Graves v

State, 180 Ga. App. 446, 349 S.E.2d 519 (1986). Since there was ample evidence to show that the defendant aided, abetted, encouraged, advised, and counseled another participant in a robbery and shooting, it made no difference that the other man fired the gun that injured a victim because all that the state had to prove was that the defendant and others were acting in concert. Culberson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 482, 512 S.E.2d 367 (1999). Person who intentionally aids or abets the commission of the crime, or intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, 16-2-20 or procures another to commit the crime, may be convicted of the crime as a party to the crime. Even if there was no direct evidence that the defendant actively participated in robbing the victim at gunpoint, there was ample evidence to support the defendant’s guilt as a party to the crime of armed robbery because the defendant participated in a discussion concerning retaliation against the victim, and when a witness saw the defendant pointing a gun at the victim. Drake v. State, 266 Ga. App. 463, 597 S.E.2d 543 (2004). Even had the first defendant not waived the issue of the trial court’s not severing the defendant’s trial from that of the second defendant, the first defendant’s conviction for armed robbery was proper, as the first defendant had confessed to involvement in the robbery at a minimum as the getaway driver; since the defendant was a party to the crime, defendant could not show that the defendant was prejudiced regarding the severance ruling. Bennett v. State, 266 Ga. App. 502, 597 S.E.2d 565 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to find that the defendant was at least a party to the crime of burglary and guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, as the defendant’s own statements established that the codefendant intended to commit an underlying offense of armed robbery when telling the defendant that they should go rob someone in order to get drinking money, and that the codefendant had a handgun; the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was present and assisted in the commission of the crime, such that the defendant was liable as an aider and abettor under a party to the crime theory pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008). Defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), was supported by sufficient evidence, as the defendant and two other persons, with their faces covered and while wielding a gun and a box cutter, entered a convenience store, made the two employees sit on the floor, and took their jewelry as well 177 Aiding and Abetting (Cont’d) as other property and cash; although the defendant claimed that the defendant participated under duress and was threatened at gunpoint, it was up to the jury to determine the believability of that claim, and the defendant was found to have participated in the crime as an aider and abettor under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Spradley v. State, 276 Ga. App. 842, 625 S.E.2d 106 (2005). Sufficient evidence supported convictions arising from the defendant’s participation in a robbery which resulted in the death of a store clerk where, knowing that the cousin was going to commit a robbery, the defendant voluntarily went with the cousin, saw that the cousin had a gun, agreed to ‘‘stand over’’ the scene, and joined the cousin in using the victim’s credit cards afterwards; contrary to the defendant’s assertions, testimony showed that the defendant was not intimidated by the cousin. Scott v. State, 280 Ga. 466, 629 S.E.2d 211 (2006). Testimony of a defendant’s accomplice implicating the defendant in several armed robberies was sufficiently corroborated based on the defendant’s admission, eyewitnesses confirming that two persons participated, and the defendant’s use of the victims’ bank cards after the robberies. Thus, the defendant’s participation as an accessory was sufficiently corroborated by evidence other than from the accomplice. Epps v. State, 296 Ga. App. 92, 673 S.E.2d 608 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because although the defendant did not actually use a weapon, defendant’s accomplice’s use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant because under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, one who intentionally aided or abetted the commission of a crime by another was a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal; the defendant aided and abetted the accomplice by telling the accomplice to pull into an apartment complex after they saw the potential victims, giving the accomplice the defendant’s gun, and then taking the 16-2-20 victims’ wallets from the victims while the accomplice pointed the gun at the victims. Barber v. State, 304 Ga. App. 453, 696 S.E.2d 433 (2010). Defendant’s conviction of attempt to commit armed robbery was affirmed because the defendant discussed the attempted armed robbery beforehand with the codefendants, provided part of the disguise for the defendant’s sibling, drove the codefendants to the crime scene, was present near the scene of the attempted robbery, and fled the scene after the attempted robbery. Skipper v. State, 314 Ga. App. 870, 726 S.E.2d 127 (2012). While there was no evidence that the defendant fired any of the weapons used in the shooting, there was evidence that the defendant supplied one of the weapons with the knowledge that the weapon was to be used to commit armed robbery, was present during the commission of the crimes, fled the scene, and accompanied several of the accomplices to dispose of two of the weapons used in the crimes; thus, there was ample evidence to inculpate the defendant as a party to the crimes. Oliphant v. State, 295 Ga. 597, 759 S.E.2d 821 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery despite no testimony showing that the defendant possessed the knife during the course of the robbery as case law has established that a defendant does not need to possess the weapon to be convicted as a party to the crime of armed robbery when the defendant’s accomplice carried the weapon during the robbery. Boccia v. State, 335 Ga. App. 687, 782 S.E.2d 792 (2016). Co-defendant’s testimony constituted direct evidence that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the codefendants in committing the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and intentionally advised, encouraged, and counseled them to commit the crimes, and there was sufficient corroboration of the co-defendant’s testimony, including a recorded telephone call between the defendant and a second co-defendant, the defendant’s own testimony at trial, and the defendant’s statements to law enforcement. Stallings v. State, 343 Ga. App. 135, 178 806 S.E.2d 613 (2017). Coercion defense to armed robbery rejected. — There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial since the state disproved the defendant’s coercion defense that the defendant was forced to participate in the robbery of a restaurant because the defendant’s cohorts had