Ray v

State, 165 Ga. App. 89, 299 S.E.2d 584 (1983). When the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish commission of the crime of theft by taking, and the evidence also may have shown theft by deception, the 190 phrase ‘‘regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated’’ rendered the theft by taking statute sufficiently broad to encompass thefts perpetrated by deception. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a conviction on that charge. Lundy v. State, 195 Ga. App. 682, 394 S.E.2d 559 (1990). Merger inappropriate. — With regard to a defendant’s convictions for six counts of theft by taking, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, and six counts of felony theft by conversion, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-4(a), because there was sufficient evidence to prove each count as a separate and distinct act, merger was inappropriate and the defendant was properly convicted on all 12 counts. Kohlhaas v. State, 284 Ga. App. 79, 643 S.E.2d 350 (2007). Evidence and Inferences Venue not established by the evidence. — Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking since the evidence showed that the defendant never used the funds borrowed for relocating the Florida plant, as promised, and the loan was secured with equipment that the defendant did not own; however, the prosecution failed to prove venue was proper in Dodge County, Georgia, since although the contracts were executed in Dodge County, there was no evidence that the defendant exercised any control over the $ 350,000 in Dodge County. Davis v. State, 326 Ga. App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (2014). Evidence of additional stolen goods would be admissible as evidence of system of mutually dependent crimes. Bishop v. State, 155 Ga. App. 611, 271 S.E.2d 743 (1980). Types of evidence admissible regarding embezzlement. — In trial for embezzlement, it is permissible to prove acts of extravagance on part of accused, the amount and sources of the accused’s income, the amount reasonably necessary to maintain self and family in the manner in which they were maintained during the period of controversy, fraudulent practices on the accused’s part to increase the accused’s income and cover up defalcations, and other like matters, not only on the 16-8-2 question of intent, but also to show the accused’s bent of mind for the commission of the particular offense charged in the bill of indictment on trial. Walker v. State, 156 Ga. App. 842, 275 S.E.2d 755 (1980). Jury was authorized to consider the extravagance of large-scale gambling on a policeman’s salary as evidence which tended to show the appellant’s intent, motive, plan, scheme, and bent of mind. Walker v. State, 156 Ga. App. 842, 275 S.E.2d 755 (1980). Like criminal acts by an embezzler have been admitted to show fraudulent intent and are an exception to the general rule enunciated in former Code 1933, § 38-202 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404). Walker v. State, 156 Ga. App. 842, 275 S.E.2d 755 (1980). Ownership of stolen property must be alleged directly and not by way of inference and is properly laid as of the date when the offense was committed. McKee v. State, 200 Ga. 563, 37 S.E.2d 700 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2603). ‘‘Lawful possession.’’ — In a prosecution of theft by taking, the state was entitled to the unrebutted assumption that the appropriate city officials had authorized the defendant to collect fines and bonds in accordance with the requirements of the city charter. Wilson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 486, 439 S.E.2d 701 (1993). It can be inferred from fact that goods were on sale in supermarket that property was owned by supermarket. Earley v. State, 155 Ga. App. 576, 271 S.E.2d 709 (1980). Inference of fact. — Rule of evidence to the effect that where stolen goods are found in the possession of a defendant charged with larceny or kindred offenses recently after the commission of the offense, such fact authorizes the jury to infer that the accused is guilty unless such possession is explained to its satisfaction, constitutes an inference of fact and not of law, and is based upon a circumstantial fact from which the inference of guilt may be drawn in the absence of satisfactory explanation. Wakefield v. State, 76 Ga. App. 271, 45 S.E.2d 675 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2603). 191 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) When the defendant was found, two hours after the theft of an automobile temporarily left with the motor running in front of a liquor store, driving the automobile away from another liquor store, is sufficient evidence on such a hearing that the defendant stole the vehicle. Hulett v. State, 150 Ga. App. 367, 258 S.E.2d 48 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-1813). Evidence about the defendant’s burning the victim’s car after the defendant took the car reflected on the defendant’s ‘‘intention of depriving [the victim] of the property,’’ and was admissible. Braswell v. State, 245 Ga. App. 602, 538 S.E.2d 492 (2000). Proof of possession of stolen property which is not recent would not alone authorize conviction, but is a circumstance which may always go to the jury. Harper v. State, 60 Ga. App. 684, 4 S.E.2d 734 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2603). While recent possession of stolen goods, unexplained, will justify a conviction for larceny, the mere possession of goods several months subsequent to the time the goods were alleged to have been stolen, and a failure to satisfactorily account for such possession, will not alone authorize a conviction. Harper v. State, 60 Ga. App. 684, 4 S.E.2d 734 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 26-2603). Inference raised by unaccounted for possession of recently stolen goods. — Recent possession of stolen goods unexplained to the satisfaction of the jury and especially when accompanied by false statements as to the person from whom received authorizes a conviction of larceny. Stocks v. State, 119 Ga. App. 837, 168 S.E.2d 893 (1969). Possession of recently stolen goods, unaccounted for, raises an inference that the possessor is the one who stole the goods, and if the accused does not want this inference to arise in the accused’s case, the accused must account for the accused’s possession. Horton v. State, 228 Ga. 690, 187 S.E.2d 677 (1972). Recent possession of stolen goods without reasonable explanation will authorize 16-8-2 conviction of theft by taking. Peacock v. State, 131 Ga. App. 651, 206 S.E.2d 582 (1974); Bigby v. State, 184 Ga. App. 94, 360 S.E.2d 751 (1987). When a theft, whether by simple larceny, burglary, or robbery, is proven, recent unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant creates an inference of fact sufficient to convict. This is true without direct proof or other circumstantial evidence that the defendant committed the theft. Lockett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 569, 266 S.E.2d 236 (1980). Recent possession of stolen goods, coupled with other evidence linking the defendant with theft, negated the propriety of a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of theft by taking. Rautenberg v. State, 178 Ga. App. 165, 342 S.E.2d 355 (1986). Inference alone insufficient for conviction. — Although there is still validity to the long-established rule that proof of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant is sufficient to create an inference that the defendant is guilty of the burglary of the goods, proof of recent, unexplained possession is not automatically sufficient to support a conviction for burglary. Rogers v. State, 185 Ga. App. 211, 363 S.E.2d 846 (1987). Improper inference of criminal association. — State should not have been permitted to cross-examine the defendant as to whether the defendant was aware of an acquaintance’s past criminal indictment for running stolen goods. Busbee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 17, 435 S.E.2d 60 (1993). When only evidence supporting conviction is proof of possession of stolen goods. — Evidence of recent unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle is sufficient in itself to support a conviction for the theft by taking. Callahan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 555, 251 S.E.2d 790 (1978). When apprehended, the appellant was the driver of the recently stolen van. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation of appellant’s possession of the stolen vehicle, this evidence was sufficient in itself to support a conviction for theft by taking. Warfle v. State, 157 Ga. App. 196, 276 S.E.2d 689 (1981). The more-likely-than-not test is the ap- 192 propriate one to employ in determining the due-process validity of allowing the factfinder to presume or infer an ultimate or essential element fact from an evidentiary or basic fact. Under this test, it is rational to allow the factfinder to infer that the defendant is guilty of burglary based on proof of defendant’s recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods. If the only evidence supporting the conviction is the evidence giving rise to the inference or presumption, however, then such evidence must establish the offense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be sufficient to support the conviction. Rogers v. State, 185 Ga. App. 211, 363 S.E.2d 846 (1987). Submitting invoices to state with large markups. — When the state contends the defendant committed theft by deception when the defendant submitted false invoices to the General Assembly, but the invoices contained a statement of charges for services rendered and taken as a whole and compared with the billings to the defendant there was a very large markup, that is not a false statement, and there was no theft by taking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 and 16-8-3. Gordon v. State, 257 Ga. 335, 359 S.E.2d 634 (1987). Defendant’s conviction for theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 was proper under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803) because the business records exception did not require that the person laying the foundation for the admission of business records be the custodian of the records. Instead, the statute required only that the record offered to prove an act or transaction be made in the regular course of business and that it was the regular course of business to make the record at the time of the act or transaction; the witness’s lack of personal knowledge regarding how the records were created did not render the records inadmissible, but merely affected the weight given to the evidence. Loyal v. State, 300 Ga. App. 65, 684 S.E.2d 124 (2009). Goods obtained under color of official position. — Simply because defendant went through appropriate channels and obtained surplus law enforcement property under color of defendant’s posi- 16-8-2 tion as chief of police did not mean that defendant could not be convicted of theft by taking. Spray v. State, 223 Ga. App. 154, 476 S.E.2d 878 (1996). Trial court did not err in sustaining objection to cross-examination. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in sustaining the state’s objection to the defendant’s cross-examination of a company president regarding the president’s efforts to reduce tax liability because the defendant never testified that the defendant was being rewarded for helping the president minimize tax liability, and some of the questions to which the state objected related to tax advice the president received from the president’s accounting firm, which would have shed no light on the defendant’s actions. Gautreaux v. State, 314 Ga. App. 103, 722 S.E.2d 915 (2012). Whether or not defendant’s explanation of possession was satisfactory or reasonable was jury question. Warfle v. State, 157 Ga. App. 196, 276 S.E.2d 689 (1981). Instruction not comment on defendant’s failure to testify. — An instruction stating that guilt of the defendant can be inferred from possession of recently stolen property unaccounted for by defendant cannot properly be construed as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. Horton v. State, 228 Ga. 690, 187 S.E.2d 677 (1972). When evidence supports finding of theft by deception. — One may be indicted and convicted under former Code 1933, § 26-1802 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2) for theft by taking if the evidence supports a finding of guilt under former Code 1933, § 26-1803 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3) for theft by deception. Elliott v. State, 149 Ga. App. 579, 254 S.E.2d 900 (1979). Evidence sufficient for conviction of theft by snatching. — Identification testimony was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses of theft by sudden snatching and aggravated assault with intent to rob. Tolbert v. State, 180 Ga. App. 703, 350 S.E.2d 51 (1986). Error in admitting similar transaction evidence required reversal. — While state presented sufficient evidence 193 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) of the victim’s age to support assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), because the trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence of two burglaries defendant committed in 1998 as similar transactions to help prove the issue of identity, the defendant’s aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, theft, and battery convictions were reversed. Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008). Evidence of similar transaction admissible. — Given the similarities between the theft of a car and the theft of a second vehicle only hours after the car was stolen, evidence of either theft would be admissible as a similar transaction of the other to show bent of mind, intent, and course of conduct; both crimes occurred in the same city and on the same date, both involved the theft of foreign-made, mid-size sedans, and the state presented evidence from which the jury could infer that, like the car, the keys had been left in the second vehicle at the time the car was stolen, and the keys from both cars were missing when the cars were recovered. Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 704 S.E.2d 470 (2010). Evidence of previous convictions. — When the trial was conducted by the court without a jury, there was no need for a separate hearing to consider prior similar crimes (two previous convictions for shoplifting) before the crimes were admitted. Lark v. State, 190 Ga. App. 821, 380 S.E.2d 505 (1989). Indictments for two previous convictions for shoplifting were sufficient on their face to show the remaining elements of the required foundation and the convictions were admissible as going to the defendant’s state of mind, when the defendant admitted walking out of the store with the clothing on this occasion one year later. Lark v. State, 190 Ga. App. 821, 380 S.E.2d 505 (1989). Evidence sufficient to support conviction. — See Hicks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 542, 314 S.E.2d 113 (1984); McIlhenny v. State, 172 Ga. App. 419, 323 S.E.2d 280 (1984); Thomas v. State, 177 Ga. App. 366, 339 S.E.2d 599 (1985); 16-8-2 Rucker v. State, 177 Ga. App. 779, 341 S.E.2d 228 (1986); Hayes v. State, 177 Ga. App. 889, 341 S.E.2d 709 (1986); Benton v. State, 178 Ga. App. 239, 342 S.E.2d 722 (1986); Milford v. State, 178 Ga. App. 792, 344 S.E.2d 505 (1986); Phinazee v. State, 182 Ga. App. 45, 354 S.E.2d 671 (1987); Eady v. State, 182 Ga. App. 293, 355 S.E.2d 778 (1987); Murphy v. State, 182 Ga. App. 791, 357 S.E.2d 147 (1987); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Howell v. State, 188 Ga. App. 425, 373 S.E.2d 216, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 216 (1988); Eads v. State, 193 Ga. App. 262, 387 S.E.2d 591 (1989); Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. App. 180, 396 S.E.2d 33 (1990); Davis v. State, 223 Ga. App. 346, 477 S.E.2d 639 (1996); Massalene v. State, 224 Ga. App. 321, 480 S.E.2d 616 (1997); Jordan v. State, 224 Ga. App. 181, 480 S.E.2d 228 (1996); Massalene v. State, 224 Ga. App. 321, 480 S.E.2d 616 (1997); Dorillas v. State, 224 Ga. App. 336, 480 S.E.2d 351 (1997); Rice v. State, 226 Ga. App. 770, 487 S.E.2d 517 (1997); Holland v. State, 232 Ga. App. 284, 501 S.E.2d 829 (1998); Shores v. State, 240 Ga. App. 189, 522 S.E.2d 515 (1999); Travis v. State, 243 Ga. App. 77, 532 S.E.2d 430 (2000); Chastain v. State, 244 Ga. App. 84, 535 S.E.2d 25 (2000); Jaber v. State, 243 Ga. App. 562, 533 S.E.2d 767 (2000); Parker v. State, 247 Ga. App. 722, 544 S.E.2d 542 (2001); Goss v. State, 247 Ga. App. 520, 544 S.E.2d 206 (2001); Kier v. State, 247 Ga. App. 431, 543 S.E.2d 801 (2000); Shaw v. State, 247 Ga. App. 867, 545 S.E.2d 399 (2001); Knight v. State, 246 Ga. App. 299, 540 S.E.2d 254 (2000); Mullinax v. State, 273 Ga. 756, 545 S.E.2d 891 (2001); Thomas v. State, 249 Ga. App. 571, 549 S.E.2d 408 (2001); Tukes v. State, 250 Ga. App. 117, 550 S.E.2d 678 (2001). Evidence sufficient to enable rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by taking and recklessly causing harm to or endangering bodily safety of another person. Lucas v. State, 183 Ga. App. 637, 360 S.E.2d 12 (1987). Jury was authorized to conclude from the evidence that the defendant accosted the victim in the mall parking lot, forced 194 her to accompany him to a secluded area where he raped and murdered her, then took her jewelry, her pocket book, and her automobile, and used her credit cards the next day. Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281, 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925, 109 S. Ct. 3261, 106 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1989). Testimony of an accomplice and the evidence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony were sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary and theft of a motor vehicle. Thurston v. State, 186 Ga. App. 881, 368 S.E.2d 822 (1988). Evidence demonstrating that the defendant was seen removing two small medicinal items and retaining those items for a period of time inside the store’s premises was sufficient to satisfy a finding under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 that the defendant appropriated the subject goods, though the items were not ultimately recovered from the defendant’s person. Moore v. State, 208 Ga. App. 458, 430 S.E.2d 835 (1993). Videotapes of the defendant taking the victim’s purse and using the victim’s credit card, the defendant’s company photograph and the ID testimony of a clerk at the store where the purse was stolen, were sufficient evidence to convict defendant for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Green v. State, 223 Ga. App. 467, 477 S.E.2d 895 (1996). Proof that defendant cashed or deposited into defendant’s own account more than $500 worth of unauthorized checks was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that defendant committed theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Jordan v. State, 242 Ga. App. 547, 528 S.E.2d 858 (2000). Evidence was sufficient to sustain theft by taking conviction, where the evidence showed that the defendant made withdrawals which far exceeded the amounts the defendant knew had been deposited, despite the fact that the jury had evidence from which it could infer that the defendant could have made a mistake by relying on the availability of the funds. Smith v. State, 255 Ga. App. 580, 565 S.E.2d 904 (2002). Defendant was convicted of felony theft 16-8-2 by taking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 and 16-8-12(a)(1) for taking more than $500 from potential buyers of ecstasy pills and then fleeing with the money without delivering the promised pills, since there was sufficient evidence that defendant took more than $500 despite defendant’s claim that the money was counterfeit after one of the buyers testified that the buyer contributed $1,000 of real money to the total that was given to defendant. Camero v. State, 257 Ga. App. 109, 570 S.E.2d 405 (2002). Evidence that defendant had taken his former wife’s car keys and had driven off in the former wife’s car after defendant committed battery on the former wife and her mother, that the former wife had not given defendant permission to take the car, and that defendant refused to return the car even though the former wife begged defendant to do so was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of theft by taking a motor vehicle. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 30, 567 S.E.2d 693 (2002). Evidence was legally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a motor vehicle as the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that defendant took a vehicle belonging to a man who had left it in a friend’s front yard, unlocked and with the key in the ignition, especially since defendant was identified as having been in an accident with the truck on the same day, and was chased the next day as defendant drove the truck by a police officer who was on the lookout for the stolen truck and saw that defendant was driving it. Brown v. State, 259 Ga. App. 819, 578 S.E.2d 516 (2003). When at the time the defendant sold a victim a factoring agreement, the defendant had substantial debt and no immediate prospects of re-paying the money within the 90 days provided for in the note, and nine months after the investment was made, presented the victim with a check to reimburse the victim that was dishonored, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of theft by taking. Rasch v. State, 260 Ga. App. 379, 579 S.E.2d 817 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support de- 195 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) fendant’s conviction for theft by taking as it showed the defendant was in recent and unexplained possession of a lighter belonging to the victim’s spouse, as well as other items taken from the victim’s residence, that the residence from which the items were taken was adjacent to and accessible on foot from a wooded area where the defendant was seen around the time the crimes occurred, and similar transaction evidence showed the defendant had previously received items stolen from homes in the area. Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 581 S.E.2d 279 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) there was evidence that defendant entered a store, placed a knife to the neck of one of the three victims, forced that victim to the back of the store, aided another assailant who was armed with a gun to bind the victims and drag them to the back of the store, and stole money and other items from two of the victims; (2) defendant confessed to the crimes during interviews with law enforcement officials; and (3) defendant’s confessions were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who, despite earlier being unable to identify the robbers, ultimately identified defendant as one of the robbers. The corroborating victim’s initial inability to identify defendant posed an issue of credibility for the jury’s resolution and did not require reversal. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003). Victim’s testimony that defendant took the victim’s car and drove away, and the testimony of a police officer that the car was recovered only after police pursuit of the vehicle and apprehension of the occupants, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for theft by taking. Newton v. State, 261 Ga. App. 762, 583 S.E.2d 585 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support de- 16-8-2 fendant’s convictions for malice murder, theft by taking, and financial transaction card fraud, as the evidence authorized any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence showed that defendant struck the victim multiple times with a wrench, causing the victim’s death, that the defendant was in possession of a laptop computer that had been missing from the victim’s office, and that defendant had used the victim’s credit, posing as the victim’s spouse, on the day the victim died. Baugh v. State, 276 Ga. 736, 585 S.E.2d 616 (2003). There was sufficient evidence to identify the semi-tractor and trailer described in count one of the petition and in the proof at trial as being one and the same, and the misidentification did not mislead or misinform defendant or leave defendant subject to subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and thus was not a fatal variance; the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile judge’s adjudication of delinquency based on all the counts alleged in the petition. In the Interest of J.D.T., 262 Ga. App. 860, 586 S.E.2d 748 (2003). Evidence that unauthorized withdrawals were made from a victim’s account using the victim’s account and social security numbers, which were on the victim’s bank statements, that defendant’s mailbox was near the victim’s, and that for each withdrawal there was a corresponding deposit into defendant’s account on the same day, sufficiently supported defendant’s conviction for theft by taking. Westbrooks v. State, 263 Ga. App. 566, 588 S.E.2d 335 (2003). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for theft of trailers and tires being delivered in the trailers where defendant and a codefendant were seen moments after having returned one of the missing trailers, where they subsequently tried to flee from the police, where defendant’s explanation for defendant’s presence at the scene was undermined by other testimony, where a note in defendant’s pocket described the crime scene, and where defendant and the codefendant gave conflicting accounts of their travel plans; the fact that one trailer was withheld temporarily 196 and later returned with half its load missing did not mean that that trailer was not ‘‘taken.’’ Howard v. State, 263 Ga. App. 593, 588 S.E.2d 793 (2003). Defendant’s boasting that the defendant stole the victim’s cell phone, coupled with the victim’s testimony that the phone was missing, provided ample circumstantial evidence to support the defendant’s convictions of entering an auto with intent to commit a theft, and of theft. In the Interest of M.C.A., 263 Ga. App. 770, 589 S.E.2d 331 (2003). When the defendant, who was not in custody at the time, volunteered an explanation as to why the defendant possessed a weapon without authority, no Miranda warning was necessary and the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant inflicted a shot upon the defendant’s person in a government building with a weapon that defendant took from police custody in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-24(a) and 16-8-2; therefore, the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. McClendon v. State, 264 Ga. App. 174, 590 S.E.2d 189 (2003). Evidence that defendant abandoned the project, promised to return the unearned portion of the down payment, and then failed to do so was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by taking. Smith v. State, 265 Ga. App. 57, 592 S.E.2d 871 (2004). Evidence that defendant was given a key to the victim’s apartment, that there was no forced entry, that defendant admitted being in close proximity to the closet where the stolen bank was located, and that defendant had not returned the key to the apartment to the leasing office on the date in question was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by taking. Pitmon v. State, 265 Ga. App. 655, 595 S.E.2d 360 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 as defendant took a car and its contents, including a victim’s handgun, with the intent to deprive the owners of the property; the evidence included: (1) testimony as to the gunman’s size; (2) testimony that the car’s rims were found at defendant’s home; (3) testimony that a victim’s cell phone made 16-8-2 calls to defendant’s home; (4) an accomplice’s reference to the gunman as ‘‘B’’; and (5) similar transaction evidence of another carjacking, involving a car of the make and color as a car used in the hijacking of the victims’ car. Mullins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 393, 599 S.E.2d 340 (2004). When the defendant, according to the defendant’s love interest, drove a stolen vehicle onto the victim’s property through a locked gate, parked near a building where objects were stolen, and got into the vehicle and drove away, and the owner testified that the owner had not given the defendant permission to take the objects that were stolen, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of criminal trespass in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a), burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Sexton v. State, 268 Ga. App. 736, 603 S.E.2d 66 (2004). There was sufficient evidence to support defendant juvenile’s adjudication as delinquent for acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted three counts of theft by taking. Evidence that three youths were overheard in the car lot talking about stealing cars and that they fled when they saw police, coupled with the circumstantial evidence that several vehicles were hot and parked in a different area than originally parked, was sufficient evidence to show the commission of the crime of theft by taking. In the Interest of S.D.T.E., 268 Ga. App. 685, 603 S.E.2d 316 (2004). Testimony of a store’s loss prevention employee as to the ownership and value of coats stolen by the defendant, and testimony by the employee that the employee saw the defendant take the coats, place the coats in a bag, and flee from the store was sufficient to support a theft by shoplifting conviction. Lanier v. State, 269 Ga. App. 284, 603 S.E.2d 772 (2004). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking because the defendant pawned a TV and two VCRs stolen from a home within hours of the crime and a mode of operation was proven from evidence that the defendant pled guilty to a similar burglary in which a door was also kicked in while the home- 197 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) owner was absent during the day and valuable items were taken from the master bedroom. Jefferson v. State, 273 Ga. App. 61, 614 S.E.2d 182 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking as a rational trier of fact was authorized to conclude that the defendant obtained the victim’s money by telling the victim that the defendant was going to invest the money for the victim and then took that money and sent the money to entities defendant controlled, thus depriving the victim of the lawful use of that money. Gould v. State, 273 Ga. App. 155, 614 S.E.2d 252 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s theft by taking a motor vehicle conviction as the defendant was seen driving a city truck that was kept behind a locked fence at a city landfill, the chain on the lock was cut, the defendant was not authorized to enter the landfill when it was locked, and defendant was selling items out of the truck. Sadberry v. State, 273 Ga. App. 257, 614 S.E.2d 885 (2005). Convictions for theft, aggravated assault, and making a terroristic threat was supported by evidence because the defendant admitted to taking gas cans, raised a machete to scare or strike the defendant’s sibling, the sibling was frightened and ran, and the defendant then threatened both of the defendant’s siblings that if either called the sheriff the defendant would return and kill the siblings. Turner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 535, 615 S.E.2d 603 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for concealment of a death and theft by taking as the evidence showed that the defendant directed the customer of a salon the defendant operated, who had a fight with a person with whom the defendant had been living, to dispose of the person’s body after the customer shot the person to death following an argument at the defendant’s home and that the defendant told people that the person had left after an argument; too, the evidence showed that the defendant had taken the person’s sports memorabilia collection and a camera, and, thus, was 16-8-2 guilty of theft by taking. James v. State, 274 Ga. App. 498, 618 S.E.2d 133 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for misdemeanor theft by taking since the defendant broke into the victim’s residence, took a gun valued at $80.00, and left a blood trail back to the defendant’s own residence next door and when the defendant’s sibling turned the stolen gun into police after the sibling found the gun in the defendant’s residence. Meeks v. State, 274 Ga. App. 517, 618 S.E.2d 152 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s theft by taking conviction as defendant’s unexplained possession of stolen tools, which defendant pawned soon after the thefts, supported the conviction. Drake v. State, 274 Ga. App. 882, 619 S.E.2d 380 (2005). Evidence that a person matching the defendant’s description was seen driving a victim’s car out of a parking lot, that the car was later found at an address the defendant had given on a job application, that property stolen from other victims was found in the car, and that the defendant’s thumbprint matched a fingerprint found on that property was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking a motor vehicle, theft by retaining a motor vehicle, and theft by retaining stolen property. Campbell v. State, 275 Ga. App. 8, 619 S.E.2d 720 (2005). Because an accomplice’s testimony was corroborated by the defendant’s recent possession of a stolen boat as well as the defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking; consequently, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 161, 620 S.E.2d 433 (2005). Defendant’s conviction for felony theft by taking over $500.00 was supported by the evidence as defendant was accused of stealing over $500.00 in the aggregate over a 35-month period; the state could aggregate the amount of money stolen over a period of time into one count in an accusation. Parham v. State, 275 Ga. App. 528, 621 S.E.2d 532 (2005). Because the defendant promised— orally and in writing—to use the victims’ 198 money to acquire tire hauling containers, but instead used the money for other purposes, the jury was entitled to infer criminal intent and to find the defendant guilty of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 or as a party to the crime of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. Matthiessen v. State, 277 Ga. App. 54, 625 S.E.2d 422 (2005). As the state presented direct, and not circumstantial, evidence from the victims supporting the jury’s finding of guilt, when this testimony was coupled with that from the police officers involved, substantial and sufficient evidence supported a conviction for armed robbery and related offenses; the fact that the defendant offered another explanation for the defendant’s presence at the scene did not render the other evidence insufficient or circumstantial. Bakyayita v. State, 278 Ga. App. 624, 629 S.E.2d 539 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to prove that a juvenile was a party to theft by taking a motor vehicle since, even though there was no direct evidence that the juvenile was at the crime scene, the juvenile was with three other juveniles when the juveniles were seen driving and riding in vehicles that were later discovered to have been stolen from a repair shop storage facility since a witness testified that the vehicles exited a driveway near the shop shortly before one of the of the vehicles broke down, that the vehicle broke down a few hundred feet from the shop, and that the second vehicle circled back, since the juveniles gave conflicting stories about the owner of the broken down vehicle, and since the key to the second vehicle was found in the juvenile’s pocket; the juvenile court could have inferred from the location of the broken down vehicle that both vehicles had just been taken from the shop by the four juveniles. In the Interest of R.F., 279 Ga. App. 708, 632 S.E.2d 452 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s convictions for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer as an underlying offense for felony murder, theft by taking, vehicular homicide, disregarding a traffic control