O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.1 — McCracken v

State, 224 Ga. App. 356, 480 S.E.2d 361 (1997). There was no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s warrantless arrest after being found at the home of a friend was justiﬁed under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) as another friend of the defendant had been found shot at the defendant’s home, and by the time of the arrest the police knew that the defendant’s spouse was missing, that the defendant and the defendant’s spouse were estranged, and that the defendant had stalked and threatened the defendant’s spouse, such that the police had probable cause to believe that an act of family violence had occurred, and the possibility that the spouse was still alive was an exigent circumstance which authorized the entry into the friend’s home to arrest the defendant. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2004). Probable cause not found. — Powell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 801, 295 S.E.2d 560 (1982); State v. Gunter, 249 Ga. App. 802, 549 S.E.2d 771 (2001). Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after the defendant’s car was impounded during a traffic stop because, even though the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on criminal database search results that the defendant’s car was not insured, once the defendant provided proof of insurance in an acceptable manner, the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant or issue the defendant a citation; and, without probable cause to issue the citation, the officer had no basis for impounding the defendant’s vehicle. State v. Lewis, 344 Ga. App. 630, 811 S.E.2d 436 (2018). Probable cause found. — Defendant’s arrival with a police suspect at a hidden 87 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) drug transaction location and the defendant’s attempt to leave the scene at the time of the suspect’s arrest supported a ﬁnding that the police had probable cause on which to arrest the defendant. Fowler v. State, 201 Ga. App. 417, 411 S.E.2d 335 (1991). Since police officers knew that a fatal stabbing and robbery had occurred that morning, that the defendant had been at or near the scene of the murder, that the defendant had threatened the victim only a week before, and that the defendant had been treated that morning for a wound, the protective search for weapons made by the police officers was constitutionally permissible. Further, as the search was proper, the police were also authorized to arrest the defendant when the police found a pistol concealed on defendant’s person. Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 615, 449 S.E.2d 516 (1994). Probable cause from videotape identiﬁcation and commercial transactions. — Probable cause for warrantless arrest of the defendant as the defendant left the defendant’s home was properly established through the defendant’s identiﬁcation from videotapes by bank coworkers and by a police officer who had known the defendant for 25 years, and by the defendant’s payments in cash to four ﬁnancial institutions. Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 728, 425 S.E.2d 856, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 998, 114 S. Ct. 565, 126 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1993). Officers justiﬁed in arresting defendant for DUI. — Officers were justiﬁed in arresting the defendant for driving under the inﬂuence and operating a vehicle after being declared a habitual violator since once the defendant had been stopped, the officers observed that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated, and the defendant admitted being a habitual violator. Cheatham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 483, 419 S.E.2d 920 (1992). Persons entitled to arrest probation violators. — Power to make a warrantless arrest of a known probation violator is not limited to the probation 17-4-20 supervisor, under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-38, but also includes a law enforcement officer with general arrest powers who has trustworthy information as to the probation violation. Battle v. State, 254 Ga. 666, 333 S.E.2d 599 (1985). Suspect found wearing incriminating type of shoe justiﬁed warrantless arrest. Clinkscale v. State, 158 Ga. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 341 (1981). Defendant’s appearance, a cut in defendant’s jacket shoulder, defendant’s proximity to the burglary site, the observation of a running person believed by the officer to be the same one stopped pursuant to the officer’s description by the other officer a few minutes later, the short time between the report of the burglar alarm and the apprehension of the defendant, the absence of anyone else in the area matching the suspect’s description, the defendant’s nervousness, and the deputy’s knowledge of the defendant’s prior record of burglary and escape, added up to probable cause to arrest the defendant. State v. Wilson, 179 Ga. App. 334, 346 S.E.2d 111 (1986). Officer must reveal the officer’s police status. — It is the duty of an officer to disclose the officer’s official character to the person whom the officer is arresting. Douglas v. State, 152 Ga. 379, 110 S.E. 168 (1921). Officer must reveal charge. — Officer who arrests an alleged offender must also inform the accused of the nature of the charge. Dorsey v. State, 7 Ga. App. 366, 66 S.E. 1096 (1910). Illegal arrest is tort. — Arrest without a warrant, unless made under circumstances declared by statute to permit an arrest without a warrant, is illegal and is a tort for which an action will lie as well as when arrest is under process of law but without probable cause and maliciously made. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 74 Ga. App. 823, 41 S.E.2d 576 (1947). Liability for false imprisonment. — To avoid liability for false imprisonment, it must be shown not only that the arrest was valid but also that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the charged offense had been committed. Amason v. Kroger Co., 204 Ga. App. 695, 88 420 S.E.2d 314 (1992). Burden on arrester to show exception to warrant requirement. — Whoever arrests or imprisons a person without a warrant is guilty of a tort, unless the arrestor can justify under some of the exceptions in which arrest and imprisonment without a warrant are permitted by law; and the burden of proving the existence of the facts raising the exception is upon the person making the arrest or inﬂicting the imprisonment. Vlass v. McCrary, 60 Ga. App. 744, 5 S.E.2d 63 (1939); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951). Plaintiff held for payment without warrant justiﬁed false imprisonment action. — Under allegations that the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant when the plaintiff was not guilty of any offense under the state laws or under any city ordinance and, without being carried before a committing magistrate, was held under arrest and deprived of liberty until the plaintiff and the plaintiff ’s brother paid to the defendant a sum of money, whereupon the defendant accepted the money and caused or permitted the plaintiff to be released from custody, the arrest and detention of the plaintiff were clearly illegal, and a cause of action for false imprisonment was set out. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951). Information suggesting why officer believed plaintiff inebriated admissible. — If, in a false imprisonment action there is evidence from which the jury would be authorized to ﬁnd that the defendant in good faith and with probable cause arrested the prosecutor for drunkenness, any facts, circumstances, or information on which the defendant officer acted in making the arrest are admissible, not as proof of the facts, but as evidence that the officer in making the arrest did so upon a reasonable ground of suspicion. Henderson v. State, 95 Ga. App. 830, 99 S.E.2d 270 (1957). Evidence affirming details of an informant’s tip. — That the defendant matched the description of a drug dealer and that the defendant had ‘‘a large bulge’’ in the area of the defendant’s pants where the informant had seen defendant conceal 17-4-20 contraband was sufficient to verify the tipster’s veracity and support the trial court’s ﬁnding that the police had probable cause on which to arrest the defendant. Manzione v. State, 194 Ga. App. 227, 390 S.E.2d 121 (1990). Conﬂicting testimony. — Court found no impermissible conduct that would taint the subsequent arrest when the police and the defendant offered conﬂicting testimony regarding events which led to the defendant’s arrest. State v. Thurmond, 203 Ga. App. 230, 416 S.E.2d 529, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 529 (1992). Conviction of police officer for involuntary manslaughter was proper. O’Conner v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. R. 58 (1879). 