Roberts v

State, 276 Ga. 258, 577 S.E.2d 580 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault where the record revealed that the defendant admitted to being in the apartment of the victim, who was the defendant’s former love interest, the defendant admitted to having the gun, and the defendant’s only defense was that the gun went off accidentally, which was contradicted by the evidence of the defendant’s intentional punching and shooting of the victim. Milton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 660, 577 S.E.2d 862 (2003). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence after the victim testified as to the attack, there were photographs which showed the victim’s cuts, and the jury’s decision was based in part on its weighing of the credibility of the witnesses; it was also determined that the sentence imposed was within the statutory guidelines of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(g) and was not more severe merely because defendant had requested a jury trial. Benham v. State, 260 Ga. App. 243, 581 S.E.2d 586 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) there was evidence that the defendant entered a store, placed a knife to the neck of one of the 16-5-21 three victims, forced that victim to the back of the store, aided another assailant who was armed with a gun to bind the victims and drag them to the back of the store, and stole money and other items from two of the victims; (2) the defendant confessed to the crimes during interviews with law enforcement officials; and (3) the defendant’s confessions were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who, despite earlier being unable to identify the robbers, ultimately identified the defendant as one of the robbers. The corroborating victim’s initial inability to identify the defendant posed an issue of credibility for the jury’s resolution and did not require reversal. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003). When a jury could believe that defendant shot a victim without aggravation rather than defendant’s claim that a gun went off by accident during a struggle, ample evidence sustained the conviction for aggravated assault pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Wilson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 28, 581 S.E.2d 625 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the State of Georgia presented evidence that the defendant stabbed the defendant’s love interest’s child several times with a butcher knife. Even though the defendant argued that the defendant was merely defending against the child’s attack with a bat, the jury was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) to reject the defendant’s justification claim; the evidence showed that the love interest’s child hit the defendant with a bat to protect the child’s parent from the defendant, who forcefully entered their house and then charged the love interest’s child, pushed the child down, and stabbed the child. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault because: (1) the defendant was in an altercation with the victim at a dance; (2) eyewitnesses saw the defendant make a stabbing motion at the victim; (3) the victim died of a nine stab wounds, including one to the heart; (4) the defendant’s burned blue jeans were found in the de- 721 Assault with Deadly Weapon (Cont’d) fendant’s love interest’s backyard; (5) the defendant provided an investigator with clean clothes the defendant allegedly wore at the dance; and (6) the victim’s blood and DNA were found on the defendant’s leather jacket and on the shirt the defendant’s love interest wore to the dance. Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 608 S.E.2d 216 (2005). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for malice murder and aggravated assault because the victim had defensive wounds on a hand, the victim’s blood was found on defendant’s shoe, a mixture of the victim’s and defendant’s blood was found on defendant’s shirt, and the victim planned to ask defendant to leave the apartment. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005). There was sufficient evidence to support defendants’ convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2), because evidence was seen in one of the defendant’s vehicles during a traffic stop, defendants were identified from the videotape of the stop, and the shotgun used by the assailant in the home invasion was found in one of the defendant’s homes. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and a statutory violation, all in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1, 16-5-21, 16-7-1, 16-8-41, and 16-11-106, respectively, where the defendant and the codefendant went to a club with the intention of robbing someone, met the victim and drove the victim back to the victim’s home, beat and fatally stabbed the victim, and upon leaving the victim’s apartment, took some of the victim’s belongings. Willoughby v. State, 280 Ga. 176, 626 S.E.2d 112 (2006). Victim’s testimony that the defendant threatened the victim with a knife and struck the victim with a lamp, and evidence that the victim was found in a bathroom with an electrical cord wrapped 16-5-21 tightly around the victim’s neck, and that the defendant’s finger and palm prints were lifted from blood on the bathroom wall, allowed any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of three counts of aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim’s presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant repeatedly followed the victim in and out of a restaurant, and eventually chased the victim from the restaurant, firing at the victim at least nine times; (2) after the shooting, the defendant jumped into a silver truck and sped away; (3) the victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds; and (4) two witnesses identified the defendant from photographic lineups. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006). In spite of the defendant’s contrary testimony, a conviction on a charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and (c), was supported by sufficient evidence; the trial judge, as the trier of fact, was authorized to credit testimony that the defendant’s act of pointing a gun at the victim’s midsection caused that person a reasonable apprehension of fear, over testimony presented 722 by the defendant. Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (2008). Evidence of the defendant’s shooting a victim, striking the victim’s companion with a motorcycle helmet, the defendant’s sibling’s pointing a gun at the companion, and the sibling’s pointing a gun at the victim and pulling the trigger, was sufficient to convict the defendant of four counts of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant was responsible for the sibling’s acts as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008). Defendant’s new trial motion based on insufficient evidence lacked merit, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and a weapons possession charge under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and 16-11-106(b)(1); issues of credibility regarding witnesses’ identification of defendant as the shooter were within the jury’s province pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620). Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 248, 730 S.E.2d 726 (2012). Evidence that the defendant, who threatened to kill the victim in the past, took the victim to a retention pond, shot the victim, wrapped the body with a large boulder, placed the victim in a retention pond, and, for days, misled the victim’s mother and authorities about the victim’s whereabouts was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder, felony murder, feticide, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm. Platt v. State, 291 Ga. 631, 732 S.E.2d 75 (2012). Evidence that the defendant and others were present at the scene of the offense, shot at the victims’ vehicle, and wounded two of the victims was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault of the victim because the victim saw the defendant pointing the rifle in the victim’s vicinity, the defendant fired the gun in the victim’s direction, and the victim heard the shot and fell to the ground to avoid being shot at again; and the evidence 16-5-21 supported a jury finding that the defendant intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury from a deadly weapon. Sears v. State, 298 Ga. 400, 782 S.E.2d 259 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because after the defendant pulled a knife on the former girlfriend, the former girlfriend told police and the defendant that the former girlfriend wanted the defendant out of the apartment; when the defendant came to retrieve the defendant’s belongings, the defendant entered the bedroom the defendant had shared with the former girlfriend and began throwing things about and destroying the former girlfriend’s personal property; when the victim entered the room and told the defendant to leave, the defendant reached for the defendant’s knife and charged at the victim; and, during their fight, the defendant stabbed the victim five times with the knife. Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 783 S.E.2d 662 (2016). Identification of defendant. — Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness’s identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012). Conviction of aggravated assault, murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was justified. — See Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983). Instruction on defense of accident or misfortune properly refused. — Trial court properly refused to give a requested jury instruction on the defense of accident or misfortune, where defendant’s own testimony showed that defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit an aggravated assault upon the victim when defendant’s pistol discharged and the victim was struck by a bullet. Grude v. State, 723 Assault with Deadly Weapon (Cont’d) 189 Ga. App. 901, 377 S.E.2d 731 (1989). Instruction using phrase ‘‘deadly weapon’’ correct. — Trial court’s use of the phrase ‘‘deadly weapon’’ in the jury instructions was a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in former O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2)), which also included any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury and was a correct instruction. State v. Easter, 297 Ga. 171, 773 S.E.2d 181 (2015). Assault With Gun Stun gun. — Victim’s acts of cooperation when the victim recognized that assailants were armed with a stun gun, the testimony of the victim’s intense reaction to being repeatedly assaulted by the gun’s electronic discharge, and the legal recognition that the stun gun was an ‘‘offensive weapon’’ constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim was assaulted with a weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury. Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 512 S.E.2d 892 (1999). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery because, during the confrontation, the defendant stated to one of the victims that the defendant had shot a person the day before; shooting the victims when the defendant was frustrated in the robbery attempts was consistent with the defendant’s behavior toward the other victims. Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (2012). An unloaded gun pointed at another in a threatening manner is a deadly weapon. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986). When it reasonably appears to an assault victim that the firearm is or might be loaded, then the assailant should be held to consequences of using a deadly weapon whether or not the weapon in fact is loaded. An unloaded shotgun pointed at another in a threatening manner is a 16-5-21 ‘‘deadly weapon’’ as a matter of law within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981). Empty pellet gun in the shape of an automatic weapon was per se a deadly weapon. Clark v. State, 191 Ga. App. 386, 381 S.E.2d 763 (1989). When a pellet gun that could not be fired reasonably appeared to the victims to be a deadly weapon, such evidence authorized defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault. Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga. App. 866, 476 S.E.2d 639 (1996). Toy pistol can be offensive or deadly weapon under certain circumstances but is not necessarily a deadly weapon. Butts v. State, 153 Ga. App. 464, 265 S.E.2d 370 (1980). Toy gun having appearance of real gun. — Defendant did not object to the officer’s direct testimony that the toy gun the defendant used to assault defendant’s former girlfriend looked like a real gun and defendant did not challenge admission of that testimony on appeal; so, the testimony was properly admitted to prove aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Further, defendant had stated to friends who were witnesses that the defendant used the toy gun since the toy looked like a real gun; therefore, the defendant did not show prejudice since the officer’s opinion was also cumulative of other evidence. Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. App. 166, 605 S.E.2d 876 (2004). Reassembled rifle. — Regardless of whether the reassembled rifle the defendant used in committing an aggravated assault was loaded and capable of firing, the gun reasonably appeared to be a deadly weapon, despite testimony from the defendant’s sibling that the sibling later informed the victim that the defendant’s rifle was broken. Stancil v. State, 278 Ga. App. 843, 630 S.E.2d 130 (2006). Armed robbery can be committed either with a real weapon or with a toy or replica weapon having appearance of being real. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981). Pistol as deadly weapon. — Pistol was a ‘‘deadly weapon’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) as a matter of law even though it was loaded only with 724 blanks. Veal v. State, 191 Ga. App. 445, 382 S.E.2d 131, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 131 (1989). Whether pistol was deadly weapon is jury question. — If the jury were to find that there was an assault, then whether the pistol used was a weapon likely to produce death when used in such manner was a jury question. Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973). Defendant’s use of police officer’s pistol involved jury question. — Whether the defendant’s use of a police officer’s pistol by placing the defendant’s hand on the pistol and trying to pull the pistol from the pistol’s holster constituted use of a deadly weapon under the circumstances was properly for the jury’s determination. Hall v. State, 189 Ga. App. 107, 375 S.E.2d 50 (1988). Evidence supported the defendant’s aggravated assault upon a police officer conviction as whether to credit the defendant’s testimony that the defendant acted in self-defense and that the defendant did not have control of or fire the officer’s weapon was a matter for the jury. Mills v. State, 273 Ga. App. 699, 615 S.E.2d 824 (2005). Discharging firearm from within vehicle. — Evidence did not support a charge for involuntary manslaughter as the defendant’s act of firing from the car clearly established the felony of aggravated assault and not mere reckless conduct. Browder v. State, 294 Ga. 188, 751 S.E.2d 354 (2013). Indictment alleging ‘‘shooting’’ by defendant adequately denotes use of deadly weapon. — An indictment charging aggravated assault and alleging that the defendant committed an aggravated assault on the victim by commission of an act of ‘‘shooting’’ clearly denotes the use of a deadly weapon and, therefore, is not fatally defective. Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276, 348 S.E.2d 910 (1986). Assault during bank robbery. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41, 16-5-21, 16-5-41, and 16-11-106, based on testimony from wit- 16-5-21 nesses inside the bank, the defendant’s clothing, a text message between the defendant and the defendant’s accomplice, and the defendant’s accomplice’s testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015). Shooting a shotgun towards others. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial because sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for arson and aggravated assault based on the testimony of the witnesses who testified that the witnesses could see the defendant starting the fire through the kitchen windows and witnessed the defendant shoot a shotgun in the direction of a neighbor and four law enforcement officers who were at the scene as well as the defendant’s admission that the defendant set the fire. Jackson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 199, 818 S.E.2d 268 (2018). Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. — Defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, were affirmed, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to prove that the defendant was the person who committed the acts in question, based on witness testimony and the discovery of clothes and a gun used in the robbery in the defendant’s room. Moore v. State, 277 Ga. App. 474, 627 S.E.2d 107 (2006). Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault based on the victims’ testimony that guns were used in the commission of the crimes, the testimony of the defendant’s girlfriend and the presence of a cell phone found near the scene of the crimes, and the victims identifying the defendant’s accent was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant was an armed participant in the crimes. Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to enable a juvenile court to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis from the victim’s testimony that a juvenile stood in a nearby park and did not participate in an assault as the third, unidentified assailant, pursuant to 725 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6, and to adjudicate guilt for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm while committing a felony, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b)(2) and 16-11-106(b)(1). In the Interest of C. S., 334 Ga. App. 153, 778 S.E.2d 396 (2015). Evidence sufficient for assault with gun. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction given testimony showing that defendant fired defendant’s gun inside a game room along with a bullet hole that an officer found behind the counter where a victim was located which allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant committed the crime of aggravated assault by shooting defendant’s gun toward one of the victims. Dukes v. State, 264 Ga. App. 820, 592 S.E.2d 473 (2003). Determination of witness credibility, including the accuracy of eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive province of the jury. Evidence that defendant wielded and attempted to use a gun during the robbery of a pool hall owner was sufficient to convict defendant for aggravated assault where the question of eyewitness identification of defendant was a jury matter. Bartley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 367, 599 S.E.2d 318 (2004). There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), where evidence showed that three persons forcibly entered the victims’ apartment and demanded money, that all three persons were in the car together on the way to the apartment and on the way to the hospital to drop off a bleeding codefendant, that all three persons carried guns, that one of the victims was shot, and that defendant’s statement that defendant only was involved to drop off the bleeding codefendant at the hospital was in contrast to the fact that defendant had blood on defendant’s pants, shirt, boxer shorts, and that defendant ejected the bloody codefendant from the car in a hurried 16-5-21 manner at the hospital. Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 642, 600 S.E.2d 731 (2004). There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish that defendant was the perpetrator. Davis v. State, 267 Ga. App. 668, 600 S.E.2d 742 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and armed robbery convictions where one of the victims opened the door to the victim’s home when the victim recognized one of defendant’s accomplices, where defendant and another then pushed the door open and rushed inside, and where defendant grabbed the first victim, pointed a gun at the first victim’s head, took money from the second victim’s wallet, kept the gun pointed at both victims during the entire incident, ripped the telephone cord out of the wall, and instructed the accomplices to bind and blindfold the victims, which they did; the victims both identified defendant as the gunman from a police photo array and made an in-court identification at trial, and any conflict between the victims’ testimony that the gunman had a tattoo on the gunman’s arm and a trial demonstration revealing no tattoo on defendant’s arm was a matter for the jury to resolve and did not affect the sufficiency of the identification. Kates v. State, 269 Ga. App. 8, 603 S.E.2d 342 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault, as: (1) defendant previously threatened to kill the victim; (2) defendant pointed a gun at the victim, warned the victim not to give information to the police about what they did, and said, ‘‘We own this area’’; (3) the frightened victim told defendant to leave; and (4) defendant left after further words were exchanged. Husband v. State, 275 Ga. App. 246, 620 S.E.2d 479 (2005). Trial court did not err in denying a codefendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on two aggravated assault charges, given that sufficient evidence was presented that: (1) both the defendant 726 and the codefendant, while armed, attempted to rob the victims; (2) off-duty police officers working as security officers identified the defendants; (3) an assault rifle and a sawed-off shotgun were fired at the police as both the defendants were pursued; and (4) the weapons were recovered after both the defendants were apprehended. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 163, 635 S.E.2d 422 (2006). Convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and 16-5-21, were supported by sufficient evidence, including that the defendant and the codefendant were acting in concert, and the denial of the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper; the defendant argued with the victim, a prostitute, and refused to pay for the victim’s services, prompting the victim to get a gun and fire a shot into the air, whereupon the defendant and a codefendant fired their guns back at the victim in a car leaving the area, and a bullet from the codefendant’s gun killed the victim. Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006). Convictions for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and malice murder, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40, 16-5-21, and 16-5-1, respectively, were supported by sufficient evidence where defendant got into a dispute with the victim over a drug deal, defendant and the codefendants kidnapped the victim, drove the victim to a remote area, and shot the victim several times. Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), where the defendant fired shots towards the victim, who was ‘‘having a good time’’ with a group of other people in the apartment parking lot; the victim’s reasonable apprehensive of receiving a violent injury was sufficient to satisfy the intent element under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Thompson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 323, 626 S.E.2d 825 (2006). Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault where using defendant’s parent’s telephone number, defendant contacted the 16-5-21 victim and arranged a meeting to buy shoes, where the victim identified the car defendant was driving, which was registered to defendant’s parent, where the victim identified defendant from a pretrial police photo array and at trial, and where, at the meeting arranged by defendant, the victim was shot in the face and defendant then rummaged through the victim’s car where the victim kept the shoes. Waddell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 772, 627 S.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 731, 549 U.S. 1081, 166 L.Ed.2d 567 (2006). Evidence that three unarmed people went to talk to defendant about rumors that the defendant wanted to harm them, and that, when one approached the defendant, the defendant fired five shots in their direction, killing one of them, was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault. Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 627 S.E.2d 594 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault with intent to rob and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime where the defendant and two other persons tried to rob a market, one of the other persons had a pistol, which was pointed at the market’s owners, the armed participant forced one of the owners to try to open the register, and during the course of the robbery, one of the owners grabbed a hidden gun and shot and killed the armed robber, where the defendant and the other participant fled. Laurel v. State, 278 Ga. App. 147, 628 S.E.2d 208 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s aggravated assault conviction, as the fact that the victim and the defendant offered opposite accounts as to the reason the defendant reached for the gun was of no consequence on appeal, and the appeals court refused to speculate as to which evidence the jury chose to believe. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 221, 628 S.E.2d 648 (2006). Evidence that the defendant and others approached two separate victims while the defendant brandished a shotgun, that defendant threatened the victims with the gun, and that defendant and the compatriots stole both of the victims’ cars, sufficed to sustain convictions of two counts of hijacking a motor vehicle, two counts of 727 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the jury was free to disbelieve defendant’s testimony that defendant was coerced into threatening the victims at gunpoint and participating in the car thefts. Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500, 629 S.E.2d 485 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile’s delinquency adjudication based on charges of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a minor, and discharge of a gun or pistol near a street, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a), 16-11-132(b), and 16-11-103, as the juvenile was at a party and went outside with a crowd of others due to a fight, and the juvenile fired a gun into the air while standing in the midst of a crowd; the juvenile was identified by three eyewitnesses, whose testimony established that they were placed in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury due to the juvenile’s actions. In the Interest of C.D.G., 279 Ga. App. 718, 632 S.E.2d 450 (2006). Defendant’s conviction as a party for aggravated assault and aggravated battery was affirmed as: (1) the defendant drove a car knowing a gun was inside; (2) the defendant extinguished the headlights and drove slowly past a crowded corner as a passenger opened fire; (3) the defendant stopped the car next to a prone victim while the passenger continued shooting; and (4) the defendant told the police that the defendant did not care who had been shot. Ford v. State, 280 Ga. App. 580, 634 S.E.2d 522 (2006). Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the defendant’s aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the aggravated assault charges was properly denied as the defendant’s actions before, during, and after a friend’s aggravated assault and firearm possession crimes at a home showed not only that the defendant was a party to those crimes, but that the defendant was a fellow conspirator in the assault against the victim as the defendant: (1) forced the victim at gunpoint to drive to the home; (2) stayed in the nearby living room while the friend shot a gun 16-5-21 and threatened the victim (and defendant looked into the bedroom after the gun was fired); (3) accompanied the friend and the handcuffed victim in the vehicle following the incident while the friend searched for the victim’s love interest’s residence; (4) encouraged the friend to kill the victim; and (5) did not protest any of the friend’s actions throughout the evening. Sapp v. State, 280 Ga. App. 592, 634 S.E.2d 523 (2006). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by evidence that: (1) the victim and the defendant had an acrimonious relationship; (2) the defendant threatened to hit the victim with a jug; and (3) the defendant’s statement that the victim was not ‘‘dead yet’’ after the victim was shot in the back; the jury could reject the defendant’s claim that the defendant fired a warning shot away from the victim and could convict the defendant, even though the victim did not see the defendant point the gun at the victim. Rowe v. State, 280 Ga. App. 881, 635 S.E.2d 251 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for malice murder, felony murder while in commission of an aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant came to a tenant’s apartment and told the victim that the defendant just shot someone in the backyard; (2) the tenant heard the victim calling the tenant’s name; (3) another witness heard a series of gunshots and then someone being beaten, was familiar with the victim and recognized the victim’s voice as the victim hollered, ‘‘You stomping me. I’ve been shot. You already done shot me,’’ and saw the defendant emerge from behind the residence with a gun in the defendant’s hand; (4) the defendant held the gun to the head of the witness, but then instructed the witness to leave the area; and (5) the victim’s death was caused by two fatal gunshot wounds to the neck and chest and there was blunt force trauma to the head. Compton v. State, 281 Ga. 45, 635 S.E.2d 766 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s con- 728 viction of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant told the victim that the defendant was going to shoot the victim and then the defendant shot the victim in the stomach, argued with the victim some more, and shot the victim again; (2) the victim never admitted cheating on the defendant; (3) after the second shot, the defendant and a friend took the victim to a hospital in a car; (4) while en route, the defendant persisted in the defendant’s efforts to get the victim to admit to cheating on the defendant; and (5) the defendant wiped down the revolver and threw it out of the car. Durham v. State, 281 Ga. 208, 636 S.E.2d 513 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for robbery by intimidation, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as: (1) the defendant demanded that the victim give the defendant the victim’s purse and then threatened the victim with a gun and told the victim that the defendant would use it; (2) feeling that the victim’s life was in danger, the victim ran; (3) the defendant chased the victim and snatched the victim’s purse; (4) two witnesses chased the defendant to an abandoned house, where the victim’s purse was later found; (5) a witness obtained the tag number of the defendant’s vehicle and police traced the vehicle to the defendant’s parent; even assuming that the pre-trial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, the in-court identifications by a witness and the victim were admissible as they were based on independent recollections. Boatwright v. State, 281 Ga. App. 560, 636 S.E.2d 719 (2006). Aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal based on the defendant’s act of deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another; moreover, the fact that one of the defendant’s cohorts also fired a weapon in the direction of the shooting victims was sufficient for the defendant to be guilty as a party to those criminal acts. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006). On appeal from the defendant’s aggravated assault, possession of a firearm dur- 16-5-21 ing the commission of a crime, and first-degree criminal damage to property convictions, the court held that the testimony provided by two of the victims identifying the defendant as one of the perpetrators was sufficient to uphold the same, as: (1) the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; and (2) under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), the credibility of a witness was a matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Reid v. State, 281 Ga. App. 640, 637 S.E.2d 62 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony as: (1) during a van ride, the defendant fought with an assault victim, striking the assault victim in the head with a gun, and was told to stop hitting the assault victim; (2) a gunshot was heard and the passengers saw a murder victim lying dead and the defendant holding the gun; (3) the gun was inside the murder victim’s mouth when it was fired; (4) the assault victim and another passenger fled; and (5) the defendant and an accomplice dumped the body in an industrial area. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. 229, 637 S.E.2d 393 (2006). Defendant’s malice murder and aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal, as supported by sufficient evidence, including that: (1) the defendant, along with two codefendants, fired numerous shots into a crowd in an attempt to shoot several men with whom they had been feuding; (2) one of the codefendants later told a friend that the three committed the crimes; (3) one of the defendant’s friends saw the defendant with a shotgun shortly after the shooting, the shotgun had red shells, and the defendant told the friend that the gun had been used in the shootings; and (4) forensic evidence later confirmed that red shotgun shells were found at the scene. Adkins v. State, 281 Ga. 301, 637 S.E.2d 714 (2006). Sufficient evidence was presented to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because witness testimony indicated that the first victim and the first victim’s young child, the second victim 729 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) who was also the defendant’s child, were scared and crying after a confrontation with the defendant and that gunshots were fired; thus, the evidence established that the victims were in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury as required by § 16-5-21. Cain v. State, 288 Ga. App. 535, 654 S.E.2d 456 (2007). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and possession-of-a-firearm based on the testimony of three separate witnesses, including the victim, that the defendant threateningly pointed a gun at the victim’s head. Further, regarding the need to show the victim’s reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, the state presented evidence from the victim’s mouth that the victim feared the gun and that the fear resulted in the victim urinating on the victim’s person and in the victim lying to an officer at the front door to protect the victim’s children. Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730 (2008). Victim’s testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim’s residence, entered, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give the defendant money was sufficient in itself to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a). Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008). Though the victim was approaching the defendant when the defendant fatally shot the victim at a distance of three feet, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and felony murder despite the defendant’s claim of self-defense as the defendant decided to confront the victim and beat the victim up, retrieved a gun from a car, and lied to police about the victim’s pulling a knife before the shooting. McNeil v. State, 284 Ga. 586, 669 S.E.2d 111 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of aggravated assault in connection with the robbery of a cell phone store at gunpoint as the employees of the store identified the defendant from a 16-5-21 non-suggestive photographic array; the getaway car had been rented by the defendant’s spouse; and the employee of another cell phone store that had been robbed 20 minutes earlier identified the defendant as the robber. Fuller v. State, 295 Ga. App. 439, 672 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0749, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 220 (Ga. 2009). Sufficient evidence was presented to convict a defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on evidence that the defendant and a codefendant approached the victims’ rental car and brandished guns; while pistol whipping the victims and robbing them of their property, the defendant’s gun went off and fatally wounded the first victim; and a gun matching the caliber of bullet recovered from the first victim during the autopsy was found during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel where the defendant had visited a guest on three occasions. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275 (2009). Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (voluntary manslaughter), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (aggravated assault), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant’s explanation of the killing was inconsistent with and not explanatory of the other direct and circumstantial evidence, and, therefore, the jury was permitted to reject such explanation and convict on the remaining evidence; the defendant’s son testified on direct that the defendant told the son that the defendant shot the victim once, that the victim ran, that the defendant pursued, and that although the victim begged for the victim’s life, the defendant shot the victim again, and there also was forensic evidence indicating that the defendant fired three more rounds into the victim’s body. Cantera v. State, 304 Ga. App. 289, 696 S.E.2d 354 (2010). Defendant’s claim that the testimony of an armed robbery victim was insufficient to authorize the jury to find that an aggra- 730 vated assault victim was placed in apprehension of receiving an immediate bodily injury was not supported by the record because the record revealed that the actual victim of the aggravated assault testified that one of the robbers pointed a gun at the victim. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because even though the defendant did not actually use a weapon, there was evidence that an accomplice brandished a handgun and pointed the handgun at both the manager and the clerk of the video store, and the accomplice’s use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant; one who intentionally aids or abets the commission of a crime by another is a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal, and reasonable apprehension of injury can be proved by circumstantial or indirect evidence as well as by direct or positive evidence since the presence of a gun would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because: (1) the defendant participated in the armed robbery of three people, including the shooting victim, who were sitting in a car on a neighborhood street; (2) during the encounter, the co-indictee fatally shot the victim in the head with a shot gun; (3) one of the two other people in the car testified that, after the shooting, the defendant, with the defendant’s hand in the defendant’s pocket simulating that the defendant had a gun, took money and drugs from the witness; (4) the co-indictee also took money from the other person; and (5) the defendant and the co-indictee then fled the scene. Gilyard v. State, 288 Ga. 800, 708 S.E.2d 329 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, 16-5-21 motor-vehicle hijacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2), 16-5-44.1(b), and 16-11-106(b)(1), because the defendant waited in a getaway vehicle while an accomplice hijacked the victim’s vehicle and possessed the gun that the accomplice used in the crime. Gordon v. State, 316 Ga. App. 42, 728 S.E.2d 720 (2012). Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s convictions for aiding and abetting armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment based on the evidence that the defendant was a party to the crimes, including evidence that the defendant drove the co-defendants to the house just before the crimes were committed; that the defendant was in the vehicle when plans to commit the crimes were discussed; that the defendant waited in the victim’s driveway when the co-defendants entered the front door of the house, wearing masks and carrying guns; and that the defendant drove the perpetrators away from the scene after the crimes were committed— speeding, driving erratically, and not stopping when the police, with sirens and lights activated, began following the vehicle. Simon v. State, 320 Ga. App. 15, 739 S.E.2d 34 (2013). Victim’s testimony that the defendant approached the victim, thrust a gun about six inches from the victim’s face, took the victim’s cell phone and keys, and told the victim to ‘‘get out of here,’’ while waving a gun, was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (2013). Aggravated assault conviction was supported by evidence that the defendant struggled with the first victim after the first victim tried to take a gun from the defendant, the defendant called for help, and an accomplice who came to help the defendant shot the first victim. Falay v. State, 320 Ga. App. 781, 740 S.E.2d 738 (2013). Evidence that the defendant was found in the laundry room of the home that was the subject of the home invasion; police 731 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) found masks, gloves, money, a gun, and some of the victim’s jewelry in or near the laundry room; and the defendant’s DNA was found on one of masks recovered supported the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Rudison v. State, 322 Ga. App. 248, 744 S.E.2d 444 (2013). Evidence that, after being ejected from a nightclub, the defendant told the bouncer that the defendant was going to the car and would be back, a statement which the bouncer viewed as threatening and meaning that the defendant was going to get a gun, authorized a finding that the bouncer was in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury as shots were fired in the bouncer’s direction and supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 744 S.E.2d 447 (2013). Evidence including testimony as to the gang’s criminal activities, corroborating the defendant’s participation in the armed robberies; the defendant’s admission to participating in two murders; and a gun the defendant used in the attempted armed robbery of the first victim was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for criminal street gang activity, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Morris v. State, 322 Ga. App. 682, 746 S.E.2d 162 (2013). Evidence that the defendant approached a group with a gun, causing the children to scream, was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault upon the restaurant owner’s wife and children. Veasey v. State, 322 Ga. App. 591, 745 S.E.2d 802 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of terroristic threats, six counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because a witness testified that a vehicle fitting the description of the defendant’s car was driven by the shooter who shot at the house of the complainant’s mother where the complainant was staying; mul- 16-5-21 tiple gunshot holes were found in the side of the home; the complainant testified that, earlier that morning, the defendant had threatened to come to the house and kill the complainant; and the complainant received text messages from the defendant later that morning apologizing for what had happened. Brown v. State, 325 Ga. App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the victim testified that the defendant shot at the victim at least three times; and the victim’s neighbor saw the victim on the ground, and the defendant was standing over the victim. Marshall v. State, 324 Ga. App. 348, 750 S.E.2d 418 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault and aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court’s final charge to the jury included instructions on the defense of justification; and the victim testified that, at the time in question, the victim did not have a gun, that the victim did not reach for any of the defendant’s guns, and that the victim was not attacking the defendant and only charged the defendant after the defendant was aiming a gun at the victim. Price v. State, 325 Ga. App. 564, 754 S.E.2d 144 (2014). Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault and terroristic threats based on the trial court properly admitting the victim’s testimony identifying defendant as the person who threatened to shoot the victim early in the morning, and the testimony of the victim’s friend, who also identified defendant as the person who threatened to shoot the victim. Johnson v. State, 326 Ga. App. 220, 756 S.E.2d 303 (2014). Victim’s testimony that the victim and the defendant were fighting, the defendant left the room and later returned with gun that the defendant held to the victim’s side, and the victim heard gunshot and turned to face the defendant, who told the victim that the defendant had been meaning to do that and ran, supported the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and possession 732 of firearm during the commission of a felony. Jones v. State, 326 Ga. App. 151, 756 S.E.2d 267 (2014). Evidence that the defendant invited the victim to physically fight the defendant after a verbal dispute arose over a dice bet, and that the victim was unarmed while the defendant had concealed a firearm in a pocket, was sufficient to defeat the defendant’s justification defense and support the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felon. Robinson v. State, 326 Ga. App. 59, 755 S.E.2d 865 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt on six counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a handgun by an underage person because the evidence included direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony identifying the juvenile as shooting and discarding the gun. In the Interest of T. D. J., 325 Ga. App. 786, 755 S.E.2d 29 (2014). Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery, aggravated assault against the manager and cashier, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery because the law allowed defendant to be charged with and convicted of the same offenses as co-defendant since the evidence showed that defendant drove co-defendant to the fast food restaurant that was robbed and waited as the getaway driver. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014). Victims’ testimony that the victims’ heard the sound of a gun being cocked and turned around to see the defendant, a juvenile, holding a gun while chasing the victims with a group of other young men, causing the victims to be so afraid the victims ran into the expressway, was sufficient to place the victims in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury and to support the defendant’s adjudication for delinquent acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated assault. In the Interest of S. W., 337 Ga. App. 110, 786 S.E.2d 499 (2016). Co-defendant’s testimony constituted direct evidence that the defendant inten- 16-5-21 tionally aided and abetted the codefendants in committing the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and intentionally advised, encouraged, and counseled them to commit the crimes, and there was sufficient corroboration of the co-defendant’s testimony, including a recorded telephone call between the defendant and a second co-defendant, the defendant’s own testimony at trial, and the defendant’s statements to law enforcement. Stallings v. State, 343 Ga. App. 135, 806 S.E.2d 613 (2017). No fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof at trial as to the defendant’s hijacking a motor vehicle and two counts of aggravated assault convictions because the evidence showed that the defendant struck the victim with a handgun and, shortly thereafter, two men fled in the minivan, while a Hispanic male and the man that struck the victim, the defendant, fled in a red car, thus, there was no fatal variance between the evidence and the indictment. Scott v. State, 342 Ga. App. 442, 803 S.E.2d 600 (2017). Evidence, including testimony as to the number of shots and ballistics, authorized the jury to conclude that, in the first incident, the defendant shot in the direction of all four alleged victims and that two different guns were used in the assault, one of the guns by the defendant and, thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Green v. State, 304 Ga. 385, 818 S.E.2d 535 (2018). Aggravated assault with gun upon police officer. — Because an officer, knowing a bank robbery and carjacking had just occurred, saw defendant with a white bag running away from a car matching the stolen car’s description, and the fleeing individual pointed a gun at the officer after being ordered to stop, and a bystander corroborated the officer’s testimony about the pointing of the gun, there was probable cause to believe the defendant had committed the felonies of aggravated assault and aggravated assault upon a peace officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and detaining the defendant was a lawful warrantless seizure such that none of the evidence obtained from the seizure was tainted. United States v. 733 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) Epps, 613 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1526, 179 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2011). Aggravated assault committed during armed robbery with gun. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and 16-5-21(a)(2), because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the perpetrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee’s car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told them what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer’s gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer’s blood was found on the defendant’s chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011). Evidence negated accident defense. — Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, and felony misuse of a firearm while hunting, and negated the defense of accident where the victim who was shot by defendant while hunting waved to signal defendant before the gun was fired and where defendant was hunting while on medication that could have caused mental and physical impairment; the jury also could have considered defendant’s actions after the shooting in removing the victim’s orange vest, hiding two guns, failing to aid the victim, and failing to alert paramedics of the victim’s location. Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 136, 630 S.E.2d 640 (2006). 16-5-21 Evidence held sufficient. — No fatal variance existed between the indictment alleging the defendant committed aggravated assault in either of two different ways and the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, as the wording of the indictment allowed the state to seek a conviction for either showing that the defendant assaulted another person with intent to murder or with a deadly weapon; the state was not required to prove both methods of assault, and, thus, the trial court’s instruction to the jury only as to aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon did not cause a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof. Lopez v. State, 260 Ga. App. 713, 580 S.E.2d 668 (2003). Because the passenger’s testimony demonstrated that the passenger had a reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault where defendant fired several shots at the car in which the passenger was riding. Richardson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 55, 581 S.E.2d 694 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support all but one of defendant’s convictions for burglary, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the three shooting victims was entirely consistent in all material respects, and any conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony raised a credibility issue for jury resolution. Squires v. State, 265 Ga. App. 673, 595 S.E.2d 547 (2004). Victim’s testimony and in-court identification was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of hijacking the victim’s motor vehicle at a gas station and of aggravated assault for shooting the victim three times; thus, a photo lineup was not unduly suggestive. Weeks v. State, 268 Ga. App. 886, 602 S.E.2d 882 (2004). Evidence that defendants intentionally fired bullets into a house occupied by three people in an attempt to kill one of them was sufficient to support their conviction of aggravated assault against another occupant, whom they wounded, under the doctrine of transferred intent. It was immaterial that defendants were unaware that the assault victim was in the 734 home. Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004). After the defendants were accused of firing into a house, killing one occupant and injuring another; one defendant admitted firing into the home, thinking defendant had killed a man; ballistics reports identified shell casings found at the scene as having been fired from at least two different guns; and DNA testing identified a cap recovered from the scene as having been worn by another defendant, their convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence. Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004). When the defendant’s victim identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial as the person who forced the victim to open the vaults in the fast-food restaurant where the victim worked, then duct-taped the victim’s limbs and repeatedly struck the victim as the victim lay face down on the floor, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to allow the jury to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as the evidence showed that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen and the arm with a gun and that defendant intended to cause serious physical harm and disfigurement to the victim. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004). Evidence that the defendant fatally shot the victim during a scuffle in a robbery attempt and told the police that the defendant was shot by a robber was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for felony murder, aggravated assault, making a false statement to law enforcement officers, and giving a false name to law enforcement officers. Sampson v. State, 279 Ga. 8, 608 S.E.2d 621 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s aggravated assault conviction as the defen- 16-5-21 dant twice pointed a gun at a victim’s neck, ordered the victim to kneel, demanded the victim’s wallet and keys, and left with a coin bag and the victim’s keys; the victim was scared and covered the victim’s head with the victim’s forearms so that the defendant would not shoot the victim in the head. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault because: (1) the victim heard an unidentified voice scream defendant’s name, tell defendant ‘‘don’t do it,’’ and tell defendant that defendant was going to kill the victim, as a gun was cocked and fired at the victim; and (2) the victim unequivocally identified defendant as the victim’s assailant. Sharif v. State, 272 Ga. App. 660, 613 S.E.2d 176 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support a jury’s verdict convicting defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because, through the testimony of someone whom defendant threatened with a gun after the defendant shot a police officer, the evidence showed that the person saw defendant fire a gun at the officer and recognized the gun later recovered as the weapon the defendant used. Milton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 908, 614 S.E.2d 140 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile court’s finding that a minor had committed aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because it showed that the minor blocked the victim’s flight, assisted a friend in pushing the victim into the bedroom, and committed sexual battery, all while the friend remained armed with the gun that the friend had pointed at the victim’s head; since defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime, defendant could be convicted of it under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. In the Interest of A.J., 273 Ga. App. 51, 614 S.E.2d 159 (2005). Because defendant shot a victim with a rifle as the victim attempted to flee and the victim at first thought that defendant had a BB gun, but realized otherwise when defendant shot at the victim’s cousin, the evidence supported defen- 735 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) dant’s conviction for aggravated assault based on: (1) defendant’s attempt to commit a violent injury to the victim with a deadly weapon; or (2) defendant’s shooting at the victim with a deadly weapon, thereby putting the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Harris v. State, 273 Ga. App. 90, 614 S.E.2d 189 (2005). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault as, notwithstanding the absence of an in-court identification of defendant and the state’s failure to present fingerprint evidence, a victim’s testimony concerning the victim’s on-the-scene identification supported the finding that defendant perpetrated the crimes; there was also sufficient evidence that the cash seized from defendant’s love interest’s house had been put there by defendant. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in a case because defendant, who had engaged in previous altercations with the victim, got out of defendant’s car after seeing the victim on the street, ran up to the victim, shot the victim, returned to defendant’s car, ran back to the victim and shot the victim again, and then got in defendant’s car and drove off, as all of the elements of those offenses were established. Hayes v. State, 279 Ga. 642, 619 S.E.2d 628 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions where the jury was entitled to give greater weight to the victim’s positive contemporaneous identification of the defendant as the shooter and to conclude that the victim’s subsequent uncertainty resulted from fear of retaliation by the defendant rather than from any real confusion about who fired the shot; the jury was also entitled to give little weight to a negative gunshot residue test result on defendant’s hands as a sergeant regularly ordered gunshot residue 16-5-21 tests on the suspects. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006). Because: (1) the jury was authorized to infer that defendant intended to commit a violent injury upon the victim in view of the evidence showing that the defendant demanded to know the victim’s location, and then walked directly up to the victim and shot the victim; and (2) this same evidence was sufficient to show that defendant intended to commit an act that placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, defendant’s two aggravated assault with a deadly weapon convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 211, 630 S.E.2d 833 (2006). In defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault in connection with robbery of a fast food restaurant, sufficient evidence existed to support defendant’s convictions based on a restaurant employee identifying defendant as one of two perpetrators who confronted that employee and manager at gunpoint and threatened to shoot if the victims did not comply with defendant’s demand for money; also, evidence showed that defendant forced the manager out of the manager’s car at gunpoint, ordered the manager back across the parking lot and into the restaurant, and stole over $300 from the restaurant’s safe as well as a cellular phone before fleeing. Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (2008). Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant ordered a man to shoot the victim, who was wounded but escaped; later, eyewitnesses saw the defendant and an armed cohort encounter the unarmed victim, who was fatally shot. This evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and murder. Wilcox v. State, 284 Ga. 414, 667 S.E.2d 603 (2008). Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile’s motion for a new trial with regard to the juvenile’s delinquency adjudication finding the juvenile guilty for aggravated assault, criminal property damage, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct arising from the shooting of a BB gun at a passing car. The juvenile was the only 736 Caucasian identified in the group of youth; the juvenile admitted to hiding the BB gun; the juvenile did not dispute that the juvenile encouraged another youth to shoot the gun; and the judge was the final arbiter of the credibility and witness issues and had the province to reject the testimony of the juvenile and a parent that the juvenile did not shoot the gun. In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga. App. 827, 668 S.E.2d 323 (2008). Testimony by two victims that the defendant grabbed a purse from one of them and pointed a gun at both of them, and testimony from an eyewitness that the defendant fled from the police, was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault; the evidence revealed that the victim and the defendant got into a physical fight at a bar, and that the victim then left the bar and went to an apartment. The defendant then went home, retrieved a handgun, went to the apartment, knocked on the door, and when one of the people inside opened the door, the defendant shot the victim in the chest, killing the victim. Rector v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 681 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1081, 130 S. Ct. 807, 175 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2009). Evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony because contrary to the defendant’s arguments, the evidence showed that the person who was sitting in the back seat of the victim’s car was not sitting directly behind the victim, but instead, that person was in the rear seat on the passenger’s side of the car; the forensics testing showed that the murderer was located to the left of the victim, not the right, and there was blood spatter on the seat behind the victim from which the jury could have inferred that no one was sitting there at the time of the shooting. Julius v. State, 286 Ga. 413, 687 S.E.2d 828 (2010). Jury could have found the defendant 16-5-21 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of aggravated assault because the victim’s testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and that a shot was subsequently fired wounding the victim was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant committed a violent injury to the victim; the victim’s testimony that the victim was afraid of being shot when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim sufficed to convict the defendant of aggravated assault by placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 690 S.E.2d 220 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for the aggravated assault of people because there was evidence that the defendant stabbed and shot at the same person, and there was evidence that the defendant and the defendant’s accomplice pointed a gun at the people in the house, and an officer testified to their names; the defendant did not show the requisite harm arising out of a claim that the allegations and proof fail to correspond. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010). Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice’s testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury’s determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by tak- 737 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) ing, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the defendant knocked the victim face-down into a table, pointed a gun at the kneeling and bloodied victim, and threatened to kill the victim and the victim’s children with the gun. The defendant later told the victim that the victim was going to commit suicide that night and forced the victim to swallow several unidentified pills. Reynolds v. State, 311 Ga. App. 119, 714 S.E.2d 621 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the three men who were with the victim when the victim was shot identified the defendant as the person who fired shots at them; there was testimony that the defendant was the boyfriend of a woman who was the former girlfriend of one of the three men with the murder victim and that the defendant and the former boyfriend had exchanged heated words earlier the day the victim was killed as well as the afternoon of the day before the shooting. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 706, 715 S.E.2d 85 (2011). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when: (1) after smoking marijuana, the defendant attacked the victim, pulled a gun from defendant’s pocket, and shot the victim four times; (2) the victim told the police that the defendant did it; (3) the victim died; (4) a knife was found near the victim, the defendant had a stab wound, and the defendant claimed self-defense; and (5) witnesses one and two saw the defendant pull the gun but did not see the victim with a knife. Hill v. State, 291 Ga. 160, 728 S.E.2d 225 (2012). 16-5-21 Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and burglary, after the state presented independent corroboration in support of an accomplice’s testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes; the defendant’s statements to police, the defendant’s actions before and after the crimes, and the defendant’s girlfriend’s testimony stating that the defendant asked the girlfriend to lie about the defendant’s whereabouts corroborated the defendant’s guilt. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. Davis v. State, 325 Ga. App. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014). Because the victim testified that the defendant held the victim at gunpoint with a rifle, that the victim thought the defendant was going to kill the victim, and that the victim was afraid for the victim’s life, the testimony of the victim, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. Lambert v. State, 325 Ga. App. 603, 754 S.E.2d 392 (2014). Aggravated assault with gun while buying marijuana. — Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for felony murder predicated on armed robbery, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because the evidence showed that the defendant and the codefendant, after discussing the idea of stealing marijuana and whatever cash the victim had on the victim, arranged to meet with the victim to buy marijuana from the victim. When the victim got into the back seat of the defendant’s vehicle and pulled out a bag of marijuana, the codefendant drew a gun and shot the victim, fatally wounding the 738 victim. Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (2011). Running from gunfire sufficient for reasonable apprehension of assault. — Evidence was sufficient to prove three counts of aggravated assault against the defendant because testimony that the victims ran from gunfire was sufficient evidence that the defendant and the codefendant placed the victims in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, and other evidence showed that all of the victims were positioned in or very near the line of fire; one of the victims testified that the victim was sitting on the ground, could have been shot, and would have been if the victim had stood up, and a jury could find that the victim experienced a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury even though the victim affirmatively testified that the victim was not afraid. Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 707 S.E.2d 80 (2011). Aiding and abetting in possession of firearm during aggravated assault. — Based on the evidence that the defendant drove and deliberately followed the victims and pulled in behind the victims’ vehicle, intentionally encouraged the shooter by telling the shooter ‘‘you better not let these guys get away, go ahead and handle your business, do what you got to do,’’ and fled with the shooter after the shooting, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant was a party to the crimes of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Talifero v. State, 319 Ga. App. 65, 734 S.E.2d 61 (2012). Evidence sufficient under doctrine of transferred intent. — Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault under the doctrine of transferred intent as the defendant participated in the gun fight that wounded the unintended victim. Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013). Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault of bus driver. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a bus driver, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because 16-5-21 the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away since the driver felt the driver’s life was in danger; the driver testified that the driver chose not to drive away for fear that the defendant would shoot. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011). Identification of defendant sufficient. — Victim’s testimony at trial sufficiently identified the defendant as the assailant who fired shots at the victim, and the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, since the victim knew the defendant from previous encounter and although it was dark, the victim was able to see the defendant’s face during incident because area was illuminated by streetlight. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 153, 630 S.E.2d 661 (2006). Evidence insufficient for conviction. — Because no eyewitnesses saw a third defendant participate in an armed robbery, a kidnapping, an aggravated assault, or possess a firearm during the commission of the crimes, and because the third defendant was not implicated by the other defendants, did not confess to the crimes, and did not flee the jurisdiction, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the third defendant. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 499, 627 S.E.2d 116 (2006). Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because there was no affirmative evidence that a restaurant employee saw the defendant with a gun or heard the defendant’s threats to shoot; from an officer’s description of the scene, the officer did not personally observe the employee climb out of the drive-through window, and thus, the evidence that the employee climbed out of the window rested mainly on the veracity and competence of persons other than the testifying officer, making the testimony hearsay under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801). Santiago v. State, 314 Ga. App. 623, 724 S.E.2d 793 (2012). Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and pos- 739 Assault With Gun (Cont’d) session of a weapon during the commission of the crime; the defendant was out of the officer’s view when the defendant fired the gun, no other officer or witness saw the defendant fire the gun, no witness saw where the defendant aimed the gun when the defendant fired the gun, and no forensic or other evidence was introduced which suggested that the defendant fired the gun in the officer’s direction. Touchstone v. State, 319 Ga. App. 477, 735 S.E.2d 805 (2012). Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault as a party because there was no evidence in the record to show that the defendant knew that the grandfather was likely to respond to the defendant’s initial cries for help by firing a shot, or that the defendant’s cries intentionally encouraged the grandfather to discharge the single shot actually fired; and, although the defendant’s exclamation after the single shot was fired could be interpreted as an expression of encouragement or incitement, it was made after the grandfather’s already completed act of firing a revolver near the officers, which was the act that formed the basis of the indictment against both the defendant and the grandfather. Hoglen v. State, 336 Ga. App. 471, 784 S.E.2d 832 (2016). Testimony as to ultimate issue excluded in assault with gun case. — In a prosecution for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6, the issue of whether the defendant shot the victim with the intention of assaulting the victim was an issue of ultimate fact to be decided by the jury. Therefore, the state’s objection to defense counsel’s question to the defendant, ‘‘Did you intend to assault the victim?’’ was properly sustained. Gordon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 908, 670 S.E.2d 533 (2008). Use of a gun to strike victim. — Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue for involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a), because the jury would have had to believe that the use of a loaded gun to strike the victim was not use as a deadly weapon (or the 16-5-21 crime would be assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21), and the theory of the defense was that the defendant was not present. Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 758 S.E.2d 598 (2014). Assault against person other than intended victim. — Since a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant shot at the bouncer intending to commit a violent injury against the bouncer and that the bullet struck a bystander instead, the evidence authorized the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault against the bystander. Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 744 S.E.2d 447 (2013). Sentencing. — Defendant was entitled to resentencing with regard to the defendant’s convictions on one count of aggravated assault and one count of armed robbery arising from the robbery of a restaurant because the two counts were based upon the same conduct, namely pointing a handgun at the restaurant’s manager in order to commit a robbery. Fagan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 784, 643 S.E.2d 268 (2007). Defendant’s sentences of 20 years in confinement for the aggravated assault on the deceased victim, followed by 20 years for the aggravated assault on the second victim (with five years in confinement and the remainder on probation), followed by an additional 15 years of probation for the charge of participation in criminal street gang activity and another five years’ probation for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to run consecutively to the other sentences, were within the statutory range for those crimes, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015). Assault With Automobile Trial counsel not ineffective as lenient sentence imposed. — Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to investigate defendant’s mental health history as: (1) defendant did not claim that defendant was insane at the time of the crimes, was incompetent to stand trial, or was otherwise suffering from delusional compulsion; (2) there was no evidence that defen- 740 dant was guilty, but mentally ill; and (3) felony murder carried a mandatory life sentence, firearm possession required a consecutive five-year sentence, and the trial court was lenient in sentencing defendant to half of the time allowed by law for an aggravated assault, so there was no harm in the failure to introduce more detail about defendant’s mental health history at sentencing. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005). Reckless driving as lesser included offense of aggravated assault. — Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the charge of aggravated assault upon a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because the trial court should have given the defendant’s requested charge on reckless driving in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390(a) as a lesser included offense since there was evidence that the defendant did not intend to injure a police officer but that the defendant’s decision to drive off suddenly with the officer in close proximity to the defendant’s truck was nonetheless an act of criminal negligence, which would have supported a conviction for reckless driving. Young v. State, 294 Ga. App. 227, 669 S.E.2d 407 (2008). Charge on reckless driving not required. — Because Count 4, alleging aggravated assault by placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury with an object which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury, only required the state to prove that the defendant had the general intent to drive the van, the offense of reckless driving would not show a less culpable mental state than that which was required to establish the commission of the crime of aggravated assault as charged, and the trial court did not err by refusing to give the requested charge of reckless driving as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as alleged in Count 4. Patterson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 221, 770 S.E.2d 62 (2015), aff ’d, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016). Automobile is not per se deadly weapon, but may become one depending upon the manner and means of the vehicle’s use. Blalock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 269, 299 S.E.2d 753 (1983); Cline v. State, 16-5-21 199 Ga. App. 532, 405 S.E.2d 524 (1991); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga. App. 884, 508 S.E.2d 674 (1998). Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means of the vehicle’s use. The question of whether an automobile, or other instrumentality, has been used so as to constitute a deadly or offensive weapon is properly for the jury’s determination. Butler v. State, 196 Ga. App. 706, 396 S.E.2d 916 (1990); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga. App. 884, 508 S.E.2d 674 (1998). Aggravated assault convictions were affirmed after the defendant accelerated toward officers standing in front of the defendant at a roadblock, forcing the officer’s to jump out of the way, and causing one to fall. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 371, 606 S.E.2d 594 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, as a rational trier of fact was authorized to conclude that defendant meant to harm the police officer who stopped defendant’s vehicle when defendant fled in the vehicle and the officer had to step out of the way to avoid being struck; although an automobile was not a deadly weapon per se, defendant used it as such and defendant’s increasing level of hostility during the stop, coupled with defendant’s attempt to run over the officer while fleeing, supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. Young v. State, 273 Ga. App. 151, 614 S.E.2d 257 (2005). Automobile can be a deadly weapon. — Evidence that defendant hit patrol cars while making a U-turn and appeared to be in full control of the vehicle just prior to the impact was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant attempted to commit a violent injury to another’s person and interfered with government property. Black v. State, 222 Ga. App. 80, 473 S.E.2d 186 (1996). Sufficient evidence existed to convict defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), since defendant used a vehicle as a deadly or offensive weapon, because when the officer pulled defendant over, defendant turned the vehicle around and accelerated at the officer, forcing the officer to jump behind a patrol 741 Assault With Automobile (Cont’d) car to avoid being hit. Thomas v. State, 255 Ga. App. 777, 567 S.E.2d 72 (2002). Evidence that defendant, a shoplifting suspect, drove off in defendant’s vehicle with a police officer hanging only halfway inside defendant’s vehicle as the officer attempted to grab defendant’s keys, and that defendant continued to drive even though the officer was hanging half-in and half-out of the vehicle was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault of a police officer as the evidence showed that defendant used the vehicle as a deadly weapon and that defendant had the general intent required to sustain an aggravated assault conviction. Frayall v. State, 259 Ga. App. 286, 576 S.E.2d 654 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer as it showed defendant had the general intent to commit the crime against the police officer who had executed a traffic stop on defendant, by using defendant’s automobile to commit an offensive act and make it likely the officer would sustain serious bodily injury as defendant was aware that the officer had both hands on defendant when defendant put the car in drive and sped off with the officer hanging on to defendant. Riels v. State, 259 Ga. App. 420, 577 S.E.2d 88 (2003). Evidence that defendant forced a love interest to remain in the love interest’s car against the love interest’s will, that the defendant chased the love interest with the love interest’s car when the love interest tried to escape, that the defendant hit the love interest with the car, and that the love interest suffered a broken ankle was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for false imprisonment and aggravated assault. Scott v. State, 268 Ga. App. 889, 602 S.E.2d 893 (2004). Convictions against defendant for aggravated assault and simple assault did not require reversal because the police failed to preserve defendant’s car after defendant had engaged in an aggressive car chase, which resulted in the assault charges based on defendant having used the car as a weapon, as there was no 16-5-21 showing that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence and no evidence that suggested that the possible exculpatory value of the car was apparent before the car’s destruction. Ransby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 594, 615 S.E.2d 651 (2005). Withdrawal of plea to charge of aggravated assault on police officer was properly denied because the defendant agreed during the plea colloquy with the state’s version of the facts that the defendant drove toward the officer-victim and rammed a stolen vehicle that the defendant was driving into the officer’s car while the officer was in it and admitted to the court that the defendant was in fact guilty of the crime as charged. Sheffield v. State, 270 Ga. App. 576, 607 S.E.2d 205 (2004). Officer stepped backward to avoid being struck by car. — Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and, because, when a police officer who was directing traffic approached the vehicle which the defendant was driving, the defendant pulled the vehicle out of the traffic, sped directly toward the officer, and then sped away. Furthermore, the officer specifically testified that the officer believed the vehicle would hit the officer and that the officer stepped backward to avoid being struck. Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011). Officer’s statement on what the defendant saw was admissible. — In the defendant’s trial for aggravated assault on a peace officer, which required knowledge of the victim’s identity as a police officer, the officer’s statement regarding the defendant’s attempt to run the officer down in a parking lot, ‘‘I know he saw me,’’ was not improper speculation but was based on the officer’s perception of events. Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015). Pinning victim to house with automobile. — Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault with an object under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) with regard to pinning the victim to a house with a vehicle was affirmed because the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions 742 on the lesser included crimes of reckless conduct and reckless driving since the base crime of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require a specific intent to cause the victim to be apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016). Evidence of intent sufficient. — Evidence of criminal intent was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault of a peace officer, notwithstanding that defendant might have had a seizure during the police chase, where: (1) defendant exhibited continued hostility of the officers during the chase; (2) defendant eluded rolling backups; (3) defendant maneuvered through stationary roadblocks; and (4) defendant maintained control of defendant’s vehicle at high speeds during the chase. Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (2004). Defendant’s proceeding pro se after three detailed trial court warnings was not abuse of discretion; the defendant’s conviction of two counts of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) aggravated assault and one count of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(c) cruelty to children (using defendant’s car as a deadly weapon to run into the defendant’s spouse’s car with the spouse and child inside) was supported by sufficient evidence. Bush v. State, 268 Ga. App. 200, 601 S.E.2d 511 (2004). Adjudications as to two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of failing to stop at or return to an accident scene were supported by sufficient evidence detailing the juvenile’s act of striking two individuals with a car, and then leaving the scene of said accident; moreover, decisions as to the credibility of witnesses were in the province of the juvenile court, which apparently determined that the state disproved the juvenile’s defense. In the Interest of J.L., 281 Ga. App. 105, 635 S.E.2d 393 (2006). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on an aggravated assault charge based on evidence that a deputy stood visibly in the roadway with the deputy’s arms raised and yelling for defendant to stop the defendant’s vehicle at a roadblock, defendant drove the vehicle at 40 miles per 16-5-21 hour directly at the deputy who had to quickly jump out of the roadway to avoid being struck by the defendant’s vehicle, and the deputy testified that the deputy feared being struck by the defendant’s vehicle and receiving serious injuries; the jury was authorized to determine that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent to commit aggravated assault against the deputy, who was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Taul v. State, 290 Ga. App. 288, 659 S.E.2d 646 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault based on the defendant, after panicking from striking a vehicle in a nightclub parking lot, drove a vehicle with headlights on toward a sheriff ’s deputy providing security at the nightclub, accelerated towards the officer, and drove within two or three car lengths of the officer without stopping, at which point the officer ran out of the vehicle’s path, which evidence authorized a jury to find that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit injury. Further, there was sufficient evidence to authorize a jury finding that the defendant intended to act in a manner that placed the officer in reasonable apprehension of an immediate violent injury based on the officer jumping to safety to avoid being struck by the vehicle. Adams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 377, 667 S.E.2d 186 (2008). Evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault when the evidence showed that the defendant chased the victims in the defendant’s car for about 15 miles, rear-ended their vehicle when the car attempted to make a turn, and ran the defendant’s vehicle into their driver’s side with enough force to push their vehicle up onto a curb; moreover, one victim testified that during the vehicle chase, it was apparent that the defendant and another person were trying to box the victim in with their vehicles and that the victim was very scared. The jury was not required to believe defendant’s testimony that the incident was an accident. Windham v. State, 294 Ga. App. 72, 668 S.E.2d 526 (2008). Aggravated assault by means of a deadly weapon (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2)) 743 Assault With Automobile (Cont’d) is not a specific intent crime; the state is only required to prove a general intent to injure. Therefore, evidence that the defendant threatened to kill the victim and tried to hit the victim with the defendant’s car was sufficient to prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit aggravated assault. Barnes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 493, 675 S.E.2d 233 (2009). Defendant fled from police in a car, disregarded their orders to stop, and almost ran over one of the officers. Evidence that an officer reasonably feared receiving a violent injury when the defendant backed the car toward the officer, and that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for human life, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault by intent to murder. The defendant’s defense, that the defendant was resisting an unlawful arrest, was meritless. Mackey v. State, 296 Ga. App. 675, 675 S.E.2d 567 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to enable the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed the intent necessary to commit aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), and felony murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c), because the defendant used a vehicle as an offensive weapon while the defendant was extremely drunk, and the evidence was sufficient to prove both forms of simply assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)-(2) by the defendant against all six of the victims; the defendant engaged in an extended high-speed car chase with a driver, deliberately rammed the other driver’s truck, and attempted to smash into the other driver head-on after the truck stalled, and within minutes after the driver escaped, the defendant came upon the other five victims by swerving sharply into oncoming traffic and slamming into a vehicle. Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 690 S.E.2d 406 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to determine that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was authorized to infer from the defendant’s conduct that the defendant had an intent to injure a driver or anybody who was in the defen- 16-5-21 dant’s way while the defendant attempted to elude police; the defendant crashed into the driver’s car while the defendant led police on a high-speed chase in a stolen car. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 650, 715 S.E.2d 99 (2011). Trial court erred in revoking probation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.1 on the ground that the probationer committed an aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because there was insufficient evidence that the probationer committed an aggravated assault offense in violation of the terms of probation; there was no evidence supporting an aggravated assault based on an alleged victim’s apprehension of injury because even assuming that the probationer’s collision with another vehicle while evading an officer was the basis for the aggravated assault charge, there was no evidence as to the occupant’s apprehension of receiving an injury or as to his or her conduct showing the injury. Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. App. 635, 727 S.E.2d 248 (2012). Assault With Hands, Fists, or Other Body Parts Fists are not, per se, deadly weapons. Thomas v. State, 237 Ga. 690, 229 S.E.2d 458 (1976); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Meminger v. State, 160 Ga. App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981), rev’d on other grounds, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982). While fists per se are not a deadly weapon within the meaning O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, they may be found to be a deadly weapon by the jury depending on the manner and means of their use, the wounds inflicted, etc. Quarles v. State, 130 Ga. App. 756, 204 S.E.2d 467 (1974); Guevara v. State, 151 Ga. App. 444, 260 S.E.2d 491 (1979); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Harper v. State, 152 Ga. App. 689, 263 S.E.2d 547 (1979); Wright v. State, 211 Ga. App. 431, 440 S.E.2d 27 (1994). Hands as deadly weapons. — Evidence that defendant beat the victim about the head and face with defendant’s hands was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault. Scott v. State, 243 Ga. App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (2000). 744 While hands are not considered deadly weapons per se within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the fact finder may find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim’s injuries. Mallon v. State, 253 Ga. App. 51, 557 S.E.2d 409 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Rowland v. State, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). Evidence that the defendant beat the victim about the head with the defendant’s hands so hard that the victim’s ears rang and was bleeding from both sides of the head was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. Ferguson v. State, 322 Ga. App. 565, 745 S.E.2d 784 (2013). Strangulation with hands. — Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault as the evidence showed that the defendant jumped on top of the victim and choked the victim with the defendant’s hands until a police officer pulled the defendant off, at which time the victim was gasping for breath and the pressure around the throat left red marks; thus, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant used the defendant’s hands as a deadly weapon or object likely to result in serious bodily injury. Goodrum v. State, 335 Ga. App. 831, 783 S.E.2d 354 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to prove aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a); an officer testified that the defendant had the victim in a chokehold and was leaning back to apply pressure to the victim’s neck, that the victim was helpless, and that the defendant refused to let the victim go when ordered by the officer and had to be physically separated. Maxwell v. State, 348 Ga. App. 870, 825 S.E.2d 420 (2019). Defense of property not sole defense. — Trial court did not err in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on the defense of property defense as the defendant’s sole defense as the defendant claimed that the defendant did not cause the victim’s injuries, defense counsel attempted to establish that the victim’s recollection of the events was impaired by the victim’s fading in and out of consciousness and by the victim’s consumption of alco- 16-5-21 hol, and the jury was adequately instructed on witness credibility, the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence. Strickland v. State, 267 Ga. App. 610, 600 S.E.2d 693 (2004). Fists may constitute weapon likely to produce death. See Haygood v. State, 154 Ga. App. 633, 269 S.E.2d 480 (1980). Whether fists are deadly weapons is question for jury. See Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and other related crimes, sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction since the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant beat the victim with the defendant’s fists until the victim was rendered unconscious, fracturing bones in the victim’s face. Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga. App. 471, 641 S.E.2d 658 (2007). As the Georgia Court of Appeals has held, the use of hands to choke a victim can satisfy the deadly weapon or dangerous object element of aggravated assault and whether the use of hands rises to that level is a question for the jury. Goodrum v. State, 335 Ga. App. 831, 783 S.E.2d 354 (2016). Fists and feet may be deadly weapons. — Although fists and feet are not considered deadly weapons within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 26-1302, they may be found to be deadly weapons by the jury depending on the manner and means of their use. Kirby v. State, 145 Ga. App. 813, 245 S.E.2d 43 (1978); Dixon v. State, 268 Ga. 81, 485 S.E.2d 480 (1997); Braswell v. State, 245 Ga. App. 602, 538 S.E.2d 492 (2000) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21). Jury could find that a defendant’s hands and feet, depending upon their use, wounds inflicted, and other surrounding circumstances, were deadly weapons or objects likely to result in serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person for purposes of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Haugland v. State, 253 Ga. App. 423, 560 S.E.2d 50 (2002). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) as defendant repeatedly 745 Assault With Hands, Fists, or Other Body Parts (Cont’d) stomped defendant’s work boots on the victim’s chest and face, driving the victim’s head into the floor. Kemp v. State, 257 Ga. App. 340, 571 S.E.2d 412 (2002). While an indictment against defendant failed to state that defendant’s hands were used as deadly weapons, this omission did not render the charge flawed, where the allegations set forth that defendant’s hand were used as offensive objects, resulting in serious bodily injury to defendant’s child. State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 578 S.E.2d 413 (2003). Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, criminal trespass, and obstruction of a 9-1-1 call as the defendant became irate after a demand for a refund was denied by a store, a store manager told the defendant to leave, but the defendant refused, when the manager picked up the phone to call 9-1-1, the defendant grabbed the phone and slammed it on the counter, the defendant pushed the bag of brass plates the defendant was trying to return in the manager’s face, cutting the manager, and punched the manager in the face. Hooker v. State, 278 Ga. App. 382, 629 S.E.2d 74 (2006). Delinquency finding for acts constituting party to the crimes of aggravated assault and battery was supported by sufficient evidence showing that the appellant was one of a group of youths who punched, kicked, and struck one victim with a shotgun, and participated in the attack; the appellant also knocked another victim to the ground and hit that victim during the fracas. In the Interest of E.R., 279 Ga. App. 423, 631 S.E.2d 458 (2006). Two defendants were properly convicted of felony murder with aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the predicate felony since the evidence established that the defendants killed the victim by repeatedly striking the victim’s face and head, and the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendants’ hands and feet were used as deadly weapons. Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 676 S.E.2d 181 (2009). Victim’s testimony that the defendant 16-5-21 pushed the victim off a porch railing then came down the stairs and kicked the victim in the mouth, after which the victim was paralyzed from the chest down, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Morales v. State, 305 Ga. App. 569, 699 S.E.2d 864 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because although hands and feet were not considered per se deadly weapons within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the jury could find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim’s injuries. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 218, 735 S.E.2d 1 (2012). Hands, fists, and shoe-clad feet are not necessarily or per se deadly weapons, but may or may not be deadly weapons depending upon the circumstances of the case. Chafin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 122, 267 S.E.2d 625 (1980). Although hands, feet and a telephone receiver are not deadly weapons per se, the jury could find them to be deadly depending upon their use, wounds inflicted, and other surrounding circumstances. Wheeler v. State, 232 Ga. App. 749, 503 S.E.2d 628 (1998). Whether defendant’s hands were used as a deadly weapon within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was a jury question. Richards v. State, 222 Ga. App. 853, 476 S.E.2d 598 (1996). Assault with shoe clad feet. — Evidence supported a conviction of aggravated assault when the indictment alleged that the defendant kicked and stomped the victim with shoe clad feet, a means likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person. Whether the defendant’s shoe-clad feet constituted objects likely to result in serious injury was a question of fact for the jury, and given that the defendant stomped on and kicked the victim, rendering the victim bruised and unconscious, the jury was authorized to convict the defendant of aggravated assault. Windham v. State, 294 Ga. App. 72, 668 S.E.2d 526 (2008). It is jury question as to whether or not shoe or boot constitutes deadly 746 weapon, under all the circumstances surrounding the shoe or boot, its size, weight and construction, and the manner in which it was used. Williams v. State, 127 Ga. App. 386, 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972). Use of brass knuckles. — In a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of one count of aggravated assault when the second defendant struck one of the employees with brass knuckles because the jury was authorized to find that brass knuckles qualified, at a minimum, as an object, device, or instrumentality that was likely to cause serious bodily injury; and the first defendant was a party to the second defendant’s use of the brass knuckles against the employee. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018). Actual serious injuries not required. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of violating of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the indictment alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury (a broom handle and defendant’s feet and hands), not that serious bodily injury in fact occurred. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006). Photographs of victim’s injuries. — In a prosecution for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the indictment alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury (a broom handle and the defendant’s feet and hands), photos depicting the condition of the victim, one of which depicted the defendant’s foot print on the victim’s face, were relevant to establish the nature and extent of the injury. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006). Denial of motion for acquittal proper. — Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on an aggravated assault of a peace officer charge was properly denied as the evidence supported the conviction since an officer testified that the defendant knocked the officer to the ground, attempted to remove the officer’s firearm from its holster, told the officer that defendant ‘‘was going to take care of (the officer),’’ indicated that the 16-5-21 defendant wanted the defendant’s drugs back, grabbed the drugs, and ran away; a videotape of the incident was also admitted at trial. Bolden v. State, 281 Ga. App. 258, 636 S.E.2d 29 (2006). Jury instructions. — Since defendant’s aggravated assault conviction merged as a matter of law into defendant’s malice murder conviction, any complaint by defendant about the jury instruction on aggravated assault was rendered moot. Mason v. State, 279 Ga. 636, 619 S.E.2d 621 (2005). Biting victim with risk of transmitting HIV virus. — When defendant was tried for aggravated assault with intent to murder after biting a police officer, the jury could rationally find the risk of transmitting the HIV virus through a human bite rendered defendant’s bite, if not defendant’s spittle, a ‘‘deadly’’ weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991). Hands likely to cause serious bodily injury sufficient for indictment. — Trial court erred in quashing an aggravated assault count against defendant because the indictment was sufficient where it alleged that defendant assaulted defendant’s spouse with defendant’s hands, which, when used offensively were likely to cause serious bodily injury; further, the indictment did not need to additionally charge in the language of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 in order to withstand demurrer. State v. Tate, 262 Ga. App. 311, 585 S.E.2d 224 (2003). Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error. — Although the admission of a victim’s statements to a deputy violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the error was harmless as to defendant’s aggravated assault and battery convictions in light of the photographs of the victim’s injuries and the defendant’s admission that the defendant grabbed the victim around the neck and that the defendant might have hit the victim in the face. Miller v. State, 273 Ga. App. 761, 615 S.E.2d 843 (2005). Choking victim and slamming her around room. — Evidence supported de- 747 Assault With Hands, Fists, or Other Body Parts (Cont’d) fendant’s rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, criminal trespass, misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and possession of marijuana conviction because: (1) a victim testified that defendant choked the victim, slammed the victim around a room, and raped and sodomized the victim, then drank a beer, took some BC powder packets, and cell phone, and left; (2) defendant fled from the police, kicked two officers, and had marijuana, BC packets, and a cell phone; (3) defendant’s DNA matched the DNA on the beer can; (4) a nurse testified that the victim’s bruise was consistent with strangulation; and (5) a doctor testified that the victim’s injuries were consistent with rape and sodomy. Lewis v. State, 271 Ga. App. 744, 611 S.E.2d 80 (2005). No merger with family violence battery. — Aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 with fists only and family violence battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f ) with fists and a bottle upon the defendant’s then live-in love interest were not required to be merged under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a) because there were two separate incidents separated by the love interest’s visit to a store and because the aggravated assault did not require the use of a bottle. Collins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 381, 626 S.E.2d 513 (2006). Evidence sufficient to show beating. — Evidence that the defendant beat the victim about the head and face with the defendant’s hands was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that the defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault, particularly in light of the victim’s concussion and fractured face bone caused by the defendant’s punches. Sims v. State, 296 Ga. App. 461, 675 S.E.2d 241 (2009). Evidence was insufficient to sustain a juvenile court’s finding that a child committed aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) because there was no showing that the child’s ongoing memory and cognitive problems were caused by the beating and not by a preexisting brain tumor and brain surgeries; however, 16-5-21 the evidence was sufficient to show an aggravated assault. In the Interest of Q. S., 310 Ga. App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (2011). Evidence that the defendant struck the male victim in the back of the head with a pistol and participated in further beating the male victim during a fight involving the defendant and at least eight others, and that the male victim sustained serious bodily injury when the male victim lost a tooth sometime during the fight was sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction as to the male victim. Bledson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 444, 787 S.E.2d 809 (2016). Evidence sufficient for assault on infant. — Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault, given the defendant’s own admissions to the police that the defendant had shaken the defendant’s love interest’s infant; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s version of events and credit the testimony of the state’s multiple medical experts, as each of the experts testified that the child’s severe injuries were inconsistent with the defendant’s explanation for the injuries. Sullivan v. State, 277 Ga. App. 738, 627 S.E.2d 437 (2006). Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 upon the eight-month-old victim, as a jury could have concluded that the other children, ages four and five, could not have injured the victim; medical testimony indicated that such shaken baby injuries could not have been caused by the other children, and the defendant was the only adult with the child at the time the injuries were allegedly sustained. Mahan v. State, 282 Ga. App. 201, 638 S.E.2d 366 (2006). Evidence that the baby had been in the defendant’s care for more than two hours when the baby died; that in the medical examiner’s opinion, the baby would have died within minutes or hours of suffering a brain injury; and that the autopsy uncovered extensive internal injuries to the baby was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for cruelty to children, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. Graham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 714, 740 S.E.2d 649 (2013). 748 Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children with regard to the skull fracture and other head injuries incurred by the defendant’s infant son because the expert testimony and medical evidence established that the child’s injuries were not accidental but caused by a blow to the head and severe trauma. Oliver v. State, 324 Ga. App. 53, 748 S.E.2d 510 (2013). Assault With Other Objects Knife with two blades each three and one-fourth inches in length was deadly weapon. Powell v. State, 140 Ga. App. 36, 230 S.E.2d 90 (1976). Knives. — Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant’s conviction for burglary, aggravated assault, and two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree based on the evidence adduced at trial that the defendant broke into the adult victim’s apartment through a rear window and attacked the victim, stabbed the adult victim in the neck, dragged the victim down the hall, and stabbed the victim’s hand, and although the defendant put a cloth over the victim’s face at some point, the adult victim saw that the person stabbing the victim in the neck was the defendant, the victim’s ex-boyfriend, and the victim positively and consistently identified the defendant as the perpetrator. White v. State, 319 Ga. App. 530, 737 S.E.2d 324 (2013). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault with a knife and theft by shoplifting based on the testimony of the loss prevention officer, who witnessed the defendant take the watch, and the testimony of both the loss prevention officer and the store manager, who indicated that the defendant had a knife. Broom v. State, 331 Ga. App. 564, 769 S.E.2d 400 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1173, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 520 (Ga. 2015). Defensive use of knife. — O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 does not differentiate between offensive and defensive threats of immediate bodily harm, and a knife may constitute a ‘‘deadly weapon’’ even though the victim was out of striking range and the defendant maintained a defensive pos- 16-5-21 ture. Davis v. State, 184 Ga. App. 230, 361 S.E.2d 229 (1987). Box cutter. — Evidence did not support finding that defendant had committed aggravated assault because the state did not show that a box cutter was a deadly weapon; the state showed only that the defendant hit the victim with the blunt side of a box cutter, inflicting minor injuries, but there was no evidence that the blade was ever exposed or that defendant threatened the victim with an exposed blade. Ware v. State, 289 Ga. App. 860, 658 S.E.2d 441 (2008). Razor blades. — Since the evidence showed the first defendant threatened to cut the victim and hit the victim with a razor blade in the defendant’s hand, there was no error in the denial of the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the aggravated assault charge. Griffin v. State, 292 Ga. 321, 737 S.E.2d 682 (2013). Scissors. — Evidence that the defendant approached the first victim while holding scissors and threatened the victim supported a conviction for aggravated assault. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013). Chain. — Evidence supported defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) where the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, showed that defendant, after being sprayed with pepper spray during a confrontation with a police officer, grabbed a long chain and swung it over defendant’s head while moving toward the officer; defendant’s testimony that defendant had been backing away with the chain raised an issue of credibility for the jury to resolve. Chancey v. State, 258 Ga. App. 319, 574 S.E.2d 383 (2002). Ceramic vase is not per se an offensive or deadly weapon. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984). Table as tool for assault. — Based on the victim’s testimony that the victim was concerned that the victim would be injured by the table the defendant threw at the victim, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the table offensively in a manner that was likely to cause serious bodily injury, supporting the defendant’s 749 Assault With Other Objects (Cont’d) conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Hendrix v. State, 328 Ga. App. 819, 762 S.E.2d 820 (2014). Pencil. — Sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant, a juvenile, had committed an act that would have constituted aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); circumstantial evidence, including cuts on the victim’s face, discovery of the pencil in the vicinity of the assault, and the investigating officer’s testimony, corroborated the victim’s belief that the defendant wielded a broken pencil during the attack. In the Interest of M.V.H., 281 Ga. App. 486, 636 S.E.2d 168 (2006). Pen. — Evidence sufficed to sustain the jury’s determination that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) for stabbing a store manager with a pen because the defendant stabbed the manager with the pen with such force that it bent the pen and broke the manager’s skin, causing bleeding; the jury viewed the weapon and received testimony and photographic evidence about the nature and extent of the victim’s actual injuries and the manner in which the defendant used the pen to stab the manager. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010). Metal cane employed to beat victim’s head sufficiently showed the use of an instrumentality in a way that was likely to cause serious injury, so as to prove aggravated assault. Coney v. State, 209 Ga. App. 9, 432 S.E.2d 812 (1993). Metal objects. — Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) after the defendant’s companions used metal knuckles, a metal pipe, and a gun to beat the victim; the defendant was a party to the offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as the victim, whose testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), testified that, during the incident, the defendant summoned the companions to help beat the victim, and the defendant and the companions repeatedly warned the victim 16-5-21 not to testify in court in the defendant’s criminal case. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. 