device, failing to stop at a stop sign, and reckless driving as: (1) the defendant stole a vehicle and was spotted by 16-8-2 an officer shortly after the vehicle was reported as stolen; (2) when the officer began to follow the vehicle, the vehicle rapidly accelerated; (3) the officer followed the stolen vehicle for several blocks, with both vehicles traveling between 60-70 miles per hour; (4) the vehicle continued to accelerate after the officer turned on the officer’s blue lights and siren; (5) when the stolen vehicle ran a red light, the vehicle struck a car, killing the driver; and (6) the officer and the owner of the stolen vehicle identified the defendant as the person driving the stolen vehicle. Ferguson v. State, 280 Ga. 893, 635 S.E.2d 144 (2006). There was sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to support the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking, and other related charges, since the victim testified that the defendant took the victim’s vehicle and the jury was charged on the law of parties to a crime; the victim testified that the perpetrators took the victim’s keys and that when the victim freed oneself sufficiently to look outside, the victim’s car was gone. Bills v. State, 283 Ga. App. 660, 642 S.E.2d 352 (2007). Based on the defendant’s concession that the state’s evidence tended to show an inference of the defendant’s guilt in making a false claim against the county as to money the county allegedly owed to the defendant, and despite a claim that the facts supported the conclusion that the county’s aquatic center director was the culpable party, when the defendant pointed to no evidence proving such, convictions for criminal attempt to commit theft by taking and first-degree forgery were supported by the evidence. Brown v. State, 285 Ga. App. 453, 646 S.E.2d 289 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1503, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 672 (Ga. 2007). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions of theft by taking; records showed that the defendant, a business manager, had received payments for a car but had never credited the payments to the business, and the defendant had made a loan to a fictitious person, then issued a check that was purportedly endorsed and cashed by the fictitious person. Ruppert v. State, 284 Ga. App. 456, 643 S.E.2d 892 (2007). Evidence supported the defendant’s 199 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) convictions of malice murder and of theft by taking when: the victim was found dead in a motel room that the victim and the defendant shared; DNA taken from under the victim’s fingernails matched samples taken from the defendant; there was evidence that the defendant drove the victim’s pickup truck away from the motel and left the truck at a friend’s house; and a bloodstain on the truck abandoned by the defendant contained a transfer bloodstain that matched the victim’s blood. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007). In a bench trial, because conflicts in the evidence were for the trial court, as the trier of fact, and not the court of appeals to resolve, the defendant’s convictions for theft by taking a motor vehicle and possessing cocaine were not subject to reversal on appeal based on the conflicts. Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. App. 86, 648 S.E.2d 674 (2007). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of theft by taking when an investigator hired by a company to investigate a sudden increase in company expenditures found that the defendant, a manager at the company, had written numerous company checks for personal use, diverted funds to the defendant’s family, and falsified at least one loan; the jury was entitled to disbelieve the defendant’s testimony that the company had authorized the defendant’s expenditures. Lewis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 379, 651 S.E.2d 494 (2007). Because the question of the defendant’s intent to steal was for the jury to decide, the pattern jury charge issued by the trial court was not erroneous and the defendant was properly barred from impeaching the informant through the use of prior convictions in the absence of certified copies of the convictions, the defendant’s theft by taking conviction was affirmed on appeal. Dudley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 794, 652 S.E.2d 840 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0319, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 168 (Ga. 2008). Evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of burglary, kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated assault, 16-8-2 robbery, and theft by taking when a treating physician stated that the 86-year-old victim’s injuries, including blood inside her vagina and bruises and contusions on her vagina, were consistent with forcible penetration; when the defendant admitted entering the victim’s home, removing her clothing, restraining her with electrical cords, hitting her, putting a plastic bag over her head, forcing her from one room to another, and taking her money and her car; and when DNA from the defendant matched the DNA of two hair roots found on the victim’s living room floor. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 662 S.E.2d 323 (2008). Evidence that the defendant punched the victim in the jaw to force the victim to exit the victim’s car, drove away, and admitted stealing the car to police was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Bridges v. State, 293 Ga. App. 783, 668 S.E.2d 293 (2008). Evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, theft by taking, and felony murder when the evidence showed that the defendant pulled the victim out of the victim’s car, beat the victim with a pistol, stole the car, and deliberately backed over the victim; before the crime, the defendant told an eyewitness to those acts that the defendant planned to rob the victim; and the defendant used the victim’s phone after the victim’s death. Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 669 S.E.2d 133 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for, inter alia, malice murder, theft by taking an automobile, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as the defendant admitted to a cellmate and to a cousin’s roommate that the defendant fatally shot the cousin when the cousin told the defendant to move out of a shared apartment; there was also physical evidence, the recovery of the gun used in the incident, and witness testimony that supported the conviction. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. 826, 672 S.E.2d 640 (2009). Restaurant was robbed, the manager was fatally shot, and the manager’s car was stolen. As the defendant’s accomplice, the defendant’s cellmate, and an officer 200 testified that the defendant admitted committing the murder, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, armed robbery, and theft by taking. Patterson v. State, 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1117, 130 S. Ct. 1051, 175 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict for felony theft by taking given the testimony of the victim, the police officers, the pawnbroker, and the videotape of the crime. Sheppard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 631, 686 S.E.2d 295 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking of a motorcycle, a helmet and jacket, and a truck because keys to the truck were found in the defendant’s motel room, keys to the motorcycle were found in the truck, and witnesses tied the defendant to both the truck and the motorcycle. McClain v. State, 301 Ga. App. 844, 689 S.E.2d 126 (2010). Evidence that a defendant kept a pick-up truck for over a year after completing repairs to the truck and that the defendant was using it as a residence, despite the fact that the owner made repeated attempts to contact the defendant about getting the truck back, was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Thornton v. State, 301 Ga. App. 784, 689 S.E.2d 361 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of criminal trespass and theft by taking because the defendant was found at a recycling facility trying to sell pieces of the victim’s aluminum awning, which the defendant had previously been told was not trash, but belonged to a laundry establishment. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 863, 690 S.E.2d 195 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to infer that the defendant acted with criminal intent and to find the defendant guilty of theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, and whether the defendant intended to deprive the victims of their property was a question for the trier of fact, who was not required to believe the defendant’s testi- 16-8-2 mony; the manner in which the property was appropriated was irrelevant, and even if the trial court had accepted the defendant’s claim that the defendant lawfully appropriated the trailer, the evidence supported a finding that although the defendant could have had lawful possession of the truck initially, the defendant failed to return the truck, or even provide the victims with the location of the truck upon their demands. Rushing v. State, 305 Ga. App. 629, 700 S.E.2d 620 (2010). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that the defendant was guilty of theft by taking because an ATM was removed from a bank’s property without authorization, defendant’s vehicle was observed at the bank approximately two hours before the theft was reported and shortly after the alarm was activated; tire tracks at the scene matched the tire prints on the defendant’s vehicle, the vehicle had a tow strap with a large metal hook tied to it, scrape marks consistent with a heavy object being drug on the pavement led from the ATM’s location in the direction of a nearby grassy lot, where the ATM was later found, and the defendant possessed black electrical tape and gloves upon the defendant’s arrest; the jury was authorized to consider the defendant’s flight from the scene and police as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. Tauch v. State, 305 Ga. App. 643, 700 S.E.2d 645 (2010). Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice’s testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evi- 201 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) dence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury’s determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010). Defendant was properly convicted of theft by taking a motor vehicle in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 because the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant stole a car; the jury was shown a video recording of the theft, the defendant admitted to a police officer that the defendant was the person depicted in the recordings walking near the car, the defendant stole another vehicle only hours after the car was stolen, and it was assumed that the jury concluded that the defendant was untruthful when the defendant denied stealing the car. Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 704 S.E.2d 470 (2010). Rational trier of fact was authorized to find that the evidence was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt and to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, because there was evidence that the defendant was alone for 20 minutes or more on the floor of the house where the money was kept and where no cleaning was to be performed; while there was circumstantial evidence that also implicated another house cleaner, reasonable jurors could have found from the evidence that the hypothesis that the house cleaner took the money was excluded based on testimony that the defendant had been alone in the area of the house where the money was kept, and there was no such evidence regarding the house cleaner. Cookston v. State, 309 Ga. App. 708, 710 S.E.2d 900 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to convict a de- 16-8-2 fendant of theft by taking from the defendant’s employer based on an investigator’s testimony that the defendant stole a box of 50 new golf club heads from the employer. The fact that the employer was aware of the planned theft and allowed the theft to proceed did not constitute consent to the taking. Baker v. State, 311 Ga. App. 532, 716 S.E.2d 580 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the perpetrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee’s car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told them what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer’s gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer’s blood was found on the defendant’s chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011). Defendant was properly convicted of felony theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 because the evidence was sufficient to prove that the indigent defense money the defendant received was the property of a law firm; an agreement existed between the defendant and the firm for the payment of indigent defense monies to the firm. Clarke v. State, 317 Ga. App. 471, 731 S.E.2d 100 (2012). Evidence including DNA evidence, the victim’s testimony regarding the nature of the attack and description of the attacker, and the store surveillance video of an individual who wore clothing similar to that worn by the attacker and who appeared to be the same race as the attacker, 202 supported the defendant’s convictions for rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, theft by taking, and three counts of possession of a gun during the commission of a crime. Glaze v. State, 317 Ga. App. 679, 732 S.E.2d 771 (2012). Victim’s testimony that the defendant approached the victim, thrust a gun about six inches from the victim’s face, took the victim’s cell phone and keys, and told the victim to ‘‘get out of here’’, while waving a gun, was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (2013). Conviction for theft by taking was supported by evidence that the defendant, without permission from the rightful owner, made use of real property by charging rent to tenants and that the value of the property taken was over $500. Harris v. State, 324 Ga. App. 411, 750 S.E.2d 721 (2013). Evidence that the defendant and two others pulled the victim over, took the victim’s vehicle and gun, grabbed the victim from behind and struck the victim, and took both the victim’s vehicle and gun supported the defendant’s convictions for robbery and theft by taking. Chambers v. State, 327 Ga. App. 663, 760 S.E.2d 664 (2014). Evidence that the defendant’s DNA was found on a soda can left inside the victim’s house after the burglary, the victim’s stolen property was found in a house where the defendant was residing, and the defendant fled when officers tried to arrest the defendant was sufficient so support the defendant’s convictions for burglary and theft by taking. Barstad v. State, 329 Ga. App. 214, 764 S.E.2d 453 (2014). Testimony of a store’s loss prevention officer as to the price of the phone that was taken was sufficient to support the defendant’s felony conviction. Mendez v. State, 327 Ga. App. 497, 759 S.E.2d 574 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of false imprisonment, theft by taking, and three counts of battery because the defendant locked the victim in the victim’s room, struck the victim in the face, hit the victim in the back of the head 16-8-2 with a blunt object, threw the victim to the floor when the victim tried to escape, and took the victim’s cellphone. Pierre v. State, 330 Ga. App. 782, 769 S.E.2d 533 (2015). Evidence that the victim and a neighbor saw the defendant sitting on the motorcycle without a helmet minutes after the theft and witnessed the defendant’s flight on the motorcycle when the victim’s confronted the defendant, supported the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking. Newby v. State, 338 Ga. App. 588, 791 S.E.2d 92 (2016). Evidence that the defendant misled a victim into believing that the defendant was an American father and businessman who was having financial difficulty in Malaysia and needed money to pay a hotel bill so that the defendant would not be arrested and could return to the defendant’s children in the United States was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by taking. Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017). Evidence that the defendant was given a check to deliver to a consultant but deposited the check into the defendant’s own account was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had unlawfully appropriated the check, supporting a conviction for theft by taking. Green v. State, 342 Ga. App. 862, 805 S.E.2d 469 (2017). Circumstantial evidence, including that a house was burglarized, the defendant sold jewelry stolen from the house at two local pawn shops, and the defendant had a car the same as the one seen leaving the house on the day of the burglary, was sufficient to uphold the jury’s conclusion that the defendant had committed burglary and theft. Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 761, No. A17A1789, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 133 (2018). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking as the defendant drove away from the scene of the shooting in the vehicle belonging to the victim’s girlfriend without the girlfriend’s permission and despite the girlfriend’s attempts to stop the defendant. Jones v. State, No. S18A0263, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 202 (Apr. 16, 2018). 203 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) Evidence sufficient for theft by taking and racketeering. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant on 29 counts of theft by taking and racketeering because the defendant, while the director and a fiduciary of the animal shelter, transferred a series of donations intended for the animal shelter into the defendant’s own personal bank accounts; the defendant expressly admitted that the subject transactions involved donation money intended for and belonging to the animal shelter; two members of the Board of Directors of the animal shelter testified unequivocally that the defendant was never authorized to solicit funds and deposit the funds into the defendant’s personal bank accounts; and the racketeering charge was predicated upon four separate indicted incidents of theft by taking. Kilby v. State, 335 Ga. App. 238, 780 S.E.2d 411 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0653, No. S16C0653, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. 2016). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking based on the evidence showing that without authorization from the employer, the defendant wrote numerous checks to the defendant and the defendant’s brother that exceeded the pay to which they were entitled and used the employer’s bank card to make several unauthorized purchases that were not for business use. Hettrick v. State, 334 Ga. App. 115, 778 S.E.2d 369 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by taking because the defendant accepted money from the victim for the purpose of constructing cabinets, did not complete the cabinets or provide the victim with what had been completed, and failed to return any money to the victim; and the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent and to find the defendant guilty. Graham v. State, 337 Ga. App. 664, 788 S.E.2d 555 (2016). Evidence sufficient for theft from bank. — Evidence sustained defendant bank teller’s conviction, where defendant’s cash drawer showed a $300 shortage and machine tapes indicated that the 16-8-2 defendant had given incorrect credit to depositors of checks. Green v. State, 182 Ga. App. 695, 356 S.E.2d 673 (1987). Although circumstantial in nature, evidence that a defendant had a computerized key that allowed the defendant to access and service ATM machines from which money was taken and that the defendant had used the defendant’s access card after hours on those machines was sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant on two counts of theft by taking. Rogers v. State, 292 Ga. App. 90, 663 S.E.2d 789 (2008). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of theft by taking. From the defendant’s conduct at a bank and the defendant’s continued participation in a scheme in which the defendant retained a portion of the money taken from an individual’s grandparent’s account, the jury could conclude that the defendant was equally involved in the scheme with the individual. Williams v. State, 297 Ga. App. 150, 676 S.E.2d 805 (2009). Evidence sufficient for theft by taking from employer. — Evidence that the defendant lied to employer to get initial possession of the employer’s car and that the defendant used the car to flee the state was sufficient to authorize conviction for theft by taking. Romano v. State, 233 Ga. App. 149, 503 S.E.2d 380 (1998). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking through the defendant’s breach of fiduciary obligations as the evidence showed the defendant, who worked for a construction company, was hired to manage an apartment complex the company had built after the defendant persuaded the company’s owner that another man was not trustworthy enough to be hired and thereafter kept some of the rent money the defendant collected from the tenants even though the defendant was supposed to turn that money over to the owner. Leary v. State, 256 Ga. App. 639, 569 S.E.2d 593 (2002). There was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the defendant of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 after the defendant was to close the salon and deposit the money at that time; the money was not deposited six times, and the de- 204 fendant offered inconsistent explanations as to how the money disappeared. Matthews v. State, 257 Ga. App. 886, 572 S.E.2d 391 (2002). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminal attempt to commit theft by taking, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 and O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1, when defendant admitted submitting or being involved in submitting false applications for matching fund contributions from defendant’s employer to an organization defendant created. Brown v. State, 268 Ga. App. 629, 602 S.E.2d 158 (2004). Jury was authorized to infer that the defendant, a Federal Highway Administration (FHA) employee, falsified three purchase orders authorizing payment of FHA funds for the defendant’s college courses under the pretense that the orders were for supplies and services with knowledge that such payment was not authorized. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Brown v. State, 302 Ga. App. 641, 692 S.E.2d 9 (2010). Theft by taking by misrepresenting oneself as professional. — Evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for misdemeanor theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 and for practicing dentistry without a license in violation of an earlier version of O.C.G.A. § 43-11-50, when the defendant held oneself out as a dentist to numerous individuals, obtained loans for business ventures involving a dentistry practice, obtained services for the dentist practice which the defendant did not pay for, and performed services on patients; the jury resolved the credibility and weight of the evidence issues pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620). McMillan v. State, 266 Ga. App. 729, 598 S.E.2d 17 (2004), overruled in part by Gidwell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (2006). Theft by taking involving misuse of checks. — Defendant’s conviction for theft by taking was supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence since: (1) the defendant purchased items from a store with a check, returned one of the items, and received an instant credit on 16-8-2 the defendant’s check card; (2) the defendant then stopped payment on the original check; (3) the defendant’s question as to whether there was any way that the matter could be taken care of could have been interpreted as evidence of an intent to deprive the store of the store’s property; and (4) the defendant had an invalid cashier’s check delivered to the manager to pay for the items. Massey v. State, 269 Ga. App. 152, 603 S.E.2d 431 (2004). Evidence that the defendant was involved in numerous wire transfers for products or services that were not produced or tendered, thousands of checks made out to different individuals were deposited into the defendant’s bank account, and the defendant had two large deposits in the defendant’s possession when arrested was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for theft by taking. Raymond v. State, 322 Ga. App. 404, 745 S.E.2d 689 (2013). Theft of a utility trailer. — When the owner of a stolen utility trailer testified that the owner had purchased the utility trailer for $1,100 and had made improvements to the trailer, this testimony alone was sufficient to establish that the trailer had some value at the time the trailer was stolen, which was all that was necessary to sustain a conviction for theft by taking; thus, the defendant was properly convicted of misdemeanor theft by taking. Simmons v. State, 287 Ga. App. 68, 651 S.E.2d 359 (2007). Evidence supported a conviction for theft by taking of a utility trailer. The jury was authorized to find unsatisfactory the defendant’s explanation that the defendant had agreed to buy the trailer from a third party and had taken possession of the trailer but had not paid for the trailer because the third party had not yet given the defendant title documents. Boivin v. State, 298 Ga. App. 411, 680 S.E.2d 415 (2009). Insufficient amount for felony conviction for theft by taking. — Although defendant was properly convicted of theft by taking, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the theft was of a felony amount since the witness testified to an amount under $100. Harris v. State, 328 Ga. App. 852, 763 S.E.2d 133 (2014). 205 Evidence and Inferences (Cont’d) Evidence insufficient to support conviction on one count, but sufficient for the others. — Defendant’s convictions on various counts of financial transaction card theft and theft by taking were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence established that, with regard to the two victims, the defendant was the only possible person to have taken the money and/or credit cards and/or identification cards from one victim’s purse and the other victim’s center car console. However, one conviction for theft by taking currency was reversed on appeal as the victim who alleged that the defendant stole the victim’s wallet testified that the victim never kept cash in the wallet, and the indictment specifically stated that currency was taken. Allen v. State, 293 Ga. App. 439, 667 S.E.2d 215 (2008). Evidence insufficient to support conviction. — Defendant could not be convicted of unlawfully appropriating the ‘‘property of another’’ on evidence showing that defendant had been allowed to take a cellular phone from a sales office with only an invoice indicating that payment was due in ten days and that defendant was subsequently billed for this and another purchase made on account. Gill v. State, 197 Ga. App. 558, 398 S.E.2d 833 (1990). Plaintiff could not recover for theft by taking based on a claim that in purchasing a new car plaintiff was charged for services not received since there was no allegation or evidence that the amounts charged were paid by plaintiff involuntarily. Taylor Auto Group, Inc. v. Jessie, 241 Ga. App. 602, 527 S.E.2d 256 (1999). Evidence was insufficient to support conviction for theft by taking because the state failed to exclude other explanations for the disappearance of the money in question and the evidence showed nothing more than the defendants’ presence in the wrong place at the wrong time. Locklear v. State, 249 Ga. App. 104, 547 S.E.2d 764 (2001). Because no evidence was presented that defendant converted the victim’s funds for defendant’s own use or cashed the victim’s check and because the state did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, 16-8-2 the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of theft by taking, under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2; consequently, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Hydock v. State, 275 Ga. App. 122, 619 S.E.2d 807 (2005). Evidence did not support the finding that a juvenile defendant had committed theft by taking. Although there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant had a key to the home from which items were taken and had been in and out of the home at the time of the theft, the defendant testified that the defendant had left the door unlocked and returned to the home to find the home ransacked; the circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the state’s and thus did not warrant a finding of guilt under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). In the Interest of M.H., 288 Ga. App. 663, 655 S.E.2d 249 (2007). Because the evidence failed to support a finding that the defendant, a mortgage consultant, did not intend to perform the services paid for by a client, only that conviction, out of eight entered by the jury, and the restitution order attached to the conviction, had to be reversed. Patterson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (2008). Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of criminal attempt to commit theft by taking by a fiduciary as the relationship between the defendant and the employer was merely that of employer-employee because, although the defendant was responsible for creating invoices, the defendant did not have authority to act for the employer beyond weighing the metals and assigning to the weight a dollar amount that had been previously fixed by the employer; and the defendant could not negotiate with the customers or independently determine how much the metals were worth; thus, although the conviction for criminal attempt to commit theft by taking stood, the felony sentence, based on the defendant being a fiduciary, was reversed. Scott v. State, 344 Ga. App. 412, 810 S.E.2d 613 (2018). Evidence supporting robbery by force. — Evidence that defendant 206 grabbed cashier’s arm when the cashier opened cash register to give defendant change was sufficient to support a conviction of robbery by force, rather than theft by taking, even if the cashier managed to escape defendant’s grasp before defendant took any money from the register. Garner v. Victory Express, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 652, 448 S.E.2d 719 (1994). Theft by taking motor vehicle. — Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in trial for theft by taking a motor vehicle was properly denied because the jury properly assessed the evidence, although conflicting, and found each fact necessary to make out the state’s case; trial counsel failed to preserve error regarding exclusion of a portion of the victim’s videotaped interview; and a photographic lineup included people of the same general age and race as defendant and was not impermissibly suggestive. Sherls v. State, 272 Ga. App. 152, 611 S.E.2d 780 (2005). Defendant, who was the executrix of a will, was properly found guilty of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 of estate funds because unexplained counter and ATM withdrawals from two estate accounts totalling over $100,000 were made and over $75,000 was deposited into the defendant’s personal bank account during the same time period. Christian v. State, 288 Ga. App. 546, 654 S.E.2d 452 (2007). Identity of owner not required in theft of motor vehicle. — Although a vehicle stolen by two defendants from the person who was sitting in the vehicle was owned by a third person who did not testify, the identity of the owner was not a material element of the crime that was required to be alleged and proved under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Kollie v. State, 301 Ga. App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking because, although the victim testified that the victim told the defendant to ‘‘take everything’’ prior to escaping from the defendant, there was evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant had already taken the victim’s car and that the victim’s subsequent relinquishment of the car was not done willingly; when the defendant drove away and 16-8-2 returned on foot only after parking the vehicle at the defendant’s cousin’s house, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant intended to deprive the victim of the car’s use, if even temporarily. Payne v. State, 301 Ga. App. 515, 687 S.E.2d 851 (2009). Insufficient evidence of theft by taking of motor vehicle. — In a juvenile’s adjudication as delinquent for theft by taking the juvenile’s sister’s car, although the juvenile admitted taking the car, the state failed to prove venue and failed to prove that the taking was unlawful as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. The officer’s testimony that the sister said the taking was without the sister’s permission was inadmissible hearsay and was insufficient to support the adjudication even though the evidence was admitted without objection. In the Interest of E.C., 311 Ga. App. 549, 716 S.E.2d 601 (2011). Evidence that a defendant showed an interest in a car that was for sale and took a test drive and returned the car, that the car was stolen the next day, that the defendant was found driving the car hours after the car was stolen using a duplicate key, and that the defendant fled from an officer was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking (automobile) in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2(a). Kelly v. State, 313 Ga. App. 582, 722 S.E.2d 175 (2012). Jury Instructions Charging entire statute. — Trial court did not err in charging the jury with the entirety of the theft by taking statute. Wilson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 486, 439 S.E.2d 701 (1993). Charge that jury might infer intent from proof of defendants’ acts did not constitute error as impermissibly shifting burden to defendant. Rittenberry v. State, 155 Ga. App. 213, 270 S.E.2d 379 (1980). When purchaser of goods not chargeable under section. — When the sole ‘‘interest’’ that the merchants had in the goods was a right to future payment pursuant to the sales contract, the property did not belong to ‘‘another,’’ and the defendant could not be charged under former Code 1933, § 26-1802 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2), unless the facts fell 207 Jury Instructions (Cont’d) within the rule that if one, meaning to steal another’s goods, fraudulently prevails on the latter to deliver the goods to that person, under the understanding that the property in them is to pass, the person commits neither larceny nor any other crime by the taking, unless the transaction amounts to an indictable cheat. Elliott v. State, 149 Ga. App. 579, 254 S.E.2d 900 (1979). Failure to charge on theft by taking required new trial. — When the evidence on behalf of the defendant denied the charge of armed robbery, and was such that it would have authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of either of the two lesser offenses of robbery by intimidation or theft by taking, the failure of the trial court to charge on robbery by intimidation and theft by taking required the grant of a new trial. Hensley v. State, 228 Ga. 501, 186 S.E.2d 729 (1972). Evidence showing both unlawful taking and unlawful conversion. — It is reversible error to authorize in charge conviction of unlawful taking based upon evidence also showing unlawful conversion. Robinson v. State, 152 Ga. App. 296, 262 S.E.2d 577 (1979). When there is no evidence whatsoever to authorize the jury to find misdemeanor grade of theft by taking (value of the goods taken being $100.00) (now $200.00 or less) the court does not err in failing to charge the jury they might recommend the defendant be punished for a misdemeanor under the charge. Richardson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 416, 240 S.E.2d 917 (1977). Judge is not required to charge jury on lesser offense of criminal trespass in the absence of a specific request by defense counsel. Martin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 875, 240 S.E.2d 231 (1977). When not error to fail to charge on theft by taking. — When the state’s evidence requires a verdict of guilty of robbery by sudden snatching, and the defendant’s evidence if believed would require an acquittal on the ground of mistaken identity, it is not error to fail to charge on the offense of theft by taking. Hinton v. State, 127 Ga. App. 108, 192 16-8-2 S.E.2d 717 (1972); Teague v. State, 169 Ga. App. 285, 312 S.E.2d 818 (1983), aff ’d, 252 Ga. 534, 314 S.E.2d 910 (1984). Defendant’s claim of error in the failure to instruct the jury on theft by taking was rejected as the defendant failed to request an instruction on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of robbery. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005). Because the elements of theft by taking could not be inferred from the defendant’s testimony, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s requested instruction on the same as a lesser included offense; moreover, any error in failing to give this requested instruction was harmless given the overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed a burglary. Goldberg v. State, 280 Ga. App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (2006), aff ’d, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (2007). Because the undisputed facts showed that the victim was conscious of the crime as the crime was being committed, the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on theft by taking as a lesser-included offense of robbery by snatching was not erroneous. Bettis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 643, 647 S.E.2d 340 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1535, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 862 (Ga. 2007). Because the trial court properly instructed the jury on both the crimes of armed robbery and theft by taking, and expressly stated that in the event that it did not believe that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, it could convict on the lesser offense of theft by taking, given that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding of guilt on the armed robbery charge, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant’s claim that the victim knowingly assisted in the planning and perpetration of the crime. Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 651 S.E.2d 538 (2007). Because a defendant either committed burglary or committed no crime at all, a charge on the lesser included offense of theft by taking was not required. Holt v. State, 293 Ga. App. 477, 667 S.E.2d 645 (2008). Trial court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of robbery by sud- 208 den snatching as the victim’s testimony was sufficient to support the charge of robbery by snatching and the defense was that another individual committed the crime. Copeland v. State, 325 Ga. App. 668, 754 S.E.2d 636 (2014). Trial court did not err by failing to charge the jury on unarmed robbery or theft by taking as lesser-included offenses to armed robbery in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the failure to give the lesser-included instructions neither created any reasonable likelihood that the state’s burden of proving all essential elements of armed robbery was lessened, or that the charge as given likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. Boccia v. State, 335 Ga. App. 687, 782 S.E.2d 792 (2016). Not error not to charge theft by taking unless evidence authorizes such. — It is not error to fail to charge the defendant with theft by taking, as a lesser offense included in a charge of armed robbery or robbery by intimidation, unless the evidence authorizes a finding of the lessor offense. Sanders v. State, 135 Ga. App. 436, 218 S.E.2d 140 (1975). Theft by taking charge justified. — Since entering an automobile was a lesser-included offense of theft by taking as a matter of fact, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense where the facts supported both offenses. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. App. 775, 566 S.E.2d 477 (2002). Armed robbery properly charged. — Person who commits armed robbery is not necessarily entitled to obtain charge as to theft by taking. Shepherd v. State, 234 Ga. 75, 214 S.E.2d 535 (1975). When the state’s evidence clearly warranted a charge on armed robbery, which was given, and there was no evidence of the lesser offense of theft by taking, there was no error in failing to give the requested charge. Shepherd v. State, 234 Ga. 75, 214 S.E.2d 535 (1975); Edwards v. State, 209 Ga. App. 304, 433 S.E.2d 619 (1993). Failure to give limiting instructions as to ‘‘unlawful taking.’’ — When the state charged the defendant with ‘‘unlawful taking’’ method of theft by taking, 16-8-2 the trial court committed reversible error in giving the entirety of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 in a charge to the jury, emphasizing and explaining words in a method of commission of the offense which was not charged, and failing to give a limiting instruction concerning which method could be considered by the jury. Gaines v. State, 177 Ga. App. 795, 341 S.E.2d 252 (1986). Failure to charge on affirmative defense. — Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury that an affirmative defense to a prosecution for theft by a public officer arose if the defendant, a sheriff, acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-10(2), because the defendant could not have had an honest claim of right to the county’s property. Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 615 S.E.2d 512 (2005). Failure to charge jury on issue of character of defendant was reversible error, where defendant’s character was an issue in the trial of the case. Chastain v. State, 177 Ga. App. 236, 339 S.E.2d 298 (1985). No possibility jury based verdict on incorrect theory. — Since the court did not charge the jury that theft by taking could consist of the unlawful appropriation of property lawfully obtained, and thus there was no possibility that the jury based its verdict on that theory rather than the theory alleged in the indictment — theft by taking, the state’s evidence, was amply sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time defendant made the withdrawals at issue, the defendant was well aware that defendant was obtaining funds which did not belong to defendant and which defendant had no right to receive. Mullen v. State, 203 Ga. App. 170, 416 S.E.2d 784 (1992). Instruction to infer guilt based on recent possession. — Trial court’s instruction to the jurors that they could infer defendant’s guilt to robbery or auto theft from defendant’s possession of a victim’s car keys unless there was a reasonable explanation for that possession did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to defendant. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. 82, 586 S.E.2d 306 (2003). 209 16-8-2 Jury Instructions (Cont’d) While the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of theft by taking of a motor vehicle under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, the trial court’s jury charge—regarding an inference arising from the defendant’s recent possession of a stolen truck—effectively shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant in violation of the due process clause; the error was not harmless as the error applied to an element of the crime that was at issue in the trial: whether the defendant was the person who stole the truck. Ward v. State, 312 Ga. App. 609, 718 S.E.2d 915 (2011). Charge barred by statute of limitations. — Trial court did not err by granting the defendant’s motion for plea in bar dismissing the charges of conversion of sales and use taxes, theft by taking, and false swearing against the defendant because the charges were not brought within four years of the dates on which the crimes were allegedly committed as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1. State v. Crowder, 338 Ga. App. 642, 791 S.E.2d 423 (2016). Charge not warranted. — When the state’s evidence established all of the elements of burglary and defendant, testifying in defendant’s own behalf, admitted all of the allegations of the indictment, the lesser included offense of theft by taking was not raised by the evidence and it was not error to fail to charge the jury on this lesser crime as a possible verdict. Crawford v. State, 181 Ga. App. 454, 352 S.E.2d 635 (1987). Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the amount of cash stolen could have been less than $500.00 because defense counsel specifically agreed that no charge on the value of the stolen money was necessary and because the undisputed evidence revealed that the amount of money stolen was more than $500.00. Turner v. State, 276 Ga. App. 620, 624 S.E.2d 244 (2005). While the prosecution against the defendant on charges of burglary, theft by taking, and criminal trespass included both direct and circumstantial evidence, convictions on those charges were not re- versed merely because the trial court failed to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) as the defendant failed to request that charge. Rodriguez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 752, 642 S.E.2d 705 (2007). Evidence did not support a charge on theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, as a lesser included offense of robbery by sudden snatching, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3), because the evidence showed that the victim was conscious of the crime as the crime was being committed; even if the victim did not actually see the defendant pick up the wallet, when the victim saw the defendant running toward the exit of a store with the wallet the victim gave chase but was unable to stop the defendant. Brown v. State, 309 Ga. App. 511, 710 S.E.2d 674 (2011). Jury charge held proper. — Jury instruction stating, ‘‘A person commits the offense of theft by taking when that person unlawfully takes any property of another with the intention of depriving the other person of the property regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated,’’ was proper. Taken as a whole, the charge conformed to the indictment and stated the law accurately when the charge omitted the possibility that the defendant had misappropriated money after having lawful possession of the money. Dudley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 794, 652 S.E.2d 840 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0319, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 168 (Ga. 2008). Punishment Classification of punishment determined by value of property taken. — There are not two crimes of theft by taking, one being a misdemeanor and the other being a felony. There is only one such crime, and upon conviction for it, the punishment only is determined by the value of the property taken. Mack v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 86, 222 S.E.2d 337 (1976). Value was not an element of the crime of theft by taking as proscribed by former Code 1933, § 26-1802 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2), the value of stolen items was relevant only for purposes of distinguishing between a misdemeanor and a felony. 