine because the defendant did not own or lease the house where the contraband was found; officers found no bills in the defendant’s name in the house; the defendant did not possess any marked currency from the controlled buy; and the defendant’s possession of $1,332 in unmarked cash when the defendant was arrested did not connect the defendant to the drugs found in the house, in light of the three-day time lapse and evidence that the defendant was employed. Blue v. State, 350 Ga. App. 702, 830 S.E.2d 279, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 369 (2019). Evidence insufficient to revoke probation for alleged cocaine trafficking. — Defendant’s probation was improperly revoked based on the defendant’s alleged trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), as an informant’s hearsay statements were not competent to show the defendant arranged a drug sale, and no evidence connected the defendant with cocaine found in a house where the informant said the sale was to occur. That the defendant was sitting in front of the house and fled from police was insufficient to show the defendant’s constructive possession of the cocaine as none of the defendant’s belongings were inside the house; the defendant did not live there; and there was no evidence the defendant had ever been inside the house. Brown v. State, 294 Ga. App. 1, 668 S.E.2d 490, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 983 (2008). Evidence too attenuated to be intrinsic. — Defendant’s conviction on one count of trafficking in cocaine was reversed because the trial court abused the court’s discretion in admitting the evidence of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigation as intrinsic evidence of the 440 charged trafficking offense since the state failed to sufficiently link the DEA evidence to the events immediately surrounding the defendant’s arrest as it was too attenuated in time and space from the events leading up to the charged offense. Sanchez-Villa v. State, 341 Ga. App. 264, 799 S.E.2d 364, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 178 (2017), cert. denied, No. S17C1576, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 746 (Ga. Aug. 28, 2017). Circumstantial evidence sufficient for trafficking conviction. — Evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to connect the defendant to the house where drugs were found; thus, it was sufficient to support convictions of trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Although others might have been present on the property on various unspecified occasions, the defendant was allowed by the owner to use the house, had been seen at the residence by police on previous occasions, had a vehicle on the premises, and hurriedly walked away from officers when the officers arrived; the evidence also showed that no other persons were present when officers executed the search warrant. Clyde v. State, 298 Ga. App. 283, 680 S.E.2d 146, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 649 (2009). Police officer testified about searching a patrol car before transporting the defendant in the car, and about the officer’s suspicions that the defendant had stuffed something underneath the backseat because the officer saw debris on the back of the defendant’s pants and on the backseat. This circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to convict the defendant of possessing the cocaine found wedged underneath the backseat. Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2009). Circumstantial evidence insufficient for cocaine trafficking. — Circumstantial evidence consisting of the following facts was insufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking: the defendant was a passenger in a car, which was owned by the defendant’s brother and 16-13-31 driven by a friend; the car’s trunk contained two kilos of cocaine; the car led police on a high speed chase across state lines; and the car crashed near the defendant’s relatives’ home. Foster v. State, 300 Ga. App. 446, 685 S.E.2d 422, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1195 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0361, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 164 (Ga. Feb. 8, 2010). In a “reverse sting” case, the authorities conducting the sting arrested the defendants before the defendants acquired possession of the drug and therefore the convictions for trafficking in cocaine are reversed. Epps v. State, 251 Ga. App. 645, 555 S.E.2d 25, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1104 (2001), cert. denied, No. S02C0087, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 130 (Ga. Feb. 4, 2002). Evidence sufficient when drugs found in shoebox. — State’s admission of proof that over 28 grams of cocaine of at least ten percent purity was found in an envelope box on the floor of the car that the defendant was driving was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking. Kates v. State, 271 Ga. App. 326, 609 S.E.2d 710, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 35 (2005). Evidence sufficient when drugs found in laundry box. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine when in addition to the defendant’s fingerprint on a laundry detergent box of cocaine, the jury was entitled to infer from tape recorded conversations between a codefendant and an informant that the defendant was the supplier of the cocaine that was to be delivered to the informant; the day after the codefendant notified the informant that the supplier had arrived, the codefendant and the defendant showed up at the informant’s house, and the defendant was with the codefendant when the codefendant turned to avoid a roadblock and when the laundry detergent box was left in the woods. Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga. App. 26, 643 S.E.2d 316, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 248 (2007). Evidence that the defendant agreed to sell drugs to an informant was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking. Carter v. 441 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) State, 261 Ga. App. 204, 583 S.E.2d 126, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 586 (2003). Felony murder conviction reversed when no conspiracy to traffic cocaine. — Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine was reversed because there was no evidence of any agreement between the defendant and those operating the stash house, beyond a possible buy-sell agreement, and since the felony murder conviction was predicated on the conspiracy offense, that conviction required reversal as well. Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325, 751 S.E.2d 773, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 1016 (2013). Insufficient evidence of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. — Because the state failed to prove the essential element of an agreement between the defendant and the occupants of a stash house in a drug conspiracy trial, since the only evidence was that a purchase of drugs was to take place, the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and 16-13-31(a)(1) was reversed. Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325, 751 S.E.2d 773, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 1016 (2013). Evidence sufficient for attempt to traffic in cocaine. — In an attempt to traffic in cocaine case under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and 16-13-31, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because the state did not prove the purity of the cocaine that the defendant intended to purchase; proof of purity was unnecessary given that all that was needed was a substantial step towards the crime of trafficking, not completion of the crime. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1169 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0282, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 75 (Ga. Jan. 22, 2007). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for criminal attempt to commit trafficking in cocaine based on the trial evidence establishing that the defendant negotiated for and attempted to purchase one kilogram of cocaine from an undercover investigator, that the defendant took substantial steps and actively 16-13-31 participated in the attempted drug offense by meeting with the undercover investigator at the designated location and at the arranged time for the purpose of conducting the transaction and by executing the bill of sale for a vehicle in exchange for the drug purchase, and by taking possession of the package of cocaine and cutting the package open to examine the contents. Tehrani v. State, 321 Ga. App. 685, 742 S.E.2d 502, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 369 (2013). Evidence sufficient to support conviction for cocaine trafficking. — See Wilson v. State, 179 Ga. App. 780, 347 S.E.2d 709, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2663 (1986); Rodriquez v. State, 180 Ga. App. 272, 349 S.E.2d 22, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2717 (1986); Feblez v. State, 181 Ga. App. 567, 353 S.E.2d 64, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2551 (1987); Kelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 605, 353 S.E.2d 92, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2554 (1987); Lopez v. State, 184 Ga. App. 31, 360 S.E.2d 722, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2750 (1987); Thomas v. State, 184 Ga. App. 318, 361 S.E.2d 280, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2768 (1987); Reed v. State, 186 Ga. App. 539, 367 S.E.2d 809, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 410 (1988); Means v. State, 188 Ga. App. 210, 372 S.E.2d 484, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 916 (1988); Burroughs v. State, 190 Ga. App. 467, 379 S.E.2d 175, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 261 (1989); Ward v. State, 193 Ga. App. 137, 387 S.E.2d 150, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1311 (1989); Kelly v. State, 193 Ga. App. 549, 388 S.E.2d 377, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1526 (1989); Beauchene v. State, 194 Ga. App. 222, 390 S.E.2d 116, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 32 (1990); Mitchell v. State, 195 Ga. App. 255, 393 S.E.2d 274, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 455 (1990); Tatum v. State, 195 Ga. App. 349, 393 S.E.2d 494, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 516 (1990); Ross v. State, 206 Ga. App. 1, 424 S.E.2d 308, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (1992); Daniels v. State, 221 Ga. App. 476, 471 S.E.2d 560, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (1996); White v. State, 225 Ga. App. 74, 483 S.E.2d 329, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 211 (1997); Covington v. State, 226 Ga. App. 484, 486 S.E.2d 706, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 657 (1997); Brown v. State, 229 Ga. App. 87, 493 S.E.2d 230, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1354 (1997); McCoy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 703, 500 S.E.2d 611, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 442 519 (1998); Milton v. State, 232 Ga. App. 672, 503 S.E.2d 566, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 784 (1998); Smith v. State, 237 Ga. App. 616, 516 S.E.2d 319, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 499 (1999); Gurr v. State, 238 Ga. App. 1, 516 S.E.2d 553, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1045 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C1260, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 897 (Ga. Oct. 21, 1999); Straite v. State, 238 Ga. App. 420, 518 S.E.2d 914, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 832 (1999); Small v. State, 243 Ga. App. 678, 534 S.E.2d 139, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 522 (2000); Brown v. State, 244 Ga. App. 440, 535 S.E.2d 785, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 752 (2000); Montgomery v. State, 249 Ga. App. 777, 549 S.E.2d 463, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 577 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1386, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 894 (Ga. Nov. 5, 2001). When the defendant was convicted of the offense of trafficking in cocaine, and at trial, the state’s expert witness testified that the cocaine seized from the defendant’s possession weighed 28.0 grams, and on cross-examination stated that the electronic balance scales on which the cocaine was weighed had a margin of error of less than one percent, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for directed verdict because even if the jury could reasonably find that the cocaine seized from the defendant was slightly less than the requisite 28 grams, the jury could just as reasonably have found that the weight measurement was accurate or that the amount of cocaine seized slightly exceeded 28 grams. Newton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 664, 382 S.E.2d 432, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 728 (1989). When the defendant was chased by a detective to the vicinity of an abandoned house where the defendant was seen throwing something under the front porch by another police officer and a mailman, and when a bag was immediately retrieved from that location containing marijuana, rolling papers and a bottle of cocaine, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a guilty verdict of trafficking in cocaine. Hall v. State, 192 Ga. App. 151, 384 S.E.2d 428, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 944 (1989). When more than 28 grams of pure cocaine was found in the defendants’ apartment, where some of the cocaine was found in plain view, and where some of the 16-13-31 illegal drug was found hastily stashed in and under household furnishings and some of the cocaine was found carefully hidden in various spots throughout the apartment, this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that someone was involved in trafficking in cocaine. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1989). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine since: (1) a confidential informant made a controlled buy from the defendant; (2) the defendant offered to provide the name of a major drug dealer if the defendant were set free; (3) a person who was with the defendant at the time of the defendant’s arrest stated that the defendant had taken the person to the defendant’s residence to pick up cocaine; (4) officers executing a search warrant at the defendant’s residence found a lockbox filled with scales and cocaine; and (5) the defendant’s equal access defense was rejected. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 710 (2004). Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied and the evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) as the defendant arranged the drug transaction with an undercover officer, accepted the container in which the officer directed the defendant to place the cocaine, and delivered to the officer 397 grams of cocaine with a purity of 44 percent. Salgado v. State, 268 Ga. App. 18, 601 S.E.2d 417, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because there was more evidence than the defendant’s mere presence in the apartment, which was actually rented by the defendant’s sister, that linked the defendant to the cocaine: (1) the jury could infer that the defendant actually lived in the apartment because the defendant claimed ownership of a television and a video game in the apartment; (2) it was a onebedroom apartment to which the defendant had a key; (3) the defendant was 443 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) sleeping in the bedroom when the police arrived; (4) the defendant’s own statements provided additional evidence demonstrating the defendant’s possession of the cocaine hidden in the kitchen cabinets; and (5) the defendant had a lot of cash on the defendant’s person with large numbers of denominations that was typically used to purchase drugs. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 840 (2004). Evidence that an undercover police officer tried to purchase drugs from a third person, that the third person would have to get the drugs from “his source,” and that the officer was present when the defendant gave a package to a third person shortly before the third person delivered cocaine to the officer was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Serrate v. State, 268 Ga. App. 276, 601 S.E.2d 766, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (2004). When, upon executing a search warrant for the defendant’s house, four kilograms of cocaine were found in the house and a fifth kilogram was found in the defendant’s car parked at the house, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking. Solis v. State, 268 Ga. App. 493, 602 S.E.2d 166, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 914 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1966, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1069 (Ga. Nov. 22, 2004). Sufficient evidence existed to support a defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking and the subsequent denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial since the evidence showed, via testimony from the defendant’s wife and the wife’s two friends, that once the defendant found the cocaine in the house of a client the defendant was sent to retrieve the drug from, the defendant not only took possession of the cocaine but also used some of the drug as well. Fraser v. State, 283 Ga. App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 84 (2007), overruled in part, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020). There was sufficient evidence that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in co- 16-13-31 caine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a); in addition to evidence that 1,000 grams of cocaine (with a purity of 73 percent) was found in the apartment occupied by the defendant, the state produced evidence connecting the defendant to the cocaine by more than mere spatial proximity. Taylor v. State, 285 Ga. App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1515, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 655 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007). Given sufficient evidence that: (1) the defendant was arrested after driving a car containing over 900 grams of cocaine, raising a presumption of both possession and control; (2) the link between the defendant and the cocaine was not based solely on the presumption of possession; (3) the defendant admitted to purchasing the shoes originally packaged in the box containing the cocaine, and was wearing those shoes; (4) a search of the defendant’s person further revealed a large sum of cash; and (5) the trial court considered the defendant’s equal access theory but found that it did not demand a defense verdict, the defendant’s cocaine trafficking conviction was upheld on appeal. McGee v. State, 287 Ga. App. 460, 651 S.E.2d 546, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 999 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0171, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 167 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2008). When testimony from three troopers revealed that one package of contraband was taken from each of three passengers occupying a car, the packages were identified at trial as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and one of the troopers stated unequivocally on direct examination that the package of cocaine identified as Exhibit 2 was the one the trooper took from the defendant, and the state’s expert established that each package met the requisite weight and purity under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. Volcey v. State, 200 Ga. App. 881, 410 S.E.2d 36, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1158 (1991). When the total weight of the mixture equaled almost three times the amount required for the conviction and the chemist testified that the chemist tested bags 444 containing over half of the mixture there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine. Hancock v. State, 212 Ga. App. 78, 441 S.E.2d 261, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 139 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C0920, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 672 (Ga. Apr. 15, 1994). When the state tendered cocaine evidence in three exhibits, only one of which had been analyzed for purity, proof that one of the packages contained over 400 grams of cocaine, consisting of more than 10 percent purity was sufficient to support a conviction for trafficking. Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 464 S.E.2d 851, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1007 (1995), cert. dismissed, No. S96C0574, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 398 (Ga. Mar. 8, 1996). Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was the person named in the indictment and to establish that defendant was guilty of cocaine trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 498 S.E.2d 579, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 452 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1130, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 765 (Ga. June 26, 1998). Defendant’s conviction on conspiracy to traffic in cocaine was supported by the evidence as it showed that the defendant conspired with others to knowingly possess 28 grams or more of cocaine and that the defendant took the overt act of possessing the cocaine by picking it up from the defendant’s nephew, telling the driver of the vehicle to slow down in order to avoid arrest, and tried to conceal the cocaine under the defendant’s seat after being stopped for speeding. Smith v. State, 253 Ga. App. 131, 558 S.E.2d 455, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1426 (2001). Evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendants knowingly possessed more than 28 grams of cocaine found in the defendants’ car, and were guilty of trafficking in cocaine after, inter alia, officers searched the car and found a package containing 165 grams of crack cocaine under the front passenger seat and another package containing 235 grams of powder cocaine in a bag sitting on the back seat. Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga. App. 703, 574 S.E.2d 896, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1547 (2002). 