2007); overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018). Evidence that the defendant threw a punch at the victim, who punched the defendant back and walked away; and that the defendant followed the victim and aggressively swung a metal rod at the victim, who felt threatened enough to go into a residence, was sufficient to adjudicate the defendant delinquent of committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted felony aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. The trial court was authorized to find that it was the victim, not the defendant, who acted in self defense. In the Interest of J. W. B., 296 Ga. App. 131, 673 S.E.2d 630 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because a police officer met with the victim, who identified the defendant as the assailant and told the officer that the defendant had struck the victim with something like a tire iron; the officer found a metal bar that was approximately 18-20 inches long with a 90 degree bend at the end, and at night could have easily been mistaken for a tire iron; the metal bar had a tip on it that was consistent with the shape of the wound on the victim’s head; and a rational jury could have found that the state disproved the defendant’s self-defense claim as all of the testimony presented at trial pointed to the defendant as the initial aggressor who attacked the unarmed victim. Tremblay v. State, 329 Ga. App. 139, 764 S.E.2d 163 (2014). Pry bar. — Testimony indicating that the defendant struck the victim in the head and on the arm with a pry bar, breaking the victim’s arm and pulling the flesh away from the victim’s head, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Mattis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 49, 637 S.E.2d 787 (2006). Iron. — Testimony that defendant struck the victim with a hot iron along with photographs of the wounds were suf- 750 ficient to support finding that defendant used the iron as an offensive weapon. Hill v. State, 230 Ga. App. 395, 496 S.E.2d 526 (1998). Use of a dog can be considered a deadly weapon. Perkins v. State, 197 Ga. App. 577, 398 S.E.2d 702 (1990). Use of a dog. — Officer’s testimony that the defendant yelled to the defendant’s dog ‘‘sic him boy, bite him’’ before the dog attacked the officer was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer. Braziel v. State, 320 Ga. App. 6, 739 S.E.2d 13 (2013). Lit cigarette constituted an offensive weapon likely to cause serious injury when, after defendant doused the victim, a store clerk, with gasoline, the defendant profanely insisted that the victim give the defendant ‘‘the money’’ or the defendant would burn the victim with the cigarette. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (2000). Bludgeon device used as offensive weapon. — When the testimonies of the victim, a doctor, and other witnesses were a sufficient indication under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) of the severity of the blow to show that a bludgeon device was used as an offensive weapon, there was sufficient competent evidence to find defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a) and 16-8-41(a). Garrett v. State, 263 Ga. App. 310, 587 S.E.2d 794 (2003). Assault with a baseball bat. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and attempted robbery; the description of the crimes as they occurred by a witness to a 9-1-1 operator, the 9-1-1 tape transcript of that call, the observations of the police officers who responded to the call of the witness that an African-American person was beating a Hispanic person with a baseball bat while trying to take money out of the Hispanic person’s pockets, and the testimony of the witness at trial was sufficient to overcome evidence that the witness gave a false name to police, that the witness was unable to identify defendant at trial, and that the victim did not testify at trial. Williams v. State, 275 Ga. App. 491, 621 S.E.2d 512 (2005). 16-5-21 Testimony of the state’s witnesses that the defendant struck the victims with a baseball bat, coupled with testimony and photographs depicting the defendants’ injuries, amply supported the defendant’s conviction of two counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Gray v. State, 291 Ga. App. 573, 662 S.E.2d 339 (2008). Wooden plank. — Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal following the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault of a romantic friend as the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant’s friend sustained serious bodily injury as a result of being attacked with a wooden plank with which the defendant struck the friend on the back and head with repeatedly. The testimony and photographs admitted at trial reflected that, as a result of the defendant repeatedly striking the victim with the wooden plank, the victim was bruised on multiple parts of the body and experienced soreness, saw ‘‘stars,’’ and fell to the ground. Reynolds v. State, 294 Ga. App. 213, 668 S.E.2d 846 (2008). Tree limb. — There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant juvenile’s conviction of aggravated assault as the defendant juvenile hit a victim with a ‘‘big old broken tree limb,’’ bruising the victim’s back; whether the tree limb was a deadly weapon under the aggravated assault statute, capable of causing serious bodily injury, was an issue for the factfinder. In the Interest of T.W., 280 Ga. App. 693, 634 S.E.2d 854 (2006). Convictions against the defendant for malice murder, burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault were supported by evidence that the defendant entered the victim’s home, hit the victim multiple times about the head and face with a tree limb with a metal piece on the limb, and wrote a check in defendant’s name from the victim’s checkbook; evidence included witness testimony from the bank where defendant cashed the check, defendant’s confession to police, and physical evidence. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009). Stick and brick. — Evidence that the defendant intentionally struck the victim 751 Assault With Other Objects (Cont’d) with a stick and that either the defendant or one of the other parties to the assault intentionally struck the victim with their fists and a concrete block supported an aggravated assault conviction; further, although the victim was the only person who testified about having been hit with a concrete block, and was not sure which of the attackers struck that blow, this testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was hit with a concrete block because it made no difference whether an accomplice, and not the defendant, assaulted the victim in the manner alleged in the indictment. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63 (2006). Brick. — Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant’s aggravated assault conviction failed because the admission of the victim’s statement to police that the defendant threw a brick at the victim’s vehicle as the victim was driving down the street was not erroneous since the statement was admitted without objection, and an off-duty officer observed glass on the victim and the victim’s sister observed glass and speckles of blood on the victim immediately after the incident. Jones v. State, 321 Ga. App. 900, 743 S.E.2d 557 (2013). Machete. — There was sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant, charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery by maliciously causing bodily harm and serious disfigurement in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), was the person who attacked the victim with a machete; the victim and two other persons identified the defendant, and a witness testified that the defendant told the witness that the defendant had hit a person with a machete after someone threw an object at the defendant’s car. Emberson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 773, 611 S.E.2d 83 (2005). Convictions for theft, aggravated assault, and making a terroristic threat was supported by evidence because the defendant admitted to taking gas cans, raised a machete to scare or strike the defendant’s sibling, the sibling was frightened and 16-5-21 ran, and the defendant then threatened the siblings that if either called the sheriff the defendant would return and kill them. Turner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 535, 615 S.E.2d 603 (2005). Meat cleaver. — Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault in a case where the defendant, an occasional houseguest, became angry at a relative, retrieved a meat cleaver, and attacked the relative, who grabbed a pool cue to in self-defense; the defendant’s conduct amounted to a reasonable imminent threat of the use of deadly force and the relative, under the circumstances, was entitled to use force in defense of habitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23. Robison v. State, 277 Ga. App. 133, 625 S.E.2d 533 (2006). Assault with brick. — Evidence that, after an officer stopped defendant’s car and asked defendant to exit the vehicle, defendant attempted to flee, and, in the ensuing struggle, struck the officer with a brick was sufficient to support defendant’s aggravated assault conviction, as any alleged inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony were for the jury to resolve, rather than an appellate court. Monroe v. State, 273 Ga. App. 14, 614 S.E.2d 172 (2005). Pipe. — Evidence that the defendant struck the victim with a pipe was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault. Bilow v. State, 279 Ga. App. 509, 631 S.E.2d 743 (2006). Metal pipe. — While, at trial, the victim of the defendant’s assault disavowed an initial, pre-trial statement to police and medical personnel that the defendant hit the victim with a metal pipe, the jury was authorized to believe the victim’s pre-trial statement rather than the victim’s in-court disavowal, and sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault, Leonard v. State, 279 Ga. App. 192, 630 S.E.2d 804 (2006). Possession of destructive device offense did not merge with aggravated assault. — Defendant’s aggravated assault convictions and the defendant’s possession of a destructive device convictions did not merge because the possession offense required that the weapon function in a certain way and have certain dimen- 752 sions, and the assault offense required that the victim was conscious of the risk of immediately receiving a violent injury by use of an offensive weapon. Because each offense required proof of a fact not required for the other, there was no merger under the required evidence test. Mason v. State, 312 Ga. App. 723, 719 S.E.2d 581 (2011). Evidence that the defendant approached the victim from behind and struck the victim after the victim received cash in payment for delivering pizza and that the defendant attempted to use an automotive water pump to hit the victim was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Simmons v. State, 342 Ga. App. 853, 805 S.E.2d 615 (2017). Lamp. — When the defendant was accused of felony murder and aggravated assault by throwing a lamp at the victims, because the indictment alleged that the lamp was an object that when used offensively against a person was likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury, an allegation that the lamp was a deadly weapon was not required. Furthermore, the indictment was not too vague as the defendant clearly was apprised that the defendant would have to defend against the allegation that the defendant struck one victim on and about the head with the lamp, and the defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that the defendant had thrown the lamp at the other victim. Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (2008). Glass bowl. — Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because defendant hurled a glass bowl at a motel manager, which caused injuries when the manager raised a hand in front of the manager’s face for protection. Watson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 824, 689 S.E.2d 104 (2009). Beer bottle. — Victim was struck from behind with a beer bottle; the victim’s head was cut, requiring stitches. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because: (1) the victim saw defendant standing close behind the victim af- 16-5-21 ter the blow was struck, and defendant began fighting with the victim; (2) similar transaction evidence showed the defendant’s history of making unprovoked attacks on unsuspecting victims; and (3) a bartender’s testimony that someone else committed the crime was internally inconsistent and uncorroborated. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678 (2008). Defendant’s act of throwing a beer bottle at a deputy sheriff at close range and with such force that the bottle shattered on impact was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that the defendant used a bottle offensively against the officer in a manner likely to have resulted in serious bodily injury within the meaning of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Reese v. State, 303 Ga. App. 871, 695 S.E.2d 326 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., because various gang members including the defendant’s brother and their associate were on the dance floor flashing gang hand signs and dancing roughly, purposefully bumping into other club patrons, and an altercation ensued; the defendant’s brother struck the victim in the back of the victim’s head with a beer bottle; the defendant’s associate and several others struck the victim and punched the victim in the head; when the victim walked toward the exit door, the defendant hit the victim across the face with a bottle; and the victim was taken by ambulance to a hospital. Dowdell v. State, 325 Ga. App. 593, 754 S.E.2d 383 (2014). Unknown object. — Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault for repeatedly cutting a person’s arm. Even though the victim could not identify what kind of weapon inflicted the wound, a treating nurse testified the wound was inflicted by a sharp instrument, like a box cutter, and the victim’s testimony established all the other elements of the offense. Freeman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 496, 678 S.E.2d 97 (2009). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault 753 Assault With Other Objects (Cont’d) based on the defendant’s admission that the defendant hit the victim on the head as well as the testimony of the forensic pathologist, which established that the victim sustained two head injuries as a result of blunt force trauma; that the state was unable to definitively identify the object or instrument that caused the head injuries did not render the evidence insufficient to prove aggravated assault. King v. State, 304 Ga. 349, 818 S.E.2d 612 (2018). Screwdriver. — Evidence showed aggravated assault because the defendant had a long screwdriver in the defendant’s hand, the defendant took a swing at the victim when the victim caught up to the defendant, the victim assumed a fighting stance until the victim noticed the screwdriver and immediately retreated, and the victim did not thereafter try to personally apprehend the defendant but opted to call the police and only trailed the defendant while keeping a safe distance; the jury was not required to view the evidence as the defendant urged. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011). Assault with Intent to Murder Definition of assault with intent to murder is assault without justification and without any circumstances of mitigation made by one person upon another, with a weapon in its nature likely to produce death, with the specific intent at the time unlawfully to take the life of the person assaulted. Killian v. State, 19 Ga. App. 750, 92 S.E. 227 (1917). Elements of assault with intent to murder. — To constitute the offense of assault with intent to murder, there must be an assault by one person upon another, with a weapon likely to produce death in the manner used, the assault must be actuated by malice, either express or implied, and made by a person making the assault with the specific intent to kill the person assaulted. Reddick v. State, 11 Ga. App. 150, 74 S.E. 901 (1912); Griffin v. State, 50 Ga. App. 213, 177 S.E. 511 (1934); Anderson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 98, 179 S.E. 654 (1935); Dennis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 538, 180 S.E. 909 (1935). 16-5-21 On the trial of one indicted for the offense of assault with intent to murder by the use of a deadly weapon, the burden is on the state to show: (1) the assault; (2) the deadly character of the weapon; (3) the intent to take life; and (4) the commission of the assault under such circumstances that, had death ensued, the party making the assault would have been guilty of the offense of murder. Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. App. 374, 192 S.E. 633 (1937). There must be overt act. Jackson v. State, 103 Ga. 417, 30 S.E. 251 (1898). Proof of assault with intent to murder requires proof of all elements of murder except victim’s death. Jackson v. State, 51 Ga. 402 (1874); Caudle v. State, 7 Ga. App. 848, 68 S.E. 343 (1910); Baker v. State, 88 Ga. App. 894, 78 S.E.2d 357 (1953). Evidence must show specific intent to kill person assaulted. — Specific intent to kill is an essential ingredient of the offense of assault with intent to commit murder. Neese v. State, 40 Ga. App. 503, 150 S.E. 451 (1929). One cannot legally be convicted of an assault with intent to murder unless the evidence shows that the assault was committed with the specific intent to kill the person assaulted. Gresham v. State, 46 Ga. App. 54, 166 S.E. 443 (1932). To constitute the offense of assault with intent to murder there must be a specific intent to kill, which is not necessarily or conclusively shown by the use of a weapon likely to produce death. Titshaw v. State, 51 Ga. App. 60, 179 S.E. 641 (1935); Jackson v. State, 99 Ga. App. 740, 109 S.E.2d 886 (1959). Specific intent to kill will not be presumed. — When death ensues from the use of a deadly weapon, a specific intent to kill will be presumed; but when death does not ensue, such an intent will not be presumed. In a charge of assault with intent to murder, proof of the specific intent to kill is a necessary ingredient of the crime. Hawks v. State, 51 Ga. App. 317, 180 S.E. 363 (1935). Single shot assaulting two individuals. — Firing of a single shotgun blast at a car containing two persons in the front seat of the car authorized defendant’s conviction for the offense of aggravated as- 754 sault as to both individuals. Cavender v. State, 208 Ga. App. 61, 429 S.E.2d 711 (1993). Indictment must allege intent to kill. — In an indictment for assault with intent to murder, the intent to kill cannot be implied or inferred by the state, but must be specifically alleged; and the jury may or may not infer such intention from the facts proved. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 97). Indictment sufficient. — Indictment which alleged that defendant assaulted another person ‘‘with a handgun, a deadly weapon’’ was sufficient to inform defendant of the charge defendant had to defend, and the trial court properly overruled defendant’s special demurrer alleging that the indictment was deficient because it did not specify whether defendant committed the assault by shooting the victim, pointing the gun at the victim, or beating the victim with the gun. Arthur v. State, 275 Ga. 790, 573 S.E.2d 44 (2002). Allegation that act was committed ‘‘with malice aforethought’’ is not equivalent to allegation of ‘‘intent to kill,’’ which must be specifically alleged in an indictment for assault with intent to murder. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932). Intent to kill may be gathered from circumstances and is jury question. — Existence of intent to murder is matter of fact to be ascertained by the jury from all the evidence before the jury, and not a matter for legal inference or presumption. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932). Intention of the defendant is a question for determination by the jury under the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence. Vickery v. State, 48 Ga. App. 851, 174 S.E. 155 (1934). While the intent to kill is not conclusively shown by the use of a weapon likely to produce death, such intent may be gathered from circumstances and is a matter for the determination of the jury. Griffin v. State, 50 Ga. App. 213, 177 S.E. 511 (1934); Dennis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 538, 180 S.E. 909 (1935); Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. App. 374, 192 S.E. 633 (1937). 