2. Offense Committed in Officer’s Presence Words ‘‘in the presence’’ and ‘‘within his immediate knowledge’’ are synonymous; to justify the arrest without a warrant, the officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime taking place if by any of the officer’s senses the officer has personal knowledge of the crime’s commission. Marsh v. State, 182 Ga. App. 892, 357 S.E.2d 325 (1987); State v. Carranza, 217 Ga. App. 431, 457 S.E.2d 699 (1995), rev’d in part on other grounds, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996); Youhoing v. State, 226 Ga. App. 475, 487 S.E.2d 86 (1997); Watson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 636, 534 S.E.2d 93 (2000). Constitutionality of warrantless arrest depends on officer having probable cause. — Constitutional validity of an arrest without a warrant depends upon whether the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the defendant is committing or has committed, an offense in the officer’s presence. Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704, 305 S.E.2d 436 (1982). Constitutional validity of an arrest without a warrant depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make the arrest — whether at the moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that 89 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 2. Offense Committed in Officer’s Presence (Cont’d) the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 227, 416 S.E.2d 771, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 771 (1992). If any crime is committed in the arresting officer’s presence, a warrantless arrest is legal. Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911, 88 S. Ct. 839, 19 L. Ed. 2d 885 (1968). Offense committed in defendant’s home. — When an individual commits an offense in his or her home and that offense is committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer, the officer is authorized to arrest the individual in the home without a warrant only when the officer’s entry into the home is by consent or when there are exigent circumstances. Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996). Arrest is officer’s duty. — When a crime is committed in the presence of an officer, it is not only the officer’s right then and there to arrest without a warrant, but it is the officer’s duty to do so. Yancy v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 96 Ga. App. 476, 100 S.E.2d 653 (1957), appeal dismissed, 213 Ga. 903, 102 S.E.2d 497 (1958). Discretion of officer to issue citation or make arrest. — Although O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a) gives a police officer the option of issuing a citation, it does not restrict the power given to police in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 to make custodial arrests for crimes committed in the officers’ presence. Consequently, after a driver is arrested for a traffic violation, a police officer can lawfully search the interior of the driver’s car. State v. Lowe, 263 Ga. App. 1, 587 S.E.2d 169 (2003). Because an officer was authorized to arrest the defendant for weaving, a decision to impound the vehicle the defendant was driving was not unreasonable, and an inventory search of the vehicle was authorized; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. Lopez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 873, 17-4-20 650 S.E.2d 430 (2007). Officers who see persons acting suspiciously may investigate, including ‘‘stop and frisk.’’ Clark v. State, 131 Ga. App. 583, 206 S.E.2d 717 (1974). If officer believes crime occurred or will occur. — Officers have ample authority to investigate if the officers believe a crime has occurred or is about to occur in the officers’ presence. Clark v. State, 131 Ga. App. 583, 206 S.E.2d 717 (1974). Police officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of a defendant for misdemeanor obstruction when the defendant, after being told not to move a car belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend because the officer needed to check the car’s registration to complete a shoplifting investigation of the girlfriend, the defendant disobeyed the officer and had a friend remove the car from a store lot. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). Officer observed ﬁght but not the instigator. — In an arrestee’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting the arrestee without probable cause, given the circumstances known to the officers as the officers observed a physical scuffle between the arrestee and another officer in an extremely crowded venue just before midnight on New Year’s Eve, the officers had probable cause to arrest for simple battery. Robinson v. MARTA, 334 Ga. App. 746, 780 S.E.2d 400 (2015). Random search of automobile’s occupants unjustiﬁed. — While a police officer may arrest for a crime committed in the officer’s presence, that is, of which the officer is aware through the use of the officer’s senses, and while there are circumstances under which the officer may momentarily detain and question a citizen, if the officer is acting upon reasonable and articulable suspicion which may yet not amount to probable cause to believe a crime is being committed, this gives the officer no right, where a crime is not being committed in the officer’s presence in such manner that it is known to the officer by the use of the officer’s senses, to stop a vehicle and search the occupants, and calling the search a ‘‘frisk’’ in no way ameliorates the situation. A ‘‘frisk,’’ if legal at all, is such only in exceptional circumstances and only for the very limited pur- 90 pose of assuring the officer that the suspect whom the officer must accost is not going to turn upon the officer with a weapon. L.B.B. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 163, 198 S.E.2d 895 (1973). No right to arrest and search for weapons on mere suspicion. — Under this section, an officer has no authority, upon bare suspicion or upon mere information derived from others, to arrest a citizen and search the citizen’s person in order to ascertain whether or not the citizen is carrying a concealed weapon in violation of law. Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12, 25 S.E. 608 (1896). Arrest on suspicion of unknown crime. — There is no authority under which a citizen may be arrested without a warrant and held for investigation to determine if the citizen has committed some crime merely because the person making the arrest has a suspicion that the person arrested may have committed some then unknown crime. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (1964). Because arrest requires offense. — To justify a police officer in making an arrest without a warrant, there must be an offense committed by the party arrested. O’Conner v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. R. 58 (1879); Holliday v. Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779, 78 S.E. 482 (1913). Articulable suspicion based on senses. — In determining whether a suspicious situation should be further investigated or an arrest based on probable cause made, an officer may rely upon information acquired through any of the officer’s senses. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992). Detective reasonably could conclude at that time that an exigent situation was at hand after the detective received complaints regarding loud noise from a certain vicinity; proceeding to that vicinity and after the officer observed through the officer’s sense of hearing, while on a public road, screaming, hollering, and music. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992). Officer has authority to arrest anyone of whom the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a felony without waiting ﬁrst to procure a warrant. Chaney v. 17-4-20 State, 133 Ga. App. 913, 213 S.E.2d 68 (1975); Elders v. State, 149 Ga. App. 139, 253 S.E.2d 817 (1979). Detective employed by county sheriff ’s office may make arrest. — County police, including the county sheriff, have general police power to investigate and make arrests as other law enforcement officials. Thus, a detective employed by the county sheriff ’s office may make an arrest without a warrant if a criminal offense is committed in the officer’s presence or within the officer’s knowledge. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992). If facts give police reasonable grounds to believe defendant criminal. — Crucial question is whether the knowledge of the related facts and circumstances give the police officer cause and reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed an offense. If it did, an arrest without a warrant is legal. Creamer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 458, 258 S.E.2d 212 (1979). What constitutes ‘‘reasonable grounds of suspicion’’ for warrantless arrest is generally to be determined under facts of individual case. Chaney v. State, 133 Ga. App. 913, 213 S.E.2d 68 (1975). Middle ground of probable cause needed between suspicion and certainty. — There must be a middle ground between proof to a mathematical certainty that what one thinks one sees happening is in fact a violation of law, and mere suspicion that it may be a criminal act; it is frequently deﬁned as probable cause. Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973). Arrest for offenses committed in ofﬁcer’s presence meets constitutional requirement of probable cause for arrest. Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977). State courts require probable cause for warrantless arrest. — Georgia courts have equated this section with the probable cause standard or engrafted a probable cause provision on that section. Nicholson v. United States, 355 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 974, 86 S. Ct. 1866, 16 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1966). Georgia has apparently engrafted a 91 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 2. Offense Committed in Officer’s Presence (Cont’d) probable cause requirement onto this section. United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129, 94 S. Ct. 866, 38 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1974). Arrest may be made without warrant. — Police officer has a right to arrest without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe a crime is being committed in the officer’s presence. Anderson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57, 179 S.E.2d 286 (1970). When knowledge of the related facts and circumstances gives police officers probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed an offense, an arrest, even without a warrant, is legal. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975). If an officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony, an arrest is authorized. Arnsdorff v. State, 152 Ga. App. 515, 263 S.E.2d 176 (1979). When the police officer observed the driver of the car travelling at a high rate of speed through the motel parking lot, probable cause existed to stop the driver and make a warrantless arrest of the driver for driving too fast for conditions. Sanders v. State, 204 Ga. App. 545, 419 S.E.2d 759 (1992). Probable cause does not require certainty. — When dealing with probable cause, as the name implies, one deals with probabilities, not certainty, and the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is not that level which is necessary for proof of guilt in a trial. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979). Probable cause does require reasonable grounds rather than rumor. — In exigent circumstances such as the imminent removal or destruction of contraband, a police officer may arrest without a warrant, but there must be probable cause. Probable cause means reasonable grounds, and is that apparent state of 17-4-20 facts which seem to exist after reasonable and proper inquiry. Rumor, suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is not sufficient and it is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justiﬁcation. Kelly v. State, 129 Ga. App. 131, 198 S.E.2d 910 (1973). Probable cause requires reasonably trustworthy information which convinces prudent person. — Whether or not the arrest violated this section, the constitutional validity of the arrest without a warrant depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make the arrest — whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which the officers had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Peters v. State, 114 Ga. App. 595, 152 S.E.2d 647 (1966); Rockholt v. State, 129 Ga. App. 99, 198 S.E.2d 885 (1973); Lynn v. State, 130 Ga. App. 646, 204 S.E. 346 (1974); Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84 (1979); State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345, 265 S.E.2d 312 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Stilley, 261 Ga. App. 868, 584 S.E.2d 9 (2003); Watson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 545, 265 S.E.2d 871 (1980); Thompson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 101, 270 S.E.2d 313 (1980). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which the officers had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974). Reasonable police officer standard based on officer’s background. — Standard of probable cause is that of ‘‘a reasonable, cautious, and prudent peace officer’’ and must be judged in the light of the officer’s experience and training. Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973). When police officer is informant, the reliability of the informant is presumed as a matter of law. Quinn v. 92 State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974). Phrases ‘‘in his presence’’ and ‘‘within his immediate knowledge.’’ — Words ‘‘in his presence’’ in former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) and ‘‘within his immediate knowledge’’ in former Code 1933, § 27-211 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60) are synonymous. Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672, 72 S.E. 51 (1911); Novak v. State, 130 Ga. App. 780, 204 S.E.2d 491 (1974); Forehand v. State, 130 Ga. App. 801, 204 S.E.2d 516 (1974); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Terms ‘‘within the presence of the officers,’’ and ‘‘within their immediate knowledge,’’ are synonymous. Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973). An offense is committed in the presence of an officer when the senses of the officer gave the knowledge the offense is being committed. Novak v. State, 130 Ga. App. 780, 204 S.E.2d 491 (1974); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Offense within officer’s immediate knowledge. — Because the defendant was arrested immediately after the defendant admitted to the police officer that the defendant threatened the victims, therefore, even though the initial threat was made outside of the officer’s presence, it was within the defendant’s immediate knowledge and justiﬁed the arrest. Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 517, 541 S.E.2d 112 (2000). When officer sees crime. — Crime is committed in the presence of an officer if the officer sees the crime committed, or by the exercise of any of the officer’s senses the officer has knowledge, together with what the officer sees, that a crime is being committed by the person sought to be arrested. Forehand v. State, 130 Ga. App. 801, 204 S.E.2d 516 (1974); Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 204 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839, 95 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1974). Probable cause was a complete defense to an arrestee’s false imprisonment claim because the arrest for burglary was made pursuant to exigent circumstances as the 17-4-20 suspected offense was committed in the officers’ presence or within the officers’ immediate knowledge; the officers found the arrestee inside a vacant home and saw that the back door appeared to have been forced open. Gray v. Ector, 541 Fed. Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013) (Unpublished). Arrest for observed traffic violation. — Under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a), an officer has probable cause to arrest for a traffic violation committed in the officer’s presence. State v. Goolsby, 262 Ga. App. 867, 586 S.E.2d 754 (2003). Warrantless arrest of the defendant was authorized on the ground that a sale of cocaine was committed in the officers’ presence, and after the defendant retreated into a motel room, the exigencies of the situation demanded and excused an immediate entry into the room for the officer to arrest the defendant without a warrant; hence, suppression of the evidence seized thereafter would not have been granted. Fortson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693 (2006). Appeals court rejected the defendant’s contention that the arrest was made without probable cause as the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant’s presence at the scene of an alleged robbery, coupled with the defendant’s ﬂight from police, justiﬁed the arrest. McCoy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 246, 645 S.E.2d 728 (2007). Burglary tools and contraband in plain view. — Evidence adduced on a motion to suppress is sufficient to authorize the arrest without a warrant as well as the search of the automobile when the burglar’s tools and stolen merchandise are viewed and seen without a search of the automobile. Bass v. State, 123 Ga. App. 705, 182 S.E.2d 322 (1971). Defendant close to burglary scene. — Subsequent search of a bag containing items stolen in a burglary was a lawful search incident to the arrest as: defendant was stopped a half mile from the burglary scene; defendant was sweating heavily, carrying a pair of leather gloves on a summer night; and was carrying a bag which the arresting officer testiﬁed to observing as loaded with numerous items including a checkbook bearing the address of the burglarized residence. Davis v. 93 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 2. Offense Committed in Officer’s Presence (Cont’d) State, 203 Ga. App. 227, 416 S.E.2d 771, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 771 (1992). When officers recognize defendant. — Defendant was driving an automobile at a time when the officers knew the defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended and subsequently arrested the defendant; thus, the evidence found in the accompanying search of the car was admissible. Jackson v. United States, 352 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 825, 87 S. Ct. 55, 17 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1966). Police may detect crime with senses other than sight. — To justify an arrest without a warrant an officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime take place if by any of the officer’s senses the officer has personal knowledge of the crime’s commission. Forehand v. State, 130 Ga. App. 801, 204 S.E.2d 516 (1974); State v. Greene, 178 Ga. App. 875, 344 S.E.2d 771 (1986). Officer hearing cries of victim. — When a breach of the peace is committed, it is to be regarded as in the officer’s presence, so far as to authorize an arrest without a warrant, if the officer hears the noise of the disturbance and the outcries of the person assaulted, whether the officer sees the act itself or not. Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S.E. 613 (1893). Officer detecting marijuana. — When the crime of possessing marijuana is being committed in the presence of police officers, the arrest of a defendant without a warrant is permissible. Williams v. State, 129 Ga. App. 103, 198 S.E.2d 683 (1973). When a police officer, upon observing a person smoking what the officer believes to be a marijuana cigarette and upon discovering a partially smoked cigarette in the same area, clearly has probable cause to believe the officer has witnessed the person possessing less than one ounce of marijuana, a misdemeanor (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b)), thus authorizing a warrantless arrest. Corbitt v. State, 166 Ga. App. 17-4-20 311, 304 S.E.2d 123 (1983). Possession of suspected drugs authorized the arrest of the defendant. Allison v. State, 188 Ga. App. 460, 373 S.E.2d 273 (1988); Watson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 696, 379 S.E.2d 817 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874, 547 S.E.2d 664 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 563 S.E.2d 527 (2002). ‘‘Valid intrusion’’ onto defendant’s property. — Having seen the defendant commit the offense of marijuana possession during a ‘‘valid intrusion’’ into the defendant’s yard, the officer needed no warrant to arrest the defendant. Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 477 S.E.2d 910 (1996). Hot pursuit into home. — Officer who entered a home in hot pursuit of the defendant who had committed a traffic violation in the officer’s presence was authorized to make a warrantless arrest. State v. Nichols, 225 Ga. App. 609, 484 S.E.2d 507 (1997). Where crime not in officer’s senses but offender admits fact. — An offense is within the presence of the arresting party when, although the arresting party cannot be cognizant of the offense by means of the arresting party’s own senses, the defendant actually admits that the offense is in fact being so committed. Moore v. State, 128 Ga. App. 20, 195 S.E.2d 275 (1973). Arrest for offense committed outside presence. — Fourth Amendment does not prohibit arrests for offenses committed outside the presence of the arresting state officer. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975). O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) provides that an officer may arrest a suspect without a warrant in limited situations, including when the offense is committed in such officer’s presence or within such officer’s immediate knowledge; or for other cause if there is likely to be failure of justice for want of a judicial officer to issue a warrant. However, § 17-4-20(a) only applies to cases in which a custodial arrest is made and not when a private citizen reports an erratic driver who subsequently exits the vehicle outside of the officer’s presence and then is arrested. State v. 94 Cooper, 271 Ga. App. 771, 611 S.E.2d 90 (2005). Extra-jurisdictional arrest. — Law enforcement officer may make an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in the officer’s presence, even if the arrest is outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Wells v. State, 206 Ga. App. 513, 426 S.E.2d 231 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burns, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (Ga. 2019). Authority to arrest outside of jurisdiction. — Trial court did not err in granting police officers summary judgment in a citizen’s action alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress in connection with the defendant’s arrest because the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 since the obstruction occurred in the officers’ presence; even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant, the officers had the authority and discretion to arrest outside the officers’ jurisdiction for offenses committed in the officers’ presence and, therefore, the officers’ immunity could not be defeated by the officers’ decision to arrest outside of the officers’ jurisdiction. Taylor v. Waldo, 309 Ga. App. 108, 709 S.E.2d 278 (2011). Hostility of defendant and victim’s injury indicating battery. — Upon arriving at the scene, an officer observed the reported victim bleeding from the head and saw the defendant outside the victim’s shop, and since the defendant became hostile when the officer attempted to ask the defendant what had happened, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for a battery upon the victim as well as a battery upon the officer in that the defendant acted in a hostile manner and resisted arrest. Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381 (1979). Hearsay possible basis of probable cause. — Hearsay is admissible only to explain the officer’s conduct, but not in proof of the fact, and hearsay statements may serve as the foundation for probable cause. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979). Officer may testify to reasons for arrest or warrant. — Officer is entitled 17-4-20 to explain the basis for making an arrest and to testify as to all of the facts in connection with the arrest; the officer may testify relative to information which the officer obtained from others which afforded the basis for obtaining a warrant, or for making an arrest without a warrant. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979). Arrest for crime in presence made beyond time to procure warrant. — Officer has a right to arrest for a crime committed in the officer’s presence; but the rule does not apply if the officer does not act on the occasion the officer sees the crime committed, but delays and seeks to make the arrest after the officer had ample time and opportunity to procure a warrant. Yancey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 96 Ga. App. 476, 100 S.E.2d 653 (1957), appeal dismissed, 213 Ga. 903, 102 S.E.2d 653 (1958). Right to make a warrantless arrest for a crime for an offense committed in the officer’s presence does not extend beyond a reasonable time and opportunity to procure a warrant. Williams v. State, 133 Ga. App. 66, 209 S.E.2d 729 (1974). Arrest on mere oral complaint of another illegal. — When officers attempted, without a warrant, to arrest the defendant upon the mere oral complaint of another, and seize the defendant’s person, the arrest was illegal. Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 52 S.E. 283, 2 L.R.A. (n.s.) 730 (1905); Dorsey v. State, 7 Ga. App. 366, 66 S.E. 1096 (1910). Arrest on information from another officer valid. — When the detective unquestionably had reasonable and articulated cause to believe the driver of a blue and white Cadillac had committed an armed robbery, the police of another city were authorized to act upon the information supplied by the detective and make a warrantless arrest. Knighton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 390, 304 S.E.2d 512 (1983). Arrests by police officer on authority of card signed by sheriff are illegal. Gordon v. Hogan, 114 Ga. 354, 40 S.E. 229 (1901); Cuddens v. State, 152 Ga. 195, 108 S.E. 788 (1921). Officer’s arrest of restaurant invitee. — Summary judgment was prop- 95 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 2. Offense Committed in Officer’s Presence (Cont’d) erly granted to a police officer on a restaurant invitee’s false imprisonment claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20. The officer, who was told by the restaurant manager that the invitee refused an order to leave the premises, had probable cause to arrest the invitee without a warrant for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21. Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516 (2009). Hotel guest properly arrested for criminal trespass. — Exigent circumstances authorized an officer’s warrantless arrest of a hotel guest for criminal trespass because the offense was committed in the officer’s presence when the guest refused the officer’s request to leave the hotel. Thus, the guest’s false imprisonment claim against the hotel was properly dismissed on summary judgment. Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91 (2011). Arrest cannot justify search when no crime in police officer’s presence. — Search cannot be incident to an arrest if the officer has no reason to believe that the appellant committed a crime in the officer’s presence. Brown v. State, 133 Ga. App. 500, 211 S.E.2d 438 (1974). Since the defendant has committed no crime in the presence of the arresting officer, and the latter has no valid warrant, the arrest without a warrant will not justify a search, the result of which forms the basis of the charge. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975). Arrest cannot justify search when no city ordinance violation. — If there is no cause for arrest within the purview of a city ordinance, then a warrantless search and seizure is not legally supportable. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975). Unlawful arrest not legalized by ﬁnding criminal evidence. — Except for the exceptions of this section, a warrant is required to make an arrest legal, and if the arrest so measured is not legal when made, the arrest cannot be legitimated by fruit of a subsequent search. 17-4-20 Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979). Evidence procured in connection with search made under illegal warrant is inadmissible unless it appears that a crime was being committed in the presence of the officer and that the search was incidental to an arrest therefor. Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979). Officer cannot determine obscenity and make warrantless arrest. — Ability to make a warrantless arrest for an offense committed in an officer’s presence contemplates the officer’s ability to determine that an offense has actually been committed; the officer was incorrect in the officer’s belief that the officer or the officer’s agents may properly make the initial determination concerning the obscenity of a publication and that the officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer determines that the subject matter of a publication is obscene. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980). Officer cannot regularly arrest and harass magazine retailers. — When the officer’s activities constituted a calculated scheme of warrantless arrests and harassing visits to retailers of publications, the substance of the procedures resulted in a ‘‘constructive seizure’’ of magazines from the shelves of the retail establishments and created an informal system of prior restraint in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1, and 14. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980). Public indecency. — Defendant who committed the offense of public indecency in the presence of a police officer was subject to warrantless arrest, and the ofﬁcer was not required to obtain a warrant simply because the defendant was sitting on the defendant’s porch. Collins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 289, 381 S.E.2d 430 (1989). There was no excessive force sufficient to indicate an officer violated any clearly established constitutional right when a plaintiff, a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy, passed a road block without permission which provided the 96 officer with arguable probable cause since the plaintiff drove away from the scene, where she then parked and ran into a building, and since the officer only ﬁrmly held her and contacted her abdomen in the process; the act of physically holding back a misdemeanor suspect who was attempting to leave the scene, even given her pregnant condition, was not disproportionate although the woman later miscarried. Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081, 113 S. Ct. 1049, 122 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1993). Officer that shot and killed a suspect was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity as to an excessive force claim because an objective officer in the officer’s situation could have believed reasonably that the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer’s safety; the officer was acting inside the scope of the officer’s discretionary authority when the shooting occurred because even if the officer was outside the officer’s jurisdiction, the officer was authorized by Georgia law to conduct a warrantless arrest since the suspect was committing an offense, public indecency, within the officer’s presence. Wilson v. Miller, 650 Fed. Appx. 676 (11th Cir. 2016) (Unpublished). Battery of officers after illegal stop justiﬁes arrest. — Though evidence would not have been admissible if discovered as the result of the police officers’ unconstitutional roadblock and illegal Terry-stop of the defendant’s car before the defendant reached the roadblock, the defendant’s gratuitous shoving of police was an aggravated battery, which justiﬁed the officers arresting the defendant then and there, even if the defendant was not subsequently charged with the offense of battery. The discovery of drugs the defendant threw while ﬂeeing from that battery meant the discovery of the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop to justify its admission into evidence and denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. Strickland v. State, 265 Ga. App. 533, 594 S.E.2d 711 (2004). 