Waldschmidt v

Crosa, 177 Ga. App. 707, 340 S.E.2d 664, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1506 (1986). Falsely accusing customers of shoplifting, even if it constituted a pattern of criminal activity, was not conduct intended to derive pecuniary gain as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4. Sevcech v. Ingles Mkts., 222 Ga. App. 221, 474 S.E.2d 4, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 630 (1996), cert. denied, No. S96C1747, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 1100 (Ga. Oct. 31, 1996). Defendant’s indictment and sentence in a prior case were admissible, where such evidence, when combined with other evidence introduced at trial, showed the requisite pattern of racketeering activity. Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 76, 381 S.E.2d 101, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 486 (1989). Use of prior guilty pleas to prove pattern of illegal activities. — Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence two indictments from the superior court in another county, in which the defendant had been similarly charged with identity fraud, financial-transaction-card fraud, and exploitation of an elder person, relating to some of the elderly victims the defendant had targeted in that county, and the defendant’s guilty pleas to those offenses given that the state was required to prove a series or pattern of illegal activities for a conviction under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. Roberts v. State, 344 Ga. App. 324, 810 S.E.2d 169, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 28 (2018). Indictment sufficiently specific. — Indictment for criminal racketeering alleged the offense with sufficient specificity when the indictment set forth specific timber transactions involving specific persons, places, acreages, deals, and owners. Grant v. State, 227 Ga. App. 88, 488 S.E.2d 79, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1152 (1997); Adams v. State, 231 Ga. App. 279, 499 S.E.2d 105, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 427 (1998). Indictment charging a conspiracy to violate Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and 16-14-4 Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., was sufficient because there was no requirement that the state prove that a defendant personally committed the underlying predicate offenses personally. Pasha v. State, 273 Ga. App. 788, 616 S.E.2d 135, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 616 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1757, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 671 (Ga. Oct. 3, 2005). Allegation of predicate offenses sufficient. — Allegations against mortgage loan servicer were sufficient to state a claim of theft by taking, deception, and conversion because despite being told that the mortgage loan was fraudulent the servicer kept the borrowers’ money and continuously threatened the borrowers with foreclosure; however, the complaint failed to state a violation of mail and wire fraud as the borrowers did not identify any specific deceptive content in the communications made by the servicer, nor how such content misled the borrowers. Kerfoot v. FNF Servicing, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-33, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153849 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 2013). Indictment not sufficiently specific. — Indictment charging the defendants with violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., did not give the defendants enough information about the RICO charge to prepare their defense intelligently because the sparse allegations in the indictment, which said nothing about the nature of the connection between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity, were insufficient to enable the defendants to prepare for trial; and the nature of that connection was not apparent from the identification of the enterprise, the general description of the racketeering activity in Count 1, or the subsequent counts charging more particularly the predicate acts of racketeering. Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 799 S.E.2d 229, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 230 (2017). Evidence sufficient for conviction. — See Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 76, 381 S.E.2d 101, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 486 (1989); Thompson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 887, 440 S.E.2d 670, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 727 Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) 118 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C0805, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 514 (Ga. Mar. 25, 1994), cert. denied, No. S94C0804, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 567 (Ga. Mar. 25, 1994). Evidence showing that cocaine chronically used by defendant was taken from shipments of cocaine imported by defendant and others into the state was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction, where such evidence established a connection between the cocaine possession offense and the alleged “enterprise.” Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 349 S.E.2d 717, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 920 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S. Ct. 1954, 95 L. Ed. 2d 527, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 1854 (1987). Trial court’s failure to suppress jewelry in prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 was harmless error, as there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant absent the jewelry; the state introduced voluminous documentary evidence, supported by testimony from coworkers and bank employees, concerning the forgery scheme. Henry v. State, 277 Ga. App. 302, 626 S.E.2d 511, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 6 (2006). Defendants’ RICO convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 were upheld on appeal, as: (1) both the defendants were placed on sufficient notice regarding the conspiracy nature of the charges; (2) jury instructions and the trial court’s recharge on the issues of conspiracy and knowledge were properly given; and (3) neither defendant preserved error as to an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by either raising a contemporaneous objection or moving for a mistrial based on the trial court’s alleged improper comments. Graham v. State, 282 Ga. App. 576, 639 S.E.2d 384, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1479 (2006). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction under the Georgia Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 et seq., as contrary to the defendant’s contention that the crimes were isolated incidents, the acts involving the abduction and murder of a store manager and 16-14-4 various thefts and interrelated crimes set forth at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise were interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and were not isolated incidents. The state established a number of interrelated incidents of racketeering activity that had the same intents and results (monetary gain) and the same accomplices (the defendant and other members of the group) and the evidence also established that those were not isolated incidents, but a continuing pattern of criminal activity. Overton v. State, 295 Ga. App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0654, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. Apr. 20, 2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant on 29 counts of theft by taking and racketeering because the defendant, while the director and a fiduciary of the animal shelter, transferred a series of donations intended for the animal shelter into the defendant’s own personal bank accounts; the defendant expressly admitted that the subject transactions involved donation money intended for and belonging to the animal shelter; two members of the Board of Directors of the animal shelter testified unequivocally that the defendant was never authorized to solicit funds and deposit the funds into the defendant’s personal bank accounts; and the racketeering charge was predicated upon four separate indicted incidents of theft by taking. Kilby v. State, 335 Ga. App. 238, 780 S.E.2d 411, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 714 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0653, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. June 20, 2016). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction under Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., as the defendant’s contention that the amount of money used for the defendant’s benefit was small did not render the evidence insufficient and, as a co-conspirator, the racketeering activity underlying the defendant’s conviction included that of the defendant’s 728 co-conspirator. Whaley v. State, 343 Ga. App. 701, 808 S.E.2d 88, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (2017). Since the defendant’s conviction for violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., was predicated on the defendant’s commission of theft by receiving and, because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for those predicate acts, the evidence was also sufficient to sustain the RICO conviction. Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 798 S.E.2d 720, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 (2017). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of identity fraud, financialtransaction-card fraud, and exploitation of an elder person and the defendant’s convictions for those predicate acts was sufficient to convict the defendant of violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., because the defendant participated in a scheme, in which the defendant and the defendant’s cohorts obtained elderly victims’ credit card, banking, and other financial and personal information by telephoning the victims and informing the victims that the victims’ power would be cut off if the victims did not immediately provide such information; and the defendant used the cards or the account numbers to make purchases and to obtain cash advances. Roberts v. State, 344 Ga. App. 324, 810 S.E.2d 169, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 28 (2018). Ample evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of two predicate acts of theft or money laundering to support RICO charges because the victim testified that the victim never authorized the defendant to take $3.5 million and the victim’s court appointed conservator also testified that the defendant engaged in egregious transactions whereby multiple checks were written to the defendant from the widow’s accounts with no clear purpose or benefit to the widow. Carr v. State, 350 Ga. App. 461, 829 S.E.2d 641, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 324 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1422, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 15 (Ga. Jan. 13, 2020). Evidence insufficient for conviction. — Single RICO count conviction 16-14-4 required reversal since though evidence was presented that the defendant, a county school superintendent, knew or should have known that the source of funds was improper or illegal, no evidence was presented that before the superintendent’s assistants confessed to theft of funds, the defendant had knowledge that the source of the funds was theft as opposed to some other source such as illegal kickbacks or contributions from third parties. Purvis v. State, 208 Ga. App. 653, 433 S.E.2d 58, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 563 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1348, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 980 (Ga. Oct. 8, 1993). Trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the executor committed a predicate act for purposes of Georgia’s RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., as a result of concluding that alleged misrepresentations by the executor — the alleged predicate offenses — were not the proximate cause of the lodge’s loss or damages since it failed to have in place any reasonable measures to check the treasurer’s work. Benevolent Lodge No. 3 v. Davis, 365 Ga. App. 564, 878 S.E.2d 760, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 478 (2022). Evidence of pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to withstand summary judgment. — In an action alleging that the defendants cut and removed timber from the plaintiffs’ property without their consent, the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants cut and removed timber from two other properties without the owners’ consent. Patterson v. Proctor, 237 Ga. App. 244, 514 S.E.2d 37, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 267 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C1083, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 707 (Ga. Sept. 10, 1999). Defendant’s knowledge of all aspects of the enterprise not required in RICO action. — In a RICO case, the state was not required to show that each defendant in the enterprise had full knowledge of all facets and elements of the enterprise and all its members or 729 Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) actors; the trial court did not err in charging the jury on deliberate ignorance, when one defendant’s suspicions of the scheme to acquire unoccupied homes by living in the homes and claiming adverse possession. Lowery v. State, 347 Ga. App. 26, 815 S.E.2d 625, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 435 (2018). Evidence insufficient to establish pattern of proscribed activity. — Evidence showing merely two joint victims of one isolated transaction was not sufficient to establish a pattern of proscribed activity. Emrich v. Winsor, 198 Ga. App. 333, 401 S.E.2d 76, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 14 (1991). Because there was no evidence that a broker obtained a manufacturer’s bond premium by deceitful means with the intention of depriving the manufacturer of those funds, or that the broker knowingly converted the funds to its own use in violation of the oral agreement, the evidence showed that once the broker received the premium, it instructed an insurance company to proceed with posting the bonds, and it was only after being contacted by the manufacturer that the broker was put on notice that there was a problem with the posting of the bonds, the manufacturer’s claims of theft were not supported by the record, and the manufacturer failed to show two predicate acts to support a pattern of racketeering activity; therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the broker on the manufacturer’s claim under Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. Aon Risk Servs. v. Commercial & Military Sys. Co., 270 Ga. App. 510, 607 S.E.2d 157, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1423 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0582, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 270 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2005). Unpublished decision: In a case in which a property owner did not focus on the substantive claim under the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) and O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 as decided by the district court, but rather challenged an earlier district court order indicating that the property owner did not 16-14-4 have standing to allege RICO violations with respect to any conduct during the original state civil action, as the property owner was not a party to that action, the district court’s entry of summary judgment against the property owner on the RICO claims was affirmed. The property owner’s argument did not go beyond mere accusations unsupported by evidence, and the property owner pointed to no evidence that an enterprise existed for the purposes of RICO. Sun v. Girardot, 237 Fed. Appx. 415, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10630 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff failed to state claim for which relief could be granted based on fraud or violations of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., because the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud were limited to broad allegations that the plaintiff was fraudulently induced into a mortgage and that papers were fabricated, without specific information about the specific substance of the fraudulent activity, and the plaintiff failed to allege with particularity the necessary pattern of illegal activity necessary for a Georgia RICO claim. Ghee v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 18-13230-E, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1509 (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2019). Connection between injury and predicate acts required in civil action. — When the evidence did not show that the defendant’s misrepresentations in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20, prohibiting the making of false statements, were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, the plaintiff lacked standing to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. Maddox v. Southern Eng’g Co., 231 Ga. App. 802, 500 S.E.2d 591, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 480 (1998). Unpublished decision: Shareholder of a corporation lacked standing to assert that allegedly fraudulent transfers of intellectual property constituted racketeering since the property belonged to the corporation and the shareholder had no actionable interest in the property distinguishable from the interest of the corporation. Harris v. Orange S.A., 636 Fed. Appx. 476, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22905 (11th Cir. 2015). 730 Trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs’ RICO claims because they failed to show the required causal connection between the predicate acts and their injuries, as defendants, churches that hired the scoutmasters who abused plaintiffs, did not join the scheme by the scoutmasters to commit sexual abuse against children. McArthur v. Beech Haven Baptist Church of Athens, 368 Ga. App. 525, 890 S.E.2d 427, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 352 (2023). Civil remedy for violation of RICO. — LLC (“debtor”) that declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy was awarded default judgment on the debtor’s claims alleging that the debtor could recover damages from another LLC because the other LLC’s members violated the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1, specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4, when those members engaged in a scheme to wrongfully acquire property that belonged to the debtor; however, the debtor was denied default judgment on the debtor’s claims that the debtor had a right to recover damages from the other LLC under Georgia RICO because its members violated those statutes when the members brought stolen property into Georgia and committed bank fraud because there was no evidence that the LLC’s members brought stolen property into Georgia or committed bank fraud. Citrus Tower Blvd. Imaging Ctr., LLC