threatened to take the defendant’s children away as the defendant never drove away from the scene of the crime while waiting outside of the restaurant, the defendant actually entered the restaurant during the crime, and the defendant never indicated a need for protection for the children once apprehended. Engrisch v. State, 293 Ga. App. 810, 668 S.E.2d 319 (2008). By holding the victim while defendant’s brother beat the victim, the defendant was clearly an aider and abettor in the beating. As an aider and abettor, the act of one party was the act of the other person in the commission of the assault. When this fist fight turned into a knife fight, both parties became guilty of aggravated assault. Johnson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 411, 373 S.E.2d 93 (1988). Aid in assault by engaging in fistfight. — Person who engages another in a fistfight while the other is simultaneously being beaten with an object by the person’s confederate necessarily ‘‘aids and abets’’ the confederate in the assault upon the other, and is therefore a party to the crime committed by the confederate. Moore v. State, 216 Ga. App. 450, 454 S.E.2d 638 (1995). Mother’s participation in daughter’s rape. — Sufficient evidence existed to convict mother of aiding and abetting the statutory rape and child molestation of her daughter by two men when the evidence showed that mother encouraged the men to have sexual intercourse with her daughter and that mother ordered daughter to have sexual intercourse. Hixon v. State, 251 Ga. App. 27, 553 S.E.2d 333 (2001). There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that a defendant parent aided and abetted, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b), the other parent’s rape of 16-2-20 their child in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1); defendant told the child to take the child’s clothes off and was present when the other parent had sex with the child. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga. App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007). Criminal responsibility for all injuries. — When the evidence showed that the defendant participated in the group attack on the victim, the defendant was criminally responsible for the injuries inflicted by all parties to the crime, even if the defendant personally delivered only one blow. Cox v. State, 242 Ga. App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (2000). Evidence that defendant was get-away driver was sufficient for conviction. — In a case involving the malice murder of the deceased victim, the aggravated assaults of the deceased victim and four other victims, the false imprisonment and armed robbery of another victim, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party because the eyewitness stated that the driver of the car, the defendant, shouted to the first accomplice before the accomplice shot the deceased victim, then gestured to the first and second accomplice to get into the car, which the defendant then drove away; and the defendant acted as the driver of the getaway vehicle after both the shooting of the deceased victim and the robbery of another victim. Wright v. State, 296 Ga. 276, 766 S.E.2d 439 (2014). Evidence sufficient for conviction. — Because the defendant, the parent of the codefendant who had shot into a house in retaliation for an incident in which the parent was called a name by someone inside the house, had an angry attitude about the name-calling, had encouraged the codefendant and another to shoot at the house, went with the shooters to the scene of the shooting, and later bragged about the shooting, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder and aggravated assault of the shooting victims in the house. Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459, 604 S.E.2d 133 (2004). Sufficient evidence was introduced to 179 Aiding and Abetting (Cont’d) support the defendant’s convictions for felony murder and burglary despite the defendant’s claims that the defendant was not sufficiently involved in the crimes to be convicted on those charges. Joyner v. State, 280 Ga. 37, 622 S.E.2d 319 (2005). Because the defendant promised, — orally and in writing, — to use the victims’ money to acquire tire hauling containers, but instead used it for other purposes, the jury was entitled to infer criminal intent and to find the defendant guilty of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 or as a party to the crime of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Matthiessen v. State, 277 Ga. App. 54, 625 S.E.2d 422 (2005). Because the defendant acted as lookout and immediately alerted an unidentified driver to the presence of a police officer, resulting in the unidentified driver’s escaping, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aiding or abetting the unidentified driver in the crime of theft by receiving, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20, 16-8-7(a). Dixon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 656, 627 S.E.2d 406 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a trial court to find defendant delinquent for being a party to a homicide, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3), and thus, defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied; defendant’s intent could be inferred easily from the fact that the defendant stood and watched while a friend beat the victim and defecated on the victim, never leaving to call for help. In the Interest of K.B.T., 279 Ga. App. 350, 631 S.E.2d 412 (2006). Delinquency finding for acts constituting party to the crimes of aggravated assault and batter was supported by sufficient evidence showing that the appellant was one of a group of youths who punched, kicked, and struck one victim with a shotgun, and participated in the attack; the appellant also knocked another victim to the ground and hit that victim during the fracas. In the Interest of E.R., 279 Ga. App. 423, 631 S.E.2d 458 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) after the 16-2-20 defendant’s companions used metal knuckles, a metal pipe, and a gun to beat the victim; the defendant was a party to the offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as the victim, whose testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), testified that, during the incident, the defendant summoned the companions to help beat the victim, and the defendant and the companions repeatedly warned the victim not to testify in court in the defendant’s criminal case. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. 2007); overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018). Defendant’s malice murder conviction, as a party to the crime, was upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was adduced at trial of the defendant’s participation in the crime, including eyewitness testimony that the defendant encouraged the shooter to shoot the victim, that the defendant had recently threatened to shoot the victim in the head, and testimony that the defendant joined the shooter and the codefendant in the confrontation and fled with them after the shooting. Sims v. State, 281 Ga. 541, 640 S.E.2d 260 (2007). Because evidence existed that the defendant was present when the crimes charged were committed, and the jury could infer a shared criminal intent with that of the actual perpetrator from the defendant’s conduct before and after the crimes were committed, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s convictions as a party to those crimes. Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007). Given sufficient evidence of the defendant’s involvement in the common objective of fighting with a rival gang member as a party to the crimes, the defendant’s convictions on three counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal. Garcia v. State, 290 Ga. App. 164, 658 S.E.2d 904 (2008). There was sufficient evidence supporting a conviction for theft by deception under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3. The defendant drove an accomplice to a store, got a slipcover, obtained the sticker necessary to return the slipcover for a refund, and 180 transferred the slipcover to the accomplice, directing the accomplice to present it for a refund; therefore, the defendant directly committed acts in furtherance of the crime and aided in the crime’s commission under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Bruster v. State, 291 Ga. App. 490, 662 S.E.2d 265 (2008). That a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, and the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime was supported by evidence that defendant and the armed accomplice were willing companions; that they stopped to pick up the victim; that they intended to rob the victim; that defendant assisted the accomplice by driving the car while the accomplice was raping the victim; and that the defendant then swapped places with the accomplice so defendant could have sexual intercourse with the victim. Davis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (2008). Evidence of the defendant’s shooting a victim, striking the victim’s companion with a motorcycle helmet, the defendant’s sibling’s pointing a gun at the companion, and the sibling’s pointing a gun at the victim and pulling the trigger was sufficient to convict the defendant of four counts of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant was responsible for the sibling’s acts as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008). Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile’s motion for a new trial with regard to the juvenile’s delinquency adjudication finding the juvenile guilty for aggravated assault, criminal property damage, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct arising from the shooting of a BB gun at a passing car. The juvenile was the only Caucasian identified in the group of youth; the juvenile admitted to hiding the BB gun; the juvenile did not dispute that the juvenile encouraged another youth to shoot the gun; and the judge was the final arbiter of the credibility and witness issues and had the province to reject the testimony of the juvenile and a parent that the juvenile did not shoot the gun. In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga. App. 827, 668 S.E.2d 323 (2008). 16-2-20 A participant to a crime may be convicted although he is not the person who directly commits the crime. It was undisputed that the defendant’s sibling committed the acts in question, and the evidence showed that the defendant drove with the sibling to the place the sibling planned to rob, waited for the sibling at the sibling’s instructions until the sibling returned with the fruits of the crime and the weapon, and then tried to drive away. McGordon v. State, 298 Ga. App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for interference with government property because the defendant was a party to the act of damaging the locks to the water meter for the rental home in which the defendant was staying since the testimony of the rental company’s principal and the meter reader established that the locks were damaged and removed by someone living in the house for the purpose of accessing the water meter, and according to an eyewitness, the defendant was in the yard while another person who also lived in the house was ‘‘messing with the meter’’; since there was evidence that the defendant was present when the crime was committed, and the jury could infer from the defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the crime that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the actual perpetrators, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s conviction as a party to the crime. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 406, 687 S.E.2d 666 (2009). Although the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant was insufficient to convict the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), there was other evidence, including the defendant’s statements to police that the defendant urged the codefendant to kill the victim, to show that the defendant aided and abetted and counseled another to commit the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and (b)(4). Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of aiding and abetting, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, defendant’s spouse in enticing a minor child for indecent purposes in violation of O.C.G.A. 181 Aiding and Abetting (Cont’d) § 16-6-5(a) and of child molestation. Evidence was presented that the defendant had prior knowledge of the intended crimes, shared in the intent of the spouse to entice the minor victim to the defendants’ home, and was present for the crimes of child molestation. Dockery v. State, 309 Ga. App. 584, 711 S.E.2d 100 (2011). Because the victim’s testimony was legally sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to establish that the defendants assaulted the victim with intent to rob, the issue of which the defendant actually held the weapon was immaterial; therefore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), the evidence was sufficient to find both defendants guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rob and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and 16-11-106. Clark v. State, 311 Ga. App. 58, 714 S.E.2d 736 (2011). Defendant was properly convicted of financial identity fraud in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-120 because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find that the defendant, either directly or as a party to a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, committed financial identity fraud by accessing the resources of the victims through the use of identifying information without the authorization or permission of the victims, with the intent to unlawfully appropriate the victim’s resources to the defendant’s own use; the federal tax identification number of either victim was required as part of the credit card application to obtain temporary charge passes, which the defendant used to purchase thousands of dollars worth of merchandise in a short period of time. Zachery v. State, 312 Ga. App. 418, 718 S.E.2d 332 (2011). Because the driver of a delivery truck was forced at gunpoint by the defendant’s accomplice to drive a substantial distance to a secluded dirt road, and because the defendant followed the truck in another vehicle, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and 16-5-40, the crimes of kidnapping and possession of a firearm during the com- 16-2-20 mission of a felony were upheld. Sipplen v. State, 312 Ga. App. 342, 718 S.E.2d 571 (2011). Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s armed robbery conviction because the evidence showed the defendant actively aided and abetted the defendant’s codefendant by: (1) driving the codefendant to a crime scene; (2) waiting during the crimes with an intent to use the defendant’s car as a getaway car; (3) fleeing the scene with the codefendant; (4) waiting while the codefendant broke into a house; (5) fleeing the house with the codefendant; and (6) having a gunshot wound. Jones v. State, 315 Ga. App. 427, 727 S.E.2d 216 (2012). Evidence that the defendant drove the shooter to the location of the crime, that the shooter fired shots with recklessness sufficient to imply malice, and that the defendant encouraged the shooter to fire was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 783 S.E.2d 622 (2016). Jury was authorized to find that the defendant was a party to the crimes of attempted murder and first degree arson based on evidence that the defendant and an accomplice intended to rob the victim and then kill the victim to avoid detection and hitting the victim with a machete and setting fire to the victim’s residence were done in execution of that purpose. Lonon v. State, 348 Ga. App. 527, 823 S.E.2d 842 (2019). Nexus between robbery and furthering gang interest. — Two defendants were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a) in connection with the shooting death of a drug dealer in the defendants’ gang territory; the evidence established a nexus between the robbery of the drug dealer and an intent to further the interests of the gang based on expert testimony that the gang made most of the gang’s money through armed robberies. Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 816 S.E.2d 663 (2018). Participant in armed robbery as aiding and abetting assault during 182 robbery. — When appellant was a participant in armed robbery, and aggravated assault occurred during course of robbery, appellant’s actions could be construed as aiding and abetting in the crime. Jackson v. State, 163 Ga. App. 526, 295 S.E.2d 206 (1982). Trial court did not err by charging the jury on accomplice liability because while there was conflicting evidence regarding precisely who did what, there was ample evidence to implicate the defendant either as a principal or as a party to the crime of armed robbery. Cooper v. State, 342 Ga. App. 351, 801 S.E.2d 589 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 7 (Ga. 2018), cert. dismissed, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 10 (Ga. 2018), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2039, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3176, 201 L. Ed. 2d 288 (U.S. 2018). Party to armed robbery by furnishing gun. — By helping another plan a kidnapping and providing that person with a gun for that purpose, one is a party to the crime of armed robbery. However, a jury’s verdict of guilty of armed robbery is not inconsistent with its verdict of not guilty of other charges, e.g., burglary, assault, kidnapping. The jury could very well believe that the gun was used only in commission of the armed robbery, and where the defendant’s only criminal act as an aider and abettor was to furnish the gun, defendant was only guilty of the offense in which the gun was actually used. Shehee v. State, 167 Ga. App. 542, 307 S.E.2d 54 (1983). Party to armed robbery by retrieving loot. — Defendant’s testimony that defendant stood by as third party robbed victim at gunpoint and that defendant picked up victim’s discarded cash upon instruction by the third party was sufficient for conviction of armed robbery as an aider and abettor. Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 95, 432 S.E.2d 827 (1993). Evidence that defendant witnessed the victim with a roll of money and then later accompanied the victim and the codefendant in the victim’s car, after the codefendant showed defendant that the codefendant had a handgun in the codefendant’s possession, and then took the victim’s money after the codefendant shot the victim was sufficient to show that defendant 16-2-20 was a party to and an active participant in the armed robbery of the victim. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003). Planning robbery and driving getaway car were sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of armed robbery, even though defendant did not enter the victim’s home and participate in the actual robbery. Pryor v. State, 179 Ga. App. 293, 346 S.E.2d 104 (1986). Trial court had sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to those crimes by aiding and abetting, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, given evidence that the defendant helped plan the robberies of two game rooms, drove the getaway vehicle, and participated in the division of the proceeds. Norman v. State, 311 Ga. App. 721, 716 S.E.2d 805 (2011). Officer guilty of aiding and abetting robbery. — Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of several crimes, including crimes arising out of the robbery of a business even though defendant did not directly participate in that crime, as the evidence showed that defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime; defendant, a police officer, was aware that the crime was going to occur before it happened and did not report the crime, defendant made calls to the people involved in the robbery, defendant met with the people who committed the crime afterwards and advised and counseled them, and defendant asked if defendant could receive money from the robbery even if defendant did not participate in it. Greene v. State, 257 Ga. App. 837, 572 S.E.2d 382 (2002). One acting as look-out during burglary is as guilty as active participants. — One who acts as look-out during commission of burglary is participating in commission of that crime within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 and is as guilty as active participants. DeLoach v. State, 142 Ga. App. 666, 236 S.E.2d 904 (1977). Felony murder conviction based on participation in aggravated assault. — Evidence that defendant was seen making notes at the crime scene the day of the shooting, that the defendant accompa- 183 Aiding and Abetting (Cont’d) nied the coconspirator knowing that the coconspirator intended to rob a cab driver, and that the defendant drove the coconspirator away after the shooting of the cab driver authorized the jury to find the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault committed with a deadly weapon, and hence to felony murder. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to felony murder based on aggravated assault because the state’s witness testified that the defendant approached the victim’s truck with the co-defendant, that the witness and the victim were ordered out of the truck at gunpoint, that the defendant helped to control the witness while the co-defendant shot the victim, and that the defendant helped clean up the crime scene; the witness’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence; and, even if the jury found that the defendant did not have a gun or shoot the victim, it did not follow that the defendant could not properly be found guilty as a party to the felony murder based on the aggravated assault that the co-defendant committed. Herrington v. State, 300 Ga. 149, 794 S.E.2d 145 (2016). Intermediary in drug sale. — Even if defendant was not treated as the actual seller but merely the conduit or intermediary by which the sale took place, defendant was guilty of selling cocaine, because defendant aided and abetted the sale as a party to the crime. Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997). While mere presence at the scene of a crime or even approval of another’s criminal conduct was not sufficient to authorize a conviction, defendant’s actions went far beyond mere presence and authorized the jury to find that defendant actively facilitated the drug sale as defendant aided and abetted the seller in the sale by informing the undercover drug agent about where to obtain the cocaine, by taking the agent to that location, and by intentionally procuring the seller to sell the cocaine; that evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 16-2-20 of being a party to the sale of cocaine. Jackson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 108, 576 S.E.2d 85 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant because the defendant aided and abetted the sale of cocaine to the undercover officer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; the defendant approached an undercover officer, the defendant took money from the officer and went into a hotel room, and the defendant later returned and gave the officer cocaine. Ware v. State, 308 Ga. App. 24, 707 S.E.2d 111 (2011). Defendant was properly convicted for trafficking in marijuana since the defendant owned the farm used by defendant’s son to grow marijuana, the defendant helped to construct the building used to grow marijuana, and the defendant helped acquire necessary support devices to put the building into operation; this evidence authorized the jury to find that defendant’s son had actual possession of the marijuana and that defendant had constructive possession by aiding and abetting the son’s possession. Lang v. State, 171 Ga. 368, 320 S.E.2d 185 (1984). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana was authorized because the defendant, a roommate, and an accomplice were willing participants in the drug offenses, and the defendant had agreed to accept delivery of the package of marijuana at the defendant’s residence in exchange for $200 and an ounce of marijuana for the defendant’s personal consumption; whether the defendant had physical possession of the cocaine, the defendant aided and abetted the marijuana’s actual physical possession and was guilty of the offense of trafficking under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(c) and under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as a party to the crime because the defendant admitted that the defendant was aiding the accomplice’s efforts to commit the trafficking offense by giving the accomplice a safe haven and a means to avoid law enforcement detection. Park v. State, 308 Ga. App. 648, 708 S.E.2d 614 (2011). When defendant who had been hired to pick up marijuana from plane had, at time of arrest, succeeded in opening only the upper portion of the door 184 to the plane, defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana could be supported on theory of defendant being an aider and abettor of drug conspirators who were in constructive possession. State v. Lewis, 249 Ga. 565, 292 S.E.2d 667 (1982). Aiding another in escape from confinement. — O.C.G.A. § 16-10-53(a) (knowingly aiding another in escaping from any place of lawful confinement) preempts O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) (aiding and abetting the commission of an offense), insofar as escape from confinement is concerned. Harden v. State, 184 Ga. App. 371, 361 S.E.2d 696 (1987); Roberts v. State, 257 Ga. 180, 356 S.E.2d 871 (1987). Arranging for victim to be present, and filming crime. — Evidence that defendant had arranged for the victim to be present at a party and that defendant actively engaged in videotaping an act of sodomy between the roommate and the victim authorized a finding that defendant was guilty of the offense of sodomy as an aider and abettor and was guilty of the offense of exploitation of children as either a principal or as an aider and abettor. Parker v. State, 190 Ga. App. 126, 378 S.E.2d 503 (1989). Accessory to theft by taking. — To be guilty as a party to a crime as an aider or abettor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3), a defendant must be an accessory before the fact, and where no evidence was presented that defendant was an accessory to the commission of the crime of theft by taking of school district funds, conviction for stealing these monies was not warranted. Purvis v. State, 208 Ga. App. 653, 433 S.E.2d 58 (1993). Evidence sufficient as to aiding and abetting felony shoplifting. — There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, finding defendant guilty of aiding and abetting in felony shoplifting, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-14(a)(1) and 16-2-20(b)(3), because employees in a store were alerted to a shoplifting in progress, and they followed the alleged shoplifter out to a car, which defendant got into and drove away; defendant was positively identified by an employee who was on the driver’s side of the car, the owner of that 16-2-20 car had loaned the car to defendant and defendant never returned it, and defendant simply contended that the car had been stolen and did not report the theft because defendant intended to get the car back. Patterson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 675, 613 S.E.2d 200 (2005). When defendants were charged in accusation with directly committing specific acts of shoplifting, but neither was specifically accused of being a party to the other’s commission of the offense, there was no error in charging the jury under the language of both O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(1) (direct commission of crime) and O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) (intentionally aiding or abetting in commission of crime). Jenkins v. State, 172 Ga. App. 715, 324 S.E.2d 491 (1984). Even though defendant was not charged as anything other than a direct perpetrator in a prosecution for aggravated assault, an instruction that defendant could be convicted under a theory of indirect concern was proper since defendant had notice of the testimony of a defense witness authorizing the jury to find that defendant was an aider and abettor. Upshaw v. State, 221 Ga. App. 655, 472 S.E.2d 484 (1996). Instigating gang attack supported aiding and abetting conviction. — There was sufficient evidence to convict one defendant of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 based upon defendant’s actions of instigating the gang attack on the victim and participating in the attack by knocking down the victim and shooting a gun; even though that defendant did not actually fire the shot that killed the victim, defendant was criminally responsible under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 for the shot that killed the victim. Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604, 619 S.E.2d 644 (2005). Evidence sufficient to show party to gang activity. — Evidence was sufficient to show the defendant’s participation in gang activity as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a) and (b)(4): the defendant and other gang members drove cars into a neighborhood, exited the cars, and began fighting with the residents; the defendant shouted ‘‘bust that sh*t,’’ and another gang member fired a gun, killing the victim. Parks v. State, 304 Ga. 313, 185 Aiding and Abetting (Cont’d) 818 S.E.2d 502 (2018). Evidence sufficient for conviction of financial transaction card fraud. — Because the evidence showed the defendant’s family participated in a scheme whereby they obtained credit cards in the names of non-existent businesses and used the cards to buy goods for their own use with no intention of repayment, even though the defendant did not personally sign for these purchases, a jury could conclude that the defendant aided and abetted the fraudulent use of the card in light of evidence showing the defendant agreed to the step-child’s offer to obtain one of the fictitious business credit cards for the defendant’s use, that the defendant was aware of a scheme to commit fraud through the use of credit cards, and that the defendant was seen often in the store where the fraudulent purchases occurred. Stuart v. State, 267 Ga. App. 463, 600 S.E.2d 629 (2004). Jury instructions. — In a prosecution for robbery, a charge to the jury was not confusing or prejudicial which, in part, authorized finding that defendant was a party to the crime if the defendant ‘‘had knowledge of the commission of the offense and after the act drove the car in a precipitous manner,’’ and the charge did not invade the province of the jury. Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 445, 481 S.E.2d 238 (1997). Regarding the principle of parties to a crime, the trial court’s substitution of ‘‘helps’’ for ‘‘aids or abets’’ in its charge was not improper since aiding and abetting encompasses the concept of helping in the commission of a crime. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 948, 121 S. Ct. 350, 148 L. Ed. 2d 282 (2000). Jury instruction about ‘‘parties to a crime’’ that stated defendant could be charged as a party, or aider or abettor, to the offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime properly stated the law, and the charge was adjusted to the evidence. Wade v. State, 261 Ga. App. 587, 583 S.E.2d 251 (2003). Defendant’s claim that the court erred by charging O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, on par- 16-2-20 ties to a crime, in its entirety is without merit. When the entire Code section is charged even though a portion may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence, it is usually not cause for a new trial. Maness v. State, 265 Ga. App. 239, 593 S.E.2d 698 (2004). Jury was properly instructed on conspiracy and parties, even though the defendant’s indictment alleged that the defendant directly committed the offenses and did not specify that the defendant was only a party to or coconspirator in the criminal acts. Michael v. State, 281 Ga. App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Gibbs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308 (2017). Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the crimes of armed robbery and theft by taking, and expressly stated that in the event that the jury did not believe that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could convict on the lesser offense of theft by taking, given that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding of guilt on the armed robbery charge, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant’s claim that the victim knowingly assisted in the planning and perpetration of the crime. Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 651 S.E.2d 538 (2007). There was slight evidence to justify a charge as to parties to the crime as two or more persons could have been involved; it was possible that the defendant acted with an accomplice who fled the scene in a yellow car, while the defendant fled the scene in a green car, because several witnesses claimed to have seen the robber leave in a yellow car, and other witnesses said the perpetrator got into a green car. Williams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 22, 717 S.E.2d 532 (2011). Failure to give circumstantial evidence charge was error. — Circumstantial evidence against a defendant in a cocaine trafficking case under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crime: defendant drove the defendant’s sibling, who arranged the drug sale, to the designated place for the transaction and patrolled the parking lot, and, when the 186 defendant saw a police officer, fled the scene. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 71, 692 S.E.2d 737 (2010). Evidence insufficient. — There was insufficient evidence to convict the defendants, both of whom had been passengers in a vehicle they knew had been stolen, of theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a); there was no evidence that the defendants did anything other than allow themselves to be transported in the vehicle or that they intentionally aided or abetted the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (2006). Evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106; the defendant had a fight earlier in the afternoon at a different location with several of the people who were at the scene of the shooting, and the evidence showed that the defendant had motive and intent to do harm, that the defendant was upset, that the defendant drove by the scene of the shooting before the shooting occurred, and that the defendant’s brother gave the defendant a gun at least three days before the crime occurred, but the state failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Thus, what the evidence produced by the state did not show were the essential links between the defendant’s proven behavior and the crimes charged. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009). Except as to one incident, the evidence was insufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband’s sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, because the record showed that the mother had no knowledge of seven of the eight incidents until she took the children to therapy, and the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence—including the fact of the family’s nudist lifestyle, the existence of pornographic movies in the home, and 16-2-20 the fact that, during therapy, the mother advised the girls to not talk about their father—was insufficient to prove aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383 (2009). Convictions as aider and abettor proper despite lack of personal involvement. — Despite the defendant’s contention that the crimes against a stabbing victim were solely committed by the codefendant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), there was ample evidence to conclude that the defendant either committed the crimes or was a party to the crimes, including that both the defendant and the codefendant drove to the stabbing victim’s home, that the victim was stabbed to death, and that the victim’s wallet and checkbook were stolen so that both defendants could have money to buy more drugs. Odom v. State, 279 Ga. 599, 619 S.E.2d 636 (2005). Evidence sufficient on one count of aiding and abetting, but insufficient on another. — With regard to a juvenile’s adjudication as delinquent on two counts for acts, which if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal attempt to hijack a motor vehicle, insufficient evidence existed to find that the juvenile was a party to the criminal attempt to hijack on one count because the charge showed only that the juvenile was standing by the side of the road with the two other persons who were parties to the action and remained on the side of the road when another approached the victims’ motor vehicle with a handgun and attempted to take the car by force and intimidation; mere presence, association, or suspicion, without any evidence to show further participation in the commission of the crime was insufficient to authorize a conviction. However, with regard to criminal attempt to hijack a motor vehicle, sufficient evidence existed to establish that the juvenile had knowledge of what was going to take place based on the prior attempt to hijack since: (1) the juvenile stood directly in front of the victim’s vehicle; (2) the juvenile assisted one of the cohorts after that person fell; and (3) an investigating officer testified to the juvenile’s own admission that the juvenile fled 187 Aiding and Abetting (Cont’d) the scene in an attempt to elude the police, which authorized the juvenile court to infer that the juvenile was a participant and not merely a bystander in the second attempted hijacking. In the Interest of C.L., 289 Ga. App. 377, 657 S.E.2d 301 (2008). Application 1. In General Corporate officer not shielded from criminal responsibility for acts in corporation’s behalf. — Officer or agent of corporation cannot assert that criminal acts, in form corporate acts, were not the officer’s acts merely because carried out by the officer through instrumentality of the corporation which the officer controlled and dominated in all respects and which the officer employed for that purpose. Williams v. State, 158 Ga. App. 384, 280 S.E.2d 365 (1981). One hindering apprehension or punishment of criminal. — One guilty of violating former Code 1933, § 26-2503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-50) would be classified as an accomplice after the fact at common law, and such an offender was not considered an accomplice within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 38-171 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), or a party to the crime under former Code 1933, § 26-801 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20). Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977). Since one may not be convicted of murder as a party to that crime and also be convicted of not being a party to the crime, but only as an accessory after the fact, defendant’s conviction for hindering the apprehension of a criminal was set aside. Conviction as a party to the crime was reversed where the appellate court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant intentionally aided, abetted, advised, encouraged, counseled, hired, or procured others to commit the crimes; the evidence, at most, established that defendant found out about the crimes after they were committed and did everything defendant could to help the others avoid prosecution. James v. State, 16-2-20 260 Ga. App. 350, 579 S.E.2d 750 (2003). An accessory after the fact is not considered an accomplice to the underlying crime itself, but is guilty of a separate, substantive offense in nature of obstruction of justice. Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977). Presence and observation of crime may establish one as party. — Jury question was presented where evidence showed that plaintiff was in presence of, and talking with, other party who removed hat from counter, tore out price tag, and placed it on plaintiff ’s head. Dixon v. S.S. Kresge, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 776, 169 S.E.2d 189 (1969). Fact that defendant lived with person who committed offense. — Fact that defendant lived with person who committed offense did not support guilty verdict of defendant, since mere presence in and of itself will not justify conviction. Parker v. State, 155 Ga. App. 617, 271 S.E.2d 871 (1980). Mere presence at scene and flight from authority are insufficient to support a criminal conviction. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1, 267 S.E.2d 314 (1980). When a party possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony, an accomplice who is concerned in the commission of the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 is likewise guilty of both offenses. Anderson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 595, 516 S.E.2d 315 (1999). Although the trial court might not have been presented with evidence that the defendant was in physical possession of a firearm during the hijacking of the victim’s car, because the evidence that was presented authorized a finding that the defendant was a party to that crime, and that all those involved were joint conspirators, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on grounds that the indictment charging possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was at fatal variance with the proof presented at trial. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 786, 653 S.E.2d 104 (2007). When ownership not shown, equal access proves all defendants guilty of possession of drugs. — When the state did not show the indicia giving rise to a 188 presumption of ownership or exclusive control of a vehicle, no presumption arose and, therefore, there was no triggering of the equal access defense, but by showing circumstantially that each of the defendants had equal access to the drugs, the state was able to support its theory that all of the defendants were parties to the crime and thus guilty of joint constructive possession of the drugs. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629 (1983). Collusion among relatives established by slight circumstances. — When transactions involving relatives are under review, slight circumstances are often sufficient to induce belief that there was collusion among parties. Heard v. State, 142 Ga. App. 703, 236 S.E.2d 911 (1977). Effect of contradictory testimony on defendant’s denial of intent to participate. — Where defendant’s posture is one of admitting presence and cooperation for one criminal purpose (stealing money from the cash register), but denying the intent of participating in an armed robbery, the matter thus essentially involves the credibility of the defendant; and if the defendant’s explanation of the incident is contradicted by the testimony of the police officers, the hotel employee, and the victims, the jury is authorized to reject the explanation. Parham v. State, 166 Ga. App. 855, 305 S.E.2d 599 (1983). Even though codefendants’ testimony conflicted, their testimony with regard to defendant’s aid to them was sufficiently corroborative to establish that defendant was a party to the burglary. Allen v. State, 224 Ga. App. 324, 480 S.E.2d 328 (1997). Codefendant’s trial should have been severed. — Trial court erred in denying a codefendant’s motion to sever the trial from the defendant’s trial because the codefendant was not allowed to introduce the exculpatory portions of the statements that explained the excerpted admissions introduced by the state, which supported the codefendant’s antagonistic defense that the codefendant was present at the robberies due to coercion by the defendant. To avoid potential Bruton issues, the state introduced only those portions of the codefendant’s 9-1-1 calls or 16-2-20 custodial statements made establishing that the codefendant was at the scene of two robberies, that the codefendant’s vehicles were used, and that the codefendant sent police to a motel room to investigate the robberies, but refused the additional portions of the statements that tended to support the codefendant’s defense that the codefendant was coerced into participating in the crimes. Bowe v. State, 288 Ga. App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (2007), cert. dismissed, sub. nom., State v. Baker, No. S08C0548, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 318 (Ga. 2008). Medicaid fraud. — Even assuming defendant could not be considered a ‘‘provider,’’ the wide range of activities performed by defendant, combined with defendant’s supervisory role in the medical office, made the defendant a party to the crime of Medicaid fraud. Bullard v. State, 242 Ga. App. 843, 530 S.E.2d 265 (2000). Evidence sufficient to support residential mortgage fraud conviction. — Evidence that the defendant, a loan officer who handled the closing on a codefendant’s home, was a party to a scheme whereby the defendant gave the codefendant money for the downpayment before closing, the codefendant falsely stated in the loan application that the codefendant had not borrowed the down payment, and later defaulted on the loan was sufficient to convict the defendant of residential mortgage fraud as a party to that crime. Gilford v. State, 295 Ga. App. 651, 673 S.E.2d 40 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0827, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. 2009). Inference that defendant tampered with evidence. — When the defense to a tampering with evidence charge was that no one saw defendant pull up and destroy marijuana plants, but the police officers saw the defendant on the property with the plants, advised the defendant not to remove the plants, returned in two hours to find the plants missing, and saw no one else around the premises at either time, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant at the very least participated in the destruction and that in itself would justify conviction. Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987). Possession of firearm during commission of crime. — Evidence which was 189 Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) sufficient to authorize a conviction of defendant’s codefendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime combined with evidence which was sufficient to authorize defendant’s conviction of the crime during the commission of which the gun was possessed was also sufficient to sustain defendant’s guilt of the possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Roberts v. State, 167 Ga. App. 38, 306 S.E.2d 43 (1983). Defendant may properly be convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime on the ground that defendant was a party or aider or abettor to the offense. Perkins v. State, 194 Ga. App. 189, 390 S.E.2d 273 (1990). In a prosecution for armed robbery and burglary, where evidence showed that a gun was used, that defendant at one point had possession of the gun, and that defendant disposed of the gun, defendant was guilty of armed robbery, and the court did not err in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses of robbery and theft by taking. Hopkins v. State, 227 Ga. App. 567, 489 S.E.2d 368 (1997). Jury’s verdict of acquittal on an aggravated assault charge and guilty on the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime was not necessarily inconsistent because the jury was free to reject the defendant’s testimony that the defendant did not know the defendant’s passenger had a gun and accept the defendant’s testimony that the defendant was unaware of the intended robbery. Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. App. 443, 721 S.E.2d 643 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0800, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 484 (Ga. 2012). Juvenile delinquency and weapons charges. — Adjudication of delinquency for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a pistol by a person under the age of 18 was proper when juvenile defendant who was driving a relative’s vehicle had free run of the relative’s property while the relative was deployed overseas; also, defendant was in the vehicle the morning of and night be- 16-2-20 fore a traffic stop, defendant directed the other juvenile where to drive, neither gun was registered to the relative, defendant seemed to know about the guns’ existence, and defendant gave a deputy false information about the defendant’s identity. In the Interest of C.M., 290 Ga. App. 788, 661 S.E.2d 598 (2008). Evidence sufficient to support finding of participation. — Evidence of actor’s conduct before, during, and after offenses sufficient to support finding that the actor was participant. In re J.S.S., 168 Ga. App. 340, 308 S.E.2d 855 (1983); In re K.B., 223 Ga. App. 105, 476 S.E.2d 875 (1996). When the defendant was identified as the person who demanded an admission fee from everyone who entered a cock fighting area and, when captured, still had $256 in cash in defendant’s pants pocket, defendant was a direct participant in the criminal enterprise, and thus chargeable with both cruelty to animals and commercial gambling under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Morgan v.