O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1

Edwards, 307 Ga. App. 267, 704 S.E.2d 816 (2010). Search of cell phone incident to lawful arrest was proper. — When evidence showed that the defendant’s cell phone was an instrumentality of the crime of cocaine trafficking and that the details of the drug transaction were arranged by telephone, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the search of the cell phone because the defendant’s cell phone was conﬁscated during a lawful search incident to the defendant’s arrest and because it was an instrumentality of the crime that was probative of criminal conduct. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116 (2004). Officer listening did not rise to interrogation and justify suppression. 228 — Order denying a motion to suppress the statements the defendant made to police after invoking a right to remain silent and have counsel present was not clearly erroneous as the defendant continued to make unsolicited statements after the invocation, and the officer was not interrogating the defendant by choosing to listen. Mulvaney v. State, 281 Ga. App. 620, 636 S.E.2d 762 (2006). Computer insurance inquiry insufﬁcient for stop and evidence suppressed. — Because the trial court had ample evidence to support the court’s conclusion that the reason police officers supplied as the basis to stop the defendant’s vehicle, speciﬁcally, an alleged computer insurance inquiry, was ‘‘suspect and insufﬁcient’’, the court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle as a result of the stop. State v. Starks, 281 Ga. App. 15, 635 S.E.2d 327 (2006). Forensic computer analysis not suppressed. — No basis existed under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-24 for suppressing the results of forensic computer analysis because the analysis required expert skill, and without such expertise, it was conceivable that evidence could have been overlooked or even destroyed; the computer examination was conducted at the direction of Georgia peace officers to enable the officers to complete the officers’ own investigation. Twiggs v. State, 315 Ga. App. 191, 726 S.E.2d 680 (2012). Suppression of evidence in sexual abuse cases. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the search warrant affidavit outlined the information provided by a New Hampshire detective’s investigation, including the fact that the defendant had electronically sent the detective sexually explicit photographs of young boys; (2) the officer’s affidavit also included information regarding the detective’s extensive background and vast experience in the investigation of child sexual exploitation cases; (3) the detective’s investigation provided probable cause to search the defendant’s residence wherever that was; (4) the warrant sought sexually explicit photographs and other sexually explicit visual depictions of children, as well as the computer 17-5-30 hardware and software used to create, store, and distribute those depictions; and (5) the affidavit contained information based on the detective’s contact and electronic correspondence with the defendant indicating the likelihood that the defendant’s computer ﬁles would contain evidence of child sexual exploitation, given that the affidavit stated that those who sexually exploited children often kept sexually explicit photographs and other images in their possession and often stored those images in computer ﬁles. Walthall v. State, 281 Ga. App. 434, 636 S.E.2d 126 (2006). Evidence of prior conduct between defendant and victim admissible. — Trial court did not err in permitting a witness to testify about the decedent victim’s statement concerning the defendant’s prior acts of abuse as testimony about prior difficulties between the defendant and a victim was admissible at trial to show the nature of the relationship and to demonstrate motive, intent, or bent of mind of the defendant in committing the act. Banegas v. State, 283 Ga. App. 346, 641 S.E.2d 593 (2007). Development of ﬁlm discovered in search incident to arrest. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in refusing to suppress photographs that were developed from ﬁlm that was in a disposable camera found in the defendant’s duffle bag at the time of defendant’s arrest because: (1) the defendant lacked standing to challenge the admission of the evidence since the camera belonged to the defendant’s brother, most of the photographs had been taken by the brother, and the camera had only been borrowed by the defendant; (2) the ﬁlm was admissible under the same rationale as an inventory search because police had to develop the ﬁlm to determine to whom the camera belonged before the police could return the camera to the owner; and (3) the ﬁlm was the fruit of a search incident to the defendant’s lawful arrest because it was found in the defendant’s duffle bag in a search incident to the defendant’s arrest. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2004). Application to circumstantial evidence. — Jury should be able to consider 229 17-5-30 17-5-30 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2. Consent Searches (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) and weigh the evidence, even though the evidence may be circumstantial; thus, the defendant’s motion to suppress a gun found alongside a highway was properly denied. Ross v. State, 281 Ga. App. 891, 637 S.E.2d 491 (2006). Evidence seized from employment investigations suppressed. — Trial court properly suppressed the oral and written statements made by the defendant, a public employee, during an internal investigation interview conducted by the Georgia Department of Corrections, and after the defendant was forbidden to seek the advice of counsel as the defendant had an objective belief that a failure to cooperate with the investigation by taking part in the interview and signing a written document entitled ‘‘Notice of Interfering with On-Going Internal Investigation’’ would result in a loss of employment; thus, the defendant’s right against self-incrimination was violated. State v. Aiken, 281 Ga. App. 415, 636 S.E.2d 156 (2006). Search pursuant to arrest for assaulting officers following illegal stop. — Though evidence would not have been admissible if discovered as the result of police officers’ unconstitutional roadblock and illegal Terry-stop of the defendant’s car before the defendant reached the roadblock, the defendant’s gratuitous shoving of police was an aggravated battery, and the discovery of drugs the defendant threw while ﬂeeing from that battery meant the discovery of the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop to justify its admission into evidence and denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress. Strickland v. State, 265 Ga. App. 533, 594 S.E.2d 711 (2004). Technical irregularities in search warrants. — Raising of technical irregularities in search warrants is not favored by the law, especially if the defendant has not timely exercised the defendant’s statutory right by a motion to suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized. Parker v. State, 118 Ga. App. 837, 166 S.E.2d 41 (1968). Scope of consent. — Given that a police officer was granted consent to search the defendant’s hotel room to search for the victim’s stolen truck keys, upon the officer’s receipt of an inconclusive response that a set of keys found could belong to the victim, a continued search, which yielded methamphetamine, was reasonable, and did not exceed the original scope of consent granted; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence that officers found as a result of a continued search. Shuler v. State, 282 Ga. App. 706, 639 S.E.2d 623 (2006). Because the consent received by an ofﬁcer to search the defendant’s pockets for weapons did not extend to allowing the officer to remove the contents of those pockets, when the officer testiﬁed that the contents did not feel like a weapon or an object immediately identiﬁable as contraband, the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted. Foster v. State, 285 Ga. App. 441, 646 S.E.2d 302 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1428, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 625 (Ga. 2007). Defendant was not entitled to suppression of, inter alia, marijuana seized from the trunk of a car in which the defendant was a passenger because a police officer did not exceed the scope of the driver’s consent to search, which allegedly was limited to looking in the car, by opening the trunk as the officer had discussed the problems with contraband being transported on the state highways prior to requesting the driver’s consent; thus, the driver was on notice that the officer was looking for contraband. Davis v. State, 297 Ga. App. 319, 677 S.E.2d 372 (2009). Consent established even though defendant handcuffed. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence police officers seized from the defendant’s apartment because the state satisﬁed the state’s burden of showing that the defendant’s consent to the search was not the product of coercion, express or implied, and although the defendant was handcuffed at the time the defendant consented to the search, 230 voluntary consent could be given while a suspect was handcuffed; the evidence supported a ﬁnding that one of the officers requested and received the defendant’s consent to search under permissible circumstances, and the officer testiﬁed that the officer’s gun was not drawn and that the defendant was compliant. Silverio v. State, 306 Ga. App. 438, 702 S.E.2d 717 (2010). Consent established. — Denial of the motion to suppress was not error as there was some evidence to support the trial court’s ﬁnding that consent to search was given; the trial court chose to disbelieve the defendant’s witness and to believe the testimony of the police officers that the officers received consent to enter and to check the apartment. Yemane v. State, 277 Ga. App. 286, 626 S.E.2d 238 (2006). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence as the drugs located in the residence were found after the defendant voluntarily gave police consent to enter and the drugs were spotted by one officer in plain view. Saadatdar v. State, 277 Ga. App. 339, 626 S.E.2d 552 (2006). Because the defendant waived the defendant’s Miranda rights and because the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to a search of the defendant’s premises, to a drug test, and to an interview, the defendant’s consent was not the product of coercion; accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. Handy v. State, 298 Ga. App. 633, 680 S.E.2d 646 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer found in the defendant’s wallet during a traffic stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger because the defendant voluntarily consented to the officer’s search of the wallet; although the officer did not have a proper basis to frisk the defendant after asking the defendant to exit the automobile, the contraband was not uncovered during the unlawful pat-down, and the prior unlawful pat-down did not operate to invalidate the defendant’s later consent to the search of the wallet. Rogue v. State, 311 Ga. App. 421, 715 S.E.2d 814 (2011). Trial court did not err in denying a 17-5-30 motion to suppress evidence a police officer seized in a hotel room because the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that the state satisﬁed the state’s burden of showing that the defendant’s consent to enter the hotel room was voluntary and not the product of coercion, express or implied; the officer’s testimony and the defendant’s statement supported a ﬁnding that the officer requested and received the defendant’s consent to enter the hotel room under circumstances that did not suggest either coercion or threat, and the trial court was authorized to infer that the defendant’s consent to search was freely given in the calculated hope that the officer would not ﬁnd the hidden contraband. Liles v. State, 311 Ga. App. 355, 716 S.E.2d 228 (2011). Trial court did not err in failing to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress a pistol because the search of a residence was properly conducted when the police obtained the consent of the homeowner; the defendant, who was a visitor at the residence, was physically present but failed to express any refusal of consent or any objection to a police search. Rockholt v. State, 291 Ga. 85, 727 S.E.2d 492 (2012). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress with regard to the defendant’s drug conviction because the case involved a ﬁrst-tier encounter wherein the officer asked for consent to search, which was given by the defendant and, therefore, the search was not a seizure and did not require articulable suspicion. Carter v. State, 319 Ga. App. 624, 737 S.E.2d 724 (2013). Consent must be uncoerced. — Consent to search must be the product of an essentially free and unrestrained choice by the maker. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720 (1979). Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress as the defendant’s spouse was coerced into giving consent to a police search of the residence since the police had no search warrant or arrest warrant but only an order awarding temporary custody of the children to the state. State v. Fulghum, 261 Ga. App. 594, 583 S.E.2d 278 (2003). Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress both the evi- 231 Searches (Cont’d) 2. Consent (Cont’d) dence seized upon being stopped and detained by the sheriff ’s officers and all statements made to any law enforcement officer following such detention given that: (1) law enforcement exceeded the authority to search the defendant; and (2) the evidence showed that any consent given by the defendant was coerced as the consent was obtained when one of the officers pointed a stun gun at the defendant. State v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 187, 635 S.E.2d 807 (2006). An officer’s statement to the driver of a vehicle that it would be better for the driver if the driver cooperated because a female officer and a drug dog were on the way did not amount to improper coercion so as to render the driver’s admission or voluntary relinquishment of cocaine invalid. Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 666 S.E.2d 559 (2008). Consented search needs no probable cause or warrant. — Probable cause and a warrant are not required for a search and seizure which is conducted pursuant to consent. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720 (1979). Consent to search given after the defendant had a clear understanding that the defendant was free to go and was not under any compulsion to remain to obey the officer’s request was voluntary and, thus, denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was upheld. Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116 (2004). Limited consent established. — Given the defendant’s consent to the limited search of the premises, the officers were lawfully in a position to plainly view the items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine; as a result, the officers developed the probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant and search for additional evidence, supporting denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. Wesson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 428, 631 S.E.2d 451 (2006). Consent given by apartment lessee valid. — Police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and question the defendant, based on the defendant’s description matching that of a rob- 17-5-30 bery perpetrator, and the officers then had probable cause to pursue the defendant to an apartment that the defendant retreated to; the lessee provided the officers with consent to search, whereupon the defendant’s clothing that matched the robber’s description and the robber’s gun were found and, accordingly, the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 was properly denied. Anderson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 428, 594 S.E.2d 669 (2004). Consent of housing authority director invalid. — City housing authority director’s consent to the search of a housing unit was not valid; therefore, an officer’s warrantless entry into the premises and seizure of marijuana therein was also invalid. The state failed to show that the terms of the housing unit lease authorized the director to enter the premises under certain circumstances. Bowden v. State, 304 Ga. App. 896, 698 S.E.2d 372 (2010). Consent by defendant’s son to search of defendant’s bedroom not valid. — Trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b), was proper as the defendant’s 14-year-old son lacked authority to consent to a search of the defendant’s bedroom, although the son resided in the mobile home with the defendant and his girlfriend as the bedroom was not a common area and, accordingly, the second Atkins factor was not met for purposes of U.S. Const. amend. IV; further, the officer who arrived at the home had minimal interaction with the teenager, such that the officer lacked a reasonable belief that the son could validly consent to the search, and the drugs in defendant’s bedroom were not available in plain view. State v. McKinney, 276 Ga. App. 69, 622 S.E.2d 429 (2005). Separate part of parolee’s home not subject to search. — Because law enforcement officers lacked any reason to search the defendant’s part of a mobile home, which had been permanently divided in half, the officers could not rely on a waiver of rights executed by the defendant’s brother, who was on probation at the time, to authorize a search of the defendant’s separate part of that home. Further, no exigent circumstances were 232 present to support a warrantless entry. State v. Kuhnhausen, 289 Ga. App. 489, 657 S.E.2d 592 (2008). Illegal, warrantless entry into motel room tainted subsequent consent. — Trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence found in a motel room that the defendant was occupying with another as the warrantless entry into the hotel room by the police violated the Fourth Amendment and the illegal entry tainted defendant’s consent to search and rendered the consent invalid. The state also failed to carry the state’s burden to show that a third party’s subsequent consent to search the room was untainted by the illegal entry. Snider v. State, 292 Ga. App. 180, 663 S.E.2d 805 (2008). Suppression of evidence from consensual activities. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied after the defendant voluntarily consented to police officers searching the bedroom and the officers found the ﬁrearm in plain view; moreover, the officers did not threaten the defendant into giving the consent merely by telling the defendant that the officers could obtain a warrant based on the officers’ earlier seizure of marijuana in another part of the house. Butler v. State, 272 Ga. App. 557, 612 S.E.2d 865 (2005). Trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress was upheld on appeal as: (1) the defendant lacked standing to contest a search of a cohort’s vehicle; (2) the defendant consented to a subsequent search of the defendant’s own residence; and (3) the defendant failed to show harm by the introduction of evidence found in vehicles parked in the yard of the residence, which the trial court clearly found to be innocuous. Valle v. State, 282 Ga. App. 223, 638 S.E.2d 394 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0405, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 219 (Ga. 2007), 552 U.S. 849, 128 S. Ct. 108, 169 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2007). Because the defendant’s encounters with the police remained consensual and voluntary, and the defendant consented to a continued detention for further questioning, a motion to suppress the evidence seized based on an illegal detention by the police was properly denied. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 185, 640 S.E.2d 1 (2006). 