16-13-31 Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as the evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine; evidence showed that the one bag that the state tested was positive for cocaine, the state was not required to test the other two bags containing a similar-looking substance, the three bags together contained more than 28 grams of cocaine with a purity of 10 percent, and no evidence indicated the defendant was making personal use of that amount of cocaine. Pitts v. State, 260 Ga. App. 553, 580 S.E.2d 618, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 419 (2003). When the drug expert testified to performing a random analysis on the 200 grams of cocaine, tested approximately 40.8 grams, and found that the sample was 93 percent pure cocaine, the defendant’s conviction of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) was affirmed because the expert’s opinion was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the drug trafficking charge. Castillo v. State, 263 Ga. App. 772, 589 S.E.2d 325, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1320 (2003). There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant possessed cocaine when the defendant resided in the bedroom where the cocaine was discovered, a friend testified that the friend heard the defendant admit the cocaine was found in the defendant’s room, the defendant’s mother pointed out the room as the defendant’s, and after the cocaine was discovered, the defendant went into hiding, and the argument of equal access by the defendant’s mother and brother to the cocaine was unavailing since other evidence linked the defendant to the cocaine. Truitt v. State, 266 Ga. App. 56, 596 S.E.2d 219, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 299 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine because: (1) the defendant rented and furnished an apartment for the codefendant, who defendant described as a casual friend; (2) the defendant paid for a cell phone used by the codefendant; and (3) a kilogram of cocaine and over $98,000.00 was found in the apartment; however, the conviction was reversed on other grounds. Patten v. State, 275 Ga. 445 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) App. 574, 621 S.E.2d 550, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1040 (2005). Because: (1) the defendant failed to sufficiently prove an entrapment defense and, hence, the need for disclosure of an informant’s identity; (2) no error resulted in refusing to strike a juror for cause; and (3) the trial court’s entrapment instruction was legally correct and did not mislead the jury, the defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and two counts of use of communication facilities in committing a felony drug offense, under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.3, were affirmed on appeal. Griffiths v. State, 283 Ga. App. 176, 641 S.E.2d 169, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1516 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0652, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 333 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine since the defendant was the only passenger in a hatchback and chose to sit in the rear of the vehicle with full access to the cargo area and the cocaine. The defendant volunteered in an interview that the defendant “just needed to make some money.” Oliveres v. State, 292 Ga. App. 460, 664 S.E.2d 836, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 817 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1821, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 916 (Ga. Oct. 27, 2008). Evidence which included testimony from a defendant’s codefendant that: (1) the defendant came to the codefendant’s house; (2) the defendant showed the codefendant drugs; (3) the defendant indicated that the defendant needed help to move the drugs; and (4) the codefendant contacted the defendant and arranged a date and time for a drug transaction after a confidential informant (CI) told the codefendant that CI had an associate in need of one to four kilos of cocaine was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction on a trafficking in cocaine charge. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 670 S.E.2d 506, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1320 (2008). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as 16-13-31 there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the observations of the police watching the defendant and codefendants engaging in suspicious behavior in a high-crime area; the contents of the backpack, which contained 377.45 grams of 50.7 percent pure cocaine heavily wrapped in saran wrap, with a street value between $8,000 and $10,000 in powder form or as much as $15,000 if cut with an agent and compressed into rocks of crack cocaine; the drugs found in the trunk of the defendant’s rental vehicle; and the rental of a motel room by the defendant. Mosley v. State, 296 Ga. App. 746, 675 S.E.2d 607, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 324 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1188, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 322 (Ga. June 8, 2009). There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of a drug-related object, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-31(a)(1) and 16-13-32.2, against the defendant as the defendant’s van contained items used as drug pipe filters, the defendant’s passenger had dropped crack cocaine on the ground just prior to being apprehended, both individuals had large amounts of cash on them, and the defendant had a criminal history of similar drug-related conduct. Holloway v. State, 297 Ga. App. 81, 676 S.E.2d 445, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 356 (2009). Sufficient evidence existed to convict a defendant of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because a search of the defendant’s residence revealed, inter alia, large amounts of cocaine and cash and several persons approached the residence while the officers were there to execute the search warrant and sought to purchase drugs. Weems v. State, 295 Ga. App. 680, 673 S.E.2d 50, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 420 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant on a trafficking in cocaine charge as a large amount of cash was found on the defendant’s person, the defendant tried to flee once a drug dog alerted to the area of a van in which the defendant was sitting, and a shopping bag containing cocaine was observed by the defendant’s foot. Singleton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 452, 446 677 S.E.2d 348, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 377 (2009). Evidence that the defendant was going in and out of the defendant’s home, that an officer saw through the open front door the codefendant sitting near a large slab of cocaine, and that a small amount of cocaine was found on the defendant’s person, allowed the jury to find that the defendant had the intent to exercise control over the slab of cocaine seen in plain view. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Reid v. State, 298 Ga. App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 811 (2009). Defendant’s accomplice’s testimony that the defendant was knowingly in possession of cocaine found in their vehicle was corroborated by evidence of 575 grams of cocaine in the vehicle, that the defendant was extremely anxious when stopped by police, and the fact that there were 18 air fresheners hung throughout the vehicle, and was therefore sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), supporting the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Richardson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 850, 700 S.E.2d 738, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2010). There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of tools for the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-20 and 16-13-31, when narcotics and an electronic scale were found in the defendant’s residence, and although the defendant did not own the residence, the defendant resided there for the previous five years and there was a lack of evidence at the home of any other persons residing therein. Further, the items were well hidden within the premises, the defendant used a closed circuit surveillance system to monitor the home, and the defendant possessed a substantial amount of cash at the time of the search. Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 704 S.E.2d 227, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1101 (2010). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in more than 400 grams of cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. 16-13-31 § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) because the defendant directed that the cocaine package be cut open and tasted, provided a knife for this purpose, directed another man to get the money, and assisted in counting the money. A jury could conclude that the defendant had the power and intent to control the cocaine. Phillips v. State, 307 Ga. App. 366, 705 S.E.2d 287, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1135 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), based on the defendant’s participation in a sale of a sufficient amount and purity of cocaine to an undercover agent; although a codefendant conducted the sale directly, the defendant was a party to the sale under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) since the defendant was in a nearby vehicle that the codefendant went to during the transaction. McGee v. State, 316 Ga. App. 661, 730 S.E.2d 131, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of cocaine trafficking because the defendant arrived at a house under surveillance wearing a light-colored shirt and carrying a package. After police entered the house, an officer saw a man in a light-colored shirt drop a bag of cocaine out the window. No other person present had on a light-colored shirt; therefore, the jury could conclude that the defendant possessed the 490.22 grams of cocaine found in the bag. Kimble v. State, 301 Ga. App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0570, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 464 (Ga. May 17, 2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0569, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 466 (Ga. May 17, 2010). Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on the evidence showing that the mixture in the defendant’s possession weighed 37.79 grams and had a purity of 34.6 percent of cocaine. Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678, 738 S.E.2d 130, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 42 (2013). Regardless of whether the defendant passenger had physical possession of the cocaine, the evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant passenger actively participated in, and was a party to, the trafficking of the three kilos of 70-percent 447 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) pure cocaine because a sergeant set up an undercover surveillance at an apartment complex; after the defendants exited the building, the defendants were talking back and forth and the defendant driver was carrying a black and grey duffle bag, which the defendant driver did not have upon entering the building; and, during an open-air sniff, a canine alerted to the rear passenger side of the vehicle where the detective saw the black and grey duffle bag that contained the cocaine. Williams v. State, 336 Ga. App. 64, 783 S.E.2d 666, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 117, overruled in part, Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 460 (2016). Evidence that the defendant made a four-hour round trip drive at night for a brief stop before police found over 200 grams of cocaine and that upon being stopped the defendant expressed to the defendant’s girlfriend that the defendant could not go to prison for over 30 years was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Anderson v. State, 338 Ga. App. 171, 789 S.E.2d 363, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 448 (2016), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Evidence sufficient for conviction of trafficking in cocaine as “party thereto.” Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 405 S.E.2d 716, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 591 (1991). Evidence sufficient for conviction as party to trafficking in cocaine. — Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction as a party to trafficking in cocaine since the evidence showed that the defendant was aware that an alleged drug dealer kept cocaine in the house where the defendant was arrested, that the dealer doled cocaine out to the defendant and others so that they could sell the cocaine, that the defendant had sold cocaine for the dealer in the past and had stated the intent to do so on the day the defendant was arrested, that cocaine found in the defendant’s 16-13-31 possession had the same packaging as cocaine found in the basement of the house, and that when the police arrived to execute a search warrant, the defendant attempted to destroy the cocaine the defendant had in the defendant’s physical possession. Riley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 202, 663 S.E.2d 835, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 745 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because the state presented evidence that even if the defendant did not bring the bag of cocaine to an owner’s residence, the defendant possessed the cocaine and was a party to the crime of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Kegler v. State, 317 Ga. App. 427, 731 S.E.2d 111, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 726 (2012), overruled in part, Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 756 S.E.2d 507, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2014). Evidence that the defendant was the driver, approximately 220 grams of narcotics were found in the passenger compartment, the defendant was nervous, and scales were found on the passenger floor board was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Robinson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 872, 772 S.E.2d 223, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 55 (2015). Defendant’s trafficking conviction was supported by evidence that the defendant had been staying at the house where the warrant was executed, the defendant was inside the house during an active cook of crack cocaine, the defendant fled with several other people, some of whom were throwing cocaine in the air, police apprehended the defendant immediately after the defendant jumped the back yard fence and found drugs within arm’s reach, and the defendant made an inculpatory statement. Johnson v. State, 338 Ga. App. 500, 790 S.E.2d 291, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 478 (2016). Principal or party to cocaine trafficking. — Evidence that the defendant’s companion showed a bag of cocaine to an undercover officer while the defendant stood nearby in a manner the officer described as a “show of force,” and 448 that the companion’s car contained another 16 ounces of cocaine, was sufficient for a jury to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of trafficking in cocaine as either a principal in the transaction or as a party to the crime. Martinez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 113 (2003). Juvenile delinquent for trafficking in cocaine. — Juvenile’s possession of 38.7 grams of cocaine was sufficient to sustain delinquency adjudication for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). In the Interest of R.S., 253 Ga. App. 409, 559 S.E.2d 143, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 86 (2002). Spatial proximity insufficient to convict juvenile defendant. — State failed to prove the state’s case that the defendant, a minor, was delinquent under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and 15-11-471) for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31, as the state did not prove the necessary connection between the defendant and the drugs, other than spatial proximity, which was insufficient; the fact that the defendant was in a house in the middle of the night with non-family members, that a large amount of cocaine and cash were found in the house, although not visible, and that the defendant was sitting on a couch where a bag containing crack cocaine was found did not establish the necessary connection and did not exclude all other possibilities except the guilt of the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). In re E.A.D., 271 Ga. App. 531, 610 S.E.2d 153, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 93 (2005). Constructive possession of cocaine shown. — Defendants’ convictions for trafficking in cocaine were vacated, and their cases remanded with direction that a conviction and sentence be entered for both defendants for possession of cocaine, since there was not sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants possessed at least 28 grams of pure cocaine, but the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable 16-13-31 doubt, that the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine seized from the adjacent building. Byers v. State, 204 Ga. App. 552, 420 S.E.2d 23, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 911 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 928, 113 S. Ct. 1305, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1388 (1993). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) because the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine and was a party to the crime pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) and (b)(3), and the trial evidence authorized the jury to find that the only reasonable hypothesis pointed to the defendant’s guilt of the drug offense; the evidence showed that the defendant participated and intentionally aided in the commission of the drug trafficking offense by driving the codefendants and the cocaine to the pre-arranged location for the transaction, warning the codefendants that the principal agent was a police officer and taking possession of the funds used for the transaction. Valdez v. State, 310 Ga. App. 274, 712 S.E.2d 656, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 542 (2011). Because the state introduced sufficient corroborating evidence of an accomplice’s testimony that the drugs found in the basement of the house belonged to the defendant because the record showed the presence of all factors required to authorize admission of the similar transaction evidence, and because there was sufficient evidence of probable cause for a search warrant even without the representation that the affiant saw the informant buy drugs from the defendant, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in cocaine. Dickerson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 320, 718 S.E.2d 564, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 947 (2011). Defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in 400 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C), because the evidence tended to show a connection between the defendant and the contraband sufficient to prove the defendant knowingly shared with the defendant’s brother the power 449 Cocaine (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) and intention to exercise dominion or control over the mixture; there was evidence that the cocaine mixture was in plain view and visible from the common sitting area of the apartment and that the defendant was in the apartment alone for an extended period of time, and there was evidence of two similar transactions, which tended to show a course of conduct and intent to possess and distribute cocaine, possess large amounts of currency, and in one of the similar transactions, use a black bag to transport drug-related items. Holiman v. State, 313 Ga. App. 76, 720 S.E.2d 363, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1078 (2011), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine because the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant possessed the cocaine the defendant retrieved from the trunk of a car; the defendant retrieved the drugs from the trunk of the car and had the drugs in hand when the police arrested the defendant. Raines v. State, 313 Ga. App. 879, 722 S.E.2d 779, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 103 (2012). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), was supported by sufficient evidence under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(b)(3) and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) because both the defendant and the codefendant made statements regarding the defendant’s involvement in the criminal activity, and the police observed the defendant’s actions; there was evidence that the defendant was an active participant and a party to the trafficking offense. Martinez v. State, 314 Ga. App. 551, 724 S.E.2d 851, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 232 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of drug trafficking because an intercepted phone call indicated that the second defendant had successfully delivered nine kilograms of cocaine. 