16-5-21 In prosecution for assault with intent to murder, the court, in passing upon the intent, may take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case at the time of the attack, and also the nature of the wound inflicted. Breland v. State, 80 Ga. App. 575, 56 S.E.2d 921 (1949). Proving intent. — Intent to kill may be established by proving, to satisfaction of jury, reckless disregard of human life. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932). Intent to kill may be inferred. — While to authorize a conviction for assault with intent to murder a deliberate intent to kill must be shown at the time of the assault, such intent may be inferred by the jury from the nature of the instrument used in making the assault, the manner of its use, and the nature of the wounds inflicted. Reece v. State, 60 Ga. App. 195, 3 S.E.2d 229 (1939); Tanner v. State, 86 Ga. App. 767, 72 S.E.2d 549 (1952). Jury may consider brutality and duration of assault as circumstances from which intent to kill may be inferred. Reece v. State, 60 Ga. App. 195, 3 S.E.2d 229 (1939). Evidence sufficient to show intent. — When the defendant was tried for aggravated assault with intent to murder after biting a police officer, the jury’s finding of ‘‘intent to murder’’ was supported by evidence that the defendant sucked up excess sputum before biting the officer — this being evidence of a deliberate, thinking act rather than purely spontaneous — and that the defendant laughed when the officer asked the defendant if the defendant had AIDS. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991). Evidence was sufficient to adjudicate a juvenile a delinquent for aggravated assault with intent to murder when: (1) the juvenile was willingly present when the victim was beaten and stabbed; (2) the juvenile was part of a group carrying bricks, sticks, and bats on a mission of revenge; and (3) the juvenile fled the crime scene and gave police false information moments after the incident, because, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, whether the juvenile actually stabbed the victim was 755 Assault with Intent to Murder (Cont’d) not controlling, as the juvenile was an accomplice of those who did, and it could be inferred from the juvenile’s conduct before and after the crime that the juvenile shared the perpetrators’ criminal intent. In the Interest of N.L.G., 267 Ga. App. 428, 600 S.E.2d 401 (2004). Jury was authorized to find that the defendant intended to murder a kidnapping victim since the defendant strangled the victim after the defendant’s spouse told the defendant to get rid of the victim, the defendant’s conduct caused the victim to lose consciousness and created such pressure in the victim’s neck that both eyes hemorrhaged, and the defendant then threw the victim into the back of the defendant’s car trunk and drove away. Moody v. State, 279 Ga. App. 440, 631 S.E.2d 485 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for malice murder and assault as: (1) the defendant told a first witness that the defendant had killed a man; (2) the defendant had tried to sell the victim’s car; (3) the defendant admitted to police that the defendant had the key to the victim’s car; and (4) the defendant told a fellow prisoner that the defendant and an accomplice strangled the victim, beat the victim, stabbed the victim, cut the victim’s throat, and tore out the victim’s fingernails. Richard v. State, 281 Ga. 401, 637 S.E.2d 406 (2006). Reasonable jury was entitled to find that the defendant acted with the intent to kill the victim, as required to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with the intent to murder, based on the fact that the defendant lured the victim down a secluded path while arguing with the victim and repeatedly kicked and struck the victim with tree limbs so that the victim could barely walk. Gipson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 309, 772 S.E.2d 402 (2015). Aggravated assault merged into felony murder. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault based on the non-fatal beating of the victim where: (1) the victim had been beaten, but had died from stran- 16-5-21 gulation; (2) the victim’s clothing was found in defendant’s apartment complex’s trash bin; and (3) the victim’s DNA was present in blood on defendant’s bedspread. Thus, the aggravated assault conviction merged into the felony murder conviction; however, a Separate aggravated assault conviction based on the non-fatal beating of the victim did not merge. Scott v. State, 276 Ga. 195, 576 S.E.2d 860 (2003). Erroneous charge to jury that assault with intent to murder linked to possibility of murder conviction. — Charge to jury that if it finds that defendant would have been guilty of murder if victim of assault had died (which the victim did not) that defendant would now be guilty of assault with intent to murder is erroneous, but it is not always reversible error to give such charge. Bradford v. State, 69 Ga. App. 856, 26 S.E.2d 848 (1943). Failure to charge jury on law of assault with intent to murder when victim died of wounds. — When in trial for murder, whether or not the evidence demanded a finding that the deceased died of a wound inflicted by defendant, it showed conclusively and without dispute that the deceased died as a result of a wound or wounds inflicted by one or more of the persons jointly indicted, the court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the law of assault with intent to murder. Fudge v. State, 190 Ga. 340, 9 S.E.2d 259 (1940). Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault conviction. — Evidence that the defendant shot the victim with a gun in a dispute over money the victim allegedly owed to the defendant was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault as it showed the defendant used a deadly weapon to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. Render v. State, 257 Ga. App. 477, 571 S.E.2d 493 (2002). Maximum sentence properly imposed. — When the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, theft by taking, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly imposed a 111-year sentence of imprisonment, which was within the statutory limits and which 756 was the maximum possible. The presumption of vindictiveness was absent when a trial court imposed a greater penalty after trial than the court would have after a guilty plea; furthermore, the trial court explained that the court imposed the sentence because the defendant’s actions were life-threatening, because the jury convicted the defendant of entering the dwelling with intent to commit murder, because the defendant’s actions against one victim, the defendant’s parent, had escalated from the defendant’s previous misdemeanor crimes against the parent, and because the defendant displayed no remorse. Townes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 185, 679 S.E.2d 772 (2009). Defendant properly sentenced for attempted murder rather than aggravated assault. — Defendant’s appeal from the defendant’s conviction of attempted murder, in which the defendant argued that the law was ambiguous about whether the defendant’s attempt to kill the defendant’s wife was punishable as attempted murder or only as aggravated assault, was res judicata and barred the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus; contrary to the defendant’s argument, there was no change in the law because McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282 (2013) applying the rule of lenity when there was ambiguity between two felony punishments, was dictated by the Supreme Court’s own precedents. Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557, 784 S.E.2d 341 (2016). Assault with Intent to Rob Offender may be convicted of assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to rob where the evidence supports an intent to murder and an intent to rob. Under the provisions of the state Constitution they are not the same offenses, although they include the same occasion, time, and place. Martin v. State, 77 Ga. App. 297, 48 S.E.2d 485 (1948). Assault with intent to rob person of money may be committed though person assaulted may not have money in their pocket, or on person, at the time and place the crime is attempted. Alexander v. State, 66 Ga. App. 708, 19 S.E.2d 353 (1942). 16-5-21 No fatal variance. — Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault was affirmed since there was not a fatal variance between the evidence and the indictment, which alleged that the defendant unlawfully made an assault with intent to rob, with a knife, by holding the knife in a threatening manner while demanding money; the defendant was a conspirator in an armed robbery and the demands for money could be attributed to the defendant as the defendant entered the apartment without permission and held the knife at the defendant’s side with the blade exposed as the defendant’s partner demanded money, and the victims were afraid that the defendant ‘‘would do something.’’ Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 523, 636 S.E.2d 709 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0168, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 99 (Ga. 2007). No merger of related offenses. — As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by refusing to merge the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004). There was sufficient evidence to uphold a defendant’s convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the fatal shootings of two men, and the wounding of four other men, as the jury was authorized to accept an accomplice’s version of events, including that robbery was the initial motive and that the defendant fired the shots that killed and wounded the victims. The fact that conflicts in the evidence were resolved adversely to the defendant did not render the evidence insufficient and there was ample evidence that the defendant acted with implied malice, therefore, there was no error in determining that the killings were malice murders rather than felony murders. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 668, 653 S.E.2d 28 (2007). Defendant was properly denied merger of a charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery and aggravated assault of a store victim as the offense of attempted armed robbery under, inter alia, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 was complete when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim and 757 Assault with Intent to Rob (Cont’d) aggravated assault occurred when the victim was struck in the face with the gun. Stubbs v. State, 293 Ga. App. 692, 667 S.E.2d 905 (2008). Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant for aggravated assault of a victim, one with a deadly weapon and the other with intent to rob, because under the case law test, the two crimes did not merge since aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof of a fact (the intent to rob) that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of a fact (the use of a deadly weapon) that aggravated assault with intent to rob does not. Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (2013). Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant for both aggravated assault with intent to rob and felony murder because the aggravated assault with intent to rob charge required the state to prove that the defendant had the intent to rob, which the state did not need to prove for the felony murder conviction based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the felony murder count required the state to prove that the defendant caused the death of the victim and used a deadly weapon, neither of which the state had to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with intent to rob. Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (2013). Because the crime of aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a gun was the underlying felony for the defendant’s felony murder conviction, it should have merged for sentencing purposes; however, the conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rob, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), did not merge into the felony murder conviction because the felony murder charge required proof that the defendant caused the victim’s death and used a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1(c) and 16-5-21(a)(2). Norris v. State, 302 Ga. 802, 809 S.E.2d 752 (2018). Merger required. — Because all of the facts used to prove the offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob were used up in proving the armed robbery, merger was required. Mercer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 606, 658 S.E.2d 173 (2008). 16-5-21 Because the assault element of a defendant’s aggravated assault with intent to rob conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) was contained within the ‘‘use of an offensive weapon’’ element of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, and both crimes shared the ‘‘intent to rob’’ element, the defendant’s aggravated assault conviction merged into the armed robbery conviction. Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825 (2010). Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction should have merged into defendant’s armed robbery conviction for sentencing purposes because the defendant’s use of the defendant’s handgun against the victim was the same conduct in both offenses, designed to immobilize the victim while the victim was robbed. The aggravated assault was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the armed robbery. Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 702 S.E.2d 731 (2010). Defendants’ robbery and aggravated assault convictions, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and 16-8-40, merged because, while aggravated assault did not require taking property from another, aggravated assault was proved by the same or less than all facts required to show robbery, as the assault forming the basis of the aggravated assault with intent to rob, which was pointing a pistol at the victim, was ‘‘contained within’’ the element of robbery requiring the defendants to have used force, intimidation, threat or coercion, or placed the victim in fear of immediate serious bodily injury. Washington v. State, 310 Ga. App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (2011). Because the victim was still being pistol whipped while the men asked the victim what the victim had and took the victim’s wallet and cell phone, the robbery by use of a handgun was completed at the same place and approximately the same time as the aggravated assault with a handgun; thus, the timing of the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated assault with intent to rob did not preclude their merger. Curtis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015). Because the ‘‘assault’’ element of aggravated assault with intent to rob is contained within the ‘‘use of an offensive 758 weapon’’ element of armed robbery and both crimes share the ‘‘intent to rob’’ element, there is no element of aggravated assault with intent to rob that is not contained in armed robbery, and the offenses merge. Curtis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015). Defendant’s testimony sufficient to authorize conviction. — Where defendant testified that codefendant conceived of the robbery without defendant’s knowledge or participation and that only the codefendant was armed, defendant did acknowledge pretending to have a gun and giving orders to the store occupants, defendant’s own testimony was sufficient to authorize a conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault, and insufficient to support a defense of coercion. House v. State, 203 Ga. App. 55, 416 S.E.2d 108, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 108 (1992). Different jury decisions supported. — Defendant’s conviction was based on direct evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence; the jury’s decision on the gun charge did not alter the fact that the aggravated assault charge was well-supported by the record. Murray v. State, 256 Ga. App. 736, 569 S.E.2d 636 (2002). Evidence sufficient for conviction of robbery and assault. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendants’ convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated battery. Autry v. State, 230 Ga. App. 773, 498 S.E.2d 304 (1998). Ample evidence supported defendant’s convictions of two counts of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and one count of aggravated assault in violation O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2), where defendant was identified by defendant’s companions in statements to the police, and also by two victims at trial, as the person who drove with the three companions to a store and, while pointing a gun at the various victims, robbed one person of money and lottery tickets, demanded and obtained money from a second person and shot that person, demanded money from the second person’s spouse, and then fled with the three companions. Bates v. State, 259 Ga. App. 232, 576 S.E.2d 619 (2003). 16-5-21 Defendant was properly found guilty of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, aggravated assault with intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 where the footprints observed along the path between the crime scene and the area where defendant was apprehended matched the size and soles of defendant’s shoes and defendant was identified as the robber based on defendant’s clothing, shoes and ‘‘build.’’ Mack v. State, 263 Ga. App. 186, 587 S.E.2d 132 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies because the only evidence of coercion came from defendant personally. To disprove the coercion defense, the victim testified that defendant did not appear nervous, that the robbery occurred very quickly, with no ‘‘fumbling’’ or ‘‘bumbling’’ on defendant’s part, and that defendant commented that the defendant was robbing the victim because the defendant needed a place to stay. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault as defendant approached a fast food manager in a parking lot, demanded money at gunpoint, and shot the victim in a struggle; the victim and the victim’s spouse identified defendant as the assailant. Clark v. State, 271 Ga. App. 534, 610 S.E.2d 165 (2005). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as: (1) defendant and codefendant tried to convince a victim to participate in a fake armed robbery; (2) defendant told the victim that they would take the bullets out of the gun if it would make the victim feel better; (3) defendant watched over the victim while codefendant retrieved the gun; (4) defendant informed the victim that the victim would not get hurt if the victim cooperated with codefendant; and (5) defendant left in the car with codefendant. Broome v. State, 273 Ga. App. 273, 614 S.E.2d 807 (2005). Because the person who stole the vic- 759 Assault with Intent to Rob (Cont’d) tim’s vehicle had a distinctive hairstyle, and the defendant, who had the same hairstyle, was apprehended while in possession of the vehicle soon after the crime was committed, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault with intent to rob in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possessing a firearm during commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Hall v.