17-5-30 Because the defendant’s consent to search was not obtained by deceit, the defendant voluntarily accompanied officers to the motel room searched, and the consent was not the product of an illegal detention, suppression of the contraband seized was unwarranted. Miller v. State, 287 Ga. App. 179, 651 S.E.2d 103 (2007). Because a police officer was authorized to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on a suspicion that the defendant had illegally dumped trash, and because the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, the items seized from the vehicle would not have been suppressed; accordingly, the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim failed, and the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw the defendant’s Alford plea. Bishop v. State, 299 Ga. App. 241, 682 S.E.2d 201 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of the defendant’s residence because the evidence supported the trial court’s ﬁnding that the defendant and the defendant’s roommate freely and voluntarily consented to the search of their residence, and the officers testiﬁed that the officers did not coerce, threaten, or offer any hope of beneﬁt to obtain the consents; the roommate gave the officers consent to search the common areas of the residence, and after the defendant arrived at the residence, the defendant likewise consented to the searches of the defendant’s bedroom and of the defendant’s person. Park v. State, 308 Ga. App. 648, 708 S.E.2d 614 (2011). Consent product of illegal detention. — State failed to satisfy the state’s burden under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) to show that the son’s consent to search the son’s room was voluntarily given; as a result of the short period of time that passed between the unlawful detention and the grant of consent, the consent was the product of the son’s illegal detention. Black v. State, 281 Ga. App. 40, 635 S.E.2d 568 (2006). An officer, who knew the defendant, forcibly opened the defendant’s vehicle door, thereby physically restraining the defendant’s movement so that the defendant’s subsequent consent to a search of 233 Searches (Cont’d) 2. Consent (Cont’d) the defendant’s vehicle, after arriving at a location under surveillance for drug manufacturing, was invalid as the consent was the product of a wrongful detention; thus, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle. Smith v. State, 288 Ga. App. 87, 653 S.E.2d 510 (2007). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer found while conducting a search of the defendant’s person because the purportedly consensual search of the defendant’s person was unlawful when the consent was the product of an illegal detention; even if the defendant’s consent was not the product of an illegal detention, the search exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent because the defendant’s indication that the defendant did not ‘‘have a problem’’ with the officer searching the defendant’s pockets could not be interpreted as having extended so far as to have authorized the officer to, after searching all of the defendant’s pockets and ﬁnding nothing, push the defendant’s abdomen, pull the defendant’s waistband forward, and look down inside the defendant’s pants for narcotics. Walker v. State, 299 Ga. App. 788, 683 S.E.2d 867 (2009). Two defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room and the room’s safe because the defendants were staying there overnight and had clothing there, although neither was a registered guest, so that the defendants both had standing under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a) to object to a search of the room. Because the male guest was illegally detained, that guest’s consent to search the room was not valid. State v. Woods, 311 Ga. App. 577, 716 S.E.2d 622 (2011). Mere acquiescence to authority of officer did not substitute for free and voluntary consent. — Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that the second of two defendant’s warrantless arrest was unauthorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a), because mere acquiescence to the authority asserted by a police lieutenant by both the defendants could not 17-5-30 substitute for a free and voluntary consent to search, the trial court erred in ﬁnding that said acquiescence granted valid consent to the officer. Thus, the trial court’s grant of the motions to suppress ﬁled, in part, was reversed. Hollenback v. State, 289 Ga. App. 516, 657 S.E.2d 884 (2008). Defendant never withdrew consent to search. — With regard to defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the drugs found on the defendant’s person as the police obtained the defendant’s consent to search the defendant’s person and the defendant’s failure to produce all of the items from the defendant’s pockets did not amount to a withdrawal of the consent to search. Allison v. State, 293 Ga. App. 447, 667 S.E.2d 225 (2008). Consent of parents of adult child staying at parents’ home. — With regard to defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and possession of a gun during a crime, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence found in the defendant’s bedroom and in the vehicle that the defendant operated as the defendant’s parents had authority to give consent to the police to search the defendant’s unlocked bedroom since the defendant did not pay rent and was only home for the summer from college. As to the vehicle, the parents asked the police to locate their vehicle and the police properly seized the vehicle, impounded the vehicle, and obtained a search warrant; thus, the riﬂe used during the robberies that was found in the trunk of the vehicle was not the product of an illegal search. Warner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1952, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 35 (Ga. 2010). Grandfather as head of household with power to consent. — Because the defendant’s grandfather, as the head of the household, possessed authority over the entire house, including the defendant’s bedroom where the defendant lived rent-free, the trial court properly found that the consent given by the grandfather was properly granted, and hence served as the proper basis to deny the defendant’s 234 motion to suppress the evidence seized in the bedroom; as a result, the defendant’s armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal. Rhone v. State, 283 Ga. App. 553, 642 S.E.2d 185 (2007). 3. Locations Defendant movant aggrieved by search on defendant’s premises. — For a defendant movant to be ‘‘aggrieved’’ by a search on the premises under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30, the alleged violation must have occurred on the movant’s premises or the movant’s Fourth Amendment rights must have been infringed in some other manner. Sanders v. State, 181 Ga. App. 117, 351 S.E.2d 666 (1986). Search of home, arrest therein legal. — Sufficient probable cause for issuance of arrest and search warrants existed based upon an affidavit from an investigative detective in which the detective described the rape and the rapist, stated that the victim identiﬁed the man in discarded photographs as her attacker, and explained that a subsequent investigation revealed that the man in the photographs was the defendant. Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 755, 434 S.E.2d 752 (1993). Because the police were entitled to conduct a limited sweep to ensure the safety of the police prior to obtaining consent to search and because the contraband was not discovered during the ‘‘protective sweep’’, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment; consequently, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. Nelson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 658, 610 S.E.2d 627 (2005). There was evidence of sufficient exigent circumstances presented to law enforcement officers to justify a warrantless search of the defendant’s home since if a warrant would have been obtained many of those individuals could have attempted to drive home, placing both themselves and the general public at risk; moreover, if a warrant would have been obtained, evidence of the crime of furnishing alcohol to minors could have easily been destroyed when the minors left the scene of the crime. Burk v. State, 284 Ga. App. 843, 644 S.E.2d 914 (2007). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as there were no 17-5-30 exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into the defendant’s home after drugs, drug-related items, and a weapon were found in the defendant’s car during a traffic stop, even though the defendant did not end a cell phone call immediately as instructed by a police officer; the state did not show that the warrantless entry was required to prevent the destruction of contraband or that securing the home until a warrant could be obtained was not sufficient. Curry v. State, 271 Ga. App. 672, 610 S.E.2d 635 (2005). Trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions to suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia found at the residence owned by one defendant as officers had already learned that the person the officers were looking for stayed at a trailer next door, and thus officers engaged in an impermissible search of the curtilage when officers found a bag of drugs 45 feet from the defendants’ house; as a result, all evidence seized in the course of subsequent searches of the property was obtained as a direct result of the impermissible intrusion into the curtilage and had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Gravitt, 289 Ga. App. 868, 658 S.E.2d 424 (2008). Under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b), the state bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of a search when it is an unconsented police entry into a home. Since there were no exigent circumstances justifying the entry of the police into the defendant’s trailer to arrest persons for underage drinking, the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized from the unlawful entry. Statements made by the defendants after exiting the trailer were fruits of the poisonous tree and also had to be excluded. State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 643 S.E.2d 262 (2007). Consent by roommate did not authorize search. — Defendant was entitled to suppression of a gun, money, and drugs seized from the defendant’s residence because the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment as the defendant was not informed when the police came to the residence and arrested the defendant on an outstanding warrant that the defendant’s roommate had con- 235 Searches (Cont’d) 3. Locations (Cont’d) sented to the search of the residence; the defendant could have erroneously believed that the search was incident to the arrest on a driving violation. Preston v. State, 296 Ga. App. 655, 675 S.E.2d 553 (2009). Improper entry into residence justiﬁed. — Denial of a defendant’s suppression motion was proper as the police officers were authorized to immediately enter a residence, without announcing the officers’ presence as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-27 since the occupants ﬂed upon seeing the police into a residence where the police had recently conducted controlled drug buys and the officers had a reasonable belief that the ﬂeeing occupants might retrieve weapons or destroy evidence; once legally inside the residence, the police were authorized to execute a search warrant that led to the discovery of the defendant’s involvement in the drug sales. Further, suppression of evidence was not a constitutionally-required remedy for an improper entry pursuant to an otherwise valid search warrant. Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 716, 634 S.E.2d 846 (2006). Search of apartment where drugs were found in plain view. — Police who entered the defendant’s apartment after receiving a report that the defendant was chased into the apartment by a man who had a gun lawfully entered the apartment and had probable cause to seize and test what appeared to be drugs that were in plain view, and the trial court properly admitted the drugs which police found in plain view and other items which police found after police obtained a search warrant and searched the remaining areas of the defendant’s apartment. Miller v. State, 261 Ga. App. 618, 583 S.E.2d 481 (2003). In a cocaine trafficking prosecution, though the defendant testiﬁed that an officer kicked in the door to the defendant’s residence as the defendant’s landlord testiﬁed that there was no damage to the front door, and the trial court was entitled to believe the officer’s testimony that the door was open, the officer was 17-5-30 entitled to seize drugs seen in plain view through the open door. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to suppress the drugs was properly denied. Reid v. State, 298 Ga. App. 889, 681 S.E.2d 671 (2009). Closed refrigerator. — Police officer opened the door of an operating, closed refrigerator in a storage unit, after having been called to investigate vandalism and possible burglary, but these circumstances did not rise to the level of emergency involving immediate threats to life or limb, and the warrantless search of the refrigerator was not justiﬁed. State v. Gallup, 236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66 (1999). Search of relative’s residence. — Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered from the defendant’s brother’s townhouse, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30, since it was found that there was no probable cause for issuance of a search warrant of the townhouse merely because the defendant was staying there, as there was no evidence that the defendant had been there at or around the time of committing various crimes and, accordingly, there was no reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of the crimes would be found there. A search warrant must be supported by probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Brantley, 264 Ga. App. 152, 589 S.E.2d 716 (2003). Search of desk at work. — Trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized by the police from the defendant’s desk at work and concluding that no warrant was required for the search of the desk because the desk was unlocked and was in a workspace shared by numerous coworkers. A warrant was required for the search of the desk and, since the warrant authorizing the search was issued without a showing of probable cause based on the tip of an unidentiﬁed caller, and there was no exception to the warrant requirement shown, the fruits of the search of the desk had to be suppressed. Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 657 S.E.2d 213 (2008). Fruits of aerial search admissible. — Since the special protection accorded by U.S. Const., amend. 4 to the people in 236 their ‘‘persons, houses, papers and effects’’ is not extended to open ﬁelds, evidence obtained from an aerial search of an open ﬁeld is not inadmissible as the product of an illegal search. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979). Evidence on defendant’s person. — Evidence of guilt which the defendant, either directly or indirectly, was compelled to disclose by an unlawful search and seizure of the defendant’s person under illegal arrest is not admissible in a criminal prosecution of the person thus illegally arrested. MacDougald v. State, 124 Ga. App. 619, 184 S.E.2d 687 (1971). Search of defendant’s purse unauthorized and evidence suppressed. — Defendant, who was not suspected of any crime at the time the defendant consented to a search of the defendant’s vehicle, was merely a visitor to the house and did not tell the police officer to search for the keys to the vehicle, but only stated where the defendant thought the keys might be. Defendant never speciﬁcally consented to a search of the defendant’s purse. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that a typical reasonable person would not have understood the exchange between the defendant and the officer to grant the officer permission to search the defendant’s purse; therefore, the defendant’s motion to suppress narcotics found in the purse was properly granted. State v. Fulghum, 288 Ga. App. 746, 655 S.E.2d 321 (2007). Motion proper if facts indicate defendant was legitimately on codefendant’s property. — Motion by a defendant to suppress evidence because of an unlawful search and seizure sufficiently alleges that the defendant had standing to challenge the legality of the defendant’s arrest, the seizure of the vehicle and the following search if the facts alleged in the motion can be fairly construed to state that the defendant was legitimately on the premises of a codefendant at the time of their arrest and seizure of the latter’s property and therefore the fruits of the search and seizure were to be used against the defendant such that defendant would be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure. Bramblett v. State, 135 Ga. App. 770, 219 S.E.2d 26 (1975). 17-5-30 Brass knuckles found during investigatory stop occurring in high school parking lot. — Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress brass knuckles a police officer found in the defendant’s pocket during an investigatory stop in a high school parking lot because under the totality of circumstances, the brief stop was neither arbitrary or harassing but was based on a founded suspicion of criminal activity; it was reasonable for the officer to infer, based on the officer’s training, experience, and common sense, that the defendant was looking to engage in criminal activity, and the officer had been hired to secure the lot and to guard against ﬁghting. Esposito v. State, 293 Ga. App. 573, 667 S.E.2d 425 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0184, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2009). Consent given by outbuilding owners and property deemed abandoned. — With regard to a defendant’s convictions for sexual abuse of a child, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress various items found in an outbuilding that the defendant, the victim, and the victim’s parent had been living in as the owners of the outbuilding consented to the entry by the police as well as had brought certain items to the police themselves. The defendant’s failure to retrieve the items for over three months, despite repeated requests on the part of the owners to get the items, as well as the defendant moving out of state sufﬁciently established that the defendant abandoned the property, thus, no illegal search and seizure was possible. Driggers v. State, 295 Ga. App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95 (2009). 4. Inventory Search Inventory search is custodial act not subject to motion. — That the making and ﬁling of an inventory pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-2 is merely a ministerial act not affecting the substantive rights of an accused is borne out by the fact that such failure is not a ground for a motion to suppress under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13. Williams v. State, 125 Ga. App. 170, 186 S.E.2d 756 (1971). 237 Searches (Cont’d) 4. Inventory Search (Cont’d) Inventory search pursuant to standard procedure. — Because the impoundment of the vehicle the defendant had been driving was reasonable and there was evidence to support the trial court’s ﬁnding that the inventory search, during which bags containing marijuana and cocaine were found, was conducted pursuant to standard police procedure, the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was not improper. Askew v. State, 326 Ga. App. 859, 755 S.E.2d 283 (2014). Inventory of personal items of arrestee proper. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as a search of defendant’s wallet was conducted during an inventory of the defendant’s personal items after the defendant was arrested and was not investigatory. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, aff ’d, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence officers found during the booking process at the detention center because the court’s ﬁnding there was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest for ﬁring a handgun at a street light at a hotel and was not clearly erroneous when the combined facts and circumstances known to the arresting officers were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed the offense of discharging a ﬁrearm on the property of another without permission in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-104(a); the defendant matched the unique description of one of the shooters provided by the eyewitness and communicated to the responding officers, and the defendant was encountered by the officers near the scene of the shooting incident shortly after the incident occurrence. Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 696 S.E.2d 381 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because there was evidence to support the trial court’s ﬁnding that the officers’ search of a zippered, red bag found during the inven- 17-5-30 tory search of the defendant’s motorcycle was conducted pursuant to State Patrol procedures, which required that all items of value be listed and, thus, did not exceed the permissible scope of the inventory search; there was no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Grizzle v. State, 310 Ga. App. 577, 713 S.E.2d 701 (2011). Suppression of data on electronic devices seized during arrest. — Trial court properly suppressed evidence derived from the appellees’ electronic devices legally seized at the time of arrest as, relying on persuasive authority from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the 539 day delay between the seizure of the devices and issuance of search warrants for data contained in the devices was unreasonable and violated the appellees’ rights under the Fourth Amendment and Georgia law. State v. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 442, 826 S.E.2d 18 (2019). Failure to complain when no inventory made constitutes waiver. — Failure to include in the motion to suppress the police officer’s failure to make an inventory of articles seized during a search under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) is a waiver of that particular ground. Touchstone v. State, 121 Ga. App. 602, 174 S.E.2d 450 (1970). Property clearly taken for other than protective reasons. — After a bag was placed in custody of another individual by the defendant after the defendant’s involvement in a traffic accident (such individual putting the bag in the individual’s apartment) and, additionally, after the defendant’s boyfriend was willing and able to take custody of the bag, the state could not premise seizure of the bag on the necessity to protect the bag from being lost or stolen or to protect themselves; consequently, the police conducted a warrantless investigatory search without probable cause, under the guise of an inventory search, and the defendants’ motion to suppress should have been granted. Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 270 S.E.2d 877 (1980). 238 Informants Applicability of state law. — If the informer’s privilege to remain anonymous at a probable cause hearing is a state evidentiary question, the court must look to Georgia law. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977). Information must meet probable cause test. — Sole question is whether the information to support the warrant meets the test for probable cause; there is no need to reveal the informer’s identity. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977). Tip provided by paid conﬁdential informant and then transferred to the officer through the channels of police communication had more indicia of reliability than an anonymous tip and justiﬁed the officer’s stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Beck v. State, 216 Ga. App. 532, 455 S.E.2d 110 (1995). Informer’s anonymity for probable cause purpose is evidentiary. — When the state relied on information supplied by an informer to establish probable cause for a warrant, the informer’s privilege to remain anonymous presents a question of evidentiary rather than constitutional magnitude at a motion to suppress, when the issue is the preliminary one of probable cause, and guilt or innocence is not at stake. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977). Anonymous tip lacked detail. — Defendant’s motion to suppress suspected cocaine was properly granted as: (1) police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction of justice upon the defendant’s ﬂight; (2) an initial uncoercive encounter with the police did not constitute a seizure, and the defendant was free to leave at any time; and (3) the record was devoid of any evidence about the details of an anonymous tip that the defendant was seen selling drugs in the area of the encounter; moreover, given the tip’s lack of detail and failure to predict future behavior, observation of the defendant’s conduct might have warranted further investigation, but it did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion needed to brieﬂy detain or even arrest. State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 630 S.E.2d 847 (2006). 17-5-30 9-1-1 call from unidentiﬁed informant. — A 9-1-1 call from an unidentiﬁed informant did not provide the police with reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle, and the stop unreasonably intruded upon defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights; as a result, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Slocum v. State, 267 Ga. App. 337, 599 S.E.2d 299 (2004). Direct involvement of conﬁdential informant. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress methamphetamine seized in plain view by officers who were given information by a conﬁdential informant, despite the fact that the informant had never provided this type of information to police before as: (1) that information was sufficiently reliable to give law enforcement a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant and investigate the informant’s report that the defendant would be delivering methamphetamine to a speciﬁc location at a certain time; (2) the information contained facts unknown to the general public; and (3) the informant personally provided the information to officers and accompanied the officers to the suspected location of the delivery; moreover, because the defendant did not dispute that the methamphetamine was found, and did not claim that the conﬁdential informant could aid in a defense, the trial court did not err by denying disclosure of the conﬁdential informant’s identity. Cole v. State, 282 Ga. App. 211, 638 S.E.2d 363 (2006). No error occurred in the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on a claim that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant; information provided by an informant was reliable and established probable cause because the informant used the defendant as a supplier, the informant set up a buy from the defendant under police supervision, the informant described in accurate detail the vehicle the defendant would be driving and where and when the sale would occur, and in telling the police that the informant could lead the police to the defendant, the informant made an inculpatory statement related to the defendant’s own drug trafficking charge. Lopez 239 Informants (Cont’d) v. State, 292 Ga. App. 518, 664 S.E.2d 866 (2008). Anonymous tip sufficient. — Because the trial court found that officers acting on an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown at the defendant’s residence were within the officers’ rights when the officers saw marijuana from the adjoining property, when the officers smelled marijuana from the driveway, and when the officers went to both the front and the back doors of the house in an attempt to make contact with someone, and the grounds given in the affidavit supporting a search warrant application were wholly unconnected with the defendant’s arrest and the two protective sweeps, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Padgett v. State, 287 Ga. App. 789, 653 S.E.2d 102 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0415, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 209 (Ga. 2008). Tip provided by unknown informant sufficient when corroborated. — Denial of motion to suppress was upheld when, contrary to defendant’s argument, the affidavit in support of the search warrant provided sufficient probable cause for issuing the warrant; the information provided by the allegedly unreliable, unknown informant was corroborated by the victim’s description and an officer’s observations of the defendant following the crime. In addition, the affidavit was not insufficient because the affidavit was based on double hearsay provided by the informant to one officer, who then relayed the information to the officer who presented the affidavit. Johnson v. State, 265 Ga. App. 777, 595 S.E.2d 625 (2004). Tipster’s reliability unknown. — Trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence seized in the wake of an invalid stop of defendant’s vehicle because the stop of the vehicle was based on a tip; although the officer was able to corroborate the description of the vehicle, the vehicle’s location, and the fact that there was a black male driver and female passenger, the tip did not provide any information concerning the defendant’s future behavior and related to easily obtained 17-5-30 facts; the tipster did not ﬁt the deﬁnition of a concerned citizen and was more akin to a known informant of unknown reliability. Rucker v. State, 276 Ga. App. 683, 624 S.E.2d 259 (2005). Use of ‘‘unknown’’ informant did not justify suppression. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, despite a claim that an informant used to apprehend the defendant was not previously known to police and had never provided any information until helping in the prosecution of the defendant, because the informant’s tip predicted some aspects of the defendant’s future behavior and contained information not available to the general public that was corroborated by the observations of officers; moreover, the defendant’s reckless driving and ﬂight from a congested parking lot, which caused a short high-speed chase to ensue, and the fact that the police learned that the defendant often carried a gun, provided the officers with an additional basis to stop the defendant and make an arrest. Patton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 18, 650 S.E.2d 733 (2007). Reliable and anonymous tip with sufficient detail. — Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence seized by a police officer making an investigatory stop as the information provided to the officer by a reliable and anonymous tip contained explicit details of the defendant’s travel itinerary, which were not known by the general public. Daniels v. State, 278 Ga. App. 263, 628 S.E.2d 684 (2006). Information provided by conﬁdential informant was reliable. — Denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was upheld when the personal observations of the affiant officer established the reliability of the conﬁdential informant; among other things, the officer ensured that the informant had no illegal drugs when the informant entered the residence and conﬁrmed that the informant possessed crack cocaine when the informant came out. Browner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 788, 595 S.E.2d 610 (2004). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that a conﬁdential informant was not reliable because the basis for the in- 240 formant’s knowledge was that the informant overheard one of the codefendants discuss that there was going to be methamphetamine at the address to be searched, and evidence of the informant’s reliability included that the informant had been known to the deputy and that the informant had previously provided information to narcotics agents leading to the seizure of methamphetamine and marijuana and to several drug-related arrests. Hawkins v. State, 303 Ga. App. 618, 694 S.E.2d 132 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence because the basis of an informant’s knowledge was the informant’s personal observation of marijuana at the defendant’s residence, and the informant’s reliability was sufficiently established by evidence that the informant had been known by the investigating officer for 11 or 12 years and had been instrumental in obtaining arrests and convictions in numerous prior cases; while the better practice would have been for the officer to include all information relating to the informant’s reliability, the informant’s failure to provide the informant’s prior criminal history and payment history did not invalidate the warrant in light of the other indicia of the informant’s reliability. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820 (2010). Because the information provided by a conﬁdential informant was reliable and substantially corroborated by the police officers, probable cause to search the defendant existed; accordingly, because the warrantless search was authorized with or without the defendant’s consent, there was no basis to suppress the drug evidence found on the defendant’s person. Hall v. State, 310 Ga. App. 397, 714 S.E.2d 7 (2011). Even if trial counsel was deﬁcient for failing to timely ﬁle a motion to suppress, the defendant failed to establish that the defendant was prejudiced by such failure given that a conﬁdential informant’s tip was sufficient to establish probable cause without the need for independent corroboration. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 383, 729 S.E.2d 517 (2012). Previously used informant reliable. — Trial court properly denied the defen- 17-5-30 dant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the defendant’s apartment upon execution of a search warrant. The affidavit of a deputy in support of the warrant was based on an informant’s tip that established probable cause as the informant had been in the defendant’s apartment and had personally viewed the drugs. Further, the deputy had known the informant for at least six months and the informant had been helpful in ﬁve other cases, and therefore no independent corroboration of the informant’s tip was necessary. Rocha v. State, 284 Ga. App. 852, 644 S.E.2d 921 (2007). Tip from known reliable informant. — Police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justiﬁed stopping the defendant’s truck based on a tip from a known, reliable informant and there was no requirement to provide a basis for predicting speciﬁc future behavior of the suspect. Steed v. State, 273 Ga. App. 845, 616 S.E.2d 185 (2005). In considering the ‘‘veracity’’ of the persons supplying information, the court should not lose sight of the fact that, whether an individual supplying information of a possible crime is a ‘‘concerned citizen’’ to whom a presumption of credibility is accorded or an ‘‘anonymous informant,’’ the information provided by either may support the issuance of a warrant when that information is corroborated by further investigation by officers. State v. Towe, 246 Ga. App. 808, 541 S.E.2d 423 (2000). Decision on informer’s existence by trial judge after questioning police. — Whether or not an informer really exists is a question of evidence to be decided by the trial court after the officers have been thoroughly questioned and cross-examined. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977). Informant’s information not stale. — Search warrant that a police officer executed was valid because the officer’s affidavit in support of the warrant contained sufficient, reliable information that was not stale regarding the officer’s reliance on a conﬁdential informant. Rogers v. State, 274 Ga. App. 546, 618 S.E.2d 166 (2005). Trial court did not err in denying the 241 Informants (Cont’d) defendant’s motion to suppress because the information a conﬁdential informant provided a narcotics agent was not stale, and in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate was authorized to conclude that on a certain date, based on a conversation the informant overheard, methamphetamine was going to be manufactured at the defendant’s house; regardless of whether the informant actually heard the information on the date in question, the information provided a substantial basis for believing that when the magistrate issued the warrant methamphetamine was being manufactured at the defendant’s residence. Hawkins v. State, 303 Ga. App. 618, 694 S.E.2d 132 (2010). State need not give informers’ names. — When the state relied on information supplied by an informer to establish probable cause for a search warrant, the state need not reveal the names of the state’s informers at a motion to suppress. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977). Warrant must give circumstances indicating credibility if informant unidentiﬁed. — When a search warrant issues on the basis of information furnished by an unidentiﬁed informant the warrant must include underlying circumstances from which the agent concluded that the informant was credible or the informant’s information reliable. State v. Mabrey, 140 Ga. App. 577, 231 S.E.2d 461 (1976). Informant without established reliability. — Informant without an established past reliability may be used to furnish information leading to the issuance of a valid search warrant if the officer making the affidavit satisﬁes the requirements of supplying to the magistrate the underlying circumstances from which the credibility of the information was determined. State v. Mabrey, 140 Ga. App. 577, 231 S.E.2d 461 (1976). Present reliability counts more than past. — Past reliability of an informant is important in evaluating present credibility, though it is always present reliability which is at issue when a search 17-5-30 warrant is being sought. State v. Mabrey, 140 Ga. App. 577, 231 S.E.2d 461 (1976). Informant who appears honest with no criminal record. — It is not error to overrule a motion to suppress evidence found as a result of a search after the affiant prosecutor formed the prosecutor’s opinion from the demeanor and reputation of and intrinsic corroborative detail furnished by the informer, who was a person with no known criminal record, a mature person, regularly employed, a college student in good standing who demonstrated truthful demeanor, and the detail stated indicated personal knowledge. Davis v. State, 129 Ga. App. 158, 198 S.E.2d 913 (1973). Because law enforcement had the authority to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant’s automobile based upon information supplied to law enforcement from a reliable, honest, and law-abiding informant, which was independently conﬁrmed by officers investigating the tip, the trial court did not err when the court denied a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the defendant’s car. Fleming v. State, 281 Ga. App. 207, 635 S.E.2d 823 (2006). Showing officer’s basis for probable cause. — When affidavits fail (1) to give reasons for an informant’s reliability; and (2) to either state how the informer obtained the information or that the tip described the criminal activity in such detail that the magistrate may know it is more than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld, or an accusation based merely on an individual’s general reputation, a trial judge errs in overruling a motion to suppress. Moreland v. State, 132 Ga. App. 420, 208 S.E.2d 193 (1974). For court to sustain a police officer’s determination of probable cause on the basis of information provided by an informant, the state, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, is required to produce evidence showing that the police officer knew how the informant received the information or else had such detailed information that the officer knew the information to be more than mere rumor or suspicion. State v. Wells, 153 Ga. App. 308, 265 S.E.2d 111 (1980). Defendant’s suppression motion was 242 properly denied as a search warrant was based on probable cause because Clayton County investigators purchased an illegal video poker machine from a subject in Clayton County, who said the machine was obtained from a particular address in DeKalb County, and both DeKalb and Clayton investigators observed ‘‘several other illegal video poker machines’’ at that address; while the investigators could not tell from looking at the machines whether the machines were legal or not, the test was only whether the evidence established a fair probability that contraband would be found. Jones v. State, 276 Ga. App. 810, 625 S.E.2d 4 (2005). Because: (1) the state conceded that the state’s informant was not reliable as the informant never previously provided information to the state’s investigator; and (2) the police failed to independently investigate and corroborate the information provided to the police by that informant in support of a search warrant affidavit, the magistrate lacked a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to search the defendant’s home; thus, the evidence seized as a result should have been suppressed. St. Fleur v. State, 286 Ga. App. 564, 649 S.E.2d 817 (2007). Suppression required if informant unreliable. — Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized due to a search warrant based on an informant when neither the informant nor the informant’s information were shown to be reliable; the convictions at issue were unsupported without the tainted evidence and reversal was required. Land v. State, 259 Ga. App. 860, 578 S.E.2d 551 (2003). Denial of the defendant’s suppression motion was error as a search warrant was based upon the statements of a conﬁdential informant (CI) whose reliability, credibility, and source of information were unknown, law enforcement officers had failed to corroborate the CI’s claim that the defendant was selling drugs from the residence, and the officers did not observe the CI’s conduct before or after the controlled buy. Chatham v. State, 323 Ga. App. 51, 746 S.E.2d 605 (2013). Identiﬁcation Procedures Photographic identiﬁcation. — Trial court erred in granting a defendant’s mo- 17-5-30 tion to suppress a photographic identiﬁcation as the two steps of the test for determining whether a photographic identiﬁcation was admissible were erroneously conﬂated since, without ruling on whether the lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the trial court applied the totality of the circumstances factors and ruled that the victim’s identiﬁcation was without any substantial factual basis; thereafter, the trial court again applied the totality of the circumstances factors and found that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentiﬁcation of the defendant as the intruder. State v. Norton, 280 Ga. App. 657, 634 S.E.2d 810 (2006). Trial court did not err in admitting a photograph of the victim with the victim’s spouse because the jury observed the victim’s spouse when the spouse testiﬁed and identiﬁed the photograph, and the trial court determined that the admission of the photograph would not give rise to a strong emotion. Haynes v. State, 287 Ga. 202, 695 S.E.2d 219 (2010). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s identiﬁcation of the defendant in a pretrial photo array because the array was not impermissibly suggestive; the six men depicted were of the same race or ethnicity, the same general age group, and had similar hairstyles and facial hair. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011). Independent source for identiﬁcation. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress an identiﬁcation based on a hearsay recounting that something along the lines of an improper show-up occurred; further, there was an independent source for the identiﬁcation as the victim knew the defendant and the other suspect and identiﬁed the defendant in a photographic array. State v. Byrd, 266 Ga. App. 121, 596 S.E.2d 426 (2004). Identiﬁcation evidence not suppressed. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of the identiﬁcation during a one-on-one show-up, based on the totality of the circumstances as the victim got a good look at the defendant 243 17-5-30 Identiﬁcation Procedures (Cont’d) from about three feet away, immediately was able to give a description to police, only a short time passed between the robbery and the identiﬁcation, and the victim had a clear opportunity to see the robber up close during the middle of the day. Fitzgerald v. State, 279 Ga. App. 67, 630 S.E.2d 598 (2006). Because there was no likelihood of irreparable misidentiﬁcation, especially since a witness stated that the witness’s identiﬁcation of the defendant was based upon seeing the defendant at the scene of the crime, and because the victim and witness both identiﬁed the defendant as the shooter at trial, any error in the admission of the show-up identiﬁcation was harmless; therefore, the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied. Lee v. State, 298 Ga. App. 630, 680 S.E.2d 643 (2009). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress identiﬁcation evidence because the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentiﬁcation existed; the victim identiﬁed the defendant within thirty minutes of the offense, and the victim stated that the victim got a good look at all of the assailants and was one hundred percent sure and knew for a fact that the defendant was the person who demanded money and punched the victim in the face, noting that ‘‘it was fresh in his head.’’ Law v. State, 308 Ga. App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604 (2011). Trial court did not clearly err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s pre-trial identiﬁcation of the defendant as the perpetrator because the trial court’s ruling was supported by evidence that the victim: (1) knew the defendant from the neighborhood; (2) described the defendant to an officer on the scene; (3) spent 30 minutes or more with the defendant in an apartment talking with the defendant then defending against the attack; (4) quickly and conﬁdently identiﬁed the defendant as the victim’s assailant upon seeing the defendant’s picture; and (5) identiﬁed the defendant at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial. Leeks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 724, 710 S.E.2d 908 (2011). Identiﬁcation evidence was not subject to suppression on the basis that the lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive as, even assuming that the officer indicated to the witness that the lineup contained a photograph of the second suspect, there was nothing about the identiﬁcation procedure that would have inevitably led the witness to identify the defendant as the gunman. The lineup consisted of photographs of six males, all of whom were the same race, appeared to be approximately the same age, and had similar hairstyles, facial hair, and facial features; thus, no one photograph stood out from the others. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012). One-on-one identiﬁcation evidence admissible. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s pre-trial identiﬁcation of the defendant during a one-on-one show-up at the police station because the victim had the opportunity to view the attacker’s face and focused attention thereon, and the victim’s description of the attacker was fairly accurate; the existence of some inconsistencies did not render the victim’s testimony inadmissible, but rather was a matter for the jury. Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 721 S.E.2d 876 (2012). Denial upheld when admission of pre-trial identiﬁcation was not erroneous. — Denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress based on an alleged error in the admission of a pre-trial identiﬁcation was upheld as there was no indication that the photographic line-up was impermissibly suggestive or that the identiﬁcation was not based solely upon the recognition of the defendant by the victim during the actual robbery. Pinson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 254, 596 S.E.2d 734 (2004). Applicability 1. In General Applicability to all motions to suppress. — So as not to create two procedures, one statutory and the other nonstatutory, all motions to suppress should be governed by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to the extent possible. State v. Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 315 S.E.2d 865 (1984). 244 Applicable only to criminal defendants. — Since the companies were not criminal defendants, the company’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress was inappropriate as O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 did not apply; thus, the insurance commissioner did not have to prove the commissioner’s authority to conduct an investigation and, since the law was clear on the appealed issues, the commissioner was entitled to a frivolous appeal penalty. Nat’l Viatical, Inc. v. State, 258 Ga. App. 408, 574 S.E.2d 337 (2002). Applicable only to searches and seizures made by peace officers. — See State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1975). O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 does not apply necessarily to searches by state officials. — Mere fact that action is taken by state officials is not adequate to invoke the exclusionary rule even if that section violates U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1975). Applicable to tangible evidence only. — Motion to suppress is to be aimed at tangible evidence only, not to confessions or identiﬁcation testimony, such that the trial court did not err in failing to grant a motion to suppress the defendant’s statements or the victim’s identiﬁcation testimony. Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 430 S.E.2d 830 (1993). Defendant’s purported confused mental state is not an acceptable legal reason for suppression of evidence seized following the defendant’s arrest. Rauschenberg v. State, 161 Ga. App. 331, 291 S.E.2d 58 (1982). No pretrial suppression of unlawful evidence legally seized. — Only persons entitled to the beneﬁt of Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) are persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure. No provision is made in that section for pretrial suppression of evidence deemed illegal for reasons other than unlawful search and seizure. Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479, 157 S.E.2d 784 (1967); Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779 (1971); Reynolds v. State, 147 Ga. App. 488, 249 S.E.2d 305 (1978). 17-5-30 Motion to suppress evidence illegally seized must be based on evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure. Davis v. State, 155 Ga. App. 511, 271 S.E.2d 648 (1980). Waiver as part of drug court contract upheld. — Under the terms of a drug court contract, the defendant waived any right to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search, and absent evidence to the contrary and bad faith on the part of law enforcement, the waiver remained enforceable. Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 213, 641 S.E.2d 189 (2006). Customer not ‘‘aggrieved’’ by telephone company bill’s seizure. — Defendants lacked standing under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 since the defendants were not ‘‘aggrieved’’ by the seizure of telephone toll records because the records belonged to the phone company. Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 348 S.E.2d 515 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 1568, 94 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1987). Lack of objective and particularized basis led to suppression. — Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement which showed that the ﬁrst officer on the scene lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in criminal activity, and after a back-up officer arrived, neither officer was placed in fear of the officer’s safety by the defendant’s actions; thus, the ﬁrst officer’s acts of detaining the defendant and asking for consent to search were unlawful. State v. Lanes, 287 Ga. App. 311, 651 S.E.2d 456 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0051, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 85 (Ga. 2008). Because the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant’s mental condition was clearly vulnerable, and that the defendant: (1) could not read; (2) had to be forcibly restrained while the consent form was initially being read; (3) was weeping while the remainder of the form was read; and (4) never actually signed the consent form, the trial court properly found that any consent to submit to blood and urine tests was not freely and voluntarily given. Moreover, the proper standard of review on appeal, based on the fact that credibility was an issue, was not a de novo stan- 245 Applicability (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) dard, but a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Stephens, 289 Ga. App. 167, 657 S.E.2d 18 (2008). Not error to deny motion if property not used against defendant. — It is harmless error to deny a motion to suppress if property seized under an illegal search warrant and which appellant sought to have returned to appellant by a motion to suppress is never tendered in evidence. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 200 S.E.2d 456 (1973). Since no evidence gathered in the search of the defendant’s computer or the defendant’s jail cell was tendered and admitted against the defendant, even if the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress with regard to those two search warrants, the error was harmless. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794 (2010). Evidence arising from ﬁrst level police-citizen encounter. — Trial court erroneously granted a motion to suppress concluding that: (1) police had no particularized objective basis for seizing the men, including the defendant; (2) the officer had no reason to pat down the ﬁrst man and did so as a pretext to search for drugs; and (3) the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search; the defendant lacked standing to object to the search, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag which contained the contraband, and the stop, which led to the seizure, as a ﬁrst tier encounter, was reasonable. State v. Robinson, 278 Ga. App. 511, 629 S.E.2d 509 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as a stop by a police officer qualiﬁed as a ﬁrst level police-citizen encounter, and upon learning of an outstanding warrant for the defendant, the officer had probable cause to make an arrest and conduct a search incident thereto; further, the state was not required to introduce the warrant into evidence in order to establish the warrant’s validity. Lucas v. State, 284 Ga. App. 450, 644 S.E.2d 302 (2007). Trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground 17-5-30 that a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant because there was testimony indicating that the police encounter with the defendant up to the point of the defendant’s arrest was consensual and involved no coercion or detention; therefore, the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that the encounter was of the ﬁrst tier, a communication between the police and a citizen involving no coercion or detention, and did not require a showing that the officer acted with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and once the officer learned that the defendant had been driving with a suspended license, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Grimes v. State, 303 Ga. App. 808, 695 S.E.2d 294 (2010). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for an investigatory stop, the defendant’s exercise of the right to avoid a ﬁrst-tier encounter was not relevant to whether the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and items the defendant discarded during ﬂight were related to the illegal detention and inadmissible. Walker v. State, 323 Ga. App. 558, 747 S.E.2d 51 (2013). Probable cause for arrest. — In a case when the defendants were convicted of trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in ﬁnding that there was probable cause to arrest the two defendants because after the codefendant met the two defendants in a nearby apartment complex, the defendant returned with the package of cocaine to sell to the undercover agent, and the second defendant parked that defendant’s truck facing the area of the anticipated exchange, apparently so that the second defendant and the ﬁrst defendant could watch the drug deal; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the ﬁrst defendant’s motion to suppress. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116 (2004). Trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress as the defendant’s presence at the scene of an ongoing robbery, coupled with the defendant’s ﬂight from police, supplied sufficient probable cause justifying an arrest, and police 246 thereafter conducted a lawful Terry pat-down. Vega v. State, 285 Ga. App. 405, 646 S.E.2d 501 (2007). Trial court did not err in failing to suppress all the evidence discovered as a result of the defendant’s arrest because the arresting officer had probable cause to make an arrest for DUI. Caraway v. State, 286 Ga. App. 592, 649 S.E.2d 758 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1736, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 686 (Ga. 2007). Probable cause to support arrest meant no suppression of evidence. — Appeals court rejected the defendant’s contention that a written statement should have been suppressed because the statement was obtained after the defendant was arrested without probable cause and improperly detained as the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant’s presence at the scene of an alleged robbery, coupled with the defendant’s ﬂight from police, justiﬁed the arrest made, therefore supplying the requisite degree of probable cause to support the arrest. McCoy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 246, 645 S.E.2d 728 (2007). State court lacked jurisdiction over money seized by local authorities, then delivered to federal authorities for a federal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881, the forfeiture section of the Controlled Substances Act. King v. State, 264 Ga. 282, 443 S.E.2d 844 (1994). Defendants not prejudiced if fruits of search ruled admissible. — If the evidence authorized the trial judge in ruling that the warrantless search was legal in that the search was based on probable cause and exigent circumstances precluded the police officer from obtaining a warrant, the defendants could not argue that the defendants were prejudiced because presentation to the jury of the fruits of the search was improper. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981). Motion to suppress not deemed motion in limine to exclude testimony. — Trial court correctly ruled that a motion to suppress was moot because no tangible physical evidence was admitted at trial, and even if the trial court granted the motion to suppress, the ruling did not constitute a ruling that all testimony re- 17-5-30 lated to the seized vehicle was inadmissible as the defendant’s failure to object to the evidence at the time of introduction at trial was a waiver of any illegal search and seizure; thus, the defendant’s motion to suppress could not be deemed a motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding the events that occurred after the initial stop. Maxwell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 685, 647 S.E.2d 374 (2007). Suppression motion improperly granted. — Because a police officer possessed sufficient information regarding both the defendants via a police dispatcher, who was relaying information from a 9-1-1 caller, and after signaling for the defendants to pull the vehicle over, the officer observed both the defendants switch places, the officer observed sufficient and particular facts to investigate both men for driving under the inﬂuence; hence, the trial court erroneously ordered suppression of the evidence obtained from the resulting traffic stop. State v. Bingham, 283 Ga. App. 468, 641 S.E.2d 663 (2007). Because the defendant’s apparent violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16(a) gave the investigating officer a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant and inquire further, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress a refusal to take a breath test in connection with DUI charges; moreover, the trial court erroneously concluded that the defendant could have had an innocent explanation for a last-minute swerve to avoid hitting the officer’s patrol car as the issue went to the question of guilt or innocence and was not the dispositive question on a motion to suppress. State v. Rheinlander, 286 Ga. App. 625, 649 S.E.2d 828 (2007). Because the evidence gathered while the defendant’s residence was under surveillance, including the contents of the defendant’s garbage as well as an officer’s speciﬁc testimony regarding marijuana residue found on a piece of plastic wrap, supported a ﬁnding of probable cause necessary to justify the issuance of a search warrant for the defendant’s residence, suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the execution of the search warrant was improper. State v. Davis, 288 Ga. App. 164, 653 S.E.2d 311 (2007). 