3. Offender Endeavoring to Escape Flight is ground for arrest without a warrant when there is reasonable cause to believe the fugitive is the of- 17-4-20 fender and the ﬂight itself makes it impracticable to go elsewhere in search of a warrant. Garrison v. State, 122 Ga. App. 757, 178 S.E.2d 744 (1970). Running is not grounds for arrest. — As no criminal activity was observed by police, the mere fact that (according to police) defendant ‘‘ran’’ inside the apartment when the police drove up did not provide probable cause and/or exigent circumstances authorizing the police to enter the defendant’s girlfriend’s sister’s apartment to arrest the defendant without a warrant. State v. Brown, 212 Ga. App. 800, 442 S.E.2d 818 (1994). Escape if less than felony committed. — Under this section, an officer can arrest without a warrant ‘‘an offender who is endeavoring to escape,’’ even if the offense was less than a felony. Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S.E. 877 (1901); Maughon v. State, 7 Ga. App. 660, 67 S.E. 842 (1910). Illegal distillery. — Under this section, an officer can arrest without a warrant ‘‘an offender who is endeavoring to escape’’ even if the offense is merely distilling illicit liquor. Williams v. State, 148 Ga. 310, 96 S.E. 385 (1918). Burglary. — Under this section, an officer can arrest without a warrant ‘‘an offender who is endeavoring to escape’’ even if the offense was merely burglary. Jackson v. State, 7 Ga. App. 414, 66 S.E. 982 (1910). Flight of misdemeanor convict. — Misdemeanor convict who has escaped lawful conﬁnement may be recaptured by any peace officer without a warrant. Williford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 S.E. 962 (1904). Insufficient evidence in ﬂight from unmarked vehicle. — Because the circumstances of the defendant’s low-speed ﬂight from an uniformed detective, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, were insufficient to present law enforcement with evidence of a particular crime, the defendant could not be charged with the crime of attempting to elude an officer, and police lacked the probable cause sufﬁcient to warrant an arrest for the offense; thus, the search incident to the arrest was invalid, warranting suppression of the evidence seized. Stephens v. State, 278 Ga. 97 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 3. Offender Endeavoring to Escape (Cont’d) App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (2006). Right to arrest suspected person without warrant is broader in felony than in misdemeanor cases. Chaney v. State, 133 Ga. App. 913, 213 S.E.2d 68 (1975). Using force to make arrest. — Even though an officer may have a legal right to make an arrest, still the officer can use no more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, and cannot use unnecessary violence disproportionate to the resistance offered. When the offense is a felony, a greater force even to the extent of slaying the offender in order to prevent the offender’s escape may, when sufficient circumstances so indicate, be justiﬁed. But if the arrest is only for a misdemeanor, such extreme and deadly force merely to effect the arrest and prevent escape is not justiﬁed. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). Using force when arresting for misdemeanor. — Reason for limiting the powers of a peace officer in making an arrest for a person committing or attempting to commit a public offense of the grade of misdemeanor is that organized society will suffer less by the temporary escape of such person than it would if the officer should be permitted to take the person’s life, or inﬂict upon the person great bodily harm, to prevent the person’s escape. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modiﬁed, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975). No general right to shoot ﬂeeing misdemeanant. — Notion that a peace officer may, in all cases, shoot one who ﬂees from the officer when about to be arrested is unfounded. Officers have no such power, except in cases of a felony, and then as a last resort, after all other means have failed. It is never allowed when the offense is only a misdemeanor. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modiﬁed, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975). Deadly force used in pursuing ﬂeeing suspected felon. — Officers, who shot and killed a ﬂeeing suspected felon 17-4-20 armed with a knife, were entitled to official immunity because it was a discretionary act, during pursuit a bystander twice identiﬁed the suspect, and the suspect slashed a knife at one officer, posing an immediate threat of physical violence. Williams v. Boehrer, 530 Fed. Appx. 891 (11th Cir. 2013) (Unpublished). Except in self-defense, an officer has no right to proceed to the extremity of shedding blood in arresting, or in preventing the escape of one whom the officer has arrested, for an offense less than a felony, even though the offender cannot be taken otherwise. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modiﬁed, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975). 4. Failure of Justice Phrase ‘‘likely to be a failure of justice’’ means probable ground for believing that there will be failure of justice. Mitchell v. State, 226 Ga. 450, 175 S.E.2d 545 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, 91 S. Ct. 585, 27 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1971). Failure of justice may occur if suspect is mobile and leaving area. — When a suspect is mobile and is seen leaving an area after having negotiated a sale with suspected stolen coins, a warrantless arrest is both reasonable and necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Williams v. State, 166 Ga. App. 798, 305 S.E.2d 489 (1983). Failure of justice when grounds for arrest develop after entry. — Justiﬁcation for a warrantless arrest, that there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of a judicial officer to issue a warrant, cannot be extended to excuse an illegal entry, especially when police officers did not decide to arrest until after the entry and the interrogation of the defendant. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984). For other cause when there is likely to be failure of justice for want of officer to issue warrant includes a situation when a police officer, knowing that a warrant has been issued for a felony, and with probable cause to believe that if the officer takes the time to procure the warrant the offender will escape, makes the arrest legal although the warrant is not in close 98 physical proximity at the time. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 492, 151 S.E.2d 846 (1966). Possible failure of justice alone does not justify warrantless misdemeanor arrest. — Mere possibility of there being a failure of justice does not authorize an officer to attempt an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant. Giddens v. State, 152 Ga. 195, 108 S.E. 788 (1921). Failure of justice when no one to issue warrant tested by probable cause. — This section has been equated with the probable cause test, or at least whether there was likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant was tested by the presence or absence of probable cause. Paige v. Potts, 354 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1965). Otherwise constructive possession of warrant necessary. — When a lawful arrest cannot be made except under a warrant, it must, at the time of making the arrest, be in the possession of the arresting officer, or of another in the neighborhood with whom the officer is acting in concert. Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 163, 48 S.E. 910 (1904); Maughon v. State, 7 Ga. App. 660, 67 S.E. 842 (1910). Illegal warrantless arrest not excused by probable cause. — If the arrest is without a warrant and is illegal, no amount of good faith or probable cause will excuse the defendants who were police officers. Vlass v. McCrary, 60 Ga. App. 744, 5 S.E.2d 63 (1939). Detention arrest without valid warrant. — Arrest without a valid warrant to detain the defendant places the detention in the same category as an arrest without a warrant. Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979). Driving under the inﬂuence. — When obtaining a warrant to arrest the defendant for driving under the inﬂuence would have required at least two hours, during which time physical evidence of the defendant’s alleged intoxication would dissipate, the warrantless arrest was proper under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 (a). State v. Fleming, 202 Ga. App. 774, 415 S.E.2d 513 (1992). Since evidence of the defendant’s intoxication would have dissipated during the 17-4-20 time it would have taken for the officer to obtain a warrant for the defendant’s arrest, the warrantless arrest was proper under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20. Wadsworth v. State, 209 Ga. App. 333, 433 S.E.2d 419 (1993). 5. Resisting Arrest Every person has the right to resist an illegal arrest, and may use, in resisting the illegal arrest, such force as is necessary for the purpose. Ronemous v. State, 87 Ga. App. 588, 74 S.E.2d 676 (1953). Person may use force proportional to amount used against the person. — One upon whom an arrest is unlawfully being made by an officer has the right to resist such arrest, force with force, proportionate to that being used by those detaining the person. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943); Smith v. State, 84 Ga. App. 79, 65 S.E.2d 709 (1951). Arrest for prior spouse beating. — Fact that the defendant’s wife told the officers in the defendant’s presence that he had beat her and she wanted him locked up did not render legal the arrest without a warrant of the defendant who was at home doing nothing when the police arrived, and the defendant was within his rights in resisting such arrest. Ronemous v. State, 87 Ga. App. 588, 74 S.E.2d 676 (1953). Arrestee who knows of felony charge cannot resist. — It is the duty of an officer, when authorized to arrest, but when the circumstances afford reason to believe that the officer’s object and official character are unknown to the person whom the officer seeks to arrest, so to inform the person; but an omission to do so will not justify the person arrested, or sought to be arrested, in resisting the arrest if the person in fact already knows, or on reasonable and probable grounds believes, that the person is under a charge of felony for which an arrest is being attempted. Morton v. State, 190 Ga. 792, 10 S.E.2d 836 (1940). Right to kill if arrestee fears felony by officer. — If, during an unlawful arrest, the officer commits, or reasonably appears about to commit a felony upon the arrestee, such as an assault with intent to 99 Grounds for Warrantless Arrest (Cont’d) 5. Resisting Arrest (Cont’d) kill, using a weapon likely to produce death, or if the officer’s violent behavior is enough to frighten a reasonable person into expecting a felony and causes the detainee to act from fear rather than for revenge, the detainee may protect oneself without being guilty of a crime, even if the person slays the officer. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). No right to killing mere unlawful arrest without felony. — Mere fact of unlawful arrest, in the absence of an application of unlawful force amounting to or reasonably appearing to amount to a felony, will not authorize the killing of the officer. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). Killing officer is manslaughter if injury less than felony feared. — If an officer does not attempt or reasonably appear to attempt a felony, but only the misdemeanor of an unlawful arrest, or if the person arrested is only put in fear of a lesser injury than that of a felony, killing of the officer would be manslaughter. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). Killing officer without cause to know official status. — To slay an officer to avoid being taken into custody, while having reasonable grounds of belief that the person is an arresting officer, and that the person’s object is to make a lawful arrest for a felony, is murder. If the homicide is committed without reasonable cause to know the person’s official character or purpose, and without malice, the homicide is manslaughter. Morton v. State, 190 Ga. 792, 10 S.E.2d 836 (1940). Killing known officer to prevent capture is murder. — When a person is lawfully arrested and has notice or knowledge, or by belief or reasonable grounds for belief has the equivalent of knowledge, that the person making the arrest is an officer, it is the duty of the person arrested to submit quietly. If, under such circumstances and merely to prevent the officer from lawfully arresting the person in a lawful way, the person kills the officer, the crime is murder. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 17-4-20 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). Use of force when arresting criminal who knows status as police officer. — If an offender has the equivalent of knowledge that the person making the arrest is an arresting officer, it is the duty of such person to submit quietly to arrest; and in case the person refuses to submit, the officer has the right to use such force as is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest. Morton v. State, 190 Ga. 792, 10 S.E.2d 836 (1940). Use of deadly force when officer’s life is in peril. — Officer was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity for an excessive force claim in a Bivens action because the officer was standing in a narrow space between two vehicles, the decedent was disobeying the officer’s orders to put the decedent’s hands up, and the decedent’s car suddenly moved forward; in a split second decision, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 to use deadly force when the officer had probable cause to believe that the officer’s life was in peril. Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1109, 126 S. Ct. 1063, 163 L. Ed. 2d 887 (2006). Right to prevent unlawful arrest of another. — No person should be punished for resisting or obstructing the illegal arrest of another. Prichard v. State, 160 Ga. 527, 128 S.E. 655 (1925). Unauthorized physical resistance to warrantless arrest. — Whether a warrantless arrest violates the statutory authorization depends upon whether at the time of the arrest the officer had probable cause to make an arrest; when the officer was assaulted while in the execution of the officer’s office, and when making the arrest was in the lawful discharge of the officer’s office, physical resistance to the legal arrest was not authorized. Veit v. State, 182 Ga. App. 753, 357 S.E.2d 113 (1987). Misdemeanor obstruction conviction was proper despite acquittal on original charge. — Because the police officer had grounds to arrest the defendant for public drunkenness and was in the process of making the arrest when the defendant shouted at the officer and attempted to walk away, conviction of the 100 defendant for misdemeanor obstruction was proper even though the defendant was acquitted of the charge of public drunkenness. Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 698, 492 S.E.2d 708 (1997). 6. Consent Probable cause and a warrant are not required for a search and seizure which is conducted pursuant to consent. Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 199, 303 S.E.2d 532 (1983). Mere acquiescence to authority of officer did not substitute for free and voluntary consent. — Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that the second of two defendant’s warrantless arrest was unauthorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a), because mere acquiescence to the authority asserted by a police lieutenant by both the defendants could not substitute for a free and voluntary consent to search, the trial court erred in ﬁnding that the acquiescence granted valid consent to the officer. Thus, the trial court’s grant of the motions to suppress was reversed, in part. Hollenback v. State, 289 Ga. App. 516, 657 S.E.2d 884 (2008). Authority of Local Officers This section applied to violations of municipal ordinances. State v. Koon, 133 Ga. App. 685, 211 S.E.2d 924 (1975); Whaley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 493, 333 S.E.2d 691 (1985). Applied to state and municipal officers. — This section was applicable alike to state and municipal arresting officers. Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga. 645, 144 S.E. 193 (1928). City police officer may arrest without warrant for city ordinance violation. — Police officer under city ordinance is as much under the protection of the law in making an arrest as any public officer, such as sheriff, bailiff, or constable; therefore, a town police officer has the right to arrest a defendant, without a warrant, for a violation in the police officer’s presence of a town ordinance. Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 25 S.E.2d 295 (1943). No duty to arrest for purposes of tort action. — Authority to arrest provided by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 does not cre- 17-4-20 ate a duty to arrest for purposes of a tort action. Landis v. Rockdale County, 212 Ga. App. 700, 445 S.E.2d 264 (1994). State statute violation in officer’s presence. — Police officer of a city, in making an arrest for an offense against state law, or for a violation of an ordinance of the municipality, committed in the city limits, fell within the protection of this section. Thus, a city police officer had authority to arrest without a warrant one who violates a state statute in the officer’s presence, or to arrest within the city one who violates a city ordinance in the officer’s presence. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). Where no local ordinance violation. — In the absence of any evidence as to a warrant or as to any municipal ordinance that was violated, the burden was on the state to show that the defendant violated some law of the state in the presence of the deceased police officer. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943). State may justify city police officer’s attempted arrest by showing ordinance. — When a military police officer has lawful custody of a soldier under arrest for violation of military orders, and the soldier is violently and turbulently resisting the arrest, and when several civilians go to the assistance of the military police officer, and under such circumstances, a city police officer comes to the place and attempts to arrest the soldier, and is killed by the soldier, it is proper for the state to introduce in evidence the city ordinance deﬁning ‘‘disorderly conduct,’’ as illustrating the legality of the arrest, or attempt to arrest, by the city police officer. Reed v. State, 195 Ga. 842, 25 S.E.2d 692 (1943). Arrest not unlawful although car not entirely within jurisdiction. — Warrantless arrest which was otherwise authorized under this section was not rendered illegal merely because the arrest was effected while the individual arrested was in a vehicle not completely situated within the officer’s jurisdictional limits. Rick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 519, 263 S.E.2d 213 (1979). Officer need not show insufficient time to procure warrant. — If a municipal ordinance or a state law has been 101 Authority of Local Officers (Cont’d) violated in the presence of a municipal police officer, it is not only the right but the duty of the officer to immediately make an arrest of the violator; under such circumstances it is not necessary, in order to establish the legality of the arrest, to show that the officer did not have the time and opportunity to procure a warrant. Reed v. State, 195 Ga. 842, 25 S.E.2d 692 (1943). Sheriff may arrest without warrant if offense in sheriff ’s presence. — Like other police officers or private persons, a sheriff has the power to arrest an offender without a warrant if the offense is committed in the sheriff ’s presence. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942). Seizure without warrant of illegal items in plain view in business place. — Sheriff may seize unlawfully kept property without a warrant for search, seizure, or arrest of the offender when the sheriff lawfully enters a place of business open to the sheriff as well as other members of the public under an implied invitation to enter, and ﬁnds in such place of business ‘‘slot machines’’ illegally kept by the owner or operation of such place of business. But, the sheriff has no authority to search private premises of the owner to ﬁnd slot machines in the absence of a warrant. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942). Inspectors of roads and bridges sworn in as deputy sheriffs may arrest for the violation of the criminal laws of this state. Earl v. State, 124 Ga. 28, 52 S.E. 78 (1905). Probation officers arresting probationer when not present during offense. — While the jurisdiction of probation officers to arrest offenders is limited to one class of persons, the probationers under their supervision, their power of arrest is broader with regard to that class of persons than is the general power of arrest by officers since the probation officer may arrest a probationer without a warrant for the alleged violation of any condition of the offender’s probation, which might be the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, or a mere violation of some rule prescribed for the offender’s 17-4-20 conduct, even though such violation of the conditions of the offender’s probation was not committed in the probation officer’s presence. Vandiver v. Manning, 215 Ga. 874, 114 S.E.2d 121 (1960). Violation of state arrest law creates no federal liability if no federal Constitution violation. — Even when a police officer violates a state arrest statute, the officer is not liable under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) unless the officer also violated federal constitutional law governing warrantless arrests. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Statute did not apply to rules governing suspects already in custody. — Police officer was properly suspended for using a choke-hold on a handcuffed suspect in violation of department rules; O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(d), prohibiting local rules that limited an officer’s abilities to apprehend suspects, did not apply because the officer was not apprehending the suspect, but was trying to recover evidence from the defendant’s mouth. Mercure v. City of Atlanta Civil Service Board, 327 Ga. App. 840, 761 S.E.2d 393 (2014). Jury Instructions Justiﬁcation for warrantless arrest province of jury. — Whether, under all the circumstances of the case, including the facilities for obtaining a warrant according to the spirit of this section, there was or was not cause for attempting the arrest without a warrant is a question for the jury. Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S.E. 305 (1892). Error not to charge jury on trooper’s probable cause. — When, on the trial of a state trooper for false imprisonment, it appears from the evidence that the trooper’s sole defense was that the trooper made the arrest for drunkenness upon the public highway without a warrant when the trooper in good faith had probable cause to believe that such offense was being committed in the trooper’s presence, it is error requiring the grant of a new trial for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on this defense. Henderson v. State, 95 Ga. App. 830, 99 S.E.2d 270 (1957). 102 Error to cite exceptions if arrest illegal in any case. — Absent any evidence to show that an arrest without a warrant would have been authorized, the court erred in charging the jury that part of this section which declared the circumstances under which an arrest may be lawfully made without a warrant, since the jury was not also instructed that under the evidence the arrest would have been illegal. McIntosh v. State, 191 Ga. 736, 13 S.E.2d 770 (1941). Charge differentiating arrests by citizens and police harmless as authority same. — When the arrest was made without a warrant, and the only basis for the arrest was that the crime was being committed in the presence of the 17-4-20 person making the arrest, whether the defendant acted as an officer or as a private citizen was immaterial, since the person’s authority as either was the same; therefore, the charge injecting this issue in the case could not have been confusing to the jury or harmful to the defendant. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wenger, 90 Ga. App. 267, 83 S.E.2d 58 (1954). Charging exact language of section unnecessary. — Charge in entire harmony but not in exact language is neither a misstatement of law nor misleading. Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 133 S.E. 42 (1926). Proper charge. Alexander v. State, 160 Ga. 769, 129 S.E. 102 (1925).