v. Trell (In re Citrus Tower Blvd. Imaging Ctr., LLC), 525 B.R. 816, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015). Creditor’s federal and state (Georgia) RICO conspiracy claims against the debtor failed as there were no allegations of the existence of an illicit agreement between the debtor and others to violate RICO. Vanbenschoten v. Turner (In re Turner), No. 15-40525-EJC, No. 16-04004-EJC, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 918 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2017). Creditor’s federal and state (Georgia) RICO claims were dismissed since the complaint did not allege that the debtor took or exercised control of an enterprise through racketeering activity and did not allege any injury from the debtor’s acqui- 16-14-4 sition or control of an interest in a RICO enterprise. Rather, the only injuries alleged were those that resulted from the predicate acts themselves. Vanbenschoten v. Turner (In re Turner), No. 15-40525-EJC, No. 16-04004-EJC, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 918 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2017). Creditor’s federal and state (Georgia) RICO conspiracy claims against the debtor failed as there were no allegations of the existence of an illicit agreement between the debtor and others to violate RICO. Harlander v. Turner (In re Turner), No. 15-40525-EJC, No. 15-04037-EJC, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 917 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2017). Survival of tort action following death. — In a case in which the intended beneficiaries of two life insurance policies alleged violations of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 et seq., the representative of the decedent’s estate may be able to recover in a representative capacity for acts directed toward, or harm incurred by, the decedent. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-41, a tort action did not abate by the death of the injured party, but survived to the personal representative of the decedent. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ward, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18420 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Scheme to defraud entrepreneurs. — On claims by plaintiff buyers of distributorships against defendants, the seller and the seller’s principal and relatives and other corporate entities, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s reliance element did not destroy predominance for Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), and, the allegations were that defendants undertook a single scheme to defraud would-be entrepreneurs. Brenner v. Future Graphics, LLC, 258 F.R.D. 561, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98493 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Theft by deception and residential mortgage fraud predicate acts. — Trial court erred in dismissing a mortgagor’s RICO claim because the complaint alleged that the mortgagor was injured by at least two predicate acts (theft by deception and residential mortgage fraud) which could constitute a 731 Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) pattern of racketeering activity and the mortgagee did not show that the mortgagor could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to grant relief on the RICO claim. Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 336 Ga. App. 316, 785 S.E.2d 8, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 173 (2016). Falsity in election. — Plaintiff seemed to be alleging that defendant news network committed fraud by not sufficiently acknowledging the other candidates running in the primary election. But the news network had no affirmative obligation to name other candidates and the plaintiff cited no law suggesting otherwise. Nor did the plaintiff show that the news network’s and another primary candidate’s “false” statements were “knowingly” made or made “with reckless indifference to their truth or falsity.” Thus, because the plaintiff could not point to any precise misrepresentations that amounted to fraudulent conduct committed by the defendants, the plaintiff failed to allege the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud with the heightened specificity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Wayne Johnson for Cong., Inc. v. Hunt, No. 23-10460, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2850 (11th Cir. Feb. 7, 2024). Chicken growers. — Unpublished decision: Chicken grower’s O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 claim failed because the grower produced no evidence specific to that claim, and the grower failed to create a genuine issue of material fact for the same reasons the grower failed to create an issue in the grower’s fraud claims (the grower could not produce evidence that the chicken processing company underpaid the grower for the grower’s flocks). Mims v. Cagle Foods JV, LLC, 148 Fed. Appx. 762, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11579 (11th Cir. 2005). Fraudulent borrowing scheme from parishioners. — Indictment, which described a scheme of fraudulent borrowing from the parishioners of one defendant, a pastor, to benefit the pastor and the other defendant, a banker, 16-14-4 sufficiently described the RICO crimes and predicate acts under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a) and (c) so as to inform the defendants of the charges against the defendants and protect the defendants against another prosecution for the same offense. State v. Pittman, 302 Ga. App. 531, 690 S.E.2d 661, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 74 (2010). 2. Companies and Employees Offenses committed by agents or employees of corporation. — In an action against the corporate operator of a treatment program for violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., since there was evidence that agents or employees of the operator committed predicate offenses alleged in the pleadings, and there were material issues of fact as to whether the operator was a party to or involved in commission of the offenses, the RICO enterprise could consist of the corporation and its agents or employees with respect to such offenses. Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hosp., 214 Ga. App. 259, 447 S.E.2d 617, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1437 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1817, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1179 (Ga. Dec. 2, 1994). Corporation could be held liable in a civil action for RICO predicate acts performed by the corporation’s employees within the scope of their employment. Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 665 (1995). Corporation’s liability for activities prior to incorporation. — Corporation could be held responsible for racketeering activity completed prior to incorporation when the activity provided benefits to the corporation. Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 665 (1995). Claims against employer in connection with hiring illegal aliens. — On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, a class action suit filed by legal employees of a Georgia rug manufacturer, alleging state RICO violations based on the widespread hiring of illegal aliens in order to depress the hourly wages of the manufacturer’s workers, survived a 732 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; the federal appellate court deferred to the Supreme Court of Georgia’s holding that O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4, when read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. §§ 1-3-3(14) and 16-1-3(12) provided that “any person” could be sued under the Georgia RICO statute, including corporations such as the rug manufacturer. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1260, 127 S. Ct. 1381, 167 L. Ed. 2d 174, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2798 (2007). Law firms. — Racketeering claim against a law firm failed when there was no evidence to support proximate causation. Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 293 Ga. App. 153, 666 S.E.2d 683, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 860 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2077, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 992 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2008). Civil complaint against company failed to state RICO violation. — Plaintiffs, residents, sued the defendants, a chemical plant and a laboratory, alleging the plaintiffs were injured due to chemical fires at the laboratory’s facility. As the complaint failed to allege a pattern of two or more of the 37 predicate acts listed in Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 et seq., the defendants were properly granted summary judgment on the RICO claim. Smith v. Chemtura Corp., 297 Ga. App. 287, 676 S.E.2d 756, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 311 (2009). Action against transferee of franchisee failed. — Trial court erred by failing to grant a succeeding franchisee’s motion for summary judgment in a fraud suit brought by car dealership consumers as the consumers failed to establish the succeeding franchisee’s participation or involvement in any of the complained of transactions; thus, no unfair business violations were established, and no direct claim against a transferee was permitted under the Bulk Transfer Act, former O.C.G.A. § 11-6-101 et seq. Additionally, the consumers’ claims under Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., likewise failed since the 16-14-4 uncontroverted evidence established without question that the succeeding franchisee did not make any misrepresentations to the consumers nor participated in any of the transactions that formed the basis of the consumers’ claims. Summit Auto. Group, LLC v. Clark Kia Motors Ame., Inc., 298 Ga. App. 875, 681 S.E.2d 681, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 821 (2009). Cause of action stated. — Corporate officer stated a cause of action for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 in an action arising from the officer’s discharge when the officer alleged (1) the obstruction of justice by the defendants, (2) a pattern consisting of the officer being placed on administrative leave, the termination of the officer’s employment, and the similar and interrelated termination of another person, and (3) that the defendants acted to deter the plaintiff and the other person from freely giving truthful testimony before a court or to injure them because they did so testify. O’Neal v. Garrison, 263 F.3d 1317, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19264 (11th Cir.), amended, 270 F.3d 1323, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22750 (11th Cir. 2001). Class action complaint by carpet manufacturing workers adequately pleaded civil federal and Georgia RICO violations based on employer’s widespread practice of hiring, harboring, encouraging, and inducing illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, causing reductions in the manufacturer’s legal workers’ hourly wages; by paying recruiters to find illegal workers and bring the illegal workers to Georgia, the employer engaged in a prohibited “enterprise” under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24306 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1260, 127 S. Ct. 1381, 167 L. Ed. 2d 174, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2798 (2007). Purchaser under an agricultural sales contract sufficiently showed that the seller violated federal and state racketeering laws since the purchaser established on deemed admitted facts that the seller obtained money from unsuspecting victims, including the purchaser, for agricultural products that were not delivered and 733 Application (Cont’d) 2. Companies and Employees (Cont’d) were never intended to be delivered. Functional Prods. Trading, S.A. v. JITC, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-0355-WSD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102775 (N.D. Ga. July 29, 2014). Purchaser under an agricultural sales contract sufficiently showed that a limited liability company (LLC) and its members conspired to violate state racketeering laws since the LLC and members were shown to have knowingly and willfully acted in concert and joined in a racketeering conspiracy to obtain money from unsuspecting victims for agricultural products that were not delivered and were never intended to be delivered. Functional Prods. Trading, S.A. v. JITC, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-0355-WSD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102775 (N.D. Ga. July 29, 2014). Nexus between predicate acts and employees’ injuries. — Trial court erred when the court denied a motion to dismiss employees’ Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., claims against the employees’ former employer and a former supervisor when the allegations of the employees’ complaint showed the employees could not satisfy the proximate cause element of a civil RICO claim and lacked standing to bring the allegations because there was no direct nexus between the predicate acts directed at third parties (which included fraud, forgery, and money laundering) and the employees’ injuries (the loss of the employees’ jobs). Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 746 S.E.2d 689, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 663 (2013). Employee falsifying overtime. — Evidence that the defendant conspired with other employees to falsify overtime records in exchange for payment by the employees, including both direct evidence of the defendant’s unlawful acts, corroborated by non-accomplice witnesses, as well as a recording of the defendant’s own incriminating statement, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 16-14-4 Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). Brown v. State, 321 Ga. App. 198, 739 S.E.2d 118, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 228 (2013). 3. Lending Institutions Loan practices. — Because loan practices of charging discount points and other interest charges during the first month of a loan were legal, the plaintiffs’ Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4, claims failed. Johnson v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1003, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2586 (S.D. Ga. 1992). Racketeering by a loan servicer and a note holder was sufficiently shown since notices were mailed to a bankruptcy debtor misrepresenting an ability to foreclose against the debtor’s property after the foreclosure occurred, and statements were mailed showing a balance due which was not reduced by the proceeds of the foreclosure. Gordon v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Merriweather), No. 13-53022-BEM, No. 15-5096-BEM, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3664 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2015). Misrepresentations by loan servicer. — Although a loan servicer filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the borrowers alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the causation requirement; as a result of relying on the servicer’s misrepresentations, the borrowers suffered the injuries complained of, which were the loss of the borrowers’ home as well as physical, emotional, and financial hardship. Quasebarth v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1373, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25684 (M.D. Ga. 2015). Usurious interest rate. — Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant regarding the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant violated the RICO Act by knowingly employing a scheme to charge usurious interest since the evidence showed that the inappropriate interest charges made by the defendant were the result of a programming error in software and that such programming error was not requested by the defendant, and the defendant had no prior knowledge of the 734 problem. Jordan v. Tri County Ag, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 661, 546 S.E.2d 528, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 243 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1065, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 664 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001). 4. Insurance Insurance policy. — Defendant insurers were entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff insured’s affirmance of a disability income policy with a merger clause precluded any reliance on the alleged pre-contractual misrepresentations and barred the claims for fraud and for violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a)-(c), and because the insured alleged no facts to show that the insurers had a duty independent of their contract duties to state a claim for tortious interference with property rights. Worsham v. Provident Cos., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26372 (N.D. Ga. 2002). Illegal sale of insurance is not in and of itself a basis for a civil RICO action, but it may serve as such if it was conducted in violation of federal mail and wire fraud statutes or if it was proven to have been a fraud amounting to theft. Olukoya v. American Ass’n of Cab Cos., 219 Ga. App. 508, 465 S.E.2d 715, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1081 (1995), cert. denied, No. S96C0658, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 613 (Ga. Apr. 12, 1996). Recovery not available. — Even if an insurance company engaged in a mail and wire fraud scheme to avoid compliance with state laws and illegally sell insurance without properly appointing agents, an insured could not recover in a 16-14-4 civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., without showing a connection between an insured’s injury and the predicate acts. Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593, 494 S.E.2d 388, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1546 (1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 270 Ga. 165, 509 S.E.2d 602, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 997 (1998). Evidence insufficient for conspiracy by insurance company. — Financial planner’s cause of action against the insurance company for conspiracy to commit violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(c), was dismissed because: (1) the planner’s allegations were insufficient to allege that the insurance company knowingly and willfully joined a conspiracy which intended to commit two predicate acts in furtherance of a common, unlawful scheme; (2) the insurance company could not have knowingly and willfully conspired to steal the planner’s chose of action because the company was not even aware of the terms of the settlement agreement; and (3) the planner failed to allege particular facts which demonstrated that the insurance company knowingly and willfully conspired with the parent company and the subsidiary to commit mail fraud in order to steal from the planner. Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co., No. 1:09-cv-03620-WSD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50392 (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2010).