210 Stancell v. State, 146 Ga. App. 773, 247 S.E.2d 587 (1978); Hight v. State, 221 Ga. App. 574, 472 S.E.2d 113 (1996). Value is not element, per se, of statute defining theft by taking. Value, is however, relevant in ascertaining punishment to be imposed. Thus, value can be an issue in any theft case, in the same manner as an element of the substantive offense itself. Bryan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 428, 251 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743, 272 S.E.2d 699 (1980). While defendant claimed the trial court erred in sentencing defendant for felony theft by taking because the evidence was insufficient to show the property stolen exceeded $500, defense counsel conceded at trial that the victim’s testimony that the victim had over $600 in the victim’s purse provided sufficient evidence to support felony sentencing. Grindle v. State, 265 Ga. App. 717, 595 S.E.2d 549 (2004). Despite the defendant’s claim that reversible error was premised on the state’s failure to comply with the required notice upon filing two charges of felony theft by taking, as the indictment failed to specifically allege either that the value of the items stolen exceeded $500, or that the items were motor vehicles, Georgia law did not establish two classifications for theft by taking crimes, but a determination as to the felony or misdemeanor status of a charge was based on the value of the property taken; moreover, because the defendant failed to furnish the appellate court with a transcript, it was left with no other alternative but to presume the trial judge properly considered the evidence in imposing sentence. Conley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 841, 637 S.E.2d 438 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0315, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 67 (Ga. 2007). Defendant’s felony sentence for theft by taking under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 and 16-8-12(a) had to be vacated because, although the state proved that the defendant took certain software belonging to the defendant’s employer, which the defendant was not permitted to copy, the state failed to prove the value of the software so the defendant could only receive a misdemeanor sentence; the value of the software was not an element of the crime but only determined whether the 16-8-2 defendant was punished for a felony or a misdemeanor. DuCom v. State, 288 Ga. App. 555, 654 S.E.2d 670 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0598, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 383 (Ga. 2008). Though there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that a juvenile committed an act of theft by taking, because the state failed to offer evidence as to the stolen property’s value, the juvenile court erred in finding that the juvenile committed an act of felony theft by taking. Thus, the case required a remand for an adjudication of delinquency and a disposition thereof to be entered against the juvenile for committing an act which would have supported a conviction for the offense of misdemeanor theft by taking since the value of the stolen property only was relevant as to the conviction’s classification as a felony versus a misdemeanor. In the Interest of J. S., 296 Ga. App. 144, 673 S.E.2d 645 (2009). Defendant, who was convicted of theft by taking of eight or nine aluminum tire rims, was properly sentenced for felony theft because the prosecution established that the value of the rims exceeded $500 since lay testimony of the victim provided that used rims were valued at between $150 and $175 each so that the total value of the eight to nine rims taken exceeded $1,000. Perdue v. State, 300 Ga. App. 588, 685 S.E.2d 489 (2009). Trial court did not err in imposing a felony sentence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12(a)(1) after the defendant was convicted of theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 for stealing lumber and other materials from a builder’s job site because the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that the fair cash market value of the property at the time and place of the theft exceeded $500 when according to the builder, the cost of the materials was $450, and the cost of the labor to construct the jigs was approximately $200, bringing the total value of the stolen property to $650; the builder clearly established knowledge, experience, and familiarity with the value of the property and, thus, established reasons for the value, having an opportunity for forming such an opinion. Partin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 589, 692 S.E.2d 32 (2010). 211 Punishment (Cont’d) Felony sentence imposed by the trial court was vacated, and the case was remanded because, although the State of Georgia proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, as the owner of the stolen property testified as to seeing the defendant take the property, the state’s evidence was insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12 to establish that the current fair market value of the stolen items exceeded $500. Porter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 121, 706 S.E.2d 620 (2011). Charge of receiving stolen goods is equal charge to theft by taking and punishment is same. McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 205 S.E.2d 445 (1974). Theft by taking a motor vehicle. — O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12(a)(5)(A) allowed the trial court to sentence defendant to not less than one nor more than 20 years’ imprisonment for theft of a motor vehicle, and the court properly sentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment even though the state did not offer evidence to prove the value of the vehicle defendant took. Martin v. State, 266 Ga. App. 190, 596 S.E.2d 705 (2004). Pretrial intervention program on related charges did not bar prosecution. — Prosecution of the defendants for theft by taking and criminal trespass in Calhoun County, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b) and 16-8-2, was not prohibited by double jeopardy based on their prior entry into a pretrial intervention program under O.C.G.A. § 15-18-80(b) following charges of theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), in Irwin County because there was no prosecution in Irwin County within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-3(14) and 16-1-8(a)(1)-(2). Palmer v. State, 341 Ga. App. 433, 801 S.E.2d 300 (2017). Separate sentences for separate offenses. — Given that an indictment properly charged the defendant with committing two thefts, approximately one year apart, involving property from two different owners and each requiring proof of facts or elements not required to establish the other offense, those offenses were dis- 16-8-2 tinct and separate enough that imposition of a sentence for each crime was proper. Conley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 841, 637 S.E.2d 438 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0315, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 67 (Ga. 2007). Sentence as a recidivist proper. — Upon convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by taking, the trial court did not err in denying a motion to vacate an illegal sentence, despite the claim that the defendant was improperly punished as a recidivist, as nothing supported the argument that the defendant received an enhanced punishment based on an uncertified, non-final disposition from the State of Louisiana; moreover, a trial court was authorized to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment for armed robbery, even when that defendant was not a recidivist. Jefferson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 97, 630 S.E.2d 528 (2006). Trial court did not err in considering the defendant’s prior guilty plea in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist after the defendant was convicted of felony theft by taking because the state, by tendering the certified copy of the plea, met the state’s initial burden of proving that the defendant had entered the guilty plea. Sheppard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 631, 686 S.E.2d 295 (2009). Scrivener’s error was held moot. — Because a scrivener’s error regarding the sentence entered upon the defendant’s plea to five counts of theft by taking had already been corrected by the trial court, the sentence imposed was upheld, and any claim of error was rendered moot. Manley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 358, 651 S.E.2d 453 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 94 (Ga. 2008). Juvenile’s sentence under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 vacated. — Although the state argued that a juvenile had been adjudicated on five separate petitions setting out five separate felonies, because the record revealed that adjudication had occurred on only two prior occasions for acts which, if done by an adult, would have been felonies, the juvenile’s sentence under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(B)(vii) was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. In the Interest of P.R., 282 Ga. App. 480, 638 S.E.2d 898 (2006). 212 Evidence sufficient for juvenile’s delinquency adjudication. — Testimony from the victims of three auto thefts, along with statements given by defendant juvenile, were legally sufficient to support the defendant’s delinquency adjudication for acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of burglary and theft by taking-vehicle. In the Interest of E.J., 292 Ga. App. 69, 663 S.E.2d 411 (2008). Merged counts for sentencing. — Two counts of armed robbery and two counts of theft by taking should have been merged into one armed robbery conviction. When a single victim was robbed of multiple items in a single transaction, there was only one robbery, and the same evidence was used to prove both the theft and the armed robbery charges. Wells v. State, 294 Ga. App. 277, 668 S.E.2d 881 (2008). Sentence of 111 years proper. — When the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, theft by taking, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly imposed a 111-year sentence of imprisonment, which was within the statutory limits and which was the maximum possible. The presumption of vindictiveness was absent when a trial court imposed a greater penalty after trial than the court would have after a guilty plea; furthermore, the trial court explained that the court imposed the sentence because the defendant’s actions were life-threatening, because the jury convicted the defendant of entering the dwelling with intent to commit murder because the defendant’s actions against one victim, the defendant’s parent, had escalated from the defendant’s previous misdemeanor crimes against the parent, and because the defendant displayed no remorse. Townes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 185, 679 S.E.2d 772 (2009). 16-8-2 Alien’s sentence and impact on immigration sentence. — After an alien was sentenced to a four-year confinement term, to be served on probation, for a Georgia felony theft by taking conviction, the four-year probationary period the alien served for the sentence counted toward the alien’s term of imprisonment for purposes of applying 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration judge correctly found that the alien qualified as an aggravated felon, removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Amaya-Flores v. United States AG, 595 Fed. Appx. 958 (11th Cir. Dec. 29, 2014) (Unpublished). Sentence differing from plea agreement. — Following the state agreeing to dismiss the RICO and theft charges against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea to one misdemeanor count of hindering and obstructing a law enforcement officer conditioned upon the defendant testifying truthfully at the trial against the co-defendants, the trial court erred by imposing a sentence upon the defendant which differed from the understood terms of the negotiated plea. Lewis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 412, 767 S.E.2d 771 (2014). Restitution order proper. — Defendant, who pled guilty to theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, could not argue that the trial court failed to consider the factors in O.C.G.A. § 17-14-10 in making a restitution order as the defendant did not meet the burden of proof under O.C.G.A. § 17-14-7 in establishing the defendant’s expenses as the defendant only told the court that the defendant had to make monthly payments; the defendant made no response when asked if the defendant could make house payments and the like if half the defendant’s monthly income was applied to the restitution order. Wimpey v. State, 297 Ga. App. 182, 676 S.E.2d 831 (2009).