Onumah v

State, 313 Ga. App. 269, 721 S.E.2d 115 (2011). All four factors that had to be considered in determining whether the asportation element of kidnapping was met had been satisfied because the duration of the movement of the victims to a car and while riding therein occurred after the offense of aggravated assault was completed; the movement presented a significant danger to the victims apart from the separate offense because it enhanced the defendant’s control over the victims, serving substantially to isolate the victims from protection or rescue and increasing the risks that further injury would occur in the event of an attempted escape and that the victims would be taken to a second location. Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 670, 725 S.E.2d 236 (2012). Movement to bedroom sufficient. — Evidence was sufficient to establish the asportation element of the defendant’s kidnapping with bodily injury conviction because movement occurred when the defendant pressed a knife to the victim’s throat and forced the victim from the kitchen into the bedroom where the defendant raped and sodomized the victim and committed armed robbery; the movement was not an inherent part of the crimes because the victim’s movement to the bed- 899 Application (Cont’d) room was not necessary to effect the completion of the rape, aggravated sodomy, or armed robbery. Holden v. State, 314 Ga. App. 36, 722 S.E.2d 873 (2012). Movement throughout the house sufficient. — State proved the existence of ‘‘asportation,’’ one of the essential elements of kidnapping with bodily injury, as the victim was forcibly moved at gunpoint from the front of the house to a back bathroom and that the movement did not occur during the commission of the other offenses. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012). Evidence that the movement, while not necessarily lengthy, was long enough to satisfy the duration element; the movement did not occur during the aggravated battery but rather after the first beating and before a second beating; that the movement was not an inherent part of the beating; and that the movement itself presented a danger to the victim because the victim was moved to a secluded location in the middle of the night was sufficient to support the asportation element of kidnapping. Williams v. State, 291 Ga. 501, 732 S.E.2d 47 (2012). Incidental movement sufficient. — By forcing the victim to have sexual intercourse in the living room, stopping the victim from escaping, then forcing the victim to a nearby bedroom and forcing sex again, the defendant made it substantially easier to commit the charged offense of rape in the bedroom and lessened the risk of detection, thus, the movement of the victim was not merely incidental to any other charged offense, and the evidence was sufficient to establish the asportation element of the kidnapping charge. Ward v. State, 324 Ga. App. 230, 749 S.E.2d 812 (2013). Removal of two victims from the victims’ vehicle, binding the victims with electrical ties and duct tape, and placing one victim in the back seat of the victim’s vehicle while the other lay on the ground, concealed the victim in the car, isolated the two victims, and made the commission of the armed robbery and murders substantially easier; therefore, movement of the victims was not merely incidental to 16-5-40 the other offenses, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(b)(2)(A), (B). Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 748 S.E.2d 390 (2013). Length of time for asportation not sufficient. — Sufficient evidence under the established case law standard supported the jury finding the defendant guilty of kidnapping based on the evidence showing that although the time and distance spanned by the defendant’s forceful dragging of the victim out of the house away from the protection of the victim’s teenage son, through the yard, and into the neighbor’s yard may not have been lengthy, the movement was of sufficient duration to satisfy a finding of asportation. Arnold v. State, 324 Ga. App. 58, 749 S.E.2d 245 (2013). Slight movement sufficient. — Evidence that the defendant captured the victim as the victim attempted to escape the assault, dragged the victim back to the car and put the victim into the trunk of the car, and attempted to close the trunk was sufficient to meet the slight movement requirement to prove the asportation element of kidnapping with bodily injury. Andemical v. State, 336 Ga. App. 661, 786 S.E.2d 238 (2016). Movement within the store sufficient. — Evidence was sufficient to establish the asportation element of kidnapping because the store clerk testified that after taking items inside the store, the robbers forced the clerk into the office against the clerk’s will and locked the door, and that testimony supported the reasonable inference that the robbers isolated the clerk to expedite the robbers’ escape, thereby lessening the risk of the robbers’ detection. Whatley v. State, 335 Ga. App. 749, 782 S.E.2d 831 (2016). Proof of rape and kidnapping with bodily injury. — Separate offenses of rape and kidnapping with bodily injury were shown where the evidence used to prove the kidnapping was the asportation of the victim from one room to another and bruises the victim suffered in the struggle with defendant before the subsequent intercourse which supported the rape charge. Roberson v. State, 219 Ga. App. 160, 464 S.E.2d 262 (1995). Kidnapping with bodily injury. — Burning of the victim’s face with a stun 900 gun at the outset of the kidnapping constituted the bodily harm necessary to support the conviction of kidnapping with bodily injury. James v. State, 239 Ga. App. 541, 521 S.E.2d 465 (1999). Despite the defendant’s contention that the circumstantial evidence presented by the state was insufficient, both malice murder and kidnapping by bodily injury convictions were upheld on appeal as: (1) the plain error rule did not apply to the identification evidence admitted via the defendant’s aggravated assault and armed robbery victim, and evidence of the gun used in that case was relevant in the instant prosecution because the gun connected the defendant to the identification documents presented to police in close proximity to the victim’s body; (2) a due process claim regarding the admission of a purportedly impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification, followed by an in-court identification, was waived due to failure to object at trial; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to seek suppression of the identification evidence or attack the reliability of the same. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 640 S.E.2d 280 (2007). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in admitting: (i) a prior difficulty between the defendant and the victim; (ii) evidence that the defendant sought to hire a hit man to kill the victim; and (iii) a prior inconsistent statement of a reluctant witness who claimed to have a loss of memory as that evidence was relevant to show the defendant’s motive and state of mind in committing the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury and the trial court properly ruled that the reluctant witness was a hostile witness, and allowed the state to ask leading questions, as well as admission of that witness’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. LeBlanc v. State, 283 Ga. 16-5-40 App. 434, 641 S.E.2d 646 (2007). Impact of significant mental and psychological impairments. — When petitioner was sentenced to death, remand was warranted as to petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim because the state court curtailed a more probing prejudice inquiry by placing undue reliance on the assumed reasonableness of counsel’s mitigation theory, and failed to apply the proper prejudice inquiry; a proper analysis of prejudice would have taken into account the newly uncovered evidence of petitioner’s ‘‘significant’’ mental and psychological impairments. Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (2010). Prosecution for false imprisonment and kidnapping barred by statute of limitations. — Defendant’s prosecution for the crimes of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41, and kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), were barred by the statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1, because the state did not indict the defendant on those charges until after the four-year statute of limitations ran; the state’s decision to reissue the indictment to include the false imprisonment and kidnapping counts substantially amended the original charges because those offenses contained elements separate and distinct from any of the crimes charged in the original indictment. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010). Use of prior unfiled criminal charges in prosecution. — Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, and criminal trespass were erroneously reversed as the fact that the state did not file criminal charges against the defendant based directly on three prior pool incidents with young children did not mean that those incidents were non-criminal or not indicative of the defendant’s state of mind. State v. Ashley, 299 Ga. 450, 788 S.E.2d 796 (2016).