16-13-31 Estrada-Nava v. State, 332 Ga. App. 133, 771 S.E.2d 28, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 160, overruled in part, Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 779 S.E.2d 294, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 793 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to convict the third defendant of drug trafficking because the third defendant arranged a drug sale involving 10 kilograms of cocaine; monitored and directed the transfer of vehicles; and monitored the testing of the cocaine once received. Estrada-Nava v. State, 332 Ga. App. 133, 771 S.E.2d 28, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 160, overruled in part, Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 779 S.E.2d 294, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 793 (2015). Insufficient evidence of quantity of cocaine. — State failed to present sufficient facts from which a jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant knowingly possessed 28 grams or more of cocaine with a purity of 10 percent or more as there was only one bag containing 35 grams of cocaine in evidence, the purity was never tested, and the state could not point to a scale or other evidence that the defendant weighed or measured the cocaine to know that the cocaine was more than 28 grams. Childs v. State, 330 Ga. App. 727, 769 S.E.2d 147, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 49 (2015). Knowledge of weight or purity not required for conviction. — Evidence sustained the finding of guilt on the charge of trafficking in cocaine because knowledge of the weight or precise purity of the cocaine was not necessary for a conviction. Barr v. State, 302 Ga. App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 46 (2010). Weight of cocaine. — When the defendant was indicted for being “knowingly in actual possession of more than 400 grams of cocaine, a schedule two controlled substance, and a mixture with a purity of more than 10 percent of cocaine,” but the evidence showed the total mass of the substance to be 450 grams, of which 71 percent or 319 grams was pure cocaine, it was held that since the amount shown would still show a violation of law, even if it did not meet the increment charged, there would not be a material variance between the allegata 450 and probata. Partridge v. State, 187 Ga. App. 325, 370 S.E.2d 173, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 687 (1988). Sufficient evidence showed the defendant had knowledge of the weight of the cocaine found in the search as the evidence showed that the crack cocaine which the defendant was convicted of possessing had a purity of 82 percent and weighed 50.62 grams and was packaged in a plastic bag, hidden in a vent in a bedroom that the defendant was occupying, plus, the jury heard of five similar transactions, including the defendant’s three convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Freeman v. State, 329 Ga. App. 429, 765 S.E.2d 631, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 706 (2014). Separate lots of drugs impacting quantity. — Defendant possessed requisite 28 grams of cocaine, even though it was found in two individual lots totaling 47.5 grams in the defendant’s house and truck and neither lot amounted to 28 grams. Hite v. State, 206 Ga. App. 245, 424 S.E.2d 885, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1595 (1992); Snoke v. State, 237 Ga. App. 686, 516 S.E.2d 541, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 535 (1999). Evidence established chain of custody of cocaine. — In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the state established a chain of custody for the drugs with: 1) testimony of the officer who found the drugs; 2) testimony of the officer who placed the drugs in an evidence bag, which the officer then sealed, labeled, and transported to the crime lab; 3) that officer’s identification of the state’s exhibit as that bag; and 4) testimony of a Georgia Crime Lab chemist, who identified the exhibit as the bag containing the substance the chemist tested. Testimony of another chemist who had inspected the drugs was not required since, absent evidence of tampering, the crime lab could be treated as a single link in the chain of custody for admissibility purposes. Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2009). 4. Jury Instruction Belief by jury of informant over defendant. — Evidence in cocaine trafficking case did not require a directed 16-13-31 verdict on the basis of entrapment; although the defendant claimed a confidential informant repeatedly contacted the defendant about arranging a sale, the informant testified that the defendant contacted the informant and offered to set up the sale, and the jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s version and accept the informant’s version. Mulvey v. State, 250 Ga. App. 345, 551 S.E.2d 412, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 745 (2001). Charge as to possession properly refused. — When under the evidence presented, only two verdicts were possible—guilty of trafficking in cocaine or acquittal, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury concerning possession of cocaine. Hernandez v. State, 182 Ga. App. 797, 357 S.E.2d 131, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821 (1987). Charge on lesser included offense of possession authorized. — When the indictment charged defendant with trafficking in cocaine by possessing more than 28 ounces, the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant’s requested charge on the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine. Howard v. State, 220 Ga. App. 579, 469 S.E.2d 746; Lumpkin v. State, 245 Ga. App. 627, 538 S.E.2d 514, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1026 (2000). Instruction on lesser included offense of possession. — When a jury issue exists as to whether the defendant was exercising actual or constructive possession of cocaine, the lesser offense of possession of cocaine was reasonably raised by the evidence, and the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct pursuant to the defendant’s written request. Alvarado v. State, 194 Ga. App. 781, 391 S.E.2d 668, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 316, aff’d, 260 Ga. 563, 397 S.E.2d 550, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1990). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as there was no dispute that the cocaine exceeded the amount necessary to sustain a trafficking conviction, therefore, there was no 451 Cocaine (Cont’d) 4. Jury Instruction (Cont’d) evidence of the lesser included offense. However, even if the trial court’s failure to give the requested instruction was error, it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict in light of the overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed the greater offense. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 164 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. June 1, 2009). Charge on entire definition of trafficking not error. — Trial court did not commit plain error by charging the jury on the entire definition of trafficking as no evidence was introduced at trial suggesting that the defendant brought the cocaine at issue into the state, sold the cocaine, or that the defendant delivered the cocaine to anyone; rather, the evidence showed only that the defendant was in knowing possession of the cocaine for a brief period of time; thus, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury convicted the defendant of trafficking in a manner not charged in the indictment. Hernandez-Garcia v. State, 322 Ga. App. 455, 745 S.E.2d 706, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 542 (2013). Instruction on purity not required. — Trial court’s jury charge in the attempted trafficking in cocaine case under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and 16-13-31 was not improper despite the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on purity, as purity was not an essential element of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1169 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0282, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 75 (Ga. Jan. 22, 2007). Knowingly in jury instruction. — Trial court did not plainly err by not instructing the jury that the state had to prove that the defendant knew that the substance defendant possessed contained methamphetamine because O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 was amended to delete the “knowingly” requirement. Duffie v. State, 359 Ga. App. 662, 859 S.E.2d 810, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 258 (2021). Jury question on knowledge answered incorrectly. — Although the 16-13-31 evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), the trial court’s erroneous response to a jury question regarding the knowledge requirement may have resulted in an improper verdict; such error might have led the jury to incorrectly substitute criminal negligence for the knowledge requirement when the jury rendered the jury’s verdict. McGee v. State, 316 Ga. App. 661, 730 S.E.2d 131, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (2012). Jury instruction on weight of cocaine in trafficking case. — Trial court’s instruction requiring the jury to find that a defendant who was charged with trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was required to have knowingly possessed 28 grams of cocaine or more sufficiently charged that the jury had to find that the defendant was aware of the weight of the cocaine the defendant possessed. Further, any error in the charge was harmless because the defendant was shown to have possessed 106 grams of cocaine and to have been familiar with the weight of cocaine from the defendant’s past dealings with cocaine. Harrison v. State, 309 Ga. App. 454, 711 S.E.2d 35, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 363 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1379, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 692 (Ga. Sept. 12, 2011). Failure to give circumstantial evidence charge was error. — Trial court’s failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) constituted reversible error even though the defendant failed to request such a charge because the evidence against a defendant in a cocaine trafficking case under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was entirely circumstantial based on the defendant’s participation in the crime with defendant’s brother and a third party. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 71, 692 S.E.2d 737, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 278 (2010). Jury charge on trafficking sufficient. — When in the court’s charge to the jury, the court read the indictment, pointing out that in Count 1 the defendants were charged with trafficking by knowing possession of the cocaine, and 452 further instructed that the jury should reach a decision on the trafficking offense based on the charges as made in Count 1 of the indictment, the instructions were sufficient to prevent any likelihood that the jury would mistakenly convict defendants on evidence supporting a form of trafficking in cocaine not charged in the indictment. Ancrum v. State, 197 Ga. App. 819, 399 S.E.2d 574, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1485 (1990). Despite the defendant’s allegation that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant was convicted of committing the offense of trafficking in cocaine in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, when the trial court immediately charged the jury that to establish the defendant’s guilt for trafficking, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly had in the defendant’s possession more than 28 grams of cocaine on the date alleged, the court properly limited the jury’s consideration to the offense as charged; thus, reversal on this ground was unwarranted. Brockington v. State, 265 Ga. App. 13, 592 S.E.2d 858, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1613 (2003). Failure to instruct on actual and constructive possession. — When the prosecution and defense of a case turned on proof, or the lack of proof, that each of three defendants had actual or constructive possession of the cocaine and other dangerous drugs found under the seat of the rented car in which the defendants were passengers, without any instruction on the law of possession, the jury was left without appropriate guidelines for reaching a verdict. The failure to so charge was substantial error and required reversal of the defendants’ convictions. Ancrum v. State, 197 Ga. App. 819, 399 S.E.2d 574, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1485 (1990). Instruction on constructive possession not harmful error. — Trial court’s jury instruction on constructive possession was not harmful error, even though the indictment charged the defendant only with actual possession, since the evidence indisputably showed that immediately before the defendant’s arrest the defendant had actual 16-13-31 possession of the crack cocaine at issue. Cheeks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 446, 507 S.E.2d 204, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1277 (1998). Jury instruction on defendant closing eyes to what would have otherwise been obvious. — Trial court’s error in instructing the jury that the element of intent could be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that the defendant deliberately closed the defendant’s eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to the defendant was harmless given the entire jury charge and the record as a whole, including the jury’s ability to assess the credibility of the defendant and the arresting officer, both of whom testified at trial. Matos-Bautista v. State, 353 Ga. App. 773, 839 S.E.2d 260, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 84 (2020), cert. denied, No. S20C0982, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 693 (Ga. Aug. 24, 2020). 