O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30

Johnston, 160 Ga. App. 71, 286 S.E.2d 47 (1981), aff ’d, 249 Ga. 413, 291 S.E.2d 543 (1982). Burden of proof concerning intoximeter test’s legality. — State has burden of proving that seizure of appellee’s breath resulting in the intoximeter results is in accordance with mandated procedures. State v. Johnston, 160 Ga. App. 71, 286 S.E.2d 47 (1981), aff ’d, 249 Ga. 413, 291 S.E.2d 543 (1982). Although a breath machine was taken out of service after the defendant’s test, the state submitted circumstantial evidence in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(f ) that the machine was in good working order during the test; therefore, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Rackoff, 264 Ga. App. 506, 591 S.E.2d 379 (2003). 277 17-5-30 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) B. Driving Under the Inﬂuence (Cont’d) Inappropriate ground for suppressing intoxilyzer results. — In a prosecution for driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol, the defendant’s motion to suppress intoxilyzer results premised solely on the contention that the defendant was not guilty of the offense of striking a ﬁxed object, which the officer was initially investigating, was not an appropriate ground for the motion. Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 536 S.E.2d 160 (2000). Failure to raise constitutional issue as to intoximeter results. — Defendant was not entitled to a pretrial hearing pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 since the defendant’s motion to suppress intoximeter results did not raise any grounds involving constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. Stanley v. State, 195 Ga. App. 706, 394 S.E.2d 785 (1990). Properly conducted tests admissible. — Trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the defendant’s horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) ﬁeld sobriety test and of the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test as the administrating officer testiﬁed to the officer’s experience and training as well as the testing and scoring method used regarding the HGN test, and the defendant’s constitutional challenges to the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test results had already been decided in prior case law precedent adversely to the defendant. Laseter v. State, 294 Ga. App. 12, 668 S.E.2d 495 (2008). Use of HGN test results. — Trial court erred in suppressing the results of the defendant’s breathalyzer test because the court failed to consider the horizontal gaze nystagmus test results when deciding whether the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant. State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874, 611 S.E.2d 139 (2005). HGN test results admissible. — Trial court erred in excluding the defendant’s horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test results because there was error only with two of six clues and a score of four out of six constituted evidence of impairment, and the state laid a proper foundation by showing that the officer was sufficiently experienced in administering the test and that the officer properly administered and interpreted the test with regard to four of the clues found. State v. Tousley, 271 Ga. App. 874, 611 S.E.2d 139 (2005). Suppression motion properly denied. — Trial court properly admitted an Intoxilyzer 5000’s certiﬁcate of inspection as non-testimonial as well as the defendant’s breath test results; even if error was presented, it was harmless since the defendant was acquitted of driving under the inﬂuence with an unlawful blood alcohol concentration. Moreover, the incident report was properly admitted under the rule of completeness as the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that it was necessary for the state to admit all relevant parts of the incident report in evidence to show that the omissions noted by the defendant were not so material as to have effected the accuracy of the report. Phillips v. State, 289 Ga. App. 281, 656 S.E.2d 905 (2008). C. Searches Automobile exception to warrant requirement. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress items that were found in the trunk of the defendant’s car after the defendant was apprehended on suspicion of shoplifting despite the defendant’s claim that the defendant did not consent to the search of the car as the trial court weighed the credibility of the testimony and the record supported the trial court’s ﬁnding that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search; moreover, even if the defendant did not consent to the search, the search was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which allows a warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause, because the police had probable cause to search the vehicle in light of information from a store manager who saw the defendant place store items in the defendant’s trunk without paying for the items and in light of the defendant’s subsequent conduct of shoplifting at another store down the road within 30 minutes of the original 278 incident. Horne v. State, 260 Ga. App. 640, 580 S.E.2d 644 (2003). Trial court committed no error in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence officers seized from a pickup truck because the search was authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement when under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe that the truck contained the illegal crystal methamphetamine that was to form the basis of the drug deal; a narcotics investigator’s conversations and interactions with the defendant, combined with the observations of the undercover agents who maintained continuous surveillance of the pickup truck and the movements of the defendant and a codefendant, would have led a reasonable person to believe that the drug contraband was in the truck. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 166, 692 S.E.2d 766 (2010). Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine an officer found in the defendant’s car because the defendant’s consent, a search warrant, or exigent circumstances were not required in order to render the search constitutional since the search of the car was authorized under the automobile exception, which applied even if the car was not stopped along a highway but was stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes; the officer had probable cause to believe that the car contained crack cocaine, and the officer’s observation of what the officer suspected, based upon the officer’s law enforcement experience, to be crack cocaine would have led a reasonably discrete and prudent person to believe that drug contraband was in the car. State v. Sarden, 305 Ga. App. 587, 699 S.E.2d 880 (2010). Intensive search of cars. — After a valid stop for following too closely, the deputies’ actions throughout the detention were reasonable and motivated by a genuine concern for the protection of others on the interstate that arose from the totality of the rapidly escalating situation confronting the deputies. Montoya v. State, 232 Ga. App. 24, 499 S.E.2d 699 (1998). Open car door provided plain view. — Because the defendant was already 17-5-30 stopped at the side of a road and a police chief, lawfully wanting to question the defendant about the incorrect vehicle tag number that the defendant had given earlier, walked passed an open car door and saw a gun in plain sight, there was no stop and the chief had a right to retrieve the gun; consequently, the trial court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence of the gun. Eldridge v. State, 270 Ga. App. 84, 606 S.E.2d 95 (2004). Investigatory stop. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress as the police officer had a sufficient, articulable suspicion necessary to make an investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle since the police observed during a surveillance that the occupants of the car, including the defendant, were engaged in a number of hand-to-hand transactions in an area known as an open-air drug market. Kates v. State, 271 Ga. App. 326, 609 S.E.2d 710 (2005). Trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of a DUI violation obtained during the traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle by committing clear error in ﬁnding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s car as the officer had received a radio dispatch and had obtained information from a fast-food restaurant employee that suspicious persons in a vehicle were banging on the windows and cursing at the fast-food restaurant. Such actions involved engaging in disorderly conduct, which was an allegation of a crime that gave the officer grounds for conducting a brief traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle for investigatory purposes. State v. Melanson, 291 Ga. App. 853, 663 S.E.2d 280 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress due to alleged illegal traffic stops as even though police officers did not actually see a drug transaction involving the defendant, the circumstances justiﬁed an investigative stop of another vehicle driven by individuals observed in an exchange with the defendant in a parking lot. The officers were acting on information that tied a vehicle of the same make and model of the defendant’s vehicle to illegal drug activity. Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 666 S.E.2d 559 (2008). 279 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) C. Searches (Cont’d) Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence seized after the vehicle the defendant was driving was stopped because the defendant did not abandon the car or lose any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the car; when the defendant ran away after the traffic stop, the police officer had just observed the defendant park the car within a parking space of an apartment complex, where the person to whom the car’s registered owner had entrusted the vehicle, and because the evidence from which the officer ascertained the defendant’s identify derived from documents found during the unlawful search of the car, the trial court did not err in rejecting the state’s argument that the items retrieved from the sidewalk were admissible in a trial against the defendant. State v. Nesbitt, 305 Ga. App. 28, 699 S.E.2d 368 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer recovered from the defendant’s vehicle because the evidence supported the trial court’s ﬁnding that the officer did not unreasonably prolong the stop of the vehicle, and once the drug dog alerted to the vehicle, the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle; a brief detention was authorized because it was reasonable for the officer to be suspicious in light of the defendant’s furtive movement at the initial point of the stop, and that suspicion was heightened when the defendant attempted to explain that the defendant was looking for the defendant’s wallet but then retrieved the defendant’s license from a different part of the car, and when the defendant revoked the defendant’s consent to search. Hardaway v. State, 309 Ga. App. 432, 710 S.E.2d 634 (2011). Officer had probable cause to believe that, by lying about whether weapons were in a vehicle, the defendant had violated O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 because at the time the defendant produced the rental agreement for the vehicle, the officer saw a ﬁrearm in the center console of the 17-5-30 rental car, which the defendant apparently tried to conceal by quickly closing the console; when the officer asked the defendant whether any weapons were in the car the defendant denied it, and that was a reason for the officer to detain the defendant and to secure the ﬁrearm for the officer’s own safety. Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. 115, 717 S.E.2d 698 (2011). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as the officer simply did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in or about to be engaged in a violation of the law after the officer found the defendant sleeping in a car in the parking lot of a funeral home, with the permission of the funeral home’s owner, the officer did not see or smell any illegal substances; the officer did not question the defendant regarding the defendant’s appearance or demeanor; the officer did not determine if the defendant had consumed alcohol; and the officer did not perform any ﬁeld tests to determine if the defendant was under the inﬂuence of anything. Martin v. State, 316 Ga. App. 220, 729 S.E.2d 437 (2012). Search based on lawful arrest. — Because an officer had probable cause to arrest a vehicle’s occupants, including the defendant, after encountering a truck matching the description in a be-on-the-lookout bulletin, with the same number of occupants as advised therein, traveling on the road and in the direction identiﬁed, and from a location known by the officer to be the scene of an armed robbery, a search based on a lawful arrest was upheld; as a result, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a search incident to the arrest. Boone v. State, 282 Ga. App. 67, 637 S.E.2d 795 (2006). Search of vehicle incident to lawful arrest. — Officer’s search of the defendant’s vehicle incident to the defendant’s arrest was lawful because the crime for which the defendant was under arrest was the possession of bagged marijuana in the defendant’s pocket, and it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the offense could be found in the vehicle from which the defendant exited. 280 Kirkland v. State, 316 Ga. App. 310, 728 S.E.2d 907 (2012). Consensual automobile search when the defendant a passenger. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress; since the police had probable cause to search the driver’s vehicle because a police officer had smelled the odor of burning marijuana coming from the car following a valid traffic stop and the driver had given consent to search the car, the police did not need to establish that probable cause existed to search individual containers in the car which might contain contraband since the probable cause that existed to search the car gave the police the right to also search each of the car’s containers, and, thus, the trial court should not have suppressed evidence of contraband found in the book bag of the passenger, the defendant. State v. Selph, 261 Ga. App. 541, 583 S.E.2d 212 (2003). Trial court erred in suppressing evidence found in a consensual search of a car in which the defendant was a passenger as the police officer did not impermissibly expand the scope or the duration of a valid traffic stop for an improperly displayed tag in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 by determining the status of the driver’s license and whether the driver or defendant had outstanding warrants against them; even though 26 minutes into the stop the officer had not yet written the driver a ticket for the improperly displayed tag, the officer was not required to write the ticket and conclude the stop prior to diligently completing the background checks, which were delayed by the driver’s admission that the driver might have had an outstanding warrant in another county that the officer had not discovered, and investigating the officer’s reasonable suspicions regarding alcohol and open containers arising out of the officer’s knowledge of another officer’s encounter with the men earlier in the evening. State v. Williams, 264 Ga. App. 199, 590 S.E.2d 151 (2003). Consensual automobile search. — Trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence gathered in the search of the defendant’s vehicle, which resulted in the seizure of a 17-5-30 plastic bag containing additional baggies that tested positive for methamphetamine, in light of the state’s evidence indicating that the defendant was driving under the inﬂuence; while the state introduced evidence indicating that the defendant had been driving under the inﬂuence, the state’s evidence also showed that the arresting officer asked for and got the defendant’s consent only after the defendant convinced the officer that the defendant was in full possession of the defendant’s faculties. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0176, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 179 (Ga. 2008). Trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop because: (1) there was probable cause for the initial stop, based on an officer’s observance of a traffic violation—a nonfunctional tag light; (2) the officer sought and obtained the defendant’s voluntary permission to search the car; (3) there was no evidence that the stop was unreasonably prolonged by questioning; and (4) there was no evidence that the officer performed a pat-down search nor that the officer ever put the officer’s hands in the defendant’s pocket. Carnes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 549, 667 S.E.2d 620 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer found in the defendant’s vehicle because the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was not the product of an illegal detention since after returning the defendant’s driver’s license and issuing a warning ticket, the officer told the defendant that the defendant was free to leave, but the defendant remained on the scene and engaged in casual conversation about the high level of drug activity in the area and the fact that the defendant worked nearby; the defendant’s conduct showed that the defendant did not feel intimidated by the officer’s presence, and under the circumstances, the initial traffic stop had de-escalated into a consensual encounter when the officer requested consent to search, which the defendant readily provided, and there was no evidence that the officer coerced the defendant’s consent, tricked the defendant, or con- 281 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) C. Searches (Cont’d) veyed a message that the defendant’s consent to search was required. Davis v. State, 306 Ga. App. 185, 702 S.E.2d 14 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress marijuana a police officer found during the search of the defendant’s car because the evidence showed that the defendant was legally detained when the officer requested consent to search; the officer’s testimony reﬂected that the officer sought consent to search immediately after issuing a verbal warning. Nix v. State, 312 Ga. App. 43, 717 S.E.2d 550 (2011). Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied because the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on an alert from the license-plate recognition system showing that a wanted person could be driving the subject vehicle, the defendant’s driving on a suspended license provided probable cause for an arrest, and the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle. Hill v. State, 321 Ga. App. 817, 743 S.E.2d 489 (2013). Consent to search of vehicle. — Trial court properly denied the defendant’s suppression motion as the defendant’s car was searched with the defendant’s consent while the officer was investigating the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the defendant might be transporting drugs or stolen merchandise, even though the defendant had been given a traffic citation at the time that the consent was requested; the officer testiﬁed at the suppression hearing that the officer still needed to verify the VIN of the car and to verify that the car was an actual rental vehicle and not a stolen car when the consent was requested, and that the defendant was free to leave, but that because of the officer’s concerns about the car, the car was not going anywhere. Vaughn v. State, 263 Ga. App. 536, 588 S.E.2d 330 (2003). Because the defendant committed two traffic violations, an ensuing stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not unjustiﬁably extended, the defendant voluntarily 17-5-30 granted the officers consent to search, and a canine free-air search was undertaken immediately and as a result of the defendant’s consent, the trial court properly denied suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Noble v. State, 283 Ga. App. 81, 640 S.E.2d 666 (2006). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s suppression motion as the evidence showed that once an officer obtained the defendant’s consent to conduct a free air search around the vehicle the defendant was driving, a drug dog alerted for contraband within the vehicle, and once this occurred, the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was transporting drugs. Garvin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 242, 641 S.E.2d 176 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying either the defendant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized during the consensual search of the defendant’s vehicle or a motion to suppress the defendant’s voluntary custodial statement as the testimony of the arresting and investigating officers established that the defendant did not display any problems with the understanding of the English language as did videotapes of the vehicle search and the in custody interview, which likewise showed the defendant having no problems with the English language. Therefore, the defendant’s consent to the search of the vehicle nor the defendant’s waiver of the defendant’s Miranda rights were invalidated. Serrano v. State, 291 Ga. App. 500, 662 S.E.2d 280 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because an officer did not extend the duration of a traffic stop; the officer’s testimony supported the conclusion that the officer asked for consent to search during the time that the officer was issuing citations, and the officer’s questioning did not extend the duration of the defendant’s detention. Arroyo v. State, 309 Ga. App. 494, 711 S.E.2d 60 (2011). Officer’s basis for stop. — Denial of the defendant’s suppression motion was upheld on appeal as: (1) the defendant’s vehicle was not stopped by the investigating officer; (2) the defendant voluntarily pulled into a driveway and stopped; (3) the officer did not prevent the defendant’s 282 departure; and (4) the officer had a reasonable and objective basis to conclude that the defendant committed the traffic offense of improper backing in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-249(a). Collier v. State, 282 Ga. App. 605, 639 S.E.2d 405 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0542, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 217 (Ga. 2007). Search of vehicle justiﬁed by officer’s observations. — Search of a van was lawful under the independent basis of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement since the objective facts known to the deputy after the deputy lawfully stopped the van, including needle marks on the occupants’ arms, drug paraphernalia, and evidence of drug usage on the ﬂoor of the front seat, gave the deputy probable cause to believe that the van contained contraband. Autry v. State, 277 Ga. App. 305, 626 S.E.2d 528 (2006). Officers’ initial approach of the defendant’s vehicle and request for consent to search were warranted, even without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the officers’ approach; moreover, even if a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity had been required to brieﬂy detain the defendant, the officers had such suspicion upon seeing: (1) individuals approach defendant’s car in an area known for drug activity; (2) the individuals turn and walk away upon seeing the police; and (3) the defendant’s passenger swallowing what appeared to be a crack rock as the police approached. Sego v. State, 279 Ga. App. 484, 631 S.E.2d 505 (2006). Traffic stop by a sheriff ’s deputy was not unreasonably prolonged without a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on evidence that: (1) a rental agreement in the defendant’s possession had expired; (2) the officer was justiﬁed in calling for the drug dog because the officer did not know whether the car was stolen and because the defendant was nervous, backed toward the car when the defendant declined consent to search, and confessed to an open container violation; and (3) the trial court properly credited testimony from the dog’s handler that the dog alerted when the dog showed interest in the passenger door, although the dog’s response was not an active alert; thus, the 17-5-30 trial court properly rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress. Tanner v. State, 281 Ga. App. 101, 635 S.E.2d 388 (2006). Defendant failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to timely ﬁle a motion to suppress evidence a police officer seized from the defendant’s vehicle prejudiced the case because the warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; the objective facts known to the officer after the car was lawfully stopped gave the officer probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband, and those facts included the smell of marijuana in the car, ﬂakes of what the officer suspected to be marijuana on the ﬂoorboards of the car, and the defendant’s visible agitation during the traffic stop. Brown v. State, 311 Ga. App. 405, 715 S.E.2d 802 (2011). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer recovered from a rental car because the officer had reasonable grounds for detaining the defendant since the officer found the defendant and a friend in the parking lot of a closed business late at night, knew that several burglaries and thefts had occurred in the area recently, and observed that the defendant and the friend appeared to be nervous when the officer spoke with the defendant and the friend; in the course of securing a ﬁrearm the officer saw a ﬁrearm in the center console of the rental car, the officer saw in plain view a digital scale with white residue, affording the officer probable cause to effect a custodial arrest of the defendant. Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. 115, 717 S.E.2d 698 (2011). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence an officer seized from the defendant’s vehicle because the suspected contraband was in plain view from outside the vehicle, and once the officer smelled the odor of marijuana on the recovered item, the officer had even stronger grounds to search the vehicle; because the officer saw the item before returning the defendant’s license or issuing the ticket, the officer was not exceeding the scope of the initial trafﬁc stop by seizing the object. Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 798, 728 S.E.2d 317 (2012). 283 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) C. Searches (Cont’d) Search of vehicle not justiﬁed by officer’s observation. — Trial court erred by denying two defendants’ motion to suppress the drug evidence found in the vehicle in which one defendant was driving, and the other defendant was a passenger, because the search of the vehicle was conducted after the defendants were illegally detained after a traffic stop. The officers were justiﬁed in stopping the vehicle upon observing the vehicle speeding but by only observing nervousness and an expandable baton, the officers exceeded the scope of a permissible search by continuing to detain the defendants without any cause to believe the defendants were dangerous; thus, the search was not justiﬁed. Bell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 607, 672 S.E.2d 675 (2009). Standard for inventory searches. — Contents of an impounded vehicle are routinely inventoried to protect the property of the owner, protect the officers against claims for lost or stolen property, and protect the police from potential danger, and the validity of such conduct is not dependent upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve the property, but depends instead on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of the circumstances confronting the police at the time; thus, police were authorized to impound and later perform a routine inventory of the defendant’s car when the defendant was arrested at the home of a friend in connection with a murder and the disappearance of the defendant’s spouse, the defendant’s car was at the home of the friend, and police knew that the defendant had been planning to leave the state with the friend and that the defendant’s car was wanted in an investigation in another county because, under the circumstances, the police had reason to believe that the defendant’s detention would be lengthy and the officers were not required to trust that the car would remain untouched if they left the car at the friend’s home. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003), cert. 17-5-30 denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2004). Inventory search of vehicle. — Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of cocaine and crack pipes found during an inventory search of the car was properly denied as: (1) the police impound was not unlawful; (2) waiting a reasonable time, usually 20 minutes, prior to having the car towed, was not unreasonable as a matter of law; and (3) the officers were not required to call the defendant’s relatives ﬁrst. Carlisle v. State, 278 Ga. App. 528, 629 S.E.2d 512 (2006). Because an officer was authorized to arrest the defendant for weaving, a decision to impound the vehicle the defendant was driving was not unreasonable and an inventory search of the vehicle was authorized; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. Lopez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 873, 650 S.E.2d 430 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the trial court’s ﬁnding that the impoundment of the defendant’s motorcycle was reasonably necessary under the circumstances was supported by the evidence because the defendant was arrested for attempting to elude police and for several traffic offenses, including driving with an expired license, the defendant was not going to be allowed to drive the motorcycle under any circumstances. Grizzle v. State, 310 Ga. App. 577, 713 S.E.2d 701 (2011). Impoundment of defendant’s car was reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. IV, and the resulting inventory search was proper as the defendant and the defendant’s companion were arrested, no one remained to take custody of the car, and the car was on the shoulder of an exit ramp where the car would have impeded a large truck attempting to exit the highway. Scott v. State, 316 Ga. App. 341, 729 S.E.2d 481 (2012). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the inventory search of a van was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment due to a lack of evidence of police policy; the record contained no evidence about the police department’s policy or procedures 284 on inventory searches, but rather, the officers simply testiﬁed that the officers’ searches of a ﬂatbed wrecker, the van, and the van’s contents were inventory searches pursuant to the impoundment. Capellan v. State, 316 Ga. App. 467, 729 S.E.2d 602 (2012). Search after suspect abandoned vehicle. — Probable cause existed to search a vehicle, which was left behind when a suspect ﬂed a drug transaction upon seeing a police officer approach; it was of no consequence that the car was impounded before the warrant was issued for the car’s search. Scott v. State, 277 Ga. App. 126, 625 S.E.2d 526 (2006). Because a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle that the defendant and the defendant’s cohorts were riding in would have been futile as the evidence showed the defendants abandoned the vehicle on foot after being involved in a high-speed chase with police, the defendant’s trial counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to ﬁle the motion. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 287 Ga. App. 872, 652 S.E.2d 891 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence an officer seized from the defendant’s vehicle because the evidence undisputedly showed that the defendant had abandoned the vehicle, and since the defendant abandoned the defendant’s car, the defendant had no standing to assert the claim that the search was invalid as a warrantless search incident to an arrest; the defendant abandoned the defendant’s vehicle when the defendant ﬂed to escape police, leaving the vehicle parked in a stranger’s driveway with the door open, and before searching the open vehicle, an officer even conﬁrmed with the landowner that the defendant’s vehicle was not parked there with the owner’s permission. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 635, 700 S.E.2d 612 (2010). Search proper as inventory and as incident to driver’s arrest. — Because an inventory search of a codefendant’s vehicle after impoundment was reasonable, and because the search was performed incident to the codefendant’s lawful arrest, there was no basis to suppress the evidence seized from the search. Wil- 17-5-30 liams v. State, 308 Ga. App. 464, 708 S.E.2d 32 (2011). Evidence found during search of vehicle after accident admissible. — When the defendants were taken to a hospital after a one-party automobile accident, leaving the vehicle posing a threat to public safety, and the officer conducted an investigative inventory before a private wrecker towed the vehicle, evidence of cocaine discovered by the officer during the normal investigative search will not permit a motion to suppress under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30. State v. Izquierdo, 160 Ga. App. 33, 285 S.E.2d 769 (1981). Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence including cocaine and a pistol found in a duffel bag on the ﬂoorboard of the defendant’s vehicle after the car was involved in an accident killing a deer since the defendant was unable to provide proof that the vehicle was insured, and impoundment was therefore valid; thus, the items seized were both admissible through the inventory search of the lawfully impounded vehicle, and via a search incident to the defendant’s arrest for operating the vehicle without insurance and driving on a suspended license. State v. Howard, 264 Ga. App. 691, 592 S.E.2d 88 (2003). Car being towed. — There was no error in denying a motion to suppress as an officer’s direction removing the defendant from a car following a traffic stop, which led to the discovery of cocaine, was reasonable given the circumstances. Though the officer had no basis for suspecting unlawful activity, the defendant could not remain in the car because the car was going to be towed. Carter v. State, 297 Ga. App. 608, 677 S.E.2d 792 (2009). D. Traffic Stops Stop based on erroneous facts. — It was not error to admit evidence and statements showing intoxication, even though the stop of the defendant’s automobile was due to an error on the part of the officer or the dispatcher who ‘‘ran the tag’’ and erroneously determined that the automobile was stolen. Cunningham v. State, 231 Ga. App. 420, 498 S.E.2d 590 (1998). Reasonable belief justifying stop. — Trial court’s denial of the defendant’s mo- 285 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) D. Traffic Stops (Cont’d) tion to suppress evidence that was found in a car the defendant was driving was not clearly erroneous when the initial stop of the defendant by officers was made with a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity when the defendant, the defendant’s companion, and the car met descriptions that the police were searching for in connection with the burglaries. When the defendant immediately ﬂed on foot when police stopped the vehicle, probable cause to search the car, which turned out to be stolen, existed. Porter v. State, 264 Ga. App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (2003). Motion to suppress was properly denied when the officer had a reasonable basis to make an investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle; it was reasonable for the officer to infer, based on the officer’s training, experience, and common sense that the person driving the truck who stopped, looked at the officer while the officer was at the house attempting to serve the warrant, and then took off, could have been the person the officer was trying to ﬁnd and arrest. Howard v. State, 265 Ga. App. 835, 595 S.E.2d 660 (2004). Despite the defendant’s claim that a sheriff ’s deputy lacked a speciﬁc and articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to execute a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle and thus that the evidence seized thereafter had to be suppressed, the appeals court found otherwise as sufficient facts had been conveyed to the deputy prior to the stop for the deputy to have a reasonable belief that the defendant had been involved in a domestic dispute and might be under the inﬂuence of alcohol to justify a ﬁnding that the resulting stop was valid; hence, suppression was properly denied. Lacy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 647, 647 S.E.2d 350 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1514, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 620 (Ga. 2007). Because a concerned citizen reported that a suspected drunk driver was driving a speciﬁc vehicle in a speciﬁc location, a police officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify an investigative traffic stop; accordingly, the defendant did not 17-5-30 show a basis for reversing the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Adcock v. State, 299 Ga. App. 1, 681 S.E.2d 691 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress when a police officer was authorized to stop the vehicle the defendant was driving because of a perceived traffic violation and to continue the officer’s investigation because the defendant did not have a driver’s license; the particularized and objective basis for the initial stop was the information from the Georgia Crime Information Center that the male owner of the registered vehicle defendant was operating had a suspended driver’s license, and once the stop was made, and it was ascertained that the defendant was not the owner of the car, the officer had a duty to further investigate only because the defendant could not produce a driver’s license. Humphreys v. State, 304 Ga. App. 365, 696 S.E.2d 400 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion to suppress evidence police officers seized pursuant to search warrants for a residence and vehicles and a traffic stop because all of the facts, taken together, justiﬁed the stop based on a reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicles were involved in an active marijuana growing operation; a search warrant for the residence was pending based on probable cause to believe that an active marijuana growing operation was being conducted inside, the officers had information from multiple sources that the residence was a marijuana grow house, the house exhibited the physical characteristics of other grow houses that had been recently discovered, and the officers observed the defendants driving away from the residence in tandem with a truck and large recreational trailer, which had been obscured in the backyard behind a privacy fence. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010). Statute later rendered unconstitutional did not invalidate stop. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress after ﬁnding that the excessive-window-tinting statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(b), was unconstitu- 286 tional because an officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; the officer observed that the defendant’s vehicle had darkly tinted windows and reasonably believed that to be in violation of § 40-8-73.1, and the fact that the statute was later found to be unconstitutional did not render the stop invalid. Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 727 S.E.2d 269 (2012). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop because there was some evidence that the defendant attempted to avoid a roadblock; the defendant made an immediate, sudden turn into a driveway, reversed course, and drove away from the checkpoint at the same time that the police officer noticed the defendant’s headlights. Blakely v. State, 316 Ga. App. 213, 729 S.E.2d 434 (2012). Both initial stop and unrelated questions permissible. — Denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was proper because the officer’s observation of the defendant’s car crossing over the lane line without a signal and of an inoperable third brake light gave the officer probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred and the officer’s questioning of the defendant unrelated to the stop did not prolong the stop. White v. State, 319 Ga. App. 540, 732 S.E.2d 107 (2012). Second investigatory stop justiﬁed. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence since the vehicle was properly stopped a second time after the police officer stopped the vehicle originally for a traffic violation and observed that the defendant’s female companion appeared to be the driver, and let the defendant go with a warning; however, the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that warranted the second investigatory stop when the officer saw the car stall as the woman tried to drive away, as the officer suspected that the woman had never driven that type of car, and that the defendant actually had been driving at the time the officer stopped the vehicle for the ﬁrst offense the officer observed. State v. Trammel, 270 Ga. App. 395, 606 S.E.2d 613 (2004). 17-5-30 Terry stop of vehicle on information from police dispatch. — Police dispatcher who reports a crime at a speciﬁed location gives police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene. When a police officer received a dispatch on suspicion of drunk driving describing the defendant and the defendant’s vehicle, and the officer saw the defendant in the defendant’s vehicle matching that description immediately after receiving the dispatch, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop and it was error to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress the stop even though the stop was made without the officer observing any traffic violations. State v. Harden, 267 Ga. App. 381, 599 S.E.2d 329 (2004). Dispatcher’s descriptions of vehicle justiﬁed stop. — Because police officers saw a vehicle matching a dispatcher’s description shortly after receiving the dispatch, and the vehicle attempted to elude the officers, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a), the officers had a speciﬁc and articulable reason to stop the vehicle; consequently, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motions to suppress, in limine, and for a new trial. Francis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 164, 620 S.E.2d 431 (2005). Trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because a traffic stop of the defendant was authorized; an officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity based on the officer’s knowledge that the officer was to be on the lookout for a car similar in description to the car the defendant was driving and the officer’s observations of the defendant’s suspicious driving. Aponte v. State, 296 Ga. App. 778, 676 S.E.2d 279 (2009). Stop based on be-on-the-lookout bulletin. — Motion to suppress was properly denied in a defendant’s trial for driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol and violating the open container law as an officer’s be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) bulletin provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to authorize the stop of the defendant’s vehicle; the BOLO provided particularized information de- 287 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) D. Traffic Stops (Cont’d) scribing the color, manufacturer, and model of the vehicle, the number and race of the vehicle’s occupants, and the vehicle’s location and direction of travel. Faulkner v. State, 277 Ga. App. 702, 627 S.E.2d 423 (2006). Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress as the investigating officer lacked any particularized basis to suspect the defendant of any criminal activity, and information contained in a ‘‘be on the lookout’’ alert for a certain vehicle failed to supplant the officer’s belief that the defendant was involved in a reported burglary given that: (1) the description of the vehicle being driven and the suspect were inadequate; (2) no information was provided about the lapse of time between the crime occurring and the traffic stop; (3) no information was provided about the number of persons about in the area; and (4) the defendant was not engaged in any activity which would have otherwise authorized a traffic stop. State v. Dias, 284 Ga. App. 10, 642 S.E.2d 925 (2007). Stop justiﬁed despite ulterior motives. — Defendant was properly convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine because the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress items police officers seized as a result of a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle when the stop was lawful under the circumstances; because the officer witnessed the defendant commit a traffic violation, the officers’ action in pulling over the vehicle after the defendant committed the traffic violation was valid, even though the officers had ulterior motives in initiating the stop. Gonzalez v. State, 299 Ga. App. 777, 683 S.E.2d 878 (2009). No justiﬁcation for stop. — Because: (1) an investigating officer did not have a particularized and objective reason to suspect the defendant of any criminal activity before stopping the defendant’s vehicle; and (2) the act of driving at night, lawfully, on a public road, and in a high crime area, did not justify the stop in the absence of additional circumstances, the 17-5-30 trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Young v. State, 285 Ga. App. 214, 645 S.E.2d 690 (2007). Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress because the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that the police officer who initiated the traffic stop lacked an articulable suspicion to believe that the defendant was impeding the ﬂow of traffic in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-184(a) when under the facts, the officer’s belief that the defendant was impeding the ﬂow of traffic was an insufficient basis for initiating an investigative stop; the court of appeals would not disturb the trial court’s ﬁndings, which was based upon conﬂicting witness testimony, that at the time of the traffic stop, the defendant was traveling above the posted minimum speed limit and only a few miles below the posted maximum speed limit when the defendant’s vehicle was passed by two vehicles that were speeding. State v. Parke, 304 Ga. App. 124, 695 S.E.2d 413 (2010). Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a deputy sheriff obtained in the course of a traffic stop because the court’s ﬁndings that the deputy did not really believe at the time of the stop that the absence of side view mirrors supplied proper grounds for a stop and that the deputy did not, in fact, see anyone toss anything from the car were not clearly erroneous; the factual ﬁndings were based not only upon a video that was absent from the record on appeal but also upon an assessment of the credibility of the deputy. State v. Reid, 313 Ga. App. 633, 722 S.E.2d 364 (2012). Tags being old and worn not justiﬁcation. — Because it was evident that the officer’s claim of the tag’s condition as being worn and old and appearing more than 30 days out of date, which was the sole articulated basis for the investigatory stop, was found by the trial court to lack credibility, and the appellate court found no clear error in the trial court’s credibility determination, the state failed to adduce credible evidence that the officer observed a tag that appeared more than 30 days old, and supplied no basis to disturb the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. 288 Castillo, 330 Ga. App. 828, 769 S.E.2d 571 (2015). Stop was not pretextual. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied because an investigatory stop was not pretextual, but was based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion after corroboration of a tip from a known tipster, along with a traffic offense; the tip contained details as to future actions that were not easily predicted, and a detective corroborated the tip before ordering the stop by verifying the vehicle’s make, model, year, color, route, location, and occupant. Wright v. State, 272 Ga. App. 423, 612 S.E.2d 576 (2005). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress items police officers seized as a result of a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle because the stop was lawful under the circumstances; because the officer witnessed the defendant commit a traffic violation, the officers’ action in pulling over the vehicle after the defendant committed the traffic violation was valid, even though the officers had ulterior motives in initiating the stop. Gonzalez v. State, 299 Ga. App. 777, 683 S.E.2d 878 (2009). Traffic stop initiated by conversation with concerned citizen improper. — Because a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not based on the commission of a traffic violation or illegal act, but instead was based on the unreliable information provided by a concerned citizen to a police sergeant which amounted to hearsay gleaned from an overheard conversation, and did not provide the officer with the type of ‘‘inside information’’ that would not have been known to the public at large, the defendant’s motion to suppress the marijuana seized as a result of the traffic stop was properly granted. State v. Holloway, 286 Ga. App. 129, 648 S.E.2d 473 (2007). Search of person on reasonable suspicion after routine traffic stop. — Motion to suppress was properly denied when an officer, who pulled over a van on a traffic stop for following too closely, had justiﬁcation to investigate the driver and the driver’s passenger since a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity accompanied the totality of the facts on the stop: 17-5-30 (1) the officer noticed an unusual amount of activity when the officer turned the officer’s lights on to pull the car over; (2) the van did not pull over for a mile or two after the officer turned the officer’s lights on, which was highly unusual; and (3) the driver and the passenger were extremely nervous when questioned and the driver and the passenger gave conﬂicting reports on why the driver and the passenger were traveling in the area. Rucker v. State, 266 Ga. App. 293, 596 S.E.2d 639 (2004). Search after investigative stop for DUI. — When the state presented uncontradicted evidence that the police stopped the defendant for driving while under the inﬂuence after seeing the defendant’s vehicle weaving over the yellow centerline, this was sufficient to support the legality of a search and seizure. State v. Haddock, 235 Ga. App. 726, 510 S.E.2d 561 (1998). Defendant’s continued detention proper. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as the defendant’s continued detention after an investigatory stop was justiﬁed based on a marijuana smell in the vehicle, the defendant’s nervousness, and that the defendant twice attempted to go to the vehicle to get the defendant’s gun, which was in a bag with methamphetamine. Wright v. State, 272 Ga. App. 423, 612 S.E.2d 576 (2005). Trial court erred in ﬁnding that the defendant’s continued detention after a license check was without legal justiﬁcation as a police sergeant, after detecting an odor of alcohol from the defendant’s vehicle, was legally justiﬁed to determine whether the defendant was driving while under the inﬂuence, and could not do so without conducting ﬁeld sobriety tests; moreover, a search of the defendant occurred only after the defendant granted the officer consent to do so and the consent was voluntarily given. State v. Johnson, 282 Ga. App. 102, 637 S.E.2d 825 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0374, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 58 (Ga. 2007). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of drug contraband found in the defendant’s vehicle after the vehicle was stopped due to a broken taillight as the officers had the right to detain the defendant while await- 289 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) D. Traffic Stops (Cont’d) ing word as to possible outstanding warrants; a certiﬁed drug recognition expert questioned the defendant and observed the defendant having bloodshot eyes, droopy eyelids, and displaying relaxed inhibitions; and the defendant sufficiently and voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle as was shown on a videotape of the traffic stop, despite the defendant being handcuffed at the time. Maloy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 648, 667 S.E.2d 688 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress marijuana a police officer found in a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger because the defendant was legally detained when the officer sought the driver’s consent to search, and the officer made the officer’s request shortly after completing the officer’s check of the occupants’ identiﬁcation, which was within six minutes of initiating the stop; having found that the defendant was not subject to an illegal detention, the trial court did not err in further concluding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search on other grounds. Baker v. State, 306 Ga. App. 99, 701 S.E.2d 572 (2010). Detention not prolonged. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the officer was authorized to perform a traffic stop; since the officer asked the defendant about marijuana around the same time the officer was verifying the defendant’s license, the officer did not unreasonably prolong the detention. Parker v. State, 317 Ga. App. 93, 730 S.E.2d 717 (2012). Order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress was reversed because the undisputed evidence showed that the open-air dog sniff occurred while the officer conducted the mission of the traffic stop, and it did not prolong the traffic stop since the K-9 handler conducted the search while the officer was still checking the driver’s license. State v. Herman, 344 Ga. App. 359, 810 S.E.2d 183 (2018). Search incident to an arrest following a traffic stop. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to 17-5-30 suppress the crack cocaine found in a search incident to an arrest of the defendant for having an open container of alcohol following a traffic stop because the defendant’s car was parked in a high crime area so that the traffic stop was legally permissible. Welch v. State, 263 Ga. App. 70, 587 S.E.2d 220 (2003). Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied because methamphetamine and an illegal weapon found in the defendant’s vehicle gave an officer probable cause to arrest the defendant; the resulting search of the defendant’s vehicle, which yielded additional methamphetamine and a large quantity of marijuana, was justiﬁed as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Wright v. State, 272 Ga. App. 423, 612 S.E.2d 576 (2005). Trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence in the defendant’s prosecution for ﬁnancial transaction card theft under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31; the defendant’s repeated reaching into the glove compartment while trying to ﬁnd a car rental agreement, coupled with the defendant’s initial lack of cooperation when asked to exit the car and the fact that the defendant reached to the defendant’s waistband several times, provided a police officer with the basis for conducting a pat-down search, which led to a broader search when the officer observed a bag of marijuana sticking out of the defendant’s waist band resulting in the defendant’s arrest. Leonard v. State, 281 Ga. App. 184, 635 S.E.2d 795 (2006). Inability to read license plate justifying stop. — Trial court erred in granting the suppression motions ﬁled by both the ﬁrst and second defendant, who occupied the vehicle stopped as a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 provided a sufficient reason for the traffic stop; moreover, the trial court erred in ruling that some portions of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-41 did not apply to the out-of-state license plate on the subject vehicle and by ruling that even though the word ‘‘Carolina’’ on the license plate was not legible and, hence, there was no violation of the statute because the police officer testiﬁed about an inability to recognize it as a South Carolina license plate. State v. Davis, 283 Ga. App. 200, 290 641 S.E.2d 205 (2007). Investigatory stop for taillight violation. — Grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous as the officer stopping the defendant’s automobile for an investigatory stop provided no factual basis for believing that the defendant’s older model automobile violated the taillight speciﬁcations in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-23(e) simply because newer models violated the statute; further, the trial court could have found that the officer’s testimony that the officer had conducted research into the newer models’ taillights was less than credible. State v. Keddington, 264 Ga. App. 912, 592 S.E.2d 532 (2003). Dark tinted windows. — Defendant’s vehicle was properly stopped for following too closely to another vehicle even though the police officer making the stop indicated at the suppression hearing that the officer initially followed the vehicle only due to the vehicle’s excessive window tint. Perry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 551, 618 S.E.2d 172 (2005). Trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to suppress the drug evidence seized following a traffic stop for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1 as an officer’s observations of a vehicle’s dark tinted windows, and belief that the windows violated the statute were sufficient to justify the stop; moreover, a free air search by a drug-sniffing dog did not violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Simmons, 283 Ga. App. 141, 640 S.E.2d 709 (2006). Stop based on seat belt violation. — Consensual search upon a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation supported the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress as the search conducted pursuant to the defendant’s consent was not a search based solely on the defendant’s failure to wear a seatbelt. Blitch v. State, 281 Ga. 125, 636 S.E.2d 545 (2006). Because sufficient evidence existed to support a ﬁnding that the arresting officer had a clear and unobstructed view of the defendant not wearing a seat belt as required by O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(f ), the ofﬁcer’s subsequent stop of the defendant’s vehicle was supported by probable cause, making suppression of the evidence there- 17-5-30 after seized unwarranted; as a result, reconsideration of the court’s ruling did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Schramm v. State, 286 Ga. App. 156, 648 S.E.2d 392 (2007). Traffic stop ended prior to consent. — Defendant was entitled to suppression of marijuana found in a potato chip bag in a car in which the defendant was a passenger because a police officer improperly asked the driver for consent to search the vehicle after handing the driver a citation for a seatbelt violation; the traffic stop ended before the driver gave consent. State v. Felton, 297 Ga. App. 35, 676 S.E.2d 434 (2009). Speeding justiﬁed stop. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied; the stop of the defendant was reasonable because the defendant was exceeding the speed limit and crossed the center line twice. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, aff ’d, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a police officer obtained through a traffic stop of a driver’s vehicle because the stop of the defendant and the driver was valid since the officer’s observation that the vehicle was traveling 40 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone authorized the officer to initiate the traffic stop, and the officer was on the lookout for the vehicle based on information relayed by the county drug squad; the stop was not illegally extended because it did not matter whether the request to search came during the traffic stop or immediately thereafter, and there was no illegal detention since the questioning was almost instantaneous, all indications were that the search of the vehicle was by consent of the driver. Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 710 S.E.2d 598 (2011). Purpose of stop not related to later offense. — Fact that the charge against the defendant of driving as an habitual violator of motor vehicle laws was not related to the original purpose of the stop did not require the exclusion of the arresting officer’s testimony relating to the charge if the stop was proper. State v. Roe, 211 Ga. App. 129, 438 S.E.2d 186 (1993). Suppression of evidence following impoundment without basis. — Trial 291 17-5-30 Applicability (Cont’d) 5. Vehicles (Cont’d) D. Traffic Stops (Cont’d) court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after the defendant’s car was impounded during a traffic stop because, even though the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on criminal database search results that the defendant’s car was not insured, once the defendant provided proof of insurance in an acceptable manner, the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant or issue the defendant a citation; and, without probable cause to issue the citation, the officer had no basis for impounding the defendant’s vehicle. State v. Lewis, 344 Ga. App. 630, 811 S.E.2d 436 (2018). Defendant’s continued detention after traffic stop improper. — Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence deputies seized from the defendant’s car because the deputies did not have reasonable grounds upon which to continue to detain the defendant after the deputies called for a drug dog; the state offered no evidence that the deputies still were investigating the defendant’s failure to properly signal a right turn when the deputies called for a canine unit to come to the scene and detained the defendant until the dog arrived or that the deputies had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in some criminal activity besides the traffic violation when the deputies called for the drug dog and continued to detain the defendant until the dog arrived and sniffed the car. Dominguez v. State, 310 Ga. App. 370, 714 S.E.2d 25 (2011). Suppression motion properly denied. — Drugs were lawfully seized because the defendant’s commission of a traffic offense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-2-6.1 allowed an officer to make a valid traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle and thus allowed the officer to ask for consent to search and use a drug-sniffing dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. Thus, the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. App. 161, 657 S.E.2d 247 (2008), cert. dismissed, No. S08C0959, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 491 (Ga. 2008). Suppression motion erroneously granted on basis of venue. — Grant of defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis of venue was reversed because the state did not need to establish venue at the pretrial hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress as it was not relevant to the issues raised in the motion, which challenged the reasonable basis for the traffic stop or whether the resulting search of the defendant and the defendant’s vehicle were supported by probable cause. State v. Wallace, 338 Ga. App. 611, 791 S.E.2d 187 (2016). 6. Videotape Identiﬁcation by videotape. — Because a victim’s identiﬁcation of the defendant as the robber was corroborated by other witnesses, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery as well as to provide probable cause for a search warrant; because it was proper for the witnesses to identify the defendant from a videotape, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motions to suppress and in limine. Bradford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 659, 618 S.E.2d 709 (2005). Failure to proffer videotape evidence. — Order suppressing a videotape made by one of the officers involved in the stop of the defendant was upheld on appeal as the state failed to proffer the videotape for inclusion in the record; hence, nothing was presented for the appeals court to review. State v. Winther, 282 Ga. App. 289, 638 S.E.2d 428 (2006). Suppression of videotape not required. — Trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress because the proper implied consent warning, as enacted by the General Assembly, was read to the defendant without error, there was nothing in the record supporting the defendant’s contention that the state suppressed the videotape of the stop in bad faith, and the stop was not pretextual as the corporal observed the defendant staggering, the defendant’s car weaving, and erratic driving prior to stopping the defendant. Monas v. State, 270 Ga. App. 50, 606 S.E.2d 80 (2004). 292 It was not error for the trial court to refuse to suppress a portion of the defendant’s videotaped interview with police on the basis that the statements about the defendant’s alcohol consumption improperly placed the defendant’s character at issue because generally an adult’s consumption of alcohol was irrelevant to the issue of character. Sanford v. State, 284 Ga. 785, 671 S.E.2d 820 (2009). 7. Youthful Offenders O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 does not apply to searches by school officials. — Granting that public primary and secondary school students have minimal rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to be free from searches and seizures by school officials, nonetheless the exclusionary rule is not applicable to enforce those rights, and students aggrieved by the action of school officials must fall back upon such other legal remedies as applicable law may allow the students. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 576, 46 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1975). Applicability to searches by school officials. — Trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the defendant’s classroom computer, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30, was proper when a school principal and school technical expert accessed the defendant’s computer, and there was no indication that they were acting in the capacity of, or at the request of, law enforcement personnel; the exclusionary rule of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is only applicable to actions undertaken by law enforcement officers and does not apply to the actions of school officials. Joines v. State, 264 Ga. App. 558, 591 S.E.2d 454 (2003). Applicability to searches by private individuals. — Upon a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the facts, because a warrantless search of the defendant’s gym locker was conducted by private citizens and not by law enforcement, the search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. Hobbs v. State, 272 17-5-30 Ga. App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775 (2005). Search of juvenile at school not authorized. — Law enforcement officer, who was acting as an agent for a school principal in searching a juvenile, upon reports that the juvenile had been overheard making arrangements to sell drugs on school grounds, was not authorized to search the juvenile absent probable cause to do so; thus, when the juvenile was searched and drugs were found, the court properly granted the juvenile’s motion to suppress. State v. K.L.M., 278 Ga. App. 219, 628 S.E.2d 651 (2006). Juvenile defendant’s statement not suppressed. — Given an analysis of the Riley factors, and the fact that the juvenile defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived any constitutional rights due under Miranda, suppression of a custodial statement to law enforcement was not required. Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 653 S.E.2d 23 (2007). Warrants and Affidavits Absence of warrant is not material either to guilt or punishment. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982). Arrest on valid warrant. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied as to an arrest warrant that was supported by probable cause since a witness identiﬁed the defendant and stated that the defendant was present at the murder scene and another witness conﬁrmed the identiﬁcation through a photo lineup and testiﬁed to observing the defendant carry out the actual crime; even if the affidavit contained allegedly misleading information that one witness was the victim’s cousin and that the defendant was identiﬁed by witnesses via a six-photo lineup, the remaining information was still sufficient to support the probable cause ﬁnding. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006). Invalid arrest warrant. — Because a search yielding evidence used against the defendant was incident to the execution of an arrest warrant which was later invalidated, and no good faith exception existed, the evidence seized against the defendant should have been suppressed as the ar- 293 Warrants and Affidavits (Cont’d) resting officer had no other basis to search the car in which the defendant was a passenger. Register v. State, 281 Ga. App. 822, 637 S.E.2d 761 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2007). Affidavit for search warrant insufﬁcient. — Lack of information about informants and lack of corroboration to show reliability required the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress. Elom v. State, 248 Ga. App. 273, 546 S.E.2d 50 (2001). Defendant, who was charged with cocaine trafficking and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, was entitled to suppression of evidence from the search of the defendant’s residence because the search warrant was based on an officer’s affidavit containing untrue information; the officer’s interview with a person, who was arrested with the defendant, did not contain information, which was included in the officer’s affidavit, that this person saw the defendant retrieve drugs from the home and hide the drugs in the woods or that this person saw drug paraphernalia in the defendant’s residence. State v. Willis, 302 Ga. App. 355, 691 S.E.2d 261 (2010). Denial of motion to suppress was reversed because the affidavit failed to provide any underlying details that would allow the magistrate to evaluate whether the conclusions were based on speciﬁc facts (derived, for example, from physical evidence or eyewitness testimony) rising to the level of probable cause or whether the conclusions were instead based on mere speculation or presumptions. Willoughby v. State, 315 Ga. App. 401, 727 S.E.2d 194 (2012). Officer’s affidavit insufficient. — Police officer’s failure to independently corroborate any of the information provided by source A (an unidentiﬁed third party) to an anonymous tipster rendered the officer’s affidavit insufficient to establish the reliability of either source. Absent a showing that the information in the affidavit was reliable, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Sutton v. State, 319 Ga. App. 597, 737 S.E.2d 706 (2013). 17-5-30 Affidavit for search warrant sufficient. — Even if a magistrate improperly relied upon a bloody sheet seen in plain view in a defendant’s home as a basis for issuing a search warrant for the home, the arrest warrant still contained ample evidence from which to ﬁnd probable cause that the defendant committed a battery on a victim inside the defendant’s home; the evidence included the victim’s physical injuries, the victim’s statement that the defendant had shoved a curling iron down the victim’s throat, and the presence of other blood observed inside the house after deputies entered in search of the assault victim. Lord v. State, 297 Ga. App. 88, 676 S.E.2d 404 (2009). Once the trial court found that the detective’s affidavit contained sufficient facts for the issuance of the search warrant, it was up to the defendant to produce evidence to support the defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant not only failed to do so but failed to insist on a full evidentiary hearing; thus, the state met the state’s burden of proof as a matter of law and the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was mandated. Adams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 294, 684 S.E.2d 404 (2009). Based on the totality of the circumstances, an affidavit provided a magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to believe that contraband would be found in two vehicles because the affidavit in support of the warrant recited the positive alert by an officer’s canine as well as the marijuana growing operation in the residence from which the vehicles drove away. Prado v. State, 306 Ga. App. 240, 701 S.E.2d 871 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence a detective found in the defendant’s home because given the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate who issued the search warrant was authorized to conclude that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found at the defendant’s home; the detective’s affidavit in support of the warrant contained ample facts by which the magistrate could independently evaluate the veracity and reliability of anonymous informants and the 294 informants’ information, and a conﬁdential informant’s controlled buy of marijuana from the defendant at the defendant’s residence on the day the detective applied for the warrant independently conﬁrmed that illegal drug activities were taking place at the home. Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. App. 175, 702 S.E.2d 28 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants because the reconstituted affidavit supported the issuance of the search warrant; an agent of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation testiﬁed that an antifreeze container smelling of gasoline was found in the warranted search of a car registered in the defendant’s name and located in the yard of the home of the defendant’s parents, and the affidavit executed as part of the application for a warrant to search the car set out the facts surrounding the crime, that the victim’s body had been transported from the place where the victim was killed to the site where the victim’s body was found, and that the object of the warrant was one of two vehicles registered to the defendant that the defendant likely used to move the body. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants because the applications for search warrants to search the defendant’s apartment and the car for which registration information was given in the detective’s affidavit contained sufficient information from which a judicial officer could determine there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found at those sites as the sites were likely methods of transporting the victim and the likely destination of appellant and the victim; in the detective’s affidavit, the detective related the discovery of the victim’s body and the statements of the victim’s friend and roommate concerning the victim’s relationship with the defendant, and the victim’s pregnancy and identiﬁcation of the defendant as the father, who was not pleased about the pregnancy. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794 (2010). 17-5-30 Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a search warrant authorizing entry into the defendant’s home because the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate to make a practical, commonsense decision that there was a fair probability that evidence of sexual exploitation of children would be found at the defendant’s residence; the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children forwarded the information it received from a security specialist employed by the host of the website to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), and the affidavit of a special agent with the GBI set forth facts that showed both the reliability and basis of knowledge of the specialist. James v. State, 312 Ga. App. 130, 717 S.E.2d 713 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0347, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 227 (Ga. 2012). Trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress all of the evidence seized at a residence because the affidavits underlying the warrants provided the magistrate with sufficient information to support probable cause as the evidence in the affidavits sufficiently corroborated the information received from the informant and established a nexus between the apartment and another address. Based on the suspect’s vehicle, the investigators conducted surveillance on the apartment and the other address, a search of the other address uncovered large amounts of cocaine and methamphetamine, and a background check on the suspect connected the suspect to both the apartment and the other address. State v. Perez, 349 Ga. App. 707, 824 S.E.2d 804 (2019). Evidence seized as result of warrant. — Because the magistrate was presented with a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of child molestation would be found in the cameras and ﬁlm located in the defendant’s car, and such enabled the magistrate to form probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the warrant. Manders v. State, 281 Ga. App. 786, 637 S.E.2d 460 (2006). 295 Warrants and Affidavits (Cont’d) Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant as: (1) there was a presumption of reliability as to the report of a police officer or undercover agent in the line of duty to a fellow officer in support of the warrant; (2) the affidavit attached to the warrant set forth sufficient facts to establish the reliability of the informant; and (3) a search warrant for the defendant’s home was not even necessary because at the time of the search the defendant was on probation. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 178, 645 S.E.2d 658 (2007). Because a search warrant affidavit provided the issuing magistrate with sufficient probable cause connecting the defendant to the residence of a female friend for the magistrate to logically conclude that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found therein, despite the omission of additional evidence by the affiant, an order granting suppression of the evidence seized therein was reversed; moreover, the police did not have to observe the defendant living with the female, based on the information provided to the police that the pair could still be living together. State v. Hunter, 282 Ga. 278, 646 S.E.2d 465 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant as the warrant, given the totality of the circumstances, was based upon sufﬁcient ﬁngerprint evidence which provided an accurate foundation for identifying the defendant as a suspect in all four crimes. Carruth v. State, 286 Ga. App. 431, 649 S.E.2d 557 (2007). Trial court properly denied suppression of the defendant’s blood sample for a DNA comparison pursuant to a particularized search warrant seeking the sample as the warrant and the attached affidavit when read together particularly described the evidence to be seized and gave the executing officers adequate notice of the search warrant’s scope and command. Holloway v. State, 287 Ga. App. 655, 653 S.E.2d 95 (2007). Because the application for a search 17-5-30 warrant established that the victim lived in a residence at a speciﬁc address, that the defendant lived in the basement apartment located in the residence, that the defendant had severely beaten the victim, and that there was a fair probability that evidence of the crime could be found either in the defendant’s apartment or in the victim’s part of the residence, probable cause existed to search the defendant’s basement apartment and the victim’s part of the residence; accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the apartment. Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga. 653, 670 S.E.2d 411 (2008). Trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the defendant’s hospital records, which showed that the defendant used drugs on the day the defendant shot the victim, because on the evidence’s face, the affidavit for the search warrant issued for the records demonstrated a fair probability that evidence of the defendant’s drug use would be found in the hospital records; the alleged omissions in the affidavit, which was based on the statements of the defendant’s spouse, had the potential to impeach the statements made by the spouse, but the omissions did not eliminate the existence of probable cause because if the omitted material were included in the warrant, probable cause would still exist. Herrera v. State, 288 Ga. 231, 702 S.E.2d 854 (2010). Failure to leave a copy of the supporting affidavit at the searched premises did not render a warrant facially void for lack of particularity since the warrant referred to the attached affidavit, which speciﬁed the exact location of the property to be searched and the particular items to be seized and there was no dispute that the location, the scope of the search, and seizure conformed to the warrant; thus, denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was not in error. Battle v. State, 266 Ga. App. 532, 597 S.E.2d 417 (2004). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence police officers found at a residence because the fact that the investigator who submitted the affidavit for the search warrant did not leave a copy of the affidavit with the warrant at the premises did not ren- 296 der the warrant invalid; the warrant satisﬁed the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII on the warrant’s face because the warrant listed the address of the place to be searched and contained a description of the home, and the warrant also listed items to be seized, including marijuana, weighing devices, and other paraphernalia used in the distribution of drugs. Pass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 440, 710 S.E.2d 641 (2011). Failure to tender warrant or affidavit. — Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the state did not carry the state’s burden to prove the validity of the warrant in that the affidavit supporting the warrant was not tendered into evidence. Smith v. State, 324 Ga. App. 542, 751 S.E.2d 164 (2013). Warrant for arrest of defendant’s passenger justiﬁed search. — Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of drugs and a handgun found during the warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle as the arrest of the defendant’s passenger on an outstanding warrant authorized the stop of the defendant’s vehicle and the mobility of the car, coupled with the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained marijuana, based on the officer smelling the marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, authorized the search. Somesso v. State, 288 Ga. App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0505, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 281 (Ga. 2008). Affidavit containing false statements and omitting material information. — In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit containing false statements and omitting material information, the false statements must be deleted, the omitted truthful material must be included, and the affidavit must be reexamined to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant. Redding v. State, 192 Ga. App. 87, 383 S.E.2d 640 (1989). Proof that facts in affidavit false may prove search illegal. — Proof that the facts sworn to in the supporting affidavit were actually false might well be proof of illegal execution of a search war- 17-5-30 rant. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968). Search exceeded the warrant. — Because the scope of the search exceeded the warrant and the search was excessive, the court erred in denying the motion because of the difficulty in enumerating the items improperly seized; the remedy is the suppression and return of the unlawfully seized items. Grant v. State, 220 Ga. App. 604, 469 S.E.2d 826 (1996). Search did not exceed warrant. — Because a search warrant referred to the crimes of possession of methamphetamines and theft by receiving stolen property, the warrant did not violate the particularity requirement; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Allison v. State, 299 Ga. App. 542, 683 S.E.2d 104 (2009). Insufficient evidence of existence of valid warrant. — State failed to meet the state’s burden under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) of proving that a search of a defendant’s hotel room was made pursuant to a valid warrant because the state failed to produce the warrant or supporting affidavit, and the sheriff ’s testimony concerning the warrant was hearsay because the sheriff had no personal knowledge of the warrant. Sosebee v. State, 303 Ga. App. 499, 693 S.E.2d 838 (2010). Warrant and affidavit in record prior to suppression hearing. — Because the testifying officer had personal knowledge concerning the existence of a valid search warrant and the warrant and supporting affidavit were in the record prior to the suppression hearing, the state met the state’s burden of producing evidence showing the validity of the warrant since the defendant offered nothing in opposition, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. Tyre v. State, 323 Ga. App. 37, 747 S.E.2d 106 (2013). Evidence Acquired Unlawfully Evidence seized as result of illegal police activity. — Law proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures and prohibits the use of evidence seized as a result of lawless police activity. State v. Sanders, 155 Ga. App. 274, 270 S.E.2d 850 (1980). 297 Evidence Acquired Unlawfully (Cont’d) Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress statements, drugs, paraphernalia, and cash the police found after searching the defendant’s home as fruit of the poisonous tree because although the police had authority to enter the house for the purpose of apprehending the defendant, the subsequent reentry by the police was illegal since an officer reentered the house without a warrant, valid consent, or exigent circumstances; both before and at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the defendant told the police not to enter the house, and it could not be assumed that the victim’s need for assistance justiﬁed the officer’s reentry because the exigent circumstances authorizing entry for the limited purpose of effecting the defendant’s arrest had expired. State v. Driggers, 306 Ga. App. 849, 702 S.E.2d 925 (2010). Deputy’s discovery of the tailgate allegedly from the stolen truck was problematic because the deputy did not have a warrant or consent when the deputy went behind the house and, thus, the deputy’s observation of the tailgate behind the house was illegal, and since the state did not show that the observation of the battery charger alone supported the issuance of the search warrant, the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted. Bowman v. State, 332 Ga. App. 407, 773 S.E.2d 33 (2015). No exigent circumstances justifying entry. — Because the state failed to carry the state’s burden of establishing exigent circumstances justifying the entry of the police into defendants’ trailer to arrest persons for underage drinking, the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized from the unlawful entry. State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 643 S.E.2d 262 (2007). Suppression of marijuana and cocaine was proper after three uniformed officers stepped into the codefendant’s hotel room without permission and asked about luggage and other bags in the room, because following the officers’ entry to retrieve three zipped bags, which the codefen- 17-5-30 dant’s said were not theirs, the second defendant acquiesced in an officer’s request to search the second defendant’s bag and the state did not fulﬁll the state’s burden to show that consent for the search was voluntary. State v. Hamby, 317 Ga. App. 480, 731 S.E.2d 374 (2012). Exigent circumstances not found. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly granted when: (1) an officer executing an arrest warrant for a third person had unreasonably looked through the defendants’ window, discovering the defendants using marijuana; (2) the officers did not identify themselves as police officers when the officers knocked at the defendants’ door; (3) defendants hid the marijuana before opening the door; (4) the police confronted defendants about the marijuana after the police determined that the third person was not in the house; and (5) the appellate court could not conclude, as a matter of law, that there were exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless seizure of the drugs, in that the drugs were in danger of being destroyed, simply because the defendants hid the drugs before opening the door. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence as the evidence that the police officer seized was obtained after the officer made a warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment without consent and without exigent circumstances to justify that entry; thus, the contraband that the officer observed or discovered as part of that entry was observed or discovered as a result of the officer being in a location where the officer did not have a lawful right to be. Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760, 605 S.E.2d 400 (2004). Although police officers had probable cause to investigate a crime, the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from entering the defendant’s home or the home’s curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances; consequently, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a ten-foot high marijuana plant plainly growing in defendant’s backyard. Kirsche v. State, 271 Ga. App. 729, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005). 298 Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as the back yard and the back door of the defendant’s home fell within the general deﬁnition of curtilage of the home and the state failed to show an exception, such as exigent circumstances, to the homeowners’ Fourth Amendment right to protection of the back yard/door curtilage of the home. Arp v. State, 327 Ga. App. 340, 759 S.E.2d 57 (2014). Evidence from exigent circumstances searches. — Given the existence of exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers were justiﬁed in searching the defendant’s home without a warrant in order to determine if a child was present and in need of medical attention or in danger of imminent harm; as a result, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of that search. Richards v. State, 286 Ga. App. 580, 649 S.E.2d 747 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1766, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 702 (Ga. 2007). Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the murder weapon and photographs of the crime scene because the search of the defendant’s residence was authorized due to the exigent circumstances; officers arrived at the residence to conduct a welfare check and knocked on the door, which caused the door to open slightly, allowing the officers to see the victim lying motionless on the couch, and after the victim failed to respond to the officers’ calls, the officers were authorized to proceed into the residence immediately to come to the victim’s aid. Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447 (2011). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress photographs obtained subsequent to the police officers’ entry into the defendant’s home because the officers’ entry was authorized by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment; the trial court was authorized to ﬁnd that the age of the defendant’s children, the children’s undisputed inability to care for themselves, and the lack of adult supervision due to the defendant’s absence and their father’s arrest constituted an exigent circumstance that authorized the officers’ entry into the res- 17-5-30 idence for the purpose of temporarily supervising the children until a responsible adult arrived to relieve the officers, and once the officers were legally in the house pursuant to the exigent circumstances, the officers were authorized to photograph items of potential evidentiary signiﬁcance that were in plain view, speciﬁcally, the family’s living conditions. Staib v. State, 309 Ga. App. 785, 711 S.E.2d 362 (2011). If police know about crime, warrantless arrest legal. — If law enforcement officers have sufficient personal knowledge of the acceptance of a bribe to justify the officers’ arrest of appellant without a warrant, the arrest is legal without a warrant and the exclusionary rule of Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) is not applicable to the evidence seized incident to that arrest. Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 204 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839, 95 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1974). Evidence and motion failing to prove alleged illegal warrantless search. — If a written motion to suppress evidence is based on allegations of an illegal search without a warrant, and a seizure with a warrant, but there is nothing in the written motion to support a contention that the search, if made with a warrant, was illegal for any of the reasons stated in the statute, and if the evidence adduced on the hearing authorized a determination that the search itself took place with a warrant, the motion to suppress is properly denied. Raines v. State, 123 Ga. App. 794, 182 S.E.2d 491 (1971). Failure to ﬁle motion to suppress to challenge. — Because the defendant did not ﬁle a timely motion to suppress any physical evidence in the case, the defendant waived any right to claim that the underlying search which produced the physical evidence was unconstitutional; thus, the defendant was not entitled to exclusion of testimony describing the physical evidence on the basis that the testimony was the fruit of an unconstitutional search. Riley v. State, No. A20A1376, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 ( July 21, 2020). If illegal arrest, fruits not admissible. — If an arrest without a warrant is illegal, the search is unlawful and the 299 17-5-30 Evidence Acquired Unlawfully (Cont’d) property seized as a result of the arrest should be suppressed as evidence by the trial court. Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 204 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839, 95 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1974). If there is no legal justiﬁcation for the arrest, the unlawful fruits may not be introduced in evidence. Moore v. State, 155 Ga. App. 299, 270 S.E.2d 713 (1980). Trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress because the state did not establish sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the inﬂuence since the state offered no evidence showing that the defendant’s driving ability was impaired due to alcohol consumption; evidence that an officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath, that an alco-sensor test revealed the presence of alcohol, and that the defendant admitted that the defendant had been drinking ‘‘earlier in the day’’ was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the inﬂuence. Handley v. State, 294 Ga. App. 236, 668 S.E.2d 855 (2008). Fruits of pretextual arrest inadmissible. — When the state never physically produced at any point in the criminal proceedings and when the record did not otherwise conﬁrm the existence of the alleged arrest warrant through which the state justiﬁed intruding into the defendant’s home, resulting in the eventual search-warrant seizure of a controlled substance discovered pursuant to that arrest, a motion to suppress was improperly denied. Baez v. State, 206 Ga. App. 462, 425 S.E.2d 882 (1992). Seizure for crime committed independent of warrant. — Results of a breath test obtained following the stop of the defendant pursuant to an arrest warrant on a family violence charge were untainted by any inﬁrmity in the arrest warrant; the seizure of the breath test evidence resulted from a ‘‘second’’ arrest arising from the police officer’s having witnessed the commission of an independent crime. King v. State, 211 Ga. App. 12, 438 S.E.2d 93 (1993). Evidence obtained under a void warrant, is evidence illegally obtained and the taint of illegal procurement forbids its use as evidence. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980). Backpack too far from defendant to fall under search incident to arrest exception. — State failed to meet the state’s burden to prove that the warrantless search of the defendant’s backpack was lawful as the backpack was under the exclusive control of the officers and the defendant was handcuffed, leaving no danger that the defendant would gain access to the backpack to seize the weapon or destroy evidence. Huff v. State, 346 Ga. App. 120, 816 S.E.2d 304 (2018). Requirements for Motion 1. In General Motion must state facts showing search unlawful. — All motions to suppress, whether based on statutory or nonstatutory grounds, must state facts and not merely conclusions. Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 385 S.E.2d 298 (1989); Taylor v. State, 197 Ga. App. 678, 399 S.E.2d 213 (1990). O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) requires that a motion to suppress evidence ‘‘state facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful.’’ Unless the defendant has satisﬁed this requirement, the state is under no duty to present evidence in rebuttal. Wilson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 181, 397 S.E.2d 744 (1990). O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 required only that the motion to suppress state facts showing that the search and seizure was unlawful. Watts v. State, 274 Ga. 373, 552 S.E.2d 823 (2001). Because the defendant never sought a ruling from the trial court on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadblock, the appellate court had nothing to review because the appellate court could not ﬁnd that the trial court erred by denying a motion that was never presented to the trial court; further, the motion would have been denied, even if a ruling was sought, because the motion never mentioned the roadblock and never stated any facts showing that a search and seizure were unlawful, as re- 300 quired by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b), and a series of conclusions without support of stated facts did not meet the statutory requirements. Overton v. State, 270 Ga. App. 285, 606 S.E.2d 306 (2004). Harm or prejudice must be demonstrated before a violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) can be held to give rise to reversible error. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981); Eidson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 321, 355 S.E.2d 691 (1987). Defendant only required to state facts concerning illegal warrant. — O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 requires the defendant only to ‘‘state facts’’ showing that warrant was unlawful. The statute does not require that those facts be proven or substantiated before the state satisﬁes the state’s burden of proof. The possibility that the defendant may not have competent evidence to support the defendant’s allegation is irrelevant until the state has entered evidence that speciﬁcally rebuts the defendant’s charge. Slaughter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 58, 308 S.E.2d 6 (1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, 252 Ga. 435, 315 S.E.2d 865 (1984). Contents of motion inadequate. — Objections to the legality of a search and seizure are not properly brought before the trial court when the motion to suppress evidence states no facts showing wherein the search and seizure were unlawful. Mosier v. State, 160 Ga. App. 415, 287 S.E.2d 357 (1981). Trial court did not err in dismissing the motion to suppress since the defendants’ motion to suppress failed to state any facts alleging why the search and seizure were illegal. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 315, 416 S.E.2d 789, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 789 (1992). Motion to suppress evidence found during a search was insufficient since the defendant stated in the defendant’s motion that the warrant pursuant to which the search was conducted was invalid, but did not provide any facts to support such conclusion. Powles v. State, 248 Ga. App. 4, 545 S.E.2d 153 (2001). Order suppressing evidence gathered at a traffic stop was reversed after the defendant’s motion asked the trial court to suppress the fruits of a warrantless 17-5-30 search of the defendant’s home when there had been no search of the defendant’s home, and the motion did not raise an issue of whether the officer had a valid basis to justify a traffic stop. The motion was so grossly inapplicable to the facts of the case that the motion did not give the state reasonable notice of the motion’s nature and scope. The officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify an investigative traffic stop of the defendant solely on the basis of information from a dispatcher who reported that a citizen saw the defendant’s vehicle, with the defendant’s license number, being driven erratically, by a driver who appeared intoxicated. State v. Gomez, 266 Ga. App. 423, 597 S.E.2d 509 (2004). Sufficient facts were contained in a motion which revealed the date of the stop, the identity of the person stopped, the identity of the officer who made the stop, the law enforcement organization with which the officer was affiliated, the nature of the stop, the offenses charged, and the conclusion that no violations occurred which would justify the stop. State v. Goodman, 220 Ga. App. 169, 469 S.E.2d 327 (1996). Consideration of brief ﬁled with motion. — O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) does not preclude consideration of the defendant’s brief, which was ﬁled contemporaneously with the motion to suppress, as part of the motion. Stanley v. State, 206 Ga. App. 125, 424 S.E.2d 90 (1992). Procedurally defective motion to suppress. — Motion to suppress which is procedurally defective is properly overruled, and a motion to suppress which is made orally is procedurally defective and a denial thereof is authorized. Graves v. State, 135 Ga. App. 921, 219 S.E.2d 633 (1975). Must object to defective intoxication test. — If the defendant previously has not moved to suppress the evidence, results of a defectively administered intoxication test are inadmissible over objection. State v. Johnston, 160 Ga. App. 71, 286 S.E.2d 47 (1981), aff ’d, 249 Ga. 413, 291 S.E.2d 543 (1982). Objection by codefendant’s counsel not a motion to suppress. — Objection to further testimony by a police officer on 301 17-5-30 Requirements for Motion (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) the grounds that the officer unlawfully initiated a traffic stop was improper as a motion to suppress tangible evidence because the objection was not made in writing as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b), and the objection was made by the codefendant’s counsel rather than the defendant’s counsel. Dunn v. State, 262 Ga. App. 643, 586 S.E.2d 352 (2003). Claim of error in denying suppression motion waived. — Defendant waived the defendant’s claim that the defendant’s suppression motion was improperly denied by affirmatively stating at trial that the defendant had no objection to the admission of the evidence; when a prior motion to suppress has been ﬁled, merely failing to object to the admission of the evidence during the subsequent trial does not constitute a waiver of the grounds asserted in the motion, but affirmatively stating there is no objection to admission of the evidence in effect concedes the point. Mew v. State, 267 Ga. App. 454, 600 S.E.2d 397 (2004). Contents of motion adequate. — Motion containing facts showing the date of the search, the general location, the identity of the person searched, the organization with which the officer making the search was affiliated, that defendant did not consent to the search in fact, and the conclusion that the search was unsupported by probable cause or articulable suspicion was sufficient to require the state to meet the state’s allegations with proof to the contrary. Hill v. State, 222 Ga. App. 839, 476 S.E.2d 634 (1996). Motions to suppress that established the type of searches (Terry stops-and-frisks) and identiﬁed the legal issues raised (whether the stops-and-frisks were authorized by reasonable suspicion and whether the resulting arrests were supported by probable cause) put the state on notice as to the witnesses whose testimony was required; failure of the motions to identify the officers conducting the stops-and-frisks, and to more fully detail the attendant facts, was not fatal to the sufficiency of the motions. Dean v. State, 246 Ga. App. 263, 540 S.E.2d 246 (2000). Defendant’s motion to suppress met the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) because the motion was sufficient to put the state on notice that all of the searches the state conducted pursuant to a warrant were at issue, that it was necessary to have present at the hearing the affiant detective, and that the legal issue for resolution was the sufficiency of the affidavit. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794 (2010). Motion not applicable to questions on chain of custody. — Motion to suppress may properly be directed only to the issue of whether evidence has been illegally obtained or seized, not to the issue of chain of custody. Kelly v. State, 145 Ga. App. 780, 245 S.E.2d 20 (1978). Issue of incorrect address not raised in motion to suppress. — Trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress when the defendant had ample opportunity to review the warrant in advance of the hearing and assert an incorrect address as a defect in the defendant’s motion to suppress, and since the issue was not raised in the motion to suppress and the state was not properly placed on notice that this issue would be raised at the hearing on the motion, the objection must be deemed waived. State v. Armstrong, 203 Ga. App. 159, 416 S.E.2d 537 (1992). 2. Writing Legislative intent to require motion in writing. — O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 clearly evinces the legislative intent that suppression, or exclusion, of the evidence must be founded upon motion, or objection, in writing. Brannen v. State, 117 Ga. App. 69, 159 S.E.2d 476 (1967). Written motion to suppress required. — Before a hearing is held on a motion to suppress, the motion must be in writing and state facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful. Hayes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 94, 308 S.E.2d 227 (1983); Young v. State, 225 Ga. App. 208, 483 S.E.2d 636 (1997). Appellate court declined to consider the defendant’s challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress because the defendant failed to present the arguments to the trial court in the written motion to sup- 302 press. Wise v. State, 321 Ga. App. 39, 740 S.E.2d 850 (2013). No objection required when motion in limine obtained. — As a preliminary matter, because the defendant obtained a ruling on a motion in limine, the defendant was not under an obligation to object when the state cross-examined the defendant concerning the defendant’s sexual history and habits. Having obtained a ruling in limine, it was not necessary for the defendant to raise an objection at trial when the evidence was introduced in order to preserve this issue for appellate review. Herring v. State, 288 Ga. App. 169, 653 S.E.2d 494 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0448, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 205 (Ga. 2008). Oral motion in limine. — O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 applies only to motions to suppress evidence made by criminal defendants, and the state’s oral motion in limine was therefore not required to be in writing. Brown v. State, 192 Ga. App. 864, 386 S.E.2d 734 (1989). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s oral motion made during a trial to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the defendant’s person. Belcher v. State, 230 Ga. App. 235, 496 S.E.2d 306 (1998); Bellamy v. State, 243 Ga. App. 575, 530 S.E.2d 243 (2000). Oral motion inadequate. — Because the defendant’s oral motion to suppress was made on the ﬁrst day of trial, the motion failed to satisfy the requirements of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion. Copeland v. State, 272 Ga. 816, 537 S.E.2d 78 (2000). Defendant’s oral objection at trial to the admission of alleged cocaine seized from the defendant’s person based on Fourth Amendment grounds was not reviewable because the defendant failed to ﬁle a written motion to suppress the evidence as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30. Nelson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 65, 699 S.E.2d 66 (2010). Exception allowing oral motion. — Only when the movant becomes aware of the illegal seizure at such a late hour that a written motion to suppress is impossible should an oral motion to suppress and a 17-5-30 hearing thereon be entertained. Rucker v. State, 250 Ga. 371, 297 S.E.2d 481 (1982). Writing and timely ﬁling required. — O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 requires that a motion to suppress evidence be in writing and ﬁled before arraignment. When the defendant’s motion did neither, the defendant failed to preserve the right to challenge the validity of the search of the defendant’s motel room. Jackson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 268, 555 S.E.2d 908 (2001). When the defendant waited until trial to raise the argument that a shotgun was illegally seized from the defendant’s house, the motion to suppress was not timely under the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.1, so the issue was waived both for trial and on appeal. Cranford v. State, 275 Ga. App. 474, 621 S.E.2d 470 (2005). In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, because the defendant failed to voice an objection at trial regarding an inaccuracy in a search warrant affidavit as to the precise location of the alleged cocaine sale which served as the basis of the charge, but instead raised the issue for the ﬁrst time in a motion for a new trial, the objection was late; thus, the appellate court’s review of the issue was waived. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 368, 636 S.E.2d 34 (2006). Defendant waived the issue of suppression of drug evidence because the defendant did not ﬁle a written motion to suppress under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) and neither objected to the admission of the drug evidence nor to the deputy’s testimony regarding the search. Ferrell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 122, 717 S.E.2d 705 (2011). Compelling trial court to put oral suppression motion in writing. — Because the state failed to request that the trial court put an oral order of suppression in writing, and show that the trial court refused to do so, the state did not have the right to appeal from that order; moreover, while the state could have ﬁled a mandamus petition seeking to require the court to put the oral order in writing, the state did not seek that relief. State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 635 S.E.2d 716 (2006). Writing held adequate. — See State v. Blosﬁeld, 165 Ga. App. 111, 299 S.E.2d 303 Requirements for Motion (Cont’d) 2. Writing (Cont’d) 588 (1983); State v. Jones, 245 Ga. App. 763, 538 S.E.2d 819 (2000). Under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b), a defendant waived the right to challenge the lack of a search warrant because the issue had not been raised in the defendant’s written motion to suppress, which was premised on the existence of a search warrant. The defendant could have ascertained prior to the motion hearing whether a warrant existed; moreover, even if the defendant was validly surprised at the motion hearing to learn for the ﬁrst time that no search warrant was issued, the defendant did not request a continuance to amend the motion to suppress to be in accordance with § 17-5-30(b). Young v. State, 282 Ga. 735, 653 S.E.2d 725 (2007). 3. Timely Motion Motion to suppress must be made at trial. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977), but see Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502 (1998). Motion to suppress must be ﬁled prior to trial. — Although O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 does not provide for a speciﬁc time when a motion to suppress must be ﬁled, it is clear that the motion shall be ﬁled before trial since the motion’s purpose is to avoid the interruption of the trial for the purpose of investigating the collateral issue of the legality of the means by which the evidence was obtained. Stansifer v. State, 166 Ga. App. 785, 305 S.E.2d 481 (1983), but see Hatcher v. State, 224 Ga. App. 747, 482 S.E.2d 443 (1997), and Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502 (1998); Burch v. State, 213 Ga. App. 392, 444 S.E.2d 370 (1994); Tucker v. State, 222 Ga. App. 517, 474 S.E.2d 696 (1996). Initial motion should be at trial, not on habeas corpus. — If the search warrants were illegal for any reason and the evidence obtained thereunder inadmissible on the prisoners’ trials, this can be adjudicated upon such trial, rather than authorize the prisoner’s discharge on habeas corpus in advance of the trial. Carlin 17-5-30 v. Nevil, 227 Ga. 359, 180 S.E.2d 740 (1971). Habeas corpus review test. — Habeas corpus review test on U.S. Const., amend. 4 claims is whether a defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate; not whether the claim was, in fact, litigated. Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169 (1977). Habeas corpus review test for federal courts is adopted for state habeas corpus review: a court need not apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review of a claim under U.S. Const., amend. 4 absent a showing that the prisoner was denied a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review. Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169 (1977). Exclusionary rule does not affect evidence admitted without timely challenge. — Requirement that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is inadmissible in state courts and is only an exclusionary rule which does not affect the competence of evidence admitted without timely challenge. Graves v. State, 135 Ga. App. 921, 219 S.E.2d 633 (1975). Untimely but properly challenged evidence competent if rules satisﬁed. — Evidence which is merely subject to exclusion but is not timely and properly challenged is competent evidence, provided, of course, that the applicable rules of evidence are satisﬁed. Touchstone v. State, 121 Ga. App. 602, 174 S.E.2d 450 (1970). Defendant unaware of grounds for motion. — This law is similar to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) which expressly provides that the motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion. Thomas v. State, 118 Ga. App. 359, 163 S.E.2d 850 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943, 89 S. Ct. 1273, 22 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1969). Motion to suppress must be made prior to written plea. — Although there is no time limit set out in O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 for the ﬁling of a motion to suppress, the motion must be made before the defendant enters defendant’s written plea. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 304 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984); Sartin v. State, 201 Ga. App. 612, 411 S.E.2d 582 (1991); Ellis v. State, 216 Ga. App. 232, 453 S.E.2d 810 (1995). Motion to suppress prior to joining issues. — O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 is limited in time only so far as the statute requires ﬁling of a motion to suppress prior to joining of issues. State v. Shead, 160 Ga. App. 260, 286 S.E.2d 767 (1981). Motion held untimely. — After the defendant learned of a pistol’s seizure ten days before the defendant announced ready to proceed to trial at the call of the trial calendar but nevertheless did not ﬁle the defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon until the day after the defendant announced ready, the motion was untimely. Highﬁeld v. State, 198 Ga. App. 530, 402 S.E.2d 125 (1991). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the motion was untimely ﬁled, only six days before trial in the matter. Baseler v. State, 213 Ga. App. 822, 446 S.E.2d 250 (1994). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by failing to grant the defendant’s request to present additional evidence in support of the defendant’s motion to suppress which was made after the original hearing and ruling denying the motion. Pickens v. State, 225 Ga. App. 792, 484 S.E.2d 731 (1997). Motion ﬁled ﬁve weeks after arraignment was properly dismissed as untimely. Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502 (1998). Failure to timely ﬁle results in waiver. — Trial court did not err in dismissing as untimely a defendant’s motion in limine to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence with regard to a cocaine trafficking charge. The defendant waived formal arraignment and pled not guilty, and more than three months later the defendant ﬁled a motion in limine to suppress evidence, arguing that both the cocaine and testimony regarding the cocaine should be excluded on the ground that both were products of an unlawful search; the defendant was unable to circumvent the requirements of Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.1 by couching the defendant’s motion to suppress as a motion in limine; and the defendant’s failure to ﬁle a timely motion 17-5-30 to suppress waived any right to claim that the search was unconstitutional. Fraser v. State, 283 Ga. App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129 (2007), overruled in part by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020). Untimely objection amounts to waiver. — Failure to interpose a timely motion to suppress in compliance with Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) amounts to a waiver of the constitutional guaranty against illegal search and seizure in respect to the search and seizure in question. Brannen v. State, 117 Ga. App. 69, 159 S.E.2d 476 (1967); Watts v. State, 117 Ga. App. 558, 161 S.E.2d 516 (1968); Lane v. State, 118 Ga. App. 688, 165 S.E.2d 474 (1968); West v. State, 120 Ga. App. 390, 170 S.E.2d 698 (1969); Bissel v. State, 126 Ga. App. 61, 189 S.E.2d 701 (1972); Wilson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 145, 190 S.E.2d 128 (1972); Foskey v. State, 126 Ga. App. 268, 190 S.E.2d 556 (1972); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Wilcoxen v. State, 162 Ga. App. 800, 292 S.E.2d 905 (1982). There is a waiver of defects in the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued, or in the warrant itself, or in the absence of a warrant authorizing the search if no timely motion to suppress is ﬁled. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 200 S.E.2d 456 (1973). Oral objection to evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure is not sufficient unless preceded by suppression of the evidence pursuant to a motion to suppress in compliance with Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30). Failure to interpose a timely motion to suppress in compliance with that section amounts to a waiver of the constitutional guaranty in respect to the search and seizure in question. Graves v. State, 135 Ga. App. 921, 219 S.E.2d 633 (1975). Federal habeas petitioner did not offer any compelling reason to disturb the Georgia court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s suppression motion was untimely ﬁled and, therefore, waived. Holton v. Newsome, 750 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1985). In a prosecution on four counts of child molestation, the defendant’s failure to ﬁle a timely motion to suppress waived the right to claim that the seized items were 305 Requirements for Motion (Cont’d) 3. Timely Motion (Cont’d) inadmissible as fruits of the poisonous tree. Walker v. State, 277 Ga. App. 485, 627 S.E.2d 54 (2006). State’s failure to object to timely ﬁled motion. — State waived the state’s claim that the defendant’s motion to suppress, ﬁled two months after arraignment, was untimely as the state failed to raise the issue or object to the motion on that basis before the trial court; moreover, the state’s failure to object was particularly signiﬁcant in light of the express provision in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 allowing the trial court to extend the time for ﬁling. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 650 S.E.2d 767 (2007). Waiver of judge’s error in denying hearing. — It is procedural error for the trial court to deny the appellant a hearing upon the appellant’s motion to suppress outside the presence of the jury, but if no objection is made to its admission, the appellant waives any objection which might be urged, including those contained in the written motion to suppress. Yarbrough v. State, 151 Ga. App. 474, 260 S.E.2d 369 (1979). Whether warrant void or otherwise defective. — Requirement for timely objection to introduction of illegally seized evidence applies with equal force to a warrant that is void as it does to a warrant that is defective for some other reason. Butler v. State, 134 Ga. App. 131, 213 S.E.2d 490 (1975). Later objection barred. — Failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) when evidence is ﬁrst introduced bars a later objection to the admission of such evidence. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982). Failure to request permission to ﬁle late motion. — Trial court did not err by refusing to consider a defendant’s motion to suppress which was untimely ﬁled on the day of trial since no written extension for a late ﬁling was requested prior to trial. Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 392 S.E.2d 732 (1990). Discretion of trial court. — Defendants failed to show an abuse of the trial 17-5-30 court’s discretion in denying the request for leave to ﬁle the untimely motion to suppress. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 315, 416 S.E.2d 789, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 789 (1992). Objection must be raised when evidence offered. — To be valid, an objection to evidence based on grounds other than unlawful search and seizure must be voiced at the time the evidence is actually offered. Hawkins v. State, 117 Ga. App. 70, 159 S.E.2d 440 (1967). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress a written statement given to police during the course of a pretrial interview, despite that at the time the statement was given, the defendant invoked a right to counsel, as a defense objection to the admission of the statement on this ground came after the statement was already admitted, and was thus untimely. Copeland v. State, 281 Ga. App. 656, 637 S.E.2d 90 (2006). Waiver results upon failure to make timely objection. — When testimony is tendered, an objection must be made affording the court the opportunity to rule upon the admissibility of the testimony upon the grounds then urged and in the context of the matter as the matter then appears, and failure to make a timely objection to testimony when the testimony is offered results in a waiver of any objection that might have been urged. Childers v. State, 130 Ga. App. 555, 203 S.E.2d 874 (1974). Hearing Procedure Requirement to hold hearing preserved by objection. — After a motion to suppress has been ﬁled, failure to hold the mandatory hearing is error, and the error is preserved by objection to admission of the evidence sought to be suppressed. Gray v. State, 145 Ga. App. 293, 243 S.E.2d 687 (1978). Trial court required to address tainted fruit rule. — Trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress after concluding that the state failed to prove the legality of the defendant’s arrest for failing to tender the open container ordinance as the trial court was required to go on to address and rule on whether the drugs discovered during the 306 subsequent search of the backpack in the vehicle constituted tainted fruit of the arrest based on the officers’ testimony regarding the smell of marijuana. State v. Alford, 347 Ga. App. 208, 818 S.E.2d 668 (2018). Motion sufficient to put state on notice of grounds. — Defendant’s motion to suppress was not insufficient to put the state on notice of the speciﬁc grounds of the motion; although the motion did not state the investigating officer’s name, the motion stated the indictment number and alleged that a search was illegal and that probable cause was lacking. State v. Owens, 285 Ga. App. 370, 646 S.E.2d 340 (2007). If state fails to show search validity at hearing, even imperfect motion granted. — If the state failed to produce any evidence proving the validity of a search and seizure at a hearing, a trial court should grant a motion to suppress, whether or not the sufficiency of the motion made complies with the law and amounts to a legal motion to suppress the evidence. State v. McNutt, 146 Ga. App. 369, 246 S.E.2d 402 (1978). State need not prove lawful search if no valid attack. — Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) does not require that the state present evidence of the legality of a search in the absence of a valid attack thereon. Jacobs v. State, 133 Ga. App. 812, 212 S.E.2d 468 (1975). State bears burden of proving warrantless search lawful. — Under a warrantless search and seizure, the burden of proving that the search and seizure was lawful is upon the state. Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 305 S.E.2d 918 (1983). State’s satisfaction of burden to show that search with warrant lawful. — When a motion to suppress is made on one of the three grounds of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a)(2), challenging the validity of a search and seizure with a warrant, the burden of showing that the search and seizure was lawful is on the state; this burden is satisﬁed by production of the warrant and the warrant’s supporting afﬁdavit, and by showing that the warrant is not subject to the statutory challenge alleged. State v. Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 315 S.E.2d 865 (1984). 17-5-30 When a motion to suppress based on a challenge to the warrant is not based upon one of the three statutory grounds of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a)(2), the state’s burden is satisﬁed by production of the warrant and the warrant’s supporting affidavit; the burden then shifts to the defendant to show the invalidity of the warrant on nonstatutory grounds. State v. Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 315 S.E.2d 865 (1984). Error in placing burden of going forward on the defendant in a drug prosecution who challenged the validity of the search warrant under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 was harmless since the warrant and affidavit were attached to the order and the detective who requested issuance of the warrant was the only witness at the hearing. Bowman v. State, 205 Ga. App. 347, 422 S.E.2d 239 (1992). State failed to prove lawfulness of encounter. — After defendant’s O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(b) motion to suppress put the state on notice of the defendant’s contention that an initial police encounter was unlawful and the state did not prove the lawfulness, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Burrell v. State, 261 Ga. App. 677, 583 S.E.2d 521 (2003). When state fails to prove municipal ordinance as basis for search. — If the state fails to prove the existence of a municipal ordinance by introduction of a certiﬁed copy of the ordinance, the ordinance, whose existence the court may not judicially recognize, cannot serve as a basis for upholding the arrest and incident search. Owens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 525, 265 S.E.2d 856 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011). Motion must indicate legal basis challenging traffic stop. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress based on an improper traffic stop as nothing in the motion to suppress indicated that the defendant was challenging the legal basis for the traffic stop. State v. Conley, 273 Ga. App. 855, 616 S.E.2d 174 (2005). Burden of persuasion remains. — Burden of proof referred to in Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) is a 307 Hearing Procedure (Cont’d) burden of persuasion, and does not shift during the course of the motion hearing even though the burden of producing evidence may shift back and forth. Pope v. State, 134 Ga. App. 455, 214 S.E.2d 686 (1975). Challenger of a search warrant does not have the burden of proving the warrant’s invalidity; once a motion to suppress has been ﬁled, the burden of proving the lawfulness of the warrant is on the state and that burden never shifts. Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212, 465 S.E.2d 438 (1996). Since the search warrant and affidavit at issue are not in the record nor before the trial court, the burden of production never shifts to the defendant to produce evidence regarding the allegedly false or omitted information and the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Watts v. State, 274 Ga. 373, 552 S.E.2d 823 (2001). When the defendant’s conviction was reversed because the state did not meet the state’s burden of production as to the defendant’s suppression motion challenging the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit when the state produced neither the affidavit nor the resulting search warrant, this was a ruling on the merits which was res judicata, and the defendant’s plea in bar in the trial court, on remand, seeking to prevent the state from relitigating the issue, should have been granted. Watts v. State, 261 Ga. App. 230, 582 S.E.2d 186 (2003). Trial judge is to resolve questions of fact pertaining to the admissibility of evidence subject to a motion to suppress. Gilliland v. State, 139 Ga. App. 399, 228 S.E.2d 314 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 238 Ga. 542, 233 S.E.2d 801 (1977). Findings of fact not required. — There is no authority which requires a trial judge to make ﬁndings of fact after a hearing on a motion to suppress, if the hearing on the motion, including arguments of counsel, was recorded and transcribed verbatim and is included in the record and transcript accompanying the appeal. Shirley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 456, 304 S.E.2d 468 (1983). 17-5-30 Trial judge’s decision on facts and credibility assumed correct. — Trial court’s decision on questions of fact and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 833, 261 S.E.2d 720 (1979); McShan v. State, 155 Ga. App. 518, 271 S.E.2d 659 (1980). If there is a conﬂict in the evidence on the motion to suppress, the ruling of the trial court will be upheld if there is evidence to authorize a ﬁnding in support of the court’s order. State v. Medders, 153 Ga. App. 680, 266 S.E.2d 331 (1980). Judge hearing the motion to suppress is the trier of fact, and the judge’s factual conclusion that there are no exigent circumstances, if supported by evidence, is controlling, even though the set of circumstances which ended with the search began with the stopping of a moving vehicle. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980). On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, the evidence is to be construed most favorably to the ﬁndings and judgment made and the trial court’s ﬁndings must be adopted unless determined to be clearly erroneous. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 353 (1992). Judge may admit hearsay to show how search conducted. — Judge may admit testimony on hearing of a motion to suppress, though hearsay, showing how or why the search was made. Jones v. State, 131 Ga. App. 699, 206 S.E.2d 601 (1974). Judge may admit hearsay to show probable cause. — In a hearing on a motion to suppress, there is no inhibition against hearsay evidence in the showing of probable cause in an affidavit for obtaining a search warrant. Lloyd v. State, 139 Ga. App. 625, 229 S.E.2d 106 (1976). Judge may consider matters not introduced. — Hearing is analogous to one on a motion for summary judgment in that the court may consider a wide variety of matters which need not be ‘‘introduced’’ to the judge. Merritt v. State, 121 Ga. App. 832, 175 S.E.2d 890 (1970). Defendant requesting judge trial waives right to jury determination of search legality. — If appellant decides to have the appellant’s case tried before a 308 judge alone, the appellant effectively waives the appellant’s right to submit to a jury the question of the legality of a search. Aycock v. State, 142 Ga. App. 755, 236 S.E.2d 863 (1977). Waiver of hearing before jury on motion means no harmful error. — If the defendant waived any objection regarding a hearing before a jury on the motion to suppress, there was no harmful error in having a judge decide the issue alone. Lloyd v. State, 139 Ga. App. 625, 229 S.E.2d 106 (1976). Error if judge requires jury. — If the trial judge in effect compels that the hearing be held before a jury, then error results. Lloyd v. State, 139 Ga. App. 625, 229 S.E.2d 106 (1976). Section provides way to record issues for appeal of trial judge’s ruling. — Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30) provides the defendant a full and fair opportunity to have claims under U.S. Const., amend. 4 considered prior to the defendant’s trial, and the law provides a method by which a defendant may secure a record on these issues that will enable a court, on direct appeal, to review the trial court’s ruling. Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169 (1977). Violation of motion to suppress in jury’s presence. — Although receipt of evidence on a motion to suppress in the presence of jury constitutes a statutory violation, it does not rise to the level of denial of a constitutional right. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981). Evidence in support of motion heard in jury’s presence. — When there has been a waiver of the right to have the evidence heard outside of the presence of the jury and no harm or prejudice has occurred to the defendants because the evidence was heard in the jury’s presence, reversal of the conviction is unwarranted. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981). Motion to suppress outside jury’s presence. — Failure to hear evidence on motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence outside of presence of jury is not per se reversible error. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981). 17-5-30 Right to have evidence on motion presented outside jury’s presence may be waived. — After the trial judge announces at commencement of trial that the judge will receive evidence on the motion to suppress during the course of the trial and the defense attorneys raised no objections, the defense effectively waived the complaint that has been denied the right to have this evidence presented outside of the jury’s presence. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981). Commission of error by trial judge cannot be ignored by party. — Party cannot sit idly by, ignore the commission of error by the trial judge, take the party’s chances on a favorable verdict, and then complain on appeal if the favorable verdict does not materialize. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 668 (1981). Reintroduction of previously suppressed evidence in subsequent indictment. — If evidence has been suppressed as to another indictment, the evidence cannot be reintroduced as to a second indictment. Cook v. State, 141 Ga. App. 241, 233 S.E.2d 60 (1977). Issues raised initially on appeal not considered. — Because the defendant on appeal abandoned the ‘‘second-tier’’ argument raised at the suppression hearing, and instead argued that the evidence should have been suppressed because the state failed to show that the officer was in the lawful discharge of any official duty during questioning, the latter argument was not addressed, as the argument was raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal. Harper v. State, 285 Ga. App. 261, 645 S.E.2d 741 (2007). Error to barring state to present evidence as sanction. — No constitutional provision or statute authorizes a trial court to bar the state from presenting evidence at a hearing on a motion to suppress as a sanction for prior prosecutorial conduct that the court deems to be dilatory in nature; because evidence exclusion is an extreme sanction and one not favored in the law, a trial court should exercise great caution before barring the state from showing why evidence the state seeks to admit at trial 309 Hearing Procedure (Cont’d) should not be suppressed. State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 707 S.E.2d 560 (2011). Appeals Standard of review. — Trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld if it is right for any reason. Strickland v. State, 265 Ga. App. 533, 594 S.E.2d 711 (2004). On review, the Court of Appeals of Georgia will uphold a trial court’s ﬁndings as to disputed facts in a motion to suppress unless clearly erroneous, whereas the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. State v. Harden, 267 Ga. App. 381, 599 S.E.2d 329 (2004). Because a trial court credited a police officer’s testimony and decided the defendant’s suppression motion on an issue of law rather than on any issue of conﬂicting evidence, the Court of Appeals correctly used the de novo standard of review. Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 604 S.E.2d 171 (2004). Failure to ﬁle written motion as waiver of appeal. — By failing to ﬁle a written motion to suppress evidence alleged to have been obtained by an illegal search and seizure as required by Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30), a defendant waives any objection to the evidence on that ground. Peppers v. State, 144 Ga. App. 662, 242 S.E.2d 330 (1978). By failing to ﬁle a written motion to suppress, a defendant waives an appeal on that ground. Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 305 S.E.2d 443 (1983). Trial court did not err by admitting the results of an intoximeter test even though the prosecution did not introduce evidence that the intoximeter had been calibrated since no objection was made at the time the evidence of the intoximeter results was offered. Although the defendant later attempted to exclude the evidence by an oral motion to suppress, such oral motions are not authorized. Jenkins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 843, 403 S.E.2d 859 (1991). Trial court properly convicted a defendant of driving under the inﬂuence, less safe, in violation of O.C.G.A. 17-5-30 § 40-6-391(a)(1), after a bench trial as the evidence showed that: (1) an officer saw the defendant drunk earlier in the evening while responding to a dispute between neighbors; (2) the defendant admitted to drinking; and (3) the defendant admitted to driving the defendant’s vehicle while drunk from the defendant’s home to a lake home. Any error in the charging instrument was deemed waived on appeal as the defendant should have addressed any purported error by a special demurrer and, likewise, the defendant failed to ﬁle a motion to suppress challenging the officers’ entry into the defendant’s dwelling without authority; thus, that issue was deemed waived. Pruitt v. State, 289 Ga. App. 307, 656 S.E.2d 920 (2008). Although the defendant ﬁled a motion to suppress evidence seized from the two search warrants executed on the defendant’s home on October 20, because the defendant did not move to suppress the evidence seized the day before, which was based on the defendant’s consent to search the defendant’s person and home, the defendant did not preserve that issue for appeal. Evans v. State, 842 S.E.2d 837, No. S20A0007, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 339 (May 4, 2020). Failure to request ruling meant waiver on appeal. — Defendant waived the right to argue that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion to suppress a pistol because the trial court did not make a ruling regarding suppression of the pistol, and the defendant never requested such a ruling; when the pistol was tendered into evidence at trial the defendant expressly stated that the defendant had no objections. Rockholt v. State, 291 Ga. 85, 727 S.E.2d 492 (2012). Since the defendant did not challenge evidence based on an improper inventory search in the defendant’s motion to suppress, the state was not given notice of the issue and the issue was waived on appeal. McBurrows v. State, 325 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 436 (2013). Failure to include trial transcript in record on appeal. — Because the defendant failed to include the trial transcript in the record for the appellate court to review an order denying the defen- 310 dant’s motion to suppress, the appellate court had to assume as a matter of law that the evidence presented supported the trial court’s ﬁndings, and that the court properly exercised the court’s judgment and discretion. Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 650 S.E.2d 302 (2007). Failure to raise any issue in trial court challenging search warrant. — With regard to a defendant’s convictions on multiple counts of rape and related crimes, because the defendant did not raise any issue in the trial court regarding either the existence of the warrant for the defendant’s blood sample or the adequacy of the supporting affidavit, the appellate court found no merit to the defendant’s contention on appeal that the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrant seeking a blood sample was in error. Baker v. State, 295 Ga. App. 162, 671 S.E.2d 206 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0571, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 183 (Ga. 2009). Guilty plea waives suppression issue on appeal. — Because the defendant pled guilty to the charges of possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon, the defendant waived any claim that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the ﬁrearm found in the defendant’s residence. Stuart v. State, 267 Ga. App. 463, 600 S.E.2d 629 (2004). If objection overruled, ruling appealable. — If the motion to suppress is denied, an objection may nevertheless be lodged on the ground that the testimony relates to property which was illegally seized during an unlawful search, and if the objection is overruled the ruling may become a proper subject of an enumeration of error on appeal. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 200 S.E.2d 456 (1973), criticized, Childers v. State, 130 Ga. App. 555, 203 S.E.2d 874 (1974). Standard of review following grant of motion. — On appeal from a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court construes the evidence most favorably to upholding the trial court’s ruling, and the appellate court adopts the trial court’s ﬁndings on disputed facts unless clearly erroneous. Since the trial court sits as the trier of fact, the court’s ﬁndings are analogous to 17-5-30 a jury verdict and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support the ﬁndings. Rucker v. State, 266 Ga. App. 293, 596 S.E.2d 639 (2004). Standard of review of denial of a motion to suppress. — When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, an appellate court’s responsibility is to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision; the evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the ﬁndings and judgment, and the trial court’s ﬁndings on disputed facts and credibility are adopted unless the ﬁndings and judgment are clearly erroneous. Further, since the trial court sits as the trier of fact, its ﬁndings are analogous to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support the ﬁndings. Williams v. State, 265 Ga. App. 489, 594 S.E.2d 704 (2004). State’s appeal. — State could not appeal from order compelling the return of seized property to the defendant after the state stipulated to not using the property at issue in the trial of the charges pending against the defendant, and the state did not challenge the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. McIntyre, 191 Ga. App. 565, 382 S.E.2d 669 (1989). State’s direct appeal of a judgment granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that the victims identiﬁed the defendant from photographic lineups was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(4) because the state’s direct appeal was from an order that: (1) was issued prior to the impaneling of a jury or the defendant being put in jeopardy; and (2) granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that was allegedly obtained in an illegal manner, and which the trial court deemed to be ‘‘meritorious’’ even apart from the prosecutor’s supposed dilatory conduct; during the ﬁnal hearing on the defendant’s motion, the trial court refused to allow the state to present evidence to contest the motion as a means of sanctioning the state for prosecutorial conduct that the trial court deemed to be dilatory in nature, and the fact that the trial court was the direct cause of the state’s inability to meet the state’s burden of showing that the identiﬁcations were lawfully obtained 311 Appeals (Cont’d) in no way divested the court of appeals of jurisdiction to hear the state’s appeal pursuant to § 5-7-1(a)(4). State v. Smith, 308 17-5-30 Ga. App. 345, 707 S.E.2d 560 (2011). Reconsideration of suppression order discussed. — See Chastain v. State, 158 Ga. App. 654, 281 S.E.2d 627 (1981).