Cotton, Inc

O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6 — under Crimes and Offenses.

O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6

v. Phil-Dan Trucking, Inc., 270 Ga. 95, 507 S.E.2d 730, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1042 (1998). Proof required for treble damages. — In an action based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20, prohibiting the making of false statements, even though plaintiff had to show the defendants’ criminal acts injured plaintiff to recover treble damages, plaintiff’s inability to show that plaintiff was actually misled by the false statements was not fatal. Maddox v. Southern Eng’g Co., 216 Ga. App. 6, 453 S.E.2d 70, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1415 (1994). Admission of facts by default estopped introducing evidence to rebut the admission of liability.— Admitted facts supported the defendant’s liability on plaintiff’s claims of fraud and a civil RICO violation, thus, defendant was estopped from arguing liability on those claims and was precluded from introducing evidence to rebut the admission of liability; therefore, the trial court erred by denying the plaintiff’s motion in limine on that topic. Hansford v. Veal, 369 Ga. App. 641, 894 S.E.2d 215, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 505 (2023). 740 Attorney fees. — In light of the practical difficulties required in allocating attorney fees to specific claims in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., cases, it will not be required unless the unsuccessful claims and those not receiving awards of attorney fees are distinctly different claims for relief, based on different facts and legal theories. Dee v. Sweet, 218 Ga. App. 18, 460 S.E.2d 110, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 634 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1718, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1087 (Ga. Oct. 13, 1995). Damages award of $1.00 was sufficient to justify the award of attorney fees. Dee v. Sweet, 218 Ga. App. 18, 460 S.E.2d 110, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 634 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1718, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1087 (Ga. Oct. 13, 1995). Prevailing plaintiffs in a RICO action could recover attorney fees and costs related to the investigation and litigation of actions necessary to collect on the RICO judgment they were awarded. Dee v. Sweet, 268 Ga. 346, 489 S.E.2d 823, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 509 (1997). Plain language of O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c) makes it clear that the statutory award of attorneys’ fees represents a separate and distinct interest awarded to compensate each injured plaintiff individually. Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 376 (11th Cir. 2000). Each plaintiff’s share of the attorneys’ fees recoverable under Georgia’s RICO statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., may not be aggregated to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement because under Georgia law each individual plaintiff has a separate and distinct statutory right or claim to recover those attorneys’ fees, and Georgia law provides that those fees are to compensate the injured plaintiff. Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 376 (11th Cir. 2000). Arbitration agreements’ class action waiver was valid and enforceable because the arbitration agreements expressly permitted the borrower/plaintiff and the other consumers to recover attorneys’ fees and expenses “if allowed by statute or 16-14-6 applicable law” and such relief was available under the applicable law, Georgia’s Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, specifically O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c). Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2922 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1214, 126 S. Ct. 1457, 164 L. Ed. 2d 132, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1842 (2006). Exhaustion of administrative remedies. — Allegation of Insurance Code violations does not transform a civil RICO complaint into a cause of action which must be pursued exclusively through administrative channels, particularly when numerous other predicate acts are alleged in the complaint including fraud. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co. v. James, 234 Ga. App. 403, 506 S.E.2d 892, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1258 (1998), cert. denied, No. S99C0074, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 72 (Ga. Jan. 15, 1999). Bankruptcy. — State racketeering action against the family of a debtor based on a property transfer to avoid debt collection was not property of a bankruptcy estate because a trustee stood in the shoes of the debtor, who could not have asserted the action against the family due to a role as a coconspirator. Johnson v. Flatau, 329 B.R. 910, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 543 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2005), aff’d, 339 B.R. 524, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11356 (M.D. Ga. 2006). Automatic stay did not prohibit a state racketeering action brought against the family of a debtor relating to the transfer of property to avoid debt collection because a judgment against the family would not have been in effect a judgment against the estate; the family was not entitled to indemnity from the estate. Johnson v. Flatau, 329 B.R. 910, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 543 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2005), aff’d, 339 B.R. 524, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11356 (M.D. Ga. 2006). Treble damages and attorneys fees awarded. — Internet service provider’s success on both the provider’s federal and state RICO claims each independently mandated the trebling of the provider’s damages, including the provider’s attorneys fees, under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c), respectively, 741 against an individual who had stolen Internet accounts in order to engage in unlawful spamming and spoofing activities. Earthlink, Inc. v. Carmack, No. 1:02-CV-3041-TWT, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9963 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2003). Estoppel to contest liability following criminal conviction. — Trial court erred in denying an investor’s motion for partial summary judgment as to the business person’s liability on the 16-14-7 investor’s civil Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., claim against the business person because the business person’s criminal conviction estopped the business person from contesting civil liability pursuant to RICO, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c). Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 1032 (2012).