5. Sentencing O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)-(3) establishes the specific mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking in cocaine and subsection (f) (now (g)) provides a general maximum sentence. Recoba v. State, 179 Ga. App. 31, 345 S.E.2d 81, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2583 (1986). Fine does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. — When the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and fined $100,000, the fine was not out of proportion to the severity of the crime and not constitutionally infirm either because of the fine’s mandatory nature or the fine’s amount. Wyatt v. State, 259 Ga. 208, 378 S.E.2d 690, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 195 (1989). Error in applying U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. — Unpublished decision: District court erred by applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b) enhancement because O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), the portion of the Georgia statute under which the defendant was convicted, prohibited the possession of cocaine, not possession with the intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense; because the 453 Cocaine (Cont’d) 5. Sentencing (Cont’d) district court considered the defendant’s underlying conduct to arrive at the conclusion the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute the cocaine, the district court erred (correctly applying the modified categorical approach led to the conclusion that the defendant’s Georgia conviction was for simple possession and, thus, the conviction was not a drug trafficking offense). United States v. Veleta-Dominguez, 506 Fed. Appx. 834, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 229 (10th Cir. 2013). Presentence hearing was not required when the court imposed the statutory minimum sentence for cocaine trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C). Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 464 S.E.2d 851, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1007 (1995), cert. dismissed, No. S96C0574, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 398 (Ga. Mar. 8, 1996). Sentence not void due to weight of drugs. — Since it was not required that the defendant be in possession of a specific amount of methamphetamine, the defendant’s sentence was not void because the crime lab report said the sample weight was less than one gram. Oneill v. State, 352 Ga. App. 103, 834 S.E.2d 111, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (2019). Defendants assistance was not substantial. — O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(2) did not require the trial court to impose a reduced or suspended sentence if the defendant rendered substantial assistance that led to the arrest or conviction of accomplices, accessories, coconspirators, or principals, but merely authorized the court to do so. Therefore, the defendant was properly given the mandatory minimum sentence for cocaine trafficking as the trial court found that the assistance the defendant rendered was not “substantial” since the assistance did not lead to the arrest of an associate, a codefendant, or a supplier. Eidman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 304, 671 S.E.2d 292, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1058 (2008). Sentence for possession of 200 or more grams of cocaine. — Defendant 16-13-31 was properly sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(B) for possession of 200 or more grams of cocaine because although the indictment only charged that the defendant did knowingly possess more than 28 grams, the jury returned a verdict, based on the testimony of a forensic expert, that the cocaine in the defendant’s possession weighed 245.64 grams. Singleton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 452, 677 S.E.2d 348, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 377 (2009). Refusal to follow mandatory sentencing. — Second remand was required when, upon the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine and after a prior remand, the trial court imposed the entire ten-year mandatory minimum prison sentence but refused to impose the fine of $200,000 as such was mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(A). State v. Andrews, 278 Ga. App. 899, 630 S.E.2d 139, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 428 (2006). Sentence upon conviction of trafficking in cocaine within the limits set by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1)(C) and subsection (g) was not so disproportionate as to shock the conscience. Small v. State, 243 Ga. App. 678, 534 S.E.2d 139, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 522 (2000). After the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy of trafficking in cocaine in 2011 and sentenced to two concurrent terms of life in prison, the defendant’s life sentence was proper because the defendant’s 2010 trafficking conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 qualified as an actual conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) to trigger the recidivist provisions of § 16-13-30(d) and enhance the defendant’s sentence for the 2011 trafficking conviction; and the legislature did not intend that violators of the more serious offense of trafficking be exempt from the severe punishment of § 16-13-30(d). Duron v. State, 340 Ga. App. 74, 796 S.E.2d 310, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 11 (2017), cert. denied, No. S17C0983, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 599 (Ga. June 30, 2017). Trafficking as a second violation of § 16-13-30. — Conviction for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 454 constituted a second violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) for purposes of the sentencing provisions of § 16-13-30(d) since the first conviction was for a more serious version of the offenses outlined in § 16-13-30(b). Gilber v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 430 S.E.2d 391, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 455 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1141, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 940 (Ga. Oct. 5, 1993). Life sentence appropriate. — Defendant’s conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with prior convictions for sale of cocaine to trigger the mandatory life sentence provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d). Covington v. State, 231 Ga. App. 851, 501 S.E.2d 37, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (1998). Life sentence was properly imposed on the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 after the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine. Howard v. State, 234 Ga. App. 260, 506 S.E.2d 648, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1200 (1998). Prior conviction triggers mandatory life sentence. — Defendant’s conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with the defendant’s previous conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) to trigger the mandatory life sentence provisions of § 16-13-30(d) and the state gave proper notice that the prior conviction would be used in aggravation at sentencing pursuant to § 16-13-30(d). Brundage v. State, 231 Ga. App. 478, 499 S.E.2d 408, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 470 (1998). Sentence properly enhanced for cocaine trafficking. — Unpublished decision: Defendant’s offense level was properly enhanced based on a prior conviction for cocaine trafficking in Georgia as: (1) United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003), which held that the Georgia crime of drug trafficking was a qualifying predicate offense for sentence enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2, controlled; (2) Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 16-13-31 (2013), did not abrogate or supplant Madera-Madera because it merely determined that a Georgia possession of marijuana offense could not be an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (3) Madera-Madera properly used a categorical approach by performing an analysis of the elements of the Georgia drug trafficking statute. United States v. Pineda-Goigochea, 640 Fed. Appx. 851, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 496 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 988, 136 S. Ct. 2042, 195 L. Ed. 2d 240, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3064 (2016). 20-year sentence for cocaine possession. — Trial court properly denied defendant’s “new sentence” motion since it was a rehash of a prior motion to modify the sentence; the defendant’s 20-year sentence for cocaine possession was within the statutory range and was, therefore, not void as a matter of law. Baez v. State, 257 Ga. App. 129, 570 S.E.2d 352, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1037 (2002), cert. denied, No. S03C0008, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 988 (Ga. Oct. 28, 2002). 30-year sentence for trafficking cocaine. — Defendant’s sentence of 30 years without parole for trafficking in cocaine was a sentence allowed under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) and, hence, not illegal or void. Defendant could not have been sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), or defendant’s sentence would have been 40 years. Because the sentence was not void, the sentence was not subject to modification under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(f). State v. Blue, 304 Ga. App. 471, 696 S.E.2d 692, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 561 (2010). Sentence was not enhanced, nor was defendant sentenced as a recidivist. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not improperly consider similar transaction evidence of being arrested for trafficking in cocaine in 2004, as well as convictions that were reversed on appeal, in aggravation of the defendant’s sentence because, although the state filed a notice of intent to seek recidivist punishment, the state did not offer certified copies of any convictions in evidence at sentencing and the defendant 455 Cocaine (Cont’d) 5. Sentencing (Cont’d) was not sentenced as a recidivist. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga. App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 164 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1200, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 340 (Ga. June 1, 2009). Marijuana 1. In General Assessment of marijuana bales from samples rather than from every part. — See Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 413 (1988). 2. Procedure State not required to prove THC content of marijuana. — Despite the defendant’s contrary claim, the state was not required to prove the tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content of the plant material seized in a prosecution for trafficking in marijuana; further, THC was treated separately in the criminal code as a Schedule I drug under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-25(3)(P). Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 790 (2007). 3. Evidence Evidence held sufficient to show defendant possessed marijuana fields from which bulk of marijuana was confiscated. Meeks v. State, 178 Ga. App. 9, 341 S.E.2d 880, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2493 (1986). 112 pounds of marijuana found in rental car trunk. — When the two defendants were occupants of a car rented by another in Florida which was stopped for speeding, and each admitted driving the vehicle at alternate times, the evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that both defendants had possession of the 112 pounds of marijuana found in the car trunk. Coop v. State, 186 Ga. App. 578, 367 S.E.2d 836, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 413 (1988). Precise knowledge of weight of marijuana not required. — Evidence that the defendant took delivery of a large 16-13-31 package of marijuana from an investigator dressed as a postal worker, that the defendant said the defendant was expecting the package and signed for the package using a false name and then took possession of the package was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c). Defendant’s knowledge of the precise weight of the drugs in the defendant’s possession was not required to sustain the defendant’s drug trafficking conviction, and the trial court did not err in so instructing the jury. Wilson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 166, 718 S.E.2d 31, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 856 (2011), aff’d, 291 Ga. 458, 729 S.E.2d 364, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 646 (2012). Evidence of weight. — Testimony of expert as to the weight of the marijuana produced by a given quantity of marijuana plants which were seized, together with photographs of the plants, is sufficient to establish the weight of the plants which had been destroyed upon confiscation. Evans v. State, 176 Ga. App. 818, 338 S.E.2d 48, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2907 (1985). Evidence showing that the total weight of confiscated marijuana plants, including stalks, stems, and leaves, was 10,340 pounds was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the marijuana leaves alone weighed more than 100 pounds. Westberry v. State, 178 Ga. App. 243, 342 S.E.2d 737, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2523 (1986). Reasonable doubt existed as to whether more than 100 pounds of marijuana was confiscated. Payton v. State, 177 Ga. App. 104, 338 S.E.2d 462, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2925 (1985). No remotely reasonable doubt that at least 100 pounds of chargeable marijuana was trafficked in. Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576, 302 S.E.2d 683, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1955, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3092, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 2128 (1983). Destruction of bulk of evidence harmless beyond reasonable doubt. — When the evidence is overwhelming that the defendant possessed more than 100 pounds of marijuana, the destruction 456 of all but 100 grams without notice to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, even if it was erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and if only by accident, did not prevent the state from proving possession of 100 pounds. Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576, 302 S.E.2d 683, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1955, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3092, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 2128 (1983). Joinder of offenses. — Charges of conspiracy to import marijuana and trafficking in marijuana could be joined for trial, over objection, where the charges arose from the same conduct. Bridges v. State, 195 Ga. App. 851, 395 S.E.2d 30, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 744 (1990). Offenses of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana and trafficking itself did not merge when conspirators first possessed the marijuana, since the “trafficking” charge involved sale of the marijuana, an act not yet completed. Meyers v. State, 174 Ga. App. 161, 329 S.E.2d 293, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1773 (1985). Incomplete sell of marijuana impacts offense charged. — Offense of selling marijuana was not complete upon defendants’ leading undercover agents to the site of the marijuana since an agreed-upon weighing, loading, and delivering had not yet occurred; thus, the substantive trafficking offense did not merge with or extinguish the conspiracy-to-traffic offense. Meyers v. State, 174 Ga. App. 161, 329 S.E.2d 293, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1773 (1985). Evidence insufficient to show possession by vehicle passenger. — In a trial for possession of marijuana, when a codefendant, appearing as a defense witness, claimed ownership of the contraband and testified that the defendant and another had not known of the presence of contraband in the automobile, it was established without dispute that the defendant had neither a possessory nor a proprietary interest in the vehicle but was simply occupying the vehicle as a passenger. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict. Llaguno v. State, 197 16-13-31 Ga. App. 789, 399 S.E.2d 564, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1498 (1990). Suppression motion denied after seizure of marijuana following traffic stop. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the marijuana seized as the search of the defendant’s truck was conducted after a valid traffic stop after the defendant gave the officer consent to conduct the search, and nothing supported the defendant’s claim that this consent was coerced because the consent was obtained during a custodial interrogation and without the benefit of Miranda warnings as the officer’s questioning did not unduly prolong the traffic stop and did not result in an unauthorized seizure or an equivalent custodial detention for which Miranda warnings were required. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 790 (2007). Marijuana found in trailer. — There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking marijuana as the jury was authorized to conclude that it was not reasonable, as the defendant suggested, that someone other than the defendant placed over 21 pounds of marijuana in open view in the back of a trailer of which the defendant had the only key, without the defendant’s knowledge. Mora v. State, 292 Ga. App. 860, 666 S.E.2d 412, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 829 (2008). Evidence sufficient when defendant signed for boxes of drugs. — When the defendant: (1) signed for two boxes containing approximately 82 pounds of marijuana using two different aliases; (2) claimed ignorance as to the contents of the boxes but admitted to police that the plan was to deliver the boxes to another person in a public restroom and then to accept payment of $200 per box at yet another location; and (3) gave conflicting stories before and during trial as to defendant’s belief regarding the contents of the boxes, such evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of trafficking in more than 50 pounds of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c), especially since 457 Marijuana (Cont’d) 3. Evidence (Cont’d) the “deliberate ignorance” doctrine applied. Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga. App. 633, 572 S.E.2d 657, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1241 (2002), cert. denied, No. S03C0224, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 36 (Ga. Jan. 13, 2003). Defendant was properly convicted for trafficking in marijuana as the defendant owned a farm used by the defendant’s son to grow marijuana, the defendant helped to construct a building used to grow marijuana, and the defendant helped acquire necessary support devices to put the building into operation; this evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant’s son had actual possession of the marijuana and that the defendant had constructive possession by aiding and abetting the son’s possession. Lang v. State, 171 Ga. App. 368, 320 S.E.2d 185, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2205 (1984). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana after: (1) an informant testified at trial that the informant purchased marijuana from the defendant, which was corroborated by the recovery of a large quantity of marijuana from the informant’s vehicle; (2) an expert confirmed that the substance recovered from the informant’s vehicle weighed well in excess of the 50-pound threshold for trafficking established by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c); and (3) in a taped statement, the defendant admitted buying 125 pounds of marijuana and selling 100 pounds. Whitehead v. State, 258 Ga. App. 271, 574 S.E.2d 351, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1420 (2002). Because the state presented sufficient evidence that identified the contraband seized as marijuana, and it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that the two lightweight nylon duffel bags seized, along with some plastic wrap, weighed less than 40 pounds, a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of marijuana seized from the defendant was at least the equivalent of the amount charged in the indictment; thus, the defendant’s trafficking conviction was up- 16-13-31 held on appeal. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 790 (2007). Evidence supported conviction of trafficking in marijuana since, when a package that a parcel service and police had found to contain marijuana was delivered to the place where defendant rented a mailbox, the defendant took possession of the package and said that the package contained Christmas presents, then took the package to the defendant’s truck and was arrested; it was only just before the package was opened at a police station that the defendant said the package was not the property of the defendant. Hitchcock v. State, 291 Ga. App. 455, 662 S.E.2d 155, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 452 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1569, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 665 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2008). Evidence that a defendant participated in a plan for the delivery of a package containing 12 pounds of marijuana to a residence, along with digital scales, a marijuana grinder, and plastic baggies at the residence, and the defendant’s admission that the marijuana was the defendant’s, was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of marijuana, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Salinas v. State, 313 Ga. App. 720, 722 S.E.2d 432, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 58 (2012). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c)(1) was affirmed because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony regarding the defendant’s involvement. Evidence corroborated the accomplice’s testimony that the accomplice and the defendant planned to switch vehicles after taking delivery of the crate. Watt v. State, 317 Ga. App. 551, 732 S.E.2d 96, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 756 (2012). Evidence constituted substantial step towards drug trafficking. — Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant with regard to convicting the defendant of marijuana trafficking because the evidence authorized the jury to find that by entering a vehicle used in a police sting 458 operation, the defendant took a substantial step towards marijuana trafficking in that the defendant made a substantial step towards possessing the marijuana. Drammeh v. State, 285 Ga. App. 545, 646 S.E.2d 742, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 574 (2007). Evidence sufficient to support conviction for trafficking in marijuana. — Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c), was sufficiently supported by the evidence because, although only one ounce of two plastic bags in the defendant’s vehicle was tested, the state’s expert testified that the remainder of the bags’ contents were similar to the test sample; the opinion of the state’s expert that the remainder of the bags contained marijuana was sufficient to uphold the defendant’s conviction. Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 236, 656 S.E.2d 574, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 51 (2008). Evidence that the defendant followed a person to a house, retrieved something from the house, placed it in the trunk of a friend’s vehicle, and that the marijuana found in the trunk weighed approximately 21 pounds was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for marijuana trafficking. Summerville v. State, 332 Ga. App. 617, 774 S.E.2d 190, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 369 (2015). Evidence sufficient for conviction of attempted trafficking in marijuana. — Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of attempted trafficking in marijuana. A codefendant’s testimony at the codefendant’s trial and the codefendant’s statement to the police were admissible as prior inconsistent statements and constituted substantive evidence of the defendant’s participation in the attempted drug trafficking; furthermore, the codefendant’s statements were sufficiently corroborated underformer O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) by the testimony of a case agent that a loaded pistol was found at the defendant’s feet and that a bag containing the currency used in the drug transaction was found within arm’s reach of the defendant. Green v. State, 298 Ga. 16-13-31 App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 566 (2009). Providing safe haven as part of trafficking offense. — Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana was authorized because the defendant, a roommate, and an accomplice were willing participants in the drug offenses, and the defendant agreed to accept delivery of the package of marijuana at the defendant’s residence in exchange for $200 and an ounce of marijuana for the defendant’s personal consumption; whether the defendant had physical possession of the drugs, the defendant aided and abetted the marijuana’s actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) and under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as a party to the crime because the defendant admitted that the defendant was aiding the accomplice’s efforts to commit the trafficking offense by giving the accomplice a safe haven and a means to avoid law enforcement detection. Park v. State, 308 Ga. App. 648, 708 S.E.2d 614, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 265 (2011). 4. Jury Instruction Jury instruction on knowledge of weight. — Even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury that knowledge of the weight of the marijuana possessed by the defendant was not required for a conviction of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c), because the issue was subject to reasonable dispute, the instruction did not amount to plain error under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b). Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. 458, 729 S.E.2d 364, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 646 (2012). Because the trial court instructed that the trafficking in marijuana count alleged that the defendant did knowingly possess more than 10 pounds of marijuana and because the trial court did not charge the jury that the state was not required to prove knowledge of the weight of the marijuana, the charge accurately and fully apprised the jury of the applicable law, and the failure of the trial court to give the requested instruction that the defendant knew that the weight of the marijuana 459 16-13-31 Marijuana (Cont’d) 4. Jury Instruction (Cont’d) 5. Sentencing was greater than 10 pounds was not error. Prado v. State, 327 Ga. App. 402, 759 S.E.2d 287, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 349 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C1483, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 993 (Ga. Dec. 11, 2014). Charge on lesser included offense of possession of marijuana properly refused. — See Christian v. State, 181 Ga. App. 569, 353 S.E.2d 65, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1506 (1987). Jury instruction on trafficking and conspiracy to traffic. — Since the defendant was convicted of trafficking in marijuana, a conviction for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana cannot also stand and the jury should be instructed that a verdict of one or the other is authorized but not both. Hardin v. State, 172 Ga. App. 232, 322 S.E.2d 540, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2468 (1984). Jury instruction on deliberate ignorance. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial since no error occurred with the trial court giving the state’s requested instruction on deliberate ignorance as the defendant’s actions in being paid to pick up a package from a shipping company, the defendant and the codefendant approaching the driver twice, giving a false name, and trying to allude the police, all supported the inference of deliberate ignorance. Aguilera v. State, 293 Ga. App. 523, 667 S.E.2d 378, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 993 (2008). Evidence sufficient to support jury instruction on conspiracy. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial since no error occurred by the trial court giving the jury an instruction on conspiracy as evidence that the defendant and the codefendant were paid, jointly picked up a package containing drugs from a shipping company, and both refused to tell who hired the pair was sufficient to support that a conspiracy existed. Aguilera v. State, 293 Ga. App. 523, 667 S.E.2d 378, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 993 (2008). Merger of manufacturing and trafficking marijuana offenses. — Defendant’s conviction for manufacturing marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) should have been merged into the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) because the same evidence was used to prove both crimes, and the manufacturing count did not require proof of any fact which the trafficking count did not require. Preval v. State, 302 Ga. App. 785, 692 S.E.2d 51, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 226 (2010). Methamphetamine or Amphetamine 1. In General Methamphetamine defendants treated differently not violation of substantive due process or equal protection. — Even assuming that defendants convicted of methamphetamine trafficking who provided substantial assistance were similarly situated and treated differently than those who could not provide assistance, because there was a rational basis for doing so as the legislature intended to reward individuals with a reduced sentence in exchange for information that was useful in assisting law enforcement officials with identifying, arresting, or convicting other individuals involved with illegal drugs and shutting down drug networks, the provisions for sentencing those defendants who provided assistance differently than those like the defendant who could not did not violate the defendant’s substantive due process or equal protection rights. State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 761 S.E.2d 1, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 538 (2014). Driver with keys had access to trunk with methamphetamine. — Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for new trial because the evidence at trial showed that the defendant was driving the car at the time of the stop and, thus, necessarily was in possession of the vehicle’s keys, affording the defendant access to the trunk where the methamphetamine was located. Smith v. State, 350 Ga. App. 496, 829 460 16-13-31 S.E.2d 776, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2019). 2. Procedure No fatal variance between “methamphetamine” and “mixture containing methamphetamine”. — Because “methamphetamine” and a “mixture containing methamphetamine” are synonymous for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), there was no fatal variance between the delinquency petition charging delivery of a certain amount of methamphetamine and the proof at the hearing showing delivery of that amount of a mixture containing methamphetamine. In the Interest of S. C. P., 320 Ga. App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 474, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (2013). No fatal variance in indictment for trafficking in methamphetamine. — There was no fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial when the defendant was charged with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime by trafficking in methamphetamine, while defendant was charged, in another count, with trafficking in amphetamine rather than methamphetamine; trafficking in either methamphetamine or amphetamine fell within the categories set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. Sims v.