247 Applicability (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) Trial court erroneously granted suppression of the evidence seized in a traffic stop involving two defendants in which an officer, after arresting the ﬁrst defendant for obstruction, searched the car and found a substance which a ﬁeld test showed to be cocaine as the stopping officer was authorized to make the stop based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 and because the officer could search the passenger compartment of the car incident to the arrest of the ﬁrst defendant. State v. Stafford, 288 Ga. App. 309, 653 S.E.2d 750 (2007), aff ’d, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008). Trial court erred in ﬁnding that a no-knock warrant lacked probable cause and in granting suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant because both the warrant’s affiant and a credible informant provided sufficient information that drugs were being sold at the location; moreover, a violation of the knock and announce rule did not require suppression of the evidence found in an otherwise valid search. State v. Ballew, 290 Ga. App. 751, 660 S.E.2d 732 (2008). Suppression motion properly granted. — Police officer unreasonably invaded the defendants’ privacy by looking through the defendants’ window before knocking on the defendants’ door when executing an arrest warrant for a third party when: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the third party lived with the defendants; (2) even if the police were authorized to enter the defendants’ home, looking through the window was unreasonable as the officer did not reach the window by traveling the route any visitor would travel to reach the front door; and (3) the officer did not have articulable facts which would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the third party was a danger. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003). Because it was objectively reasonable for the defendant, a deputy sheriff, to have had a subjective belief that a termination from employment in that capacity would result by not cooperating with a GBI 17-5-30 agent in an interrogation, the statements the defendant made as a result of the interrogation were properly suppressed as involuntarily made. State v. Stanﬁeld, 290 Ga. App. 62, 658 S.E.2d 837 (2008). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress as the officer was authorized to initiate the traffic stop after observing the defendant’s seat belt violation and was thereafter authorized to make a reasonable inquiry and investigation. After learning that the defendant did not have a valid driver’s license, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and after observing the defendant reach into a pocket, retrieve a plastic bag, and attempt to conceal the bag, the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (2012). Probable cause supported an officer’s search of defendant’s person based on: (1) an officers’ initial detection of the odor of marijuana in a house; (2) the primary resident’s lie concerning other people being present in the house; (3) defendant’s extreme nervousness in front of officers; (4) the discovery of drug paraphernalia after the primary resident consented twice to a search of the home; and (5) the fact that a crack pipe was found under the cushion on which the defendant was seated. Denial of a motion to suppress evidence found on the defendant after a search of the defendant’s person, given those circumstances, was proper. Williams v. State, 265 Ga. App. 489, 594 S.E.2d 704 (2004). Motion to suppress properly denied. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s suppression motion as the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant under the totality of the circumstances test when: (1) a controlled buy from the defendant was described; (2) the defendant’s willingness to turn over the cocaine at the defendant’s residence was set forth; and (3) a statement from the person who was with the defendant at the time of the defendant’s arrest that defendant had taken the person to the residence to pick up cocaine was set forth. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667 (2004). Trial court properly denied the defen- 248 dants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized from the defendants’ home pursuant to a warrant as law enforcement officers were authorized to enter the home based on information the officers received from a 911 call in order to protect the property, investigate whether a burglary had occurred therein, or to learn whether someone inside had been injured. Moreover, despite the fact that evidence was seen in plain view during the short protective sweep, the officers nevertheless erred on the side of the Fourth Amendment, and obtained a search warrant before seizing those items. Love v. State, 290 Ga. App. 486, 659 S.E.2d 835 (2008). Motion to suppress was properly denied as the trial court did not err in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity because the burglary to which the officer responded appeared to be in progress given that someone apparently intended to come back for the air-conditioning units stacked by the open door into the premises; the hour was late, the businesses were closed, and there was no reason for anyone to be driving to the businesses or to the empty properties; the driver was in a pick-up truck capable of transporting several air-conditioning units; and the driver quickly retreated when the driver saw the police car. The above factors were sufficient to give the officer a particularized and objective basis for a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and to investigate. Waldron v. State, 321 Ga. App. 246, 741 S.E.2d 301 (2013). Second investigatory stop justiﬁed search. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied, even though an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support a ﬁrst investigatory stop, as the defendant’s ﬂight after the officer’s general questions, the defendant’s suspicious claim that the defendant was biking home from a job ten miles away, and the defendant’s proximity to a car with ﬂashing lights consistent with a triggered car alarm, supported a second investigatory stop; the evidence the defendant sought to suppress was obtained after the second investigatory stop. Crowley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 718, 17-5-30 601 S.E.2d 154 (2004). Identiﬁcation. — Victim’s out-of-court identiﬁcation of the defendant as the person who robbed the victim was admissible because the victim, a cab driver, had ample time and lighting in which to observe the defendant and identiﬁed the defendant shortly after the crime occurred. Hollie v. State, 277 Ga. App. 103, 625 S.E.2d 507 (2005). Probable cause lacking. — Because the circumstances of the defendant’s low-speed ﬂight from an uniformed detective, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, were insufficient to present law enforcement with evidence of a particular crime, the defendant could not be charged with the crime of attempting to elude an officer, and police lacked the probable cause sufficient to warrant an arrest for the offense; thus, the search incident to the arrest was invalid, warranting suppression of the evidence seized. Stephens v. State, 278 Ga. App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (2006). Suppression motion improperly denied. — In a prosecution for driving under the inﬂuence, the trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop made by an officer armed with only a ‘‘be on the lookout’’ warning as the officer lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity, but admitted to possessing only scant information about the driver, the year and make of the vehicle being driven, and the vehicle’s direction of travel; moreover, the mere fact that the defendant’s gold Ford truck was located in the vicinity of the alleged crime did not necessarily give rise to articulable suspicion. Murray v. State, 282 Ga. App. 741, 639 S.E.2d 631 (2006). Because no exigency existed to justify a search after the defendant was handcuffed and placed under the watchful eye of a police officer, and even assuming that the defendant was under arrest while being detained in the kitchen, a search of the defendant’s bedroom which yielded a shotgun found under the bed in the bedroom, a box of unspent shotgun shells, and some loose unspent shotgun shells, was not one incident to arrest; thus, the defendant’s 249 Applicability (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) possession of a ﬁrearm while a convicted felon conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial in which the illegally-obtained evidence could not be introduced. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 650 S.E.2d 767 (2007). Suppression motion properly denied. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as a magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s home was supported by probable cause for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 since: (1) witnesses reported seeing the defendant at the victim’s home near the time that the victim disappeared; (2) the farm manager who located the victim’s body told police that the defendant commonly used the farm for hunting; (3) the defendant had a tumultuous relationship with the victim; and (4) the defendant’s mailbox was painted in a similar camouﬂage as the cattle trough in which the victim was found; as the warrant for the house was proper, the warrant for the defendant’s truck was not fruit of the poisonous tree. Fortson v. State, 277 Ga. 164, 587 S.E.2d 39 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018). Appellate court’s ﬁnding that O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1 was unconstitutional as no rational connection existed between the residence of the driver of a vehicle and the goal of improving law enforcement officer safety during traffic stops, did not warrant suppression of evidence seized during a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle because the investigating officer had reason to believe that the vehicle’s windows were tinted darker than that permitted by the statute. Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 597 S.E.2d 392 (2004). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant in a prosecution ﬁled against the defendant for various sex crimes, when despite alleging speciﬁc ages, given the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit sought information of sexual activity involving minor children and was predicated on information pro- 17-5-30 vided by a parent involving sexual activity between the defendant and the victim, who was the parent’s daughter. Phillips v. State, 283 Ga. App. 319, 641 S.E.2d 294 (2007). Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as: (1) an investigating officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle, based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40 for driving on the wrong side of the road; and (2) a 25-minute delay in reading the implied consent warning was not unreasonable under the circumstances presented. Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 643 S.E.2d 292 (2007). Because: (1) evidence seized from the defendant’s residence as a result of an interrogation was sufficiently attenuated from any illegality to be admissible; (2) the duration of the search had no bearing on the subsequent consent given by the defendant’s roommate; (3) the consent was not a product of any illegal conduct; and (4) there was no evidence of any ﬂagrant misconduct and coercion on the part of the investigating law enforcement officers involved, the evidence was properly admitted. Spence v. State, 281 Ga. 697, 642 S.E.2d 856 (2007). Because: (1) it was reasonable for the arresting officers to act upon an investigating deputy’s observations; (2) law enforcement had reasonably trustworthy information to warrant law enforcement’s belief that the defendant had committed or had participated in committing a burglary; and (3) a determination of probable cause to arrest the defendant could rest on the collective knowledge of the police, given the communication between them, probable cause supported the defendant’s warrantless arrest and supported the admission of the seized evidence. Murphy v. State, 286 Ga. App. 447, 649 S.E.2d 565 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized by law enforcement given the totality of the circumstances presented including: (1) an anonymous tip; (2) the two responding officers’ personal observations of the defendant’s actions at the scene; and (3) the officers’ brief investigative detention of the defendant; thus, a 250 pat-down of the defendant’s outer clothing was reasonable. Carter v. State, 287 Ga. App. 597, 651 S.E.2d 759 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0246, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 172 (Ga. 2008). Because a detective’s suspicions were raised by the defendant’s odd behavior and the detective thought that something might be hidden in the defendant’s shoes, the detective was permitted to detain the defendant in order to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information concerning that suspicion; thus, when combined with the defendant’s valid consent, suppression of the evidence seized was unwarranted. Lane v. State, 287 Ga. App. 503, 651 S.E.2d 798 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0187, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. 2008). Because two police officers were validly and lawfully at the back steps leading to the back door of the defendant’s residence investigating a possible burglary at the time it became obvious the officers needed to talk to the occupants of the residence to determine the occupants’ knowledge of the burglary suspect, and the officers were not required to go the the front door of the residence in order to initiate the inquiry, when the officers saw the defendant in plain view packaging 35 grams of cocaine and 94 grams of marijuana into smaller packages, the trial court did not err in denying suppression of that evidence. King v. State, 289 Ga. App. 461, 657 S.E.2d 570 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying motions to suppress ﬁled by the two defendants because: the officer (1) had a reasonable and sufficient basis for initiating a traffic stop of the car the defendants were traveling in based on a belief that the license plate on the subject vehicle might have belonged on another car, and hence, was illegally transferred; and (2) did not improperly prolong the stop once the defendants told conﬂicting stories of their travels and one declined to grant the officer consent to search. Andrews v. State, 289 Ga. App. 679, 658 S.E.2d 126 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0963, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 507 (Ga. 2008). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain DNA evidence linking the defendant to the 17-5-30 crimes charged because the record showed that, when asking for the issuance of a warrant authorizing the state to take the defendant’s blood sample, police informed the magistrate about the salient facts known to the police at the time including: (1) the pizza order that lured the victim to an apartment belonging to the defendant’s friend; (2) the fact that the defendant used the friend’s phone on the night in question; and (3) the defendant confessed to being involved in the crimes. Moreover, when these facts were included with the others considered by the magistrate, probable cause to issue the warrant continued to exist. Carter v. State, 283 Ga. 76, 656 S.E.2d 524 (2008). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence because the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was justiﬁed based on the police having observed the defendant at a residence under surveillance for suspected drug activity: (1) the defendant went in and out of the residence under surveillance in under ﬁve minutes; (2) the defendant had a drug seller as a passenger in the defendant’s vehicle; and (3) the defendant drove to the passenger’s residence. The stop was a second-tier encounter that required reasonable suspicion, and the collective knowledge of the officers involved, based on the officers’ observations, justiﬁed the defendant’s stop. Satterﬁeld v. State, 289 Ga. App. 886, 658 S.E.2d 379 (2008). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a pat-down search because the defendant consented to the search and, under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer conducting the search was authorized to retrieve a plastic bag suspected to be illegal contraband from the defendant’s watch pocket. Dunn v. State, 289 Ga. App. 585, 657 S.E.2d 649 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1021, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 496 (Ga. 2008). Given that an officer, responding to a disturbance call in a remote location of the precinct involving the defendant, had a reasonable safety concern, and because the call described the defendant as loud, belligerent, and possibly intoxicated, the officer had a sufficient basis to conduct a pat-down search of the defendant; hence, 251 Applicability (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of a concealed weapon and drugs found following a search was properly denied. Walker v. State, 289 Ga. App. 657, 658 S.E.2d 207 (2008). Because the defendant committed a traffic violation by crossing a solid yellow line in the roadway, and was not legitimately faced with an obstruction, despite claiming that it was undoubtedly convenient to pass the slow moving van driving ahead, a police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a trafﬁc stop of the defendant’s vehicle; thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that stop. Przyjemski v. State, 290 Ga. App. 22, 658 S.E.2d 807 (2008). Because the affidavit accompanying a search warrant contained sufficient probable cause and the resulting search was not rendered illegal merely because the date on the warrant post-dated the search by one day, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 767, 658 S.E.2d 386 (2008). Because law enforcement officers were given permission to enter a landowner’s land in order to investigate the presence of possible trespassers for engaging in other illegal activity on the property, and found the defendant and a cohort, the officers gained a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the two individuals were involved in some form of criminal activity, the very least of which was criminal trespass, and therefore had the authority to detain the individuals in a brief investigative stop; thus, suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the encounter was properly denied, after the cohort ran, and the defendant failed to comply with the officers’ orders, given that those actions amounted to probable cause to support a warrantless arrest and a search thereafter. Burgess v. State, 290 Ga. App. 24, 658 S.E.2d 809 (2008). Given that the defendant was unable to offer a credible explanation for being on 17-5-30 the grounds of a housing project, and failed to provide a law enforcement officer with a clear answer when asked about the ownership of a car the defendant had been leaning on, the officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of the defendant for loitering; thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that arrest. Boyd v. State, 290 Ga. App. 34, 658 S.E.2d 782 (2008). Because: (1) the victim’s identiﬁcation of the defendant was based upon independent memory which the victim fairly accurately recalled in developing the composite sketch; (2) there was an independent basis for the victim’s identiﬁcations; and (3) there was no substantial likelihood of misidentiﬁcation under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting the identiﬁcation evidence and the trial court’s ﬁnding that there was no likelihood of misidentiﬁcation was supported by the record. Price v. State, 289 Ga. App. 763, 658 S.E.2d 382 (2008). Given that an officer, responding to a disturbance call in a remote location of the precinct involving the defendant, had a reasonable safety concern, and because the call described the defendant as loud, belligerent, and possibly intoxicated, the officer had a sufficient basis to conduct a pat-down search of the defendant; hence, the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of a concealed weapon and drugs found following a search was properly denied. Walker v. State, 289 Ga. App. 657, 658 S.E.2d 207 (2008). Evidence, including the odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant’s person, the defendant’s slurred speech, and the defendant’s bloodshot and watery eyes, was more than sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s conduct and demeanor resulted from intoxication, supporting probable cause for arrest, and the results of a blood test did not require suppression. Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga. App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (2008). Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that an officer’s initial contact with the defendant was a valid second-tier encoun- 252 ter since the officer already knew that the defendant’s vehicle had an incorrect tag; as part of a valid second-tier encounter, the officer was authorized to conduct a pat-down search for weapons. As the defendant clearly had a large object in the defendant’s pocket, and the trial court had the opportunity to observe the actual size and contours of the object, the officer’s suspicion that the pocket contained a weapon was reasonable. Shoemaker v. State, 292 Ga. App. 97, 663 S.E.2d 423 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the search of the defendant’s pockets was valid; the officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in criminal activity, and because the pat-down was brief, yielded no evidence, and was not a basis for the further investigative detention, it did not taint the defendant’s subsequent consent to the search of the pockets. Mwangi v. State, 316 Ga. App. 52, 728 S.E.2d 729 (2012). Search and seizure not valid when defendant no longer on probation. — Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress because, given that the defendant was no longer a probationer and had not waived the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the warrantless searches and seizures were not valid. State v. New, 331 Ga. App. 139, 770 S.E.2d 239 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1075, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 429 (Ga. 2015). 2. Drug Evidence Sufficient separation between legal and illegal activities by officer. — Although a police officer’s initial entry into the defendant’s residence was illegal since the officer entered after a guest opened the door and the guest was not authorized to allow the officer to enter, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as the officer left the residence upon ﬁnding the defendant was in the bathroom and did not return until the defendant requested that the officer reenter, at which time the defendant voluntarily con- 17-5-30 sented to the search that later revealed the drugs on the defendant’s property; the subsequent search was sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegal search that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 351, 582 S.E.2d 516 (2003). Free air search leading to drugs. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as a ‘‘free air search’’ by a drug sniffing dog around the exterior of a vehicle stopped during a purportedly valid traffic stop in which the police did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion of any illegal drug activity was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. Bowens v. State, 276 Ga. App. 520, 623 S.E.2d 677 (2005). Valid ﬁrst-tier encounter. — Denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was proper; a deputy’s initial contact with the defendant was a ﬁrst-tier encounter, requiring neither reasonable suspicion nor invoking Fourth Amendment protection and, as the defendant admitted that the defendant smoked marijuana upon being asked to explain its odor on defendant’s person, the defendant was lawfully arrested and searched. Harding v. State, 283 Ga. App. 287, 641 S.E.2d 285 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the initial encounter was a ﬁrst-tier encounter requiring no suspicion since the defendant was already stopped and the officer did not block the defendant’s vehicle, activate the blue lights, or otherwise indicate that the defendant was unable to leave; the subsequent pat-down was proper because the pat-down was performed pursuant to the defendant’s consent, which the defendant freely gave when requested by the officer. Kirkland v. State, 316 Ga. App. 310, 728 S.E.2d 907 (2012). Valid second-tier encounter uncovers narcotics. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied because the methadone found in a lockbox was discovered during a valid second-tier encounter for a possible driving under the inﬂuence (DUI) violation after: (1) officers found the defendant asleep and unable to be roused at the wheel of a vehicle still in drive in the roadway, with an empty beer 253 Applicability (Cont’d) 2. Drug Evidence (Cont’d) can next to the defendant; (2) an officer had not concluded the DUI stop when the officer asked the defendant about the lockbox; (3) the officer was free to ask the defendant additional questions to gather evidence of possible intoxication; and (4) the officer’s question was related to the investigation of a possible DUI. Hendrix v. State, 273 Ga. App. 792, 616 S.E.2d 127 (2005). Independent basis for arrest. — Denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress was affirmed as the defendant’s ﬂight from an improper Terry stop gave the police officers an independent basis to arrest the defendant; thus, the methamphetamine found in close proximity was admissible. Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712, 634 S.E.2d 842 (2006). Drugs in plain view. — Defendant’s motion to suppress methamphetamine was properly denied because exigent circumstances justiﬁed an officer in retrieving the defendant’s weapon from the vehicle after the defendant admitted that the weapon was concealed and that the defendant did not have a permit for the weapon, and had twice started toward the vehicle to get the weapon personally, and the methamphetamine was in plain view in the bag that contained the weapon. Wright v. State, 272 Ga. App. 423, 612 S.E.2d 576 (2005). Because the police were authorized to seize marijuana found in plain view, seen through the window of an apartment where the police were executing an arrest warrant on another individual, once the defendant answered a knock on the apartment door, police also had the right to search incident to the defendant’s arrest for possession of marijuana and based on the exigency of the circumstances; hence, the trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress the marijuana without explaining the court’s interpretation of the evidence or ruling on the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Venzen, 286 Ga. App. 597, 649 S.E.2d 851 (2007). Trial court did not err by limiting the admissibility of items in a defendant’s felony murder trial to those items seized 17-5-30 incident to the defendant’s arrest in the early morning hours and in plain view during the processing of the crime scene as an approximately 15-minute video recording of the premises, which was viewed by the trial court, supported the officers’ testimony that guns, shell casings, significant amounts of cash, and items appearing to be crack cocaine were all in plain view and, under the circumstances, presented probable cause as being contraband or evidence of the crime of the felony murder of an officer. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence found in the defendant’s apartment as the evidence authorized the warrantless entry into the apartment based on the officers observing a marijuana cigarette lying next to the door and immediately smelling the strong odor of burnt marijuana when the door was opened. Lawrence v. State, 298 Ga. App. 94, 679 S.E.2d 94 (2009). Officer’s knowledge of defendant’s prior drug conviction. — Because officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, based on the officers’ awareness of the defendant’s prior arrest following an explosion at a methamphetamine lab and that the defendant was subject to bond requirements related to such arrest, and, at the time of the search, the defendant was in the company of an individual who was driving on a suspended license and carrying methamphetamine, which was in violation of the defendant’s bond conditions, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search incident to a valid arrest. Collins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 240, 636 S.E.2d 32 (2006). Observations of officers justiﬁed. — Evidence in the record supported the denial of a motion to suppress as officers testiﬁed regarding their observations, surveillance techniques, experience with drug sales, and the general modes of operation of persons involved in drug sales, the officers were authorized to stop the defendant’s vehicle as one involved in a drug sale, acting in concert with another vehicle as counter-surveillance and showing an obvious interest in the endeavor; 254 further, because the detention lasted at most, 15 minutes, such was not unreasonable and did not amount to an impermissible seizure. Hickman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 558, 631 S.E.2d 778 (2006). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the drug contraband found under the passenger seat of the vehicle in which the defendant was sitting as the vehicle had sped passed a residence wherein police officers were awaiting the return of an arrestee. The driver’s actions in passing the residence warranted an investigative stop based on the belief that the arrestee was in the car and the traffic stop was authorized based on the officers observing the vehicle speeding, thus, the stop of the vehicle was not illegal. McBee v. State, 296 Ga. App. 42, 673 S.E.2d 569 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the evidence provided sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to support a brief detention of the defendant; an officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in criminal activity when the officer told the defendant to leave a residence because the officer was aware that the owner of the residence was known for dealing narcotics from a number of prior cases the officer had personally worked on, and the officer believed that the defendant was at the residence to buy marijuana. Hilbun v. State, 313 Ga. App. 457, 721 S.E.2d 656 (2011). Sale of drugs in officer’s presence. — Warrantless arrest of the defendant was authorized on the ground that a sale of cocaine was committed in the officers’ presence, and after the defendant retreated into a motel room, the exigencies of the situation demanded an immediate entry into the room for the officer to arrest the defendant without a warrant; hence, there was no basis for suppression of the evidence seized thereafter. Fortson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693 (2006). Controlled buy observed by officer. — Controlled buy conducted under the observation of the officer alone was sufficient to establish probable cause, and there was no evidence that the officer 17-5-30 knew, or should have known, that more than one person resided at the residence. Ibekilo v. State, 277 Ga. App. 384, 626 S.E.2d 592 (2006). Undercover drug activities by law enforcement. — Because the totality of the circumstances known to the law enforcement officers participating in the drug investigation and the undercover purchase of narcotics supplied sufficient probable cause that contraband would be found inside the vehicle the defendant was driving, suppression of the drug evidence seized during the search of this vehicle was properly denied. Stroud v. State, 286 Ga. App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476 (2007). Use of informant in narcotics cases. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the police personally heard an individual say to the informant on the telephone that the individual had a kilogram of cocaine in the individual’s hotel room that the individual intended to sell to the informant if the informant would come to that certain hotel at a certain time, where that individual would be waiting on the third-ﬂoor balcony to throw the informant a key; (2) when the informant arrived at the designated hotel at the designated time, the police observed the defendant standing on the third-ﬂoor balcony and further observed the defendant respond favorably to the informant’s request not to throw down the key and instead to come to the back door to let the informant in; (3) the police did not arrest the defendant until the defendant appeared at that back door; and (4) the information received from an untested informant might have been helpful and corroborating, but the personal observations and perceptions of the police alone more than sufficed to supply the probable cause needed for a warrantless arrest. Fleming v. State, 282 Ga. App. 373, 638 S.E.2d 769 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence because the evidence established the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for the defendant’s residence; at the suppression hearing, the investigating officer testiﬁed as to the same information provided in the 255 Applicability (Cont’d) 2. Drug Evidence (Cont’d) affidavit and that the officer had known the informant for 11 or 12 years, the officer had used the informant in at least 20 to 30 prior investigations, and the officer had provided the magistrate with information about the informant’s prior work with other officers beyond what was set forth in the affidavit. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence police officers found at a residence because under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability contraband would be found at the residence; the affidavit for the search warrant revealed that an informant participated in a drug buy using law enforcement funds, and an officer transported the informant to the premises, where the informant made the purchase, and the informant provided the purchased contraband to the officer. Pass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 440, 710 S.E.2d 641 (2011). Drugs found during pat-down search. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the cocaine found by an officer after a precautionary pat-down as the officer’s actions in responding to a suspicious-person complaint and immediately encountering the defendant were reasonable and neither arbitrary nor harassing; hence, the seizure was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 654, 637 S.E.2d 70 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0216, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 77 (Ga. 2007). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress marijuana seized as a result of a pat-down search conducted by an investigating officer as: (1) the officer observed sufficient, articulable facts to believe that an aggravated assault suspect might be leaving town; and (2) upon smelling burnt marijuana, and the possibility that weapons might be present, a pat-down of those individuals present, including the defendant, was supported by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the 17-5-30 time. Brown v. State, 283 Ga. App. 250, 641 S.E.2d 551 (2006). Because an officer was authorized to: (1) detain the defendant for investigatory purposes based on a 9-1-1 call reporting a domestic disturbance; (2) pat the defendant down for weapons; (3) seize the cocaine from the defendant’s pocket under the plain feel doctrine; (4) search the defendant’s vehicle; and (5) seize the contraband found during that search, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. Lester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 363, 651 S.E.2d 766 (2007). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of marijuana found on the defendant’s person following a traffic stop based on the person’s vehicle having a window tint violation as the arrest was lawful based on the officer having probable cause to place the defendant under arrest and subsequently search the defendant’s person due to the defendant’s admission to having smoked marijuana recently; the smell of marijuana coming from the defendant’s person; the bulge in the defendant’s pants; the defendant’s nervous demeanor; and the defendant’s attempt to prevent a lawful pat-down of the defendant’s person in the area of the suspicious bulge. Williams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 842, 668 S.E.2d 825 (2008). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer found while conducting a search of the defendant’s person because the seizure of the drugs was not lawful when the detention of the defendant was unreasonable; the officer articulated no particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was or was about to be involved in criminal activity, and the officer’s stated reasons for detaining the defendant did not constitute an objective basis for suspecting the defendant of involvement in drug activity and justify an investigatory detention when there were no complaints that day of drug activity or of the defendant’s involvement in such activity. Walker v. State, 299 Ga. App. 788, 683 S.E.2d 867 (2009). Trial court erred in granting a defendant’s motion to suppress crack cocaine police officers found in the defendant’s 256 pants’ pocket during a pat-down search because the officers made a valid Terry stop, and the defendant was not free to leave; the undisputed testimony from the officers was that based on the officers’ experience, outside window tinting was often performed on stolen cars, the defendant and the other men were working on a car in a vacant lot, the car had no tag, and the men were gathered around the car in a way that could be construed as trying to conceal a stolen automobile. State v. Miller, 300 Ga. App. 55, 684 S.E.2d 80 (2009). Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the contact between the defendant and an officer was a ﬁrst-tier consensual encounter, and the officer was authorized to seize marijuana from the defendant’s pocket since the officer asked for consent to search the pocket, and the defendant gave consent; there was no evidence that the encounter involved coercion or detention, and upon feeling a soft, spongy item in the defendant’s pocket, the officer was not automatically authorized to search the pocket, but the officer testiﬁed that the officer asked for consent to search the pocket and that the defendant gave the defendant’s consent. Ware v. State, 309 Ga. App. 426, 710 S.E.2d 627 (2011). Traffic stop leading to narcotics. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized as a result of a traffic stop of the vehicle the defendant was a passenger in as sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s ﬁnding that an officer’s stop of the vehicle was justiﬁed by the officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime, speciﬁcally, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-20. Richardson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 89, 640 S.E.2d 676 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine seized after a valid traffic stop had essentially concluded as a state trooper’s objective observations, when combined with the extensive experience the trooper possessed in drug interdiction and knowledge of drug smuggling patterns, supplied sufﬁcient facts to conclude that the defendant might have been engaged in criminal 17-5-30 activity. Giles v. State, 284 Ga. App. 1, 642 S.E.2d 921 (2007). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the marijuana seized as the search of the defendant’s truck was conducted after a valid traffic stop after the defendant gave the officer consent to conduct the search, and nothing supported the defendant’s claim that this consent was coerced because the consent was obtained during a custodial interrogation and without the beneﬁt of Miranda warnings as the officer’s questioning did not unduly prolong the traffic stop and did not result in an unauthorized seizure or an equivalent custodial detention for which Miranda warnings were required. Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga. App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motions to suppress drug evidence because the defendants failed to establish that the actions of the arresting officer unreasonably expanded the scope or duration of the traffic stop; because the officer’s suspicions were piqued by observations of a truck’s condition, the strong scent of perfume emanating from the cab, the demeanor of one of the defendants, and the other defendant’s responses to the officer’s brief questioning, the officer was then prompted and authorized to request a K-9 unit and to run criminal histories on both defendants, and there was no evidence to suggest that the officer delayed in making either query. Young v. State, 310 Ga. App. 270, 712 S.E.2d 652 (2011). State failed to meet the state’s burden, under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b), of proving that the search of the defendant’s vehicle, following a stop for a traffic violation, and the seizure of the marijuana that was found in the vehicle was lawful because there was no evidence that the investigative detention of the defendant lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop and there was no evidence that the scope of the defendant’s detention was carefully tailored to its underlying justiﬁcation. Moreover, no evidence was adduced that the prolonged detention was justiﬁed by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. Nunnally v. State, 310 Ga. App. 183, 713 S.E.2d 408 (2011). 257 Applicability (Cont’d) 2. Drug Evidence (Cont’d) Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence resulting from a police officer’s search and seizure because, although the defendant was subjected to a tier-two Terry-type investigative detention, the defendant was not in custody, and the defendant was detained for a reasonable time to investigate in conjunction with the valid stop, and the officer’s question regarding whether the defendant was in possession of contraband occurred within a few seconds of the stop, such that no reasonable person could believe that they were under arrest and that they were not free to leave after the officer had been afforded a reasonable time to ﬁnish conducting a traffic investigation. State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 723 S.E.2d 89 (2012). Probable cause to suspect drug possession. — Upon a de novo review, the appeals court found that because law enforcement had probable cause to suspect that the defendant possessed cocaine, a warrantless arrest of the defendant was lawful; thus, an order granting suppression was reversed. State v. Bryant, 284 Ga. App. 867, 644 S.E.2d 871 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1242, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 540 (Ga. 2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine a detective found in the defendant’s pocket because the defendant’s presence on the premises being searched and the defendant’s apparent attempt to ﬂee from the premises provided probable cause for the detective to believe that the defendant possessed or was, at least, a party to the crime of possessing, the unlawful contraband speciﬁed in the warrant, which authorized the detective to detain the defendant and to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant’s person. Sheats v. State, 305 Ga. App. 475, 699 S.E.2d 798 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized from the defendant’s person because a narcotics investigator had probable cause to restrain the defendant and order the defendant to spit out the baggy; the investigator observed the defendant 17-5-30 make a series of furtive attempts at concealing the clear plastic baggy, which the investigator believed, based on experience, contained drug contraband. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 391, 730 S.E.2d 757 (2012). Police gained entry without authorization and drugs not admitted. — Prosecution failed to prove that a search and seizure of drug evidence was lawful as the police went to the defendant’s home with the speciﬁc intention of obtaining consent to search, the police went at night, in force, and entered the home when the defendant was not there, the police gained entry without proper authorization, and unlawfully detained and handcuffed the people inside the home; consequently, the defendant’s subsequent consent upon returning home was not purged of the taint of the illegal entry into the home and the illegal seizure of the defendant’s person. Pledger v. State, 257 Ga. App. 794, 572 S.E.2d 348 (2002). Search of hotel room. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in a hotel suite because the affidavit supporting the search warrant for a hotel suite recited probable cause to believe that drugs would be found on the premises under the defendant’s possession, custody, and control, namely the two-room suite that the hotel designated and rented to the defendant. Glass v. State, 304 Ga. App. 414, 696 S.E.2d 140 (2010). Actions of defendant’s attorney. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion to suppress evidence as the record showed that the defendants’ attorneys stated that there was no objection to admission of the cocaine that was seized from the defendants following a stop of the defendants’ vehicle; affirmatively stating that there was no objection in effect concedes the point that the motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 151, 619 S.E.2d 821 (2005). Suppression motion properly denied following search of vehicle and compartments pursuant to arrest and impoundment. — Trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence because the defendant lacked standing to 258 challenge the legality of the search of a bag belonging to a passenger in the defendant’s care and, in any event, after the defendant and the passenger were arrested, the police were authorized to search the interior of the car, including closed containers inside the passenger compartment, both as a search incident to the arrests and pursuant to impounding the uninsured car. Driscoll v. State, 295 Ga. App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008). Suppression motion denied to trucker after drug dog alerted. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the investigating officer had reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity based upon the drivers’ suspicious behavior related to the curtain on the sleeping compartment, the co-driver’s criminal drug history, the inconsistency in the logbooks as compared to what the officer would normally expect to see, the lack of a seal on the load, and the alert obtained by the drug dog detection canine. Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 779 S.E.2d 94 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0368, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 118 (Ga. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 51, 196 L. Ed. 2d 55 (U.S. 2016). Inventory search as part of impoundment proper. — Pretermitting whether the search was an appropriate search incident to arrest, the court upheld the propriety of inventory searches subject to a reasonable impoundment in order to protect an owner’s property and to protect officers from claims over lost or stolen property. Accordingly, the inventory search was proper. Dover v. State, 307 Ga. App. 126, 704 S.E.2d 235 (2010). Suppression motion properly granted. — Trial court properly granted a defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence seized from the defendant’s apartment as the court found that the defendant nor the defendant’s friend had consented to the search and exigent circumstances did not exist since the police had conﬁrmed that the defendant was not one of the robbers the police were pursuing and no sound or movement was coming from within the apartment to have given the police a reasonable basis to search the apartment. State v. Culpepper, 295 Ga. App. 525, 672 S.E.2d 494 (2009). 17-5-30 Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the contents of a bag a police officer seized because search of the bag was not justiﬁed since police officers’ initial approach to a vehicle and questioning of the defendant fell within the realm of a ﬁrst-tier encounter, requiring no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and during that encounter, the defendant was free to refuse to answer or ignore the officers’ requests and go on the defendant’s way; once one of the officers prevented the defendant from exercising that right, the encounter escalated to a second-tier encounter, but the defendant had done nothing to give rise to a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the defendant was involved in criminal activity, and the defendant’s subsequent refusal to answer the officer’s questions as to what was in the bag, and the defendant’s placing the bag back in the cupholder, also gave the officer no basis for an investigatory detention. State v. Jones, 303 Ga. App. 337, 693 S.E.2d 583 (2010). Suppression motion granted after backpack search. — After the hospital security officers allegedly noticed an odor of marijuana emanating from the defendant’s backpack, conﬁscated the backpack, searched the backpack, found marijuana in the backpack, and called the police, and the responding officer searched the bag without obtaining a warrant, the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly granted because the officer did not testify that the officer personally smelled marijuana; the state did not present any testimony from the hospital security officers who allegedly smelled the marijuana, conﬁscated the bag, searched the bag, and found marijuana in the bag; and the state did not argue that the defendant consented or that there were exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. State v. Cook, 337 Ga. App. 205, 786 S.E.2d 876 (2016). 3. Probationers Search upon execution of probation arrest warrant. — Contraband seized in a search of the defendant’s home upon execution of a probation arrest warrant should have been suppressed because 259 Applicability (Cont’d) 3. Probationers (Cont’d) the warrant was invalid, having been issued on the basis of an earlier illegal search of the defendant. Boatright v. State, 225 Ga. App. 181, 483 S.E.2d 659 (1997). Warrantless search of parolee. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized after an automobile search given that law enforcement had reliable information that the defendant was transporting drugs as: (1) the defendant was on parole, and that as a condition thereof, had speciﬁcally consented to a warrantless search; (2) the information received from an informant about the defendant’s actions was reliable; and (3) no evidence was presented that the officers acted in bad faith or to harass the defendant. State v. Cauley, 282 Ga. App. 191, 638 S.E.2d 351 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0420, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 148 (Ga. 2007). Evidence from probationer’s apartment. — Trial court erred in denying a probationer’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the probationer’s apartment as, even though the entry into the apartment for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the probationer was permissible, most of the evidence was seized without a warrant after the probationer was not found in the apartment and had to be excluded under the Fourth Amendment as the search conducted was only permissible insofar as the search involved the observation of items of obvious evidentiary value in plain view during the time and activities required to attempt the probationer’s arrest. The probationer was never placed on notice that the probationer was going to be subjected to warrantless searches, and the state failed to demonstrate any exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 784, 653 S.E.2d 456 (2007). Consent arising from probationary status. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as a consent to search was properly imposed as a condition of the defendant’s probation and did not amount to a waiver of rights; thus, the defendant’s tacit acceptance of 17-5-30 this special condition provided the police with the authority to search. Peardon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 158, 651 S.E.2d 121 (2007). Waiver of rights as special condition of probation. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a search of the defendant’s person and home because the defendant validly waived the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII when the defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to possession of a ﬁrearm and possession of marijuana; the transcripts of the defendant’s guilty plea revealed that the defendant was informed by the assistant district attorney that a Fourth Amendment waiver was part of the negotiation, neither the defendant nor the attorney objected to the Fourth Amendment waiver during the plea, the trial court explained the Fourth Amendment waiver to the defendant on the record, and the defendant signed a waiver as a special condition of probation. Morrow v. State, 311 Ga. App. 323, 715 S.E.2d 744 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1872, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 993 (Ga. 2011). No hearing required as to suppression motion at probation revocation hearing. — Separate hearing on a defendant’s motion to suppress in a nonjury probation revocation hearing is not necessary. Davenport v. State, 172 Ga. App. 606, 324 S.E.2d 201 (1984). 4. Statements and Testimony Motion not applicable to anticipated testimony. — Testimony is not within the scope of the motion to suppress as authorized by Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 200 S.E.2d 456 (1973), criticized, Childers v. State, 130 Ga. App. 555, 203 S.E.2d 874 (1974). Motion to suppress directed at anticipated testimony rather than ‘‘property’’ does not lie. Cauley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 278, 203 S.E.2d 239 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S. Ct. 140, 42 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1974). Witness and victim testimony not subject to motion. — Testimony of eyewitnesses and victims of alleged crimes is 260 outside the scope of a motion to suppress as contemplated under Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13. Baker v. State, 230 Ga. 741, 199 S.E.2d 252 (1973). Sheriff ’s testimony not subject to motion. — Testimony of a sheriff concerning the property seized in an illegal search could be objected to at trial but could not be made the object of a motion to suppress. Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3223, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1976). Defendant initiated discussions not suppressed. — Defendant’s motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea based on the defendant’s claim that defense counsel failed to appeal the denial of a suppression motion was properly rejected because it was not ineffective assistance to fail to make a meritless appeal and the motion to suppress was properly denied because the defendant voluntarily reinitiated discussions with law enforcement officers after the interview was terminated due to the defendant’s request for counsel. Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 637 S.E.2d 20 (2006). Hospitalization and pain did not render statement involuntary. — Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s second statement to police made during a hospitalization and while the defendant was taking pain medication as neither circumstance rendered the statement involuntary. Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36, 635 S.E.2d 772 (2006). Motion denied if statements to police were voluntarily made. — Defendant testiﬁed that the defendant changed out of wet clothes after arriving at the police station, was not threatened, was advised of the defendant’s rights, and was not intoxicated, and the interviewing officer testiﬁed that the defendant did not appear to be intoxicated, understood the questions asked, appeared clearheaded, and waived the defendant’s rights, thus, the trial court’s ﬁnding that the defendant freely and voluntarily made statements after waiving defendant’s rights, and that the statements were made free of threats or other improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officers, was amply supported by evidence and was not clearly 17-5-30 erroneous. Moody v. State, 277 Ga. 676, 594 S.E.2d 350 (2004). Police officer’s testimony believed. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress as the trial court was authorized to believe the police officer’s testimony that the officer was qualiﬁed to detect the odor of unburned marijuana based on the officer’s training and experience and, thus, that the officer recognized the smell of the ten pounds of unburned marijuana the defendant had in the trunk of the defendant’s car despite defense counsel’s attempt to impeach the officer with the officer’s testimony from a prior case that there was no difference between the smell of burnt and unburned marijuana; accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly denied and the defendant’s conviction for a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., was affirmed. King v. State, 267 Ga. App. 546, 600 S.E.2d 647 (2004). Statements made by possibly intoxicated defendant. — Despite the defendant’s possible intoxication, a statement given to police was knowingly and voluntarily made, and a waiver of the rights accorded under Miranda was intelligent; thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s videotaped custodial statements into evidence. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007). Suppression of data on electronic devices seized during arrest. — Georgia Supreme Court held that the state may appeal a grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress data on electronic devices properly seized during an arrest under O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(4) because even under a strict construction of § 5-7-1(a)(4), the state has a direct right of appeal when the trial court grants a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence on the ground that the evidence was obtained illegally. State v. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 442, 826 S.E.2d 18 (2019). Voluntary confession held admissible. — Based on the totality of the circumstances and the undisputed evidence, because the defendant’s confession to a police detective was voluntary and admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824), not coerced or 261 Applicability (Cont’d) 4. Statements and Testimony (Cont’d) received as a result of promises made, and not subject to exclusion due to improper methods used by the police, the trial court did not err in admitting the confession; further, exclusion of the confession was not required based on a violation of the defendant’s right to counsel. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007). Trial court did not err in allowing the defendant’s statements to the police into evidence because the evidence supported the ﬁndings that the statements were freely and voluntarily made, under noncustodial circumstances; a detective testiﬁed that the defendant voluntarily came to the police station for an interview, that the defendant was not in custody during the interview and was free to leave at any time, that the defendant was not threatened or promised anything, and that the defendant was allowed to leave the station after the interview. Beaudoin v. State, 311 Ga. App. 91, 714 S.E.2d 624 (2011). Defendant did not demonstrate any harm as a result of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress statements the defendant made to the police at a hospital because the defendant’s on-the-scene confessions, as well as remarks the defendant made to a police officer en route to the hospital, were spontaneous and unsolicited statements not made in response to any form of custodial interrogation; therefore, the confessions were not subject to the strictures of Miranda and were admissible without the warnings having been given. Dailey v. State, 313 Ga. App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0969, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2012). Custodial statement of Spanish speaking defendant freely and voluntarily made. — Because a taped recording of the defendant’s custodial statement showed that the defendant was fully informed of the defendant’s rights in both English and Spanish, the defendant understood those rights, and neither threats nor promises were made in exchange for the custodial statement, the trial court did 17-5-30 not err in ﬁnding that the statement was admissible as freely and voluntarily given. Pineda v. State, 287 Ga. App. 200, 651 S.E.2d 148 (2007). Statements made by defendant to polygraph examiner properly admitted. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction on three counts of cruelty to children in the ﬁrst degree based on injuries to the child of defendant’s romantic friend, the trial court did not err by admitting the incriminating statements that the defendant used too much force in putting the child into a swing, which the defendant made to the polygraph examiner during the pre-polygraph examination interview as, the examiner and the investigator testiﬁed that, prior to making any statements, the defendant was read the defendant’s Miranda warnings, had voluntarily signed a waiver of rights form, and had voluntarily signed a form stipulating that the results of the polygraph examination would be admissible evidence and both the waiver of rights form and the stipulation were produced for the trial court’s review during a suppression hearing and were introduced into evidence at trial after the defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. Legan v. State, 289 Ga. App. 244, 656 S.E.2d 879 (2008). Effect of fact that evidence taken from non-English speaker. — Trial court is authorized to suppress evidence taken from a non-English speaker when there is conﬂicting evidence relating to the non-English speaker’s consent. State v. Izquierdo, 160 Ga. App. 33, 285 S.E.2d 769 (1981). Inculpatory statements by illiterate defendant. — Despite an illiterate defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by admitting inculpatory statements to investigators, the defendant’s statements were properly admitted as the defendant: (1) had no difficulty communicating with investigators; (2) never indicated any confusion or misunderstanding; (3) never invoked a right to remain silent; and (4) was not coerced into talking with investigators. Furthermore, the defendant’s illiteracy in and of itself did not demand a ﬁnding of a less-than-knowledgeable waiver in the face of evidence to the contrary. White v. 262 State, 281 Ga. 20, 635 S.E.2d 720 (2006). Seizure of written confession. — Written confession of the defendant is not property illegally seized, and thus is not subject to a motion to suppress. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 200 S.E.2d 456 (1973), criticized, Childers v. State, 130 Ga. App. 555, 203 S.E.2d 874 (1974). Confession was not made in conﬁdence to chaplain only. — Trial court did not err when the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the confession defendant made to the police chaplain because the trial court obviously believed the chaplain’s adamant denial that the chaplain had repeated defendant’s confession to the police. The testimony revealed that defendant confessed to the police officer in the chaplain’s presence. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004). Statements made while blood sample taken. — Fact that a defendant was also subject to a search warrant seeking samples of blood and hair did not amount to an unusual susceptibility to a particular form of persuasion and did not mean the defendant was in custody. Keith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 819, 632 S.E.2d 669 (2006). Statement induced by written promise not to press additional charges held involuntary. — Defendant was granted a new trial for convictions for felony murder and other crimes after it was determined that the defendant’s statement to the detectives as to the location of the gun used in the murder and the defendant’s provision of the gun to two coindictees was involuntary and inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824) as the statement was induced by a written promise not to press any additional weapons charges against the defendant. Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 484, 660 S.E.2d 521 (2008). Defendant’s statement not suppressed. — Defendant was not in custody when incriminatory statements were made to police. An officer found the defendant in an apartment and merely sought to ascertain whether the defendant or any of the apartment’s occupants knew about the charged incident, and testimony indicated that neither the defendant nor the 17-5-30 occupants were handcuffed or otherwise restrained; thus, the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied. Navarro v. State, 279 Ga. App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (2006). Because the record failed to contain any indication that the defendant: (1) informed the officers to end an interview; (2) wished to speak with counsel; or (3) wished to leave the station, and after the statements were made the defendant was driven home by an officer, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ﬁnding that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda; therefore, admission of these non-custodial statements was proper. Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 646 S.E.2d 212 (2007). Spontaneous outburst admissible. — Because the defendant’s spontaneous outburst was voluntarily made and not the product of police interrogation, the evidence was not subject to a hearsay exception, Miranda warnings were not required, and the statement was admissible. Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 646 S.E.2d 219 (2007). Given the totality of the circumstances, and the defendant’s age, education, and knowledge of both the substance of the charge and nature of the rights to an attorney and the right to remain silent because the defendant voluntarily gave a statement to a police detective about an uncharged armed robbery, absent any threats, coercion, or promises in exchange for doing so, the statement was admissible. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007). Because a police officer who heard the defendant’s statement that the defendant shot someone because the person took some marijuana from the defendant testiﬁed that the defendant uttered the statement spontaneously, and the police officer did not question or threaten the defendant, nor did anything to coerce the defendant to make the statement, the trial court’s ruling that the defendant made the statement freely and voluntarily was not clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 352, 651 S.E.2d 450 (2007). Suppression not required when defendant not under arrest. — Based on an officer’s unequivocal testimony that 263 Applicability (Cont’d) 4. Statements and Testimony (Cont’d) the defendant was not under arrest when a challenged statement was made, but the officer was merely investigating the victim’s stolen vehicle claim, and hence Miranda warnings were not required, suppression of the statement was not required. Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. App. 86, 648 S.E.2d 674 (2007). Because testimony from the interrogating officer, and the forms by which the defendant waived Miranda and the right to be represented during questioning by an attorney, supported the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, the appeals court found no error in the trial court’s decision. Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007). Because the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant made a rational and intelligent choice to waive the rights outlined under Miranda and speak with police detectives on two separate and distinct occasions, the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress those statements. Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164, 656 S.E.2d 518 (2008). With regard to a defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault and child molestation, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the custodial statement made because the defendant was not in custody when the defendant agreed to speak to the detectives in the defendant’s office when the defendant admitted to touching the victim and that the statement was subsequently repeated at the station after the defendant was read the defendant’s Miranda rights. The statement was made voluntarily and was not the sort of in-custody interrogation forbidden by Miranda. Ellison v. State, 296 Ga. App. 752, 675 S.E.2d 613 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements the defendant made during an on-scene police investigation because Miranda warnings were unnecessary when the defendant’s initial statements on-the-scene were voluntarily made under noncustodial circumstances; the defendant voluntarily admitted to stabbing the 17-5-30 victim in the defendant’s apartment after an officer advised the defendant that the officer was investigating a report of a possible dead body, and even if the defendant was a suspect while in the presence of police, there was no evidence that the defendant was under any form of restraint or that the defendant had been placed under arrest. Additionally, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s additional motion to suppress the defendant’s post-Miranda written statement to a detective as not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because upon being advised that a dead body had been recovered at the defendant’s apartment, the detective advised the defendant of the defendant’s Miranda rights, and the defendant then waived and gave the defendant’s written confession immediately thereafter; nothing of record supported the defendant’s claim that the defendant was subjected to an interview lasting ‘‘three to four hours,’’ and the defendant did not otherwise contend that the defendant’s confession was coerced or induced upon hope of beneﬁt. Rowe v. State, 302 Ga. App. 239, 690 S.E.2d 884 (2010). Trial court did not err in failing to suppress a statement the defendant made to the police because the statement was made during the course of a subsequent interview that the defendant initiated and was admissible; the defendant contacted the case detective and requested a meeting, the detective met with the defendant and again advised the defendant of the defendant’s right to counsel, and the defendant waived the defendant’s right to counsel and made an incriminating statement. Haynes v. State, 287 Ga. 202, 695 S.E.2d 219 (2010). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress an in-custody statement the defendant made after waiving the defendant’s rights under Miranda because the preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s ﬁndings that the officers read the defendant the defendant’s rights in the defendant’s home in the presence of the defendant’s parents and explained the rights to the defendant and that the defendant voluntarily agreed to talk to the officers, and the fact that the defendant was initially 264 found incompetent to stand trial did not demand the conclusion that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to knowingly and voluntarily waive the defendant’s rights; the true analysis is whether the totality of the circumstances show that the statement was free and voluntary. Fife v. State, 306 Ga. App. 425, 702 S.E.2d 454 (2010). Officer’s inquiry on address not suppressed. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements the defendant made in response to questioning at the time of the defendant’s arrest regarding whether the defendant lived at an apartment and where the defendant’s bedroom was located therein because a police officer testiﬁed at the suppression hearing that the officer asked the defendant where the defendant lived in order to determine whether the defendant could give consent to search; inquiring as to a suspect’s address is a question commonly associated with arrest and custody and provides no basis for suppression of the response. Silverio v. State, 306 Ga. App. 438, 702 S.E.2d 717 (2010). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress statements the defendant made to police officers because the trial court did not err when the court determined, under the objective circumstances attending the police officers’ interrogation of the defendant, that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have understood that the defendant was in custody at the time the defendant gave the defendant’s statements to the officers. Crawford v. State, 288 Ga. 425, 704 S.E.2d 772 (2011). Because the defendant failed to compile a record that demonstrated all that transpired in the trial court with regard to the defendant’s motion to suppress statements the defendant made to police officers, the supreme court presumed that the evidence before the trial court supported the court’s decision to deny the motion; the appellate record contained no transcription of the defendant’s interview as recorded on DVDs, and the defendant failed to make application for the transmission of the DVDs to the supreme court pursuant to Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 71(1). 17-5-30 Crawford v. State, 288 Ga. 425, 704 S.E.2d 772 (2011). Trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the defendant’s custodial statement because the two officers who interviewed the defendant testiﬁed that the defendant was read, and that the defendant understood the defendant’s Miranda rights, that the defendant agreed to talk with the police, that the defendant was not coerced or threatened in any way, that the defendant was not offered any hope of beneﬁt in order to convince the defendant to talk to the police, and that the questioning of the defendant ceased as soon as the defendant asked for a lawyer. Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223 (2011). Right to remain silent equivocal thus no suppression. — Trial court did not err in ﬁnding the defendant’s statements to a police officer admissible because the defendant’s invocation of the defendant’s right to remain silent, if any, was equivocal since that statement conﬂicted with the defendant’s immediately preceding verbal indication that the defendant was willing to speak with the detective; thus, the officer had no obligation to stop questioning the defendant, and the officer’s attempt to clarify whether the defendant wished to speak with the officer was not improper. Law v. State, 308 Ga. App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604 (2011). Superior court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements the defendant made to law enforcement officers because the defendant’s initial statement to a detective was non-custodial, unsolicited and was supported by the record and, therefore, the defendant’s capacity to understand the substance of the defendant’s rights under Miranda in regard to the ﬁrst statement was irrelevant; the defendant’s initial patrol car statement that the victim’s death was an accident was made while the defendant was not in custody, and the defendant’s statement was not given in response to any questioning by the detective. Barrett v. State, 289 Ga. 197, 709 S.E.2d 816 (2011). Conversation voluntarily started with officer thus no suppression. — Trial court did not err in denying the 265 Applicability (Cont’d) 4. Statements and Testimony (Cont’d) defendant’s motion to suppress a statement the defendant made in response to an officer’s interrogation regarding the ownership of a vehicle because the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s statements were not solicited and, therefore, were not protected under Miranda were not clearly erroneous since the trial court’s ﬁndings of fact were supported by the testimony of the officer; the defendant voluntarily started a conversation with the officer by admitting that the defendant was not who the defendant previously stated the defendant was, and the defendant stated that the defendant did not know whose vehicle it was but that the defendant gave somebody drugs so that the defendant could use the car. Bone v. State, 311 Ga. App. 390, 715 S.E.2d 789 (2011). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to exclude the defendant’s out-of-court statement to a detective because the record supported the ruling that the detective reasonably suspected that the defendant was or had been engaged in criminal activity, and the defendant was not under arrest; the detective not only witnessed the defendant engage in a drug transaction, but on the morning of the stop, the defendant obtained a written statement from another party to the transaction conﬁrming the defendant’s involvement. The detective also recognized the defendant and the defendant’s vehicle from the scene. Arnett v. State, 311 Ga. App. 811, 717 S.E.2d 312 (2011). Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence statements the defendant made in an interview with a television correspondent because the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when the statements were made; the correspondent was not an agent of the state, and a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave. Anguiano v. State, 313 Ga. App. 449, 721 S.E.2d 652 (2011). Immigrant’s statement not suppressed. — Trial court did not err in 17-5-30 refusing to suppress the in-custody statements the defendant, who was a Lithuanian immigrant, made to the police because during the interrogation, officers answered the defendant’s questions, and the defendant told the officers that the defendant understood what was being said; at no time did the defendant invoke the right to silence or right to counsel. Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 721 S.E.2d 843 (2012). Even assuming that the trial court erred by admitting the statements the defendant made to the police at a hospital as not tainted by a Miranda violation, the error was harmless in light of the fact that the police statements were cumulative of other unchallenged confessions by the defendant; the defendant repeatedly identiﬁed oneself at the scene as the sole perpetrator. Dailey v. State, 313 Ga. App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0969, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2012). Court of appeals did not err in reversing an order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the defendant’s confession under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824) because police officers did not induce the defendant’s confession with a ‘‘hope of beneﬁt’’ within the meaning of former § 24-3-50; the defendant could not have reasonably understood the officers’ statements to mean that the defendant would never be charged or arrested for the defendant’s crimes, and even if the defendant’s confession was induced by the defendant’s hope that the officers would, as promised, let the defendant go home after the interview, it was not per se inadmissible under former § 24-3-50. Brown v.