Hopkins v

State, 255 Ga. App. 202, 564 S.E.2d 805 (2002). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery as it showed that defendant was upset with the victim and wanted to confront the victim, defendant did in fact confront the victim while the victim was sitting in the victim’s car, defendant had an angry and hostile demeanor during the confrontation, defendant started the verbal and physical confrontation, and defendant seriously disfigured the victim who sustained multiple cut wounds, including cuts to the head that took 30 staples to close. Campbell v. State, 258 Ga. App. 863, 575 S.E.2d 748 (2002). Trial court properly rejected the defendant’s contention that an aggravated battery conviction had to be reversed, as the stabbing left no part of the victim’s body seriously disfigured, given the victim’s testimony that: (1) the victim was hospitalized for three days; (2) the stabbing had violated the victim’s skin and fatty tissue and exposed the sternum; (3) the tip of the knife used penetrated the sternum or had slipped to the side of the sternum and then punctured the tissues immediately underneath the sternum; and (4) for a month after the incident, the victim suffered intermittent shortness of breath and heavy chest pain; and that for about eight months, the victim was unable to work a job as a machine operator cutting metal. Parnell v. State, 280 Ga. App. 665, 634 S.E.2d 763 (2006). Testimony indicating that the defendant struck the victim in the head and on the arm with a pry bar, breaking the victim’s arm and pulling the flesh away from the victim’s head, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Mattis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 49, 637 S.E.2d 787 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated battery under OC.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) because the record showed that defendant cut a deep gash across the victim’s abdomen using a knife with a 3.5 inch blade, stabbed the victim two more times, and then chased the vic- 831 Application (Cont’d) tim as the victim fled. Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga. App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (2009). Burn injuries sufficient for aggravated battery conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that the defendant caused the victim to sustain visible, severe burns and large hypertrophic scars on the victim’s skin, which required ongoing surgeries and corrective procedures; because the evidence established that the defendant caused the victim’s skin to be seriously disfigured, burned, and scarred, the aggravated battery conviction was authorized. Wells v. State, 309 Ga. App. 661, 710 S.E.2d 860 (2011). Injury to jaw sufficient for aggravated battery conviction. — Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of aggravated battery because the evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blows rendered the victim’s mouth and jaw useless and that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt; the victim testified that the victim’s jaw did not function normally after the victim was injured. Tidwell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 468, 718 S.E.2d 808 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0473, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. 2012). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home; (2) the defendant stabbed the ex-girlfriend’s current boyfriend in the spine with a knife, paralyzing him; (3) the defendant cut his ex-girlfriend with a knife on the back of her head, on the side of her face, on her shoulder and back, and stabbed her in the stomach; and (4) the ex-girlfriend continued to bear scars from the knife attack. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012). Victim’s testimony that the victim and the defendant were fighting, the defendant left the room and later returned with 16-5-24 gun that the defendant held to the victim’s side, and the victim heard gunshot and turned to face the defendant, who told the victim that the defendant had been meaning to do that and ran, supported the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and possession of firearm during the commission of a felony. Jones v. State, 326 Ga. App. 151, 756 S.E.2d 267 (2014). Evidence that, for several months after the shooting, the victim struggled to write and to care for the victim, had to rely on another person for help in tasks such as cooking and bathing, and had to undergo physical therapy, authorized the defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery. Smith v. State, 328 Ga. App. 863, 763 S.E.2d 251 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery as the combined injuries to the victim’s face, eyes, head, hands, and feet constituted serious disfigurement because the victim testified that the defendant repeatedly slapped and hit the victim, kicked the victim in the stomach, hit the victim in the back with a large bureau mirror, punched the victim in the nose, beat the victim with a gun, choked the victim, and dragged the victim around with an arm around the victim’s throat; the victim’s face was bruised and swollen, and one eye was swollen shut; the victim’s hands were bruised and swollen from the beating; and the victim’s feet were cut from walking on glass the defendant had broken. Levin v. State, 334 Ga. App. 71, 778 S.E.2d 238 (2015). Evidence that the victim suffered a concussion and sustained a wound on the victim’s face that took months to close up and left a dime-sized scar authorized the jury to conclude that the victim suffered more than a superficial wound and supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery. Shaw v. State, 340 Ga. App. 749, 798 S.E.2d 344 (2017). Evidence that the defendant shot at a man who laughed when the defendant yelled anyone selling drugs in the neighborhood would have to give the defendant a commission, and then began shooting and hit two others was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggra- 832 vated battery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 883, 802 S.E.2d 713 (2017). Introduction of civil lawsuit in criminal proceeding. — Defendant’s malice murder and aggravated battery convictions were upheld on appeal as the trial court did not err in introducing into evidence the pleadings filed in a civil lawsuit brought by defendant against the victim and others as the evidence was introduced to show the defendant’s motive or state of mind. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 44, 644 S.E.2d 850 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128 S. Ct. 384, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2007). Statute sufficient to give due notice of prohibited acts causing serious disfigurement. — When there was evidence that the defendant hit the defendant’s mother-in-law, breaking her nose; that the defendant hit her repeatedly; that the results of the defendant’s beating were severe, extensive bruises throughout the face and eyes, and forehead with deep lacerations at the bridge of her nose, her right brow, and her left temple, with arterial bleeding flowing from the final laceration; and, that the totality of the injuries required approximately 25 stitches, the prohibition in former Code 1933, § 26-1305 against maliciously causing bodily harm to another by seriously disfiguring the person’s body gave the defendant due notice that the statute prohibited the acts for which defendant was convicted. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24). Evidence sufficient for aggravated battery of officer. — Because sufficient evidence was presented showing that the defendant cut a correctional officer’s face with either a razor blade or other sharp object, requiring more than 150 stitches and cosmetic surgery to repair, the defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery upon a correctional officer were upheld on appeal. White v. State, 289 Ga. App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 567 (2008). Evidence that the defendant was angry, yelled at and argued with officers, jumped and thrashed about and threw the defen- 16-5-24 dant backward against the officers, and then turned a shoulder into the chief and fell onto the chief ’s leg was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant committed aggravated battery. Lidy v. State, 335 Ga. App. 517, 782 S.E.2d 302 (2016). Knowledge that victim was officer is essential element. — Charge was inadequate, and the convictions of the indictment were vacated when the court defined the elements of the charges of aggravated assault and aggravated battery without any reference to the element of defendant’s knowledge that the victim was a police officer. Chandler v. State, 204 Ga. App. 816, 421 S.E.2d 288 (1992). Exclusion of evidence relevant to exculpatory theories as reversible error. — When defendant was convicted of seriously disfiguring the body of the victim, evidence that the victim had previously attacked defendant’s spouse during a custody hearing in court and evidence that a major part of the harm done to the victim was the result, not of defendant’s fist, but of the foot of defendant’s spouse, was relevant to the issues raised by exculpatory theories, and exclusion of such evidence constituted reversible error. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980). Evidence of victim’s alcoholism. — Defendant’s convictions of aggravated battery and simple battery were affirmed as the trial court properly refused to admit evidence of the victim’s alcoholism prior to the victim’s involvement with the defendant when the defendant failed to show any nexus between the victim’s alcoholism and the conclusion that the victim had falsely accused the defendant of battery. Harris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 329, 587 S.E.2d 819 (2003). Evidence of victim’s conduct not admitted. — In a defendant’s trial for aggravated battery against a victim more than 65 years of age in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and (d), evidence that the victim had fondled the defendant’s genitals when the defendant was 15 was not admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404) to support the defendant’s claim of justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Strozier v. State, 300 Ga. App. 199, 685 S.E.2d 743 (2009). 833 Application (Cont’d) Conduct outside scope of involuntary manslaughter. — Whether the conduct of an accused is lawful at the outset, e.g., in self-defense or unlawful, where what takes place thereafter discloses felonious conduct in committing either an aggravated assault with an instrument likely to produce death or an aggravated battery which causes the death of another, such conduct is not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter. Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974). Aggravated assault occurring after aggravated battery. — When defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated battery under an indictment as to aggravated assault alleging that defendant aided, abetted, advised, and encouraged defendant’s son to shoot the victim, this occurred prior to the aggravated battery, and there is no evidence that after the victim was shot, defendant advised and encouraged the son to kill the victim, but in fact, prevented the son from doing so, it was error to sentence defendant for both offenses, and the sentence as to aggravated assault with intent to murder must be set aside. Overstreet v. State, 182 Ga. App. 809, 357 S.E.2d 103 (1987). No merger of related offenses. — Trial court did not err in failing to merge aggravated battery and armed robbery convictions. The evidence needed to prove each charge was entirely different, as one charge demanded evidence that the defendant shot and seriously disfigured the victim, while the other required proof that the defendant took money from the victim at gunpoint. Smashum v. State, 293 Ga. App. 41, 666 S.E.2d 549 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 952 (Ga. 2008). Sufficient evidence of requisite criminal intent. — Appellate court rejected the defendant’s claim that insufficient evidence with respect to the requisite criminal intent failed to support an aggravated battery conviction, as the jury could infer intent by: (1) the defendant’s act of twisting the victim’s head all the way around to the left and slamming it towards the car floorboard; (2) the fact that the incident occurred during a heated argument that extended over several 16-5-24 hours and had previously resulted in physical violence towards the victim; (3) the defendant’s refusal to take the victim to a hospital or call the victim’s mother after the incident; (4) the defendant’s subsequent flight from law enforcement; and (5) evidence of two prior similar transactions admitted against the defendant involving assaults on a previous girlfriend. Collins v. State, 283 Ga. App. 188, 641 S.E.2d 208 (2007). Evidence sufficient to support conviction. — Evidence sufficient to sustain convictions of arson in the first degree and two counts of aggravated battery. Rhodes v. State, 187 Ga. App. 218, 370 S.E.2d 219 (1988); Williams v. State, 187 Ga. App. 355, 370 S.E.2d 210 (1988). Testimony by the victim, in which the victim positively identified defendant as the man who entered the victim’s home, and committed the crimes of robbery by intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated battery and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, charged in the indictment and eyewitness testimony that defendant entered the victim’s premises minutes before the attack of the victim was sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding that defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of committing the crimes charged in the indictment. Mobley v. State, 211 Ga. App. 709, 441 S.E.2d 73 (1994). Evidence was sufficient to support defendants’ convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated battery. Autry v. State, 230 Ga. App. 773, 498 S.E.2d 304 (1998). Proof that defendant’s unjustified and malicious blows to the victim’s head caused memory lapses and permanent nerve damage is sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant committed aggravated battery by depriving the victim of a member of the victim’s body. Scott v. State, 243 Ga. App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (2000). Evidence showing that the victim, defendant’s son, was subjected to unspeakable abuse at defendant’s hands, and that the victim suffered a broken arm, amply supported defendant’s aggravated battery conviction. Mashburn v. State, 244 Ga. App. 524, 536 S.E.2d 208 (2000). 834 Evidence that defendant struck the victim in the face with such force that defendant suffered a broken jaw was sufficient to support conviction. Ellis v. State, 245 Ga. App. 807, 539 S.E.2d 184 (2000). Appellate court found that when a victim positively identified defendant as the person who came to the residence where the victim was visiting, assaulted and coerced the victim into showing defendant where certain drugs and money were stashed in the residence, and then dragged the victim to the backyard where defendant slit the victim’s throat twice and left the victim for dead, the evidence sufficed to sustain an aggravated battery conviction. Kelly v. State, 255 Ga. App. 813, 567 S.E.2d 36 (2002). Evidence that defendant intentionally stabbed a man with a knife, causing a wound that required 100 stitches and that left a scar on the victim’s side, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Townsend v. State, 256 Ga. App. 837, 570 S.E.2d 47 (2002). Since the state proved that defendant committed aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), by rendering the victim’s brain useless and by depriving the victim of a brain through defendant’s punches and kicks, the conviction was upheld. Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 571 S.E.2d 788 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1004, 123 S. Ct. 1911, 155 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated stalking and aggravated battery as the defendant’s spouse had just parked at a supermarket when the defendant ran a vehicle into the spouse’s vehicle, the defendant then approached the spouse, threatened to kill the spouse, opened the door, grabbed and twisted the spouse’s wrist, and punched the spouse’s nose, breaking the nose; on the date of the incident, a permanent protective order was in effect prohibiting the defendant from contacting the spouse or the spouse’s family, or touching or damaging their property. Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (2003). Evidence that the defendant, a convicted felon, accompanied the victim to a store with the codefendant; shot the vic- 16-5-24 tim in the head with a handgun that the defendant had in defendant’s possession thereby, causing a wound in which the victim lost one eye; and along with the codefendant took all the victim’s money was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003); Griggs v. State, 264 Ga. App. 636, 592 S.E.2d 168 (2003). Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts against defendant for false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and simple assault in regard to acts of domestic violence against the victim, defendant’s spouse, as the evidence showed that defendant dragged the spouse down a hallway by the spouse’s hair and held the spouse in a bedroom against the spouse’s will, that defendant broke the spouse’s nose and arm, and that defendant beat the spouse with a car-washing brush. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. App. 486, 585 S.E.2d 913 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support convictions against defendant for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, when the victim identified defendant from a pre-trial photograph and from in-court identification, a codefendant and a witness testified against defendant, and the gun used to shoot the victim was found near the car with shell casings in the car. Dunn v. State, 262 Ga. App. 643, 586 S.E.2d 352 (2003). Evidence that defendant, the estranged spouse of the victim, shot the victim twice and caused the spouse to be paralyzed from the neck down was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery. Colbert v. State, 263 Ga. App. 193, 587 S.E.2d 300 (2003). Evidence in the form of testimony from defendant’s accomplices that defendant repeatedly struck the victim in the face while asking the victim ‘‘where the money was’’ and choked the victim when the victim could not immediately find the money in the victim’s truck after defendant took the victim to the truck because the victim told defendant that the money was there, coupled with defendant’s pos- 835 Application (Cont’d) session of the victim’s beeper, was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated battery. Rutledge v. State, 263 Ga. App. 308, 587 S.E.2d 808 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of causing the victim’s death while committing an aggravated battery against the victim, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1(c) and 16-5-24, because defendant was seen walking toward the residence defendant shared with the victim, after a neighbor had called the police to report a disturbance there, carrying a gas can that appeared to be heavy, and, therefore, not empty, after which the victim was seen on the porch of the residence, in flames, and defendant, who was sitting on the porch, refused the requests of passersby attempting to give the victim assistance by providing a blanket to smother the flames, which caused the victim’s death shortly thereafter. Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 579 S.E.2d 728 (2003). Defendant’s attempt to invoke the circumstantial evidence rule of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) was rejected, and the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery, as the evidence was not entirely circumstantial when there was direct evidence that: (1) the defendant said that the defendant was going to set the victim on fire; (2) defendant was present and poured the gasoline on the victim; (3) defendant reached in defendant’s pocket for something just before the fire started; and (4) the victim questioned why defendant had done it. Miller v. State, 265 Ga. App. 402, 593 S.E.2d 943 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as the evidence showed that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen and the arm with a gun and that defendant intended to cause serious physical harm and disfigurement to the victim. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004). 16-5-24 Because defendant shot the victim in the buttocks, rendering the victim’s rectum and a portion of the victim’s colon useless for a period of time, the evidence sufficed to sustain an aggravated battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Parham v. State, 270 Ga. App. 54, 606 S.E.2d 79 (2004). Victim was shot while running away from the victim’s home following an armed robbery, and although the codefendant testified that the codefendant accidentally shot the victim, the victim’s testimony showed that both perpetrators fought with the victim inside the victim’s home and that after the victim was shot, both perpetrators struggled over the gun, and one of the defendant’s said, ‘‘Kill him’’; sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s aggravated battery conviction. Daniel v. State, 271 Ga. App. 539, 610 S.E.2d 90 (2005). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2), 16-5-24, 16-5-40, and 16-11-106, respectively, were supported by the evidence, as the defendant was engaged in a domestic dispute with the defendant’s spouse and child, wherein the defendant argued, threatened to kill them, and locked them in a bathroom, punched and hit the spouse, and stabbed them each multiple times with a decorative sword that the defendant removed from the wall; there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant did not stab them in the midst of a struggle over possession of the sword, but instead, that the defendant intended to stab or cut them. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer because defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that defendant was a ‘‘federal agent,’’ fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim’s thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the 836 same person’s mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified defendant as the user of the shotgun, and defendant’s DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and defendant’s fingerprints were found on the car. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005). Defendant’s conviction as a party for aggravated assault and aggravated battery was affirmed as: (1) the defendant drove a car knowing a gun was inside; (2) the defendant extinguished the headlights and drove slowly past a crowded corner as a passenger opened fire; (3) the defendant stopped the car next to a prone victim while the passenger continued shooting; and (4) the defendant told the police that the defendant did not care who had been shot. Ford v. State, 280 Ga. App. 580, 634 S.E.2d 522 (2006). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by evidence that: (1) the victim and the defendant had an acrimonious relationship; (2) the defendant threatened to hit the victim with a jug; and (3) the defendant’s statement that the victim was not ‘‘dead yet’’ after the victim was shot in the back; the jury could reject the defendant’s claim that the defendant fired a warning shot away from the victim and could convict the defendant, even though the victim did not see the defendant point the gun at the victim. Rowe v. State, 280 Ga. App. 881, 635 S.E.2d 251 (2006). Victim’s prior statements to a responding police officer and to an investigator that the defendant beat the victim, photographs of the victim’s injuries, and evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim constituted sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Meeks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 334, 636 S.E.2d 77 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery as there was evidence supporting an inference that the victim’s first wound was non-fatal, as the victim managed to flee a short distance into a neighbor’s yard before suc- 16-5-24 cumbing to the gunfire; the trial court was not required to grant the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the aggravated battery charge, and the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to consider the crime of aggravated battery as an aggravating circumstance of the murder. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006). Aggravated battery and obstruction or hindering an emergency telephone call convictions were upheld on appeal, despite a change in the victim’s story, as the injuries sustained were consistent with the victim’s original statements, foundational requirements supported the admission of hearsay statements regarding the injuries, the victim’s actual written inconsistent statement was properly withheld from the jury, and a mistrial was unwarranted. Buchanan v. State, 282 Ga. App. 298, 638 S.E.2d 436 (2006). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a), 16-5-24(a), and 16-5-70(b) for participating in a drive-by shooting were supported by sufficient evidence because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) and it was the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; based on the testimony of the witnesses to the shooting, a reasonable jury could have rejected the defendant’s claims and determined that the defendant was a party to each of the crimes. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006). Defendant’s aggravated battery conviction was upheld on appeal based on: (1) sufficient evidence showing that the victim lost the use of an elbow when the elbow was broken during the beating with the defendant; (2) the trial court’s proper jury instructions as to the offense; and (3) counsel’s representation at trial, which was not made ineffective due to a failure to object to certain testimony. Walls v. State, 283 Ga. App. 560, 642 S.E.2d 195 (2007). There was sufficient evidence that a victim had been deprived of the use of the victim’s extremities under O.C.G.A. 837 Application (Cont’d) § 16-5-24(a) when the victim’s doctor testified that the victim would not regain full mobility of the victim’s arm or hand and would likely suffer from arthritis for the rest of the victim’s life, the bones in the victim’s arm had been broken into several pieces, the victim had been immobilized by a fixation device, a cast, and a splint, and the victim had spent a month in the hospital with the victim’s extremities in restrictive devices. McClain v. State, 284 Ga. App. 187, 643 S.E.2d 273 (2007). Defendant’s convictions for malice murder, aggravated battery, burglary, and violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully possessing cocaine and marijuana were supported by sufficient evidence; the defendant walked into a neighbor’s house with a butcher knife in each hand and stabbed two people, knives found in the woods behind the defendant’s apartment matched the descriptions of those used in the stabbings and had deoxyribonucleic acid matching the defendant’s, two knives were missing from a knife block in the defendant’s apartment, marijuana and cocaine were found in the apartment, the defendant told a friend that the defendant had ‘‘hurt some people really bad,’’ and three eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the assailant. Swanson v. State, 282 Ga. 39, 644 S.E.2d 845 (2007). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, and aggravated battery as: the defendant had been seen fleeing the victim’s home in a car registered to the defendant; the defendant told the defendant’s spouse to discard the defendant’s bloody clothing; the defendant sought treatment at a hospital after being shot during the crimes; and the defendant had initiated conversations in which the defendant described the actions of the defendant’s companions in discarding guns used in the crimes and offered to reveal the names of the companions in exchange for not being charged with murder. Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007). Since the evidence presented at the de- 16-5-24 fendant’s trial showed, and the defendant admitted, that the defendant was holding a gun that shot the defendant’s boyfriend in the neck and paralyzed him, and there was no evidence presented indicating that the act of shooting the boyfriend was in self-defense, sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. Worthy v. State, 286 Ga. App. 77, 648 S.E.2d 682 (2007). Aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions were upheld on appeal as: (1) sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim; (2) two photographs were properly admitted as innocuous demonstrative aids to show the scene of the crime and the defendant’s location; and (3) the trial court did not improperly give the court’s opinion about the evidence, but merely attempted to clarify the state’s position. Whitaker v. State, 287 Ga. App. 465, 652 S.E.2d 568 (2007). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant told the victim, who had walked into a common hallway in the defendant’s apartment building, to leave, went inside, retrieved a gun, and shot the victim twice after the victim refused to leave, and then shot at the victim while the victim was fleeing. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 435, 657 S.E.2d 333 (2008). Because sufficient evidence of the defendant’s attack on the victim, repeatedly stabbing the victim and rendering the victim’s wrist useless, supported an aggravated battery charge, and the defendant was adequately put on notice of the charge by the indictment, a conviction on that charge was supported by the evidence. Thus, a conviction based on this evidence did not violate due process. Goss v. State, 289 Ga. App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (2008). There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary when the victim unhesitatingly identified the defendant as one of the people who attacked the victim with a bat or a pipe; the victim’s roommate was about ‘‘70 percent sure’’ 838 that the defendant was one of the attackers; the defendant came to the victim’s door earlier in the evening and told someone in the street, ‘‘Oh no, not now’’; one of the attackers threatened the victim because the victim befriended the attacker’s paramour; the paramour, who was a friend of the defendant and who had called the victim to the victim’s door before the attack, knew that the victim had come into some cash; and the parent of the defendant’s child testified that the defendant and others left the house saying that they were going to get into a fight. Furthermore, the victim sustained a stab wound in the liver, a shattered jaw, a broken foot, a stab to the elbow, damage to the facial nerves, and a double hernia and was in constant pain and could not work. Drew v. State, 291 Ga. App. 306, 661 S.E.2d 675 (2008). Victim’s testimony that after being shot by the defendant, the victim was left with nerve damage to the shoulder from which the victim had not fully recovered, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008). Victim testified that as the victim walked in front of the defendant’s car, the defendant hit the gas pedal, throwing the victim onto the hood; accelerated when the victim asked the defendant to stop; and slammed on the brakes, causing the victim to slide down the hood, and the victim’s legs and foot to be broken as they went underneath the car. As the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to establish these facts under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery. Cash v. State, 293 Ga. App. 702, 667 S.E.2d 691 (2008). Jury was authorized to find that the defendant committed aggravated battery by seriously disfiguring the victim’s face and rendering the victim’s hand useless. The victim testified that the defendant beat the victim repeatedly, causing many injuries, including a scar above the victim’s eye and trauma to the victim’s hand that left the hand useless for several weeks; furthermore, there was photographic evidence of the injuries. Mack v. 16-5-24 State, 294 Ga. App. 518, 669 S.E.2d 487 (2008). Evidence that the defendant shot the victim at close range; that the victim, who knew the defendant well, identified the defendant from a photo line-up and at trial; and that a witness told police of driving the defendant to find the victim and of witnessing the shooting was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of those crimes. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. The evidence showed that the defendant and other gang members opened fire on a crowd of rival gang members and that the bullets also wounded two people inside a duplex; the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant’s alibi witnesses and to believe that of the eyewitnesses. Lopez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 618, 677 S.E.2d 776 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010). Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant’s conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testified that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant’s brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009). 839 Application (Cont’d) Defendant’s aggravated battery conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) was supported by evidence that the defendant and the codefendant burned the victim’s hand and that the codefendant placed a red ant nest on the victim’s body, resulting in numerous bites. Wilkinson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 190, 679 S.E.2d 766 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The victims’ in-court identifications of the defendant and the codefendant were buttressed by the evidence that a cell phone in the defendants’ possession matched that taken from the victims, that a car of the type used by the robbers contained guns similar to those used in the robbery, and the fact that the codefendant had a key to that car. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. App. 32, 684 S.E.2d 102 (2009). Evidence supported the jury’s determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and 16-5-24, because although the victim was under the influence of alcohol and in severe pain when making statements to the police and the emergency room physician, it was within the jury’s province to find the victim’s statements more credible than the victim’s trial testimony; the victim’s statements in a request to dismiss the charges, which acknowledged that the defendant was the individual who attacked the victim, did not occur while the victim was under any physical impairment. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1(b), aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), because the victim’s testimony that the defendant raped, sodomized, punched, burned, and threatened to kill the victim was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s convictions. Harris v. State, 308 Ga. App. 523, 707 S.E.2d 908 (2011). 16-5-24 Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A.§ 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and 16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence sufficed to sustain the defendant’s conviction when an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery’s inception through the robbery’s execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim’s money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim’s residence by supplying the defendant’s car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011). Evidence including the geographic proximity of the defendant’s home to the crime and pawn shop, the temporal proximity of the defendant’s visit to the pawn shop after the intrusion, the victim’s vehicle being found running across from the pawn shop, the defendant’s initial denial of pawning the stolen television, and the lack of evidence about the identity of the person the defendant claimed to have gotten the television from supported robbery for force, burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and theft by taking convictions. Strickland v. State, 348 Ga. App. 892, 825 S.E.2d 379 (2019). Loss of sight sufficient for aggravated battery. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), because the defendant knocked the victim face-down into a table, pointed a gun at the kneeling and bloodied victim, and threatened to kill the victim and the victim’s children with the gun. 840 The victim lost sight and required surgery to correct all the facial fractures which the victim suffered. Reynolds v. State, 311 Ga. App. 119, 714 S.E.2d 621 (2011). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and burglary after the state presented independent corroboration in support of an accomplice’s testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes; the defendant’s statements to police, the defendant’s actions before and after the crimes, and the defendant’s girlfriend’s testimony stating that the defendant asked the girlfriend to lie about the defendant’s whereabouts corroborated the defendant’s guilt. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012). Victim’s testimony that defendant was one of the two men who came into the victim’s house, beat the victim with fists and a flashlight, and demanded the victim’s keys and money authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of burglary, aggravated battery, and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Garmon v. State, 317 Ga. App. 634, 732 S.E.2d 289 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault and aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court’s final charge to the jury included instructions on the defense of justification; and the victim testified that, at the time in question, the victim did not have a gun, that the victim did not reach for any of the defendant’s guns, and that the victim was not attacking the defendant and only charged the defendant after the defendant was aiming a gun at the victim. Price v. State, 325 Ga. App. 564, 754 S.E.2d 144 (2014). Victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant attacked the victim and was guilty of aggravated battery. Patterson v. State, 327 Ga. App. 695, 761 S.E.2d 101 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children in the first degree because, when the defendant and the defendant’s girlfriend brought their 11-week-old daughter 16-5-24 to the emergency room, the infant had extensive bruises all over the infant’s body, the infant’s skull was fractured on both sides, and the infant was having seizures; the skull fractures were caused by two separate impacts; and a physician who was qualified as an expert in assessing abuse and intentional injury to children testified that the physician could think of no accidental force that would account for all of the infant’s injuries. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015). Evidence that the defendant used the defendant’s fists to beat the victim in the head and face, placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury supported a conviction for aggravated battery. Shaw v. State, 340 Ga. App. 749, 798 S.E.2d 344 (2017). While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016). Evidence including the geographic proximity of the defendant’s home to the crime and pawn shop, the temporal proximity of the defendant’s visit to the pawn shop after the intrusion, the victim’s vehicle being found running across from the pawn shop, the defendant’s initial denial of pawning the stolen television, and the lack of evidence about the identity of the person the defendant claimed to have gotten the television from supported robbery for force, burglary, aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and theft by taking convictions. Strickland v. State, 348 Ga. App. 892, 825 S.E.2d 379 (2019). Evidence sufficient for family violence aggravated battery. — Evidence that a collision reconstructionist determined that the defendant’s truck struck the victim’s car, causing the car to flip, while the defendant was driving more than 56 miles per hour and that there was no evidence that either driver tried to 841 Application (Cont’d) break before the impact, that the defendant was intoxicated, and that none of the defendant’s explanations were consistent with the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for family-violence aggravated battery. Percell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 219, 816 S.E.2d 344 (2018). Attack with a bottle sufficient for conviction. — Evidence that the defendant attacked the victim with a bottle and bit off one of the victim’s ears is sufficient to support a conviction. Drayton v. State, 167 Ga. App. 477, 306 S.E.2d 731 (1983). Injury to nose sufficient for conviction. — Evidence that defendant struck the victim in the face with such force that the blow fractured the victim’s nose was sufficient to support conviction. Pollard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 159, 495 S.E.2d 629 (1998). Evidence showing that the defendant shattered the victim’s nasal bone and caused permanent injury to the victim’s sinuses was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated battery. Silvers v. State, 245 Ga. App. 486, 538 S.E.2d 135 (2000). When the indictment alleged that the defendant deprived the victim of a bodily member, the victim’s nose, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and there was not a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof; a nose is a bodily member under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and the victim’s nasal drainage and blood leakage prior to surgery, as well as the victim’s testimony that the victim’s nose was still not ‘‘all the way’’ at the time of trial, could constitute evidence of loss of use. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 631, 642 S.E.2d 331 (2007). Evidence sufficient for aggravated battery against child. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendants’ convictions of cruelty to children and aggravated battery when the medical testimony concerning the extent and possible cause of the victim’s injuries, evidence of defendants’ complacent demeanor, and testimony concerning their access to the victim were but some of the factors from which the jury could find the defendants guilty. 16-5-24 Thomas v. State, 262 Ga. App. 492, 589 S.E.2d 243 (2003). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for cruelty to children and aggravated battery because there were a multitude of factors from which the jury could determine defendant’s guilt. Hood v. State, 273 Ga. App. 430, 615 S.E.2d 244 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions on four counts of aggravated battery and one count of cruelty to children in the first degree after the 17-month-old child of a love interest was found with hot-water immersion burns incurred while the defendant was watching the child for the love interest; the jury was free to reject the explanation that defendant had no criminal intent at the time the burns were incurred and find that the only reasonable hypothesis was that defendant maliciously and intentionally immersed the baby in hot water after the baby soiled a diaper, especially since the explanations were not consistent with the evidence. Lee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 93, 619 S.E.2d 767 (2005). Evidence that the defendant kicked and slammed the infant child of the defendant’s love interest, breaking an arm and legs, and that, although the defendant knew the severity of the child’s injuries, failed to procure medical treatment for the child on the day of the incident and for the following three days was sufficient to enable a jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense of aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). McKee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 646, 621 S.E.2d 611 (2005). Evidence supported defendants’ convictions for aggravated battery and cruelty to children because the jury was free not only to reject defendants’ explanations of the child’s injuries as unreasonable, but to find that the state’s case, including testimony as to the extent and cause of the child’s injuries and as to defendants’ access to the child, excluded every reasonable possibility save defendants’ guilt. Hunnicutt v. State, 276 Ga. App. 547, 623 S.E.2d 714 (2005). Trial court properly denied a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) since there was ample circumstantial evidence under former 842 O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) for the jury to have found that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); the defendant’s claim that the defendant tripped and fell while carrying the infant child was contradicted by expert testimony that the injury to the infant’s brain was caused by shaken baby syndrome. Lindo v. State, 278 Ga. App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665 (2006). Evidence, including the defendant’s admission to squeezing and shaking the child and the testimony of the forensic pediatrician that the child’s injuries were consistent with being squeezed, was sufficient to convict the defendant of child cruelty in the first degree under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) and aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Bass v. State, 282 Ga. App. 159, 637 S.E.2d 863 (2006). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct in connection with the death of the 16-month-old victim after: the defendant repeatedly fed the victim tomatoes despite the victim’s allergic reactions to the tomatoes; two days before the victim’s fatal injuries, the victim had numerous bruises, a black eye, and a split bottom lip; while the victim was in the hospital for the fatal injuries, the defendant repeatedly asked a babysitter to persuade the defendant’s five-year-old child to say that the child had taken the victim out of the bathtub; the defendant asked medical personnel whether it could be proven that the victim was shaken; and medical evidence showed that the victim’s death was consistent with violent shaking by a person of adult strength. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for the felony murder and aggravated battery of the defendant’s two-month-old child: (1) the child, who had been in good health at a pediatric checkup earlier in the day, was limp and cold when the defendant brought the child to an office where the child’s other parent had an appointment; (2) the child was diagnosed as a ‘‘shaken baby’’; and (3) the defendant was the only person with the child during and immediately 16-5-24 prior to the onset of the child’s symptoms. Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 237, 657 S.E.2d 523 (2008). The following evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant acted with malice and thus supported the defendant’s convictions of felony murder and the predicate felonies of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and first-degree child cruelty, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70: 1) the defendant claimed the victim, a 16-month-old child who had been left in the defendant’s care, became unresponsive and that the defendant shook the child in an attempt to revive the child; 2) a medical examiner testified that the victim died from head trauma; 3) the victim’s 10-year-old sibling testified that the defendant had struck the victim in the past and had been yelling at the victim before the victim lost consciousness. Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 717 S.E.2d 453 (2011). Jury resolves issue of self defense. — Evidence was sufficient to affirm defendant’s aggravated battery conviction; whether defendant engaged in unprovoked attacks or acted in self-defense or in defense of defendant’s love interest was for the jury to resolve, and the jury obviously resolved the question in defendant’s disfavor. Chalvatzis v. State, 265 Ga. App. 699, 595 S.E.2d 558 (2004). Aggravated battery by juvenile against parent. — Delinquency judgment upon a determination that a juvenile committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), was proper. The juvenile’s acts of grabbing, shoving, and pinning the juvenile’s parent down and with such force so as to cause a knee injury exceeded the bounds of justification. In the Interest of A.D., 295 Ga. App. 750, 673 S.E.2d 116 (2009). Compelled medical examination. — Victim could not be compelled to undergo an independent medical examination of victim’s eye based on defendant’s claim that the injuries were preexisting or did not deprive the victim of eye nor render it useless. Park v. State, 230 Ga. App. 274, 495 S.E.2d 886 (1998). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated battery when 843 Application (Cont’d) defendant maliciously and seriously disfigured a detective’s face, ear, and arm, where the defendant cut the detective several times with a boxcutter inflicting a wound requiring 65 stitches and reattachment of the detective’s ear. Ramsey v. State, 233 Ga. App. 810, 505 S.E.2d 779 (1998). There was sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant was the person who attacked the victim with a machete, and that by doing so the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery by maliciously causing bodily harm and serious disfigurement, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); the victim and two other people identified the defendant, and a witness testified that the defendant confided in the witness that the defendant had hit a person with a machete after someone threw an object at the defendant’s car. Emberson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 773, 611 S.E.2d 83 (2005). Factor for death sentence. — Evidence supported the jury’s finding of an aggravated battery for purposes of the death penalty under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(7), after finding petitioner inmate guilty of felony murder, because the evidence showed that the inmate severely beat the victim in the face with a heavy stick, and then finished the victim off by crushing the victim’s skull with a log after the victim fell to the ground. Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 570 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009). Sentencing. — Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant because the sentence it imposed on defendant was 10 years in prison and 10 years probation for aggravated assault, 10 years in prison to run concurrently for aggravated battery, and five years confinement to run consecutively for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as each part of defendant’s sentence was well within the statutory limits for the respective crime involved; accordingly, defendant’s sentence would not be modified on appeal. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004). 16-5-24 Trial court erred by failing to merge a defendant’s two aggravated battery count convictions for sentencing purposes as the two counts were based on a disfigurement of the victim’s back and buttocks and rendering of the victim’s legs useless by the single act of the defendant pushing the victim out of a moving car; thus, that act did not violate two distinct statutory provisions. Rather, the state prosecuted the same act for two alleged violations of the same statutory provision, which was not appropriate; therefore, the defendant was entitled to have the two aggravated battery counts merged for sentencing purposes. Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 681 S.E.2d 248 (2009). Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant on two counts of aggravated battery because the indictment alleged that the defendant committed two separate acts against the victim that caused the victim bodily harm; evidence was presented to show that the defendant’s act of fracturing the victim’s skull was separate from the defendant’s act of violently shaking the victim. Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 709 S.E.2d 893 (2011). It was not erroneous for the trial court to impose a sentence of 20 years for aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, because after the defendant’s kidnapping conviction was voided, the trial court was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1 to sentence the defendant to a term of years on the aggravated battery count, which could consist of up to 20 years. Griggs v. State, 314 Ga. App. 158, 723 S.E.2d 480 (2012). Trial court did not err by correcting the court’s written sentence to conform with its oral pronouncement because the trial court was authorized to correct the clerical error appearing in the court’s written sentence as compared to the court’s original oral pronouncement; the trial court, after reviewing the original transcript, determined that the court’s original pronouncement and intent was for the aggravated battery and burglary counts to be served consecutive to each other as well as to the other aggravated battery count. Griggs v. State, 314 Ga. App. 158, 723 S.E.2d 480 (2012). Consecutive sentences. — When the trial court sentenced the defendant to 844 consecutive 20-year sentences on two aggravated battery convictions, after the defendant was convicted of breaking the victim’s ribs and both orbital bones of the victim’s eyes, the sentences were not cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment; the sentences were within the statutory limits under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), (b), and (h) and did not shock the conscience. Ware v. State, 259 Ga. App. 267, 576 S.E.2d 649 (2003). Supervised release properly revoked as aggravated battery was violation of condition of supervised release. — Inmate’s supervised release was properly revoked and a sentence of imprisonment imposed because there was sufficient evidence to establish that the inmate committed a violation of a condition thereof by committing robbery and aggravated battery in Georgia. United States v. Hart, 552 Fed. Appx. 930, (11th Cir. 2014) (Unpublished). Jury Instructions Charging on lesser included offense. — When the same facts were used to support aggravated assault and aggravated battery charges, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant on the aggravated assault count, the lesser included offense. Riden v. State, 226 Ga. App. 245, 486 S.E.2d 198 (1997). Trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant’s requested charge on reckless conduct, where defendant’s own testimony showed that defendant committed a culpable act with criminal intent when defendant threw gasoline on the victim and tossed a lighted match toward the victim. McClain v. State, 232 Ga. App. 282, 502 S.E.2d 266 (1998). Trial court gave the jury the option to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery or of felony aggravated battery as indicted, but since the jury rejected the misdemeanor battery charge and found the additional aggravating elements to warrant a felony conviction, the idea that the jury might have reached a different result had the jury also been charged on the even less culpable misdemeanor of simple battery is not reasonable. Christensen v. State, 245 Ga. App. 165, 16-5-24 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000). Curative instructions prevented prejudice and obviated mistrial. — In the prosecution of the defendant for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and resisting arrest, because the trial court’s curative instructions to the jury obviated the need for a mistrial with respect to statements from a potential juror and cured any prejudice which might have resulted from the prosecutor’s closing argument, convictions of those crimes were upheld on appeal. Mitchell v. State, 284 Ga. App. 209, 644 S.E.2d 147 (2007). Charge on lesser included crimes not required. — When there is uncontradicted evidence that the victim died, it is not necessary to charge on the lesser included crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983). During the defendant’s trial for aggravated battery, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct because the defendant did not submit a written request for a reckless conduct charge but orally requested such charge at the close of the evidence. Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 709 S.E.2d 893 (2011). Trial court did not sua sponte err in failing to charge jury on identity as: (1) there was Georgia law requiring a trial judge to warn the jury against the possible dangers of mistaken identification of an accused as the person committing a crime; and (2) such was not required after the jury had already been charged as to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, credibility of witnesses, and impeachment of witnesses. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 776, 642 S.E.2d 835 (2007). Omitting statutory definition of ‘‘visible bodily harm’’ from instruction error. — By omitting the statutory definition of ‘‘visible bodily harm’’ contained in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(b), the trial court failed to give the jury the proper framework for evaluating whether a laceration to the victim’s nose was severe enough to merit a finding of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 or whether only a finding of battery was merited. Thus, the charge was fatally in- 845 Jury Instructions (Cont’d) sufficient. Carroll v. State, 293 Ga. App. 721, 667 S.E.2d 708 (2008). Instructions to jury. — Trial court is not required to define the meaning of ‘‘seriously’’ with regard to the phrase ‘‘seriously disfiguring the person’s body or a body part’’ and may properly instruct the jury that the ‘‘disfigurement may be temporary.’’ Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1118, 119 S. Ct. 1768, 143 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1999). There was no conflict between the trial court’s charge that the victim’s loss of the use of an eye need not be permanent and the allegation in the indictment that defendant rendered the victim’s eye ‘‘useless.’’ Christensen v. State, 245 Ga. App. 165, 537 S.E.2d 446 (2000). Trial court’s jury instructions in defendant’s criminal trial on multiple charges arising out of a domestic dispute were proper, as: (1) there was no requirement that the jury be instructed on the element of assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) in order to be properly instructed on the crime of aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21); (2) the methods of committing an aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were properly defined based on the methods asserted in the indictment; (3) there was no support for a requested charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); and (4) there was no possibility of a lesser included conviction for false imprisonment (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41), such that instruction only on the indicted offense of kidnapping (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40) was proper. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005). At a trial in which defendant was on trial for aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, and an instruction was provided to the jury on the lesser included offenses of battery and simple battery as they related to the charged offense, the trial court judge did not commit reversible error in responding to the jury’s questions, during deliberations, as to which offenses were felonies, as there was no discussion as to the possible sen- 16-5-24 tences associated with each offense. Quintana-Camporredondo v. State, 275 Ga. App. 859, 622 S.E.2d 66 (2005). In a prosecution for aggravated battery, false imprisonment, and kidnapping, a written Allen charge issued by the court was not coercive, despite the court’s use of the phrase ‘‘must be decided’’, given that said language was only a small portion of an otherwise fair and balanced charge, the trial court urged the jury to take their time, and the defendant was acquitted of the kidnapping charge. Benson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 643, 634 S.E.2d 821 (2006). Reversal of the defendant’s aggravated battery conviction was not warranted based on a challenged jury instruction on that offense, as the charge as a whole limited the jury’s consideration to the specific manner of committing the crime alleged in the indictment. Walls v. State, 283 Ga. App. 560, 642 S.E.2d 195 (2007). On appeal from a conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of malice murder, the appeals court found that no error or prejudice resulted from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for an aggravated battery charge as a forcible felony in support of the defendant’s justification claim, and affirmed the trial court’s choice to charge on aggravated assault and rape, as the defendant failed to present evidence of any reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent the commission of an aggravated battery. Wicker v. State, 285 Ga. App. 294, 645 S.E.2d 712 (2007). Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law regarding the use of prior consistent statements and on the defense of accident, the appeals court lacked any reason to reverse the defendant’s aggravated battery and cruelty to children convictions. Watkins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 41, 658 S.E.2d 812 (2008). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and battery, since the trial court’s jury charge tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, the charge was a correct statement of law and the charge was properly tailored to the allegation in the indictment that the victim was deprived of the use of the victim’s lower body. As a result, there was no impermissible amendment to the indict- 846 ment with regard to that charge. Binns v. State, 296 Ga. App. 537, 675 S.E.2d 265 (2009). Trial court correctly instructed the jury that, under Georgia law, a person committed the offense of aggravated battery when he or she maliciously caused bodily harm to another by seriously disfiguring the person’s body or a member thereof because the instruction, which was taken from the pattern jury instructions, was adequately tailored to the indictment and adjusted to the evidence admitted in court; the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the meaning of ‘‘serious disfigurement,’’ and the jury’s verdict was supported by ample evidence that the victim’s injuries were ‘‘seriously disfiguring.’’ Seymore v. State, 300 Ga. App. 523, 685 S.E.2d 772 (2009). In an aggravated assault case in which the defense was justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge defining aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) as a forcible felony for which the use of force was justified. Also, there was no showing that the outcome of the trial would have been different if such a charge had been given. Lewis v. State, 302 Ga. App. 506, 691 S.E.2d 336 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel because there was no evidence to support an instruction on defense of habitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 and, thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to request such an instruction; there was no evidence that the victim was attempting to unlawfully enter or attack the defendant’s vehicle at the time the defendant stabbed the victim, and under the facts, there could be no reasonable belief that stabbing the victim was necessary to prevent or terminate the other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon a mo- 16-5-24 tor vehicle. Philpot v. State, 311 Ga. App. 486, 716 S.E.2d 551 (2011). Even though the trial court erred by mistakenly labeling the crime as aggravated assault before reading the charge for aggravated battery, the error was not reversible because the trial court went on to state that the crime at issue was aggravated battery and accurately read the substance of the count to the jury. In addition, a written copy of the indictment went out to the jury and the verdict form accurately listed the count as aggravated battery. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012). Trial court’s alleged overcharge on aggravated battery did not amount to harmful error because any overcharge was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the burden of proof was with the state to prove every material allegation of the crimes charged in the indictment. Lenoir v. State, 322 Ga. App. 583, 745 S.E.2d 824 (2013). Instruction on accident. — In a prosecution for felony murder and the predicate felonies of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and first-degree child cruelty, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70, assuming arguendo that the evidence supported an instruction on accident, the trial court’s failure to give that instruction was not reversible error as the jury’s conclusion that the defendant acted with malice, which was supported by overwhelming evidence, necessarily meant that the jury would have rejected any accident defense. Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 717 S.E.2d 453 (2011). Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense because the defendant never admitted to the crimes alleged and, in fact, denied even being present during the assault of the victim; therefore, there was no evidence to support the giving of the requested charge. Ransom v. State, 318 Ga. App. 764, 734 S.E.2d 761 (2012).