Mosby v

State, 319 Ga. App. 642, 738 S.E.2d 98 (2013). When the defendant was convicted of aggravated child molestation and child molestation, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss 17-3-2.1 or plea in bar based on the statute of limitations as the indictment was timely because the indictment was filed within seven years of both the victim’s 16th birthday and the date the victim reported the crimes to police. Leekomon v. State, 351 Ga. App. 836, 832 S.E.2d 437 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0283, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 412 (Ga. 2020). Because the state indicted the defendant within seven years of both the victim’s 16th birthday and the victim’s outcry to police, the indictment was timely; thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s inaccurate jury charge regarding the statute of limitation, which failed to tell the jury that the victim’s 16th birthday was a potentially relevant date for statute of limitation purposes because there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have differed. Leekomon v. State, 351 Ga. App. 836, 832 S.E.2d 437 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0283, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 412 (Ga. 2020). Indictment filed within 15 year statute of limitations. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction for forcible rape of the defendant’s child during the time the child was 13 through 15 years of age, the trial court correctly concluded that the state had 15 years from the victim’s 16th birthday on January 12, 1995, or until January 12, 2010, to prosecute the case; therefore, no ex post facto violation occurred since the indictment was filed on January 8, 2008. Duke v. State, 298 Ga. App. 719, 681 S.E.2d 174 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1866, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. 2010). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for rape of a minor relative, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations ran on the rape offenses before the defendant was charged because in applying the 1996 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1 and the tolling provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1, the limitation period for the defendant’s crime ran 15 years from December 13, 1995, when the crimes were first reported to authorities. Thus, because the state had until December 13, 2010 to indict the defendant, the January 7, 2008, indict- 64 17-3-2.1 LIMITATIONS ON PROSECUTION ment was timely and no ex post facto violation arose because the original seven-year limitation period had not expired at the time. Flournoy v. State, 299 Ga. App. 377, 682 S.E.2d 632 (2009). Allegation of molestation of a child under 16 sufficient to invoke tolling. — Indictment alleging the molestation of a child under the age of 16 sufficiently invoked the statute of limitation tolling provision set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1. Lyde v. State, 311 Ga. App. 512, 716 S.E.2d 572 (2011). State had no actual knowledge of criminal wrongdoing. — Superior court did not err in failing to grant the defen- 17-3-2.2 dant’s plea in bar, motion to dismiss, and general demurrer to prohibit prosecution of the non-murder counts in the indictment as barred by the applicable statutes of limitation because the record did not support a finding that the state had actual knowledge that there was criminal wrongdoing resulting in the fatality, much less that the defendant would be charged as the perpetrator of the victim’s death, until the superseding medical examiner’s report. Higgenbottom v. State, 290 Ga. 198, 719 S.E.2d 482 (2011). Cited in State v. Outen, 296 Ga. 40, 764 S.E.2d 848 (2014). 17-3-2.2. Statute of limitations.