Boone v

Sheriff of Lowndes County, 232 Ga. App. 601, 502 S.E.2d 535, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 768 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Libel condemnation proceeding was a special statutory proceeding governed by former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349, which must be strictly construed. Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3434 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Failure to initiate proceedings. — Claimant’s sole remedy for failure by the district attorney to initiate forfeiture action within sixty days of seizure of the property was to request return of the property pending further proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 and, absent such request, any error made by the superior court in determining if or when seizure of the property had occurred prior to the final order in the forfeiture proceeding was harmless. Turner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 309, 444 S.E.2d 372, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 572 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Although the state failed to bring proceedings in a timely manner for forfeiture of a car and money seized when drugs were found in the car, the car owner was not entitled to have the forfeiture proceedings dismissed; the property was always subject to further forfeiture proceedings, which took place, and since the car owner failed to show any harm resulting from the state’s failure to initiate the proceed- 548 ings in a timely manner, the order upholding the seizure was affirmed. Johnson v. State of Ga., 266 Ga. App. 171, 596 S.E.2d 693, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 330 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1212, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 572 (Ga. June 28, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Condemnation proceeding is designed to be expeditious and a party may not belatedly tender an answer to petition under general rules of civil practice. State v. Britt Caribe, Ltd., 154 Ga. App. 476, 268 S.E.2d 702, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2236 (1980), overruled in part, Ford v. State, 271 Ga. 162, 516 S.E.2d 778, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 504 (1999) (decided under former Code 1933, § 79A-828). Proceedings were timely when it was shown that the state commenced the forfeiture proceedings within 60 days of the seizure. Owens v. State, 241 Ga. App. 140, 525 S.E.2d 150, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1490 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0477, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 345 (Ga. Apr. 28, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a forfeiture action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 60-day time requirement to conduct a hearing under former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(o)(5) did not commence until the date that the claimant’s father was served with the complaint and summons and not the date when the claimant was served; claimant’s acknowledgment of service was ineffective to operate as a waiver of service because it was not served upon the prosecutor. Mitchell v. State, 255 Ga. App. 507, 566 S.E.2d 24, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 554, cert. denied, 255 Ga. App. 553, 565 S.E.2d 877, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court did not err in denying an owner’s motion to dismiss the state’s complaint in rem for forfeiture of property pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 because the state invoked a hearing within 60 days of service of the state’s complaint as required by former § 16-1349(o)(5), and the hearing was continued for good cause; the state invoked a hearing within 60 days of service of the state’s complaint by forwarding a blank rule nisi to the trial court and asking that the trial 16-13-49 court fix a hearing, and the trial court did not, or could not, set a hearing within the 60-day statutory period because of the court’s crowded docket, which constituted good cause for a continuance of the requested hearing. Sims v. State, 299 Ga. App. 738, 683 S.E.2d 686, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 960 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Proceedings were untimely. — In a civil forfeiture case, the state improperly seized cash from the plaintiff because the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(5) were not met since the hearing on the forfeiture complaint was conducted more than 60 days after the prior continuance, and nothing in the record indicated that the plaintiff consented to re-scheduling the hearing outside the statutory period; the hearing took place 69 days after the last continuance, the plaintiff appeared ready for the hearing on two occasions, and through no fault of the plaintiff’s own, the hearing was continued both times. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. App. 617, 691 S.E.2d 385, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 198 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). It was undisputed that the initial hearing on the state’s forfeiture complaint was not scheduled until 63 days after the defendant was served with the complaint, and the state neither moved for, nor did the trial court grant, a continuance within the statutorily imposed 60-day time period. Because the mandatory statutory time limitations contained within former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(5) were not met, the court was constrained to reverse the trial court’s judgment of forfeiture. Goodwin v. State of Ga., 321 Ga. App. 548, 739 S.E.2d 814, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 196 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1281, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 833 (Ga. Oct. 7, 2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court should have dismissed an in rem civil forfeiture action because no timely hearing on the underlying forfeiture complaint was held. After the trial court granted the state’s motion to stay the proceedings, approximately one year passed before either a hearing or another continuance. Bourassa v. State of Ga., 323 Ga. App. 435, 746 S.E.2d 815, 2013 Ga. 549 Procedure (Cont’d) App. LEXIS 656 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1819, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 151 (Ga. Feb. 24, 2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Fact that car is subject to forfeiture does not excuse failure to institute forfeiture proceedings. — Mere fact that car used in transporting drugs was subject to forfeiture proceedings under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 would not insulate police officers from liability if the officers detained the car or caused the car to be detained without instituting forfeiture proceedings. Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 12348 (5th Cir. 1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). State cannot, through notice to produce, achieve results the state unsuccessfully sought. — State may not, by using notice to produce pursuant to the Evidence Code attempt to secure indirectly the same disposition of property which would have obtained in accordance with former Code 1933, § 79A-828 had its libel for condemnation been successful. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3091 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 79A-828). Unconstitutional self-incrim- ination would be result of compliance with such notice. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3091 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 79A-828). Time specification in summons constituting mere surplusage. — In a case under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49, the summons issued by the clerk of the trial court and attached to the process directed defendant to answer the complaint “within 30 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service,” and defendant’s “answer” was timely filed in accordance with the clerk’s summons, albeit not timely filed pursuant to the court’s order contained in the process. The summons attached by the clerk was surplusage, as former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 did not require process upon the alleged owner, merely notice to the alleged owner of the proposed 16-13-49 condemnation. Farley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 694, 350 S.E.2d 263, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2245 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Failure to comply with time requirement of former O.C.G.A. § 1613-49 does not result in dismissal of forfeiture action. State v. Luke, 183 Ga. App. 182, 358 S.E.2d 272, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1927 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in Robinson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 446, 433 S.E.2d 707, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 910 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in Turner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 309, 444 S.E.2d 372, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 572 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Dismissal of the state’s forfeiture action against the property owner was reversed because the property owner was not entitled to have the forfeiture proceedings dismissed despite its untimely initiation since former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(h)(3) provided the sole remedy and case law established that if the state failed to initiate a timely forfeiture, the property had to be released at the owner’s request pending further forfeiture proceedings, unless the property was being held as evidence. State of Ga. v. Brooks, 333 Ga. App. 769, 777 S.E.2d 54, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 523 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Defendant may obtain return of property when state failed to comply with former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(e). State v. Ellis, 156 Ga. App. 779, 275 S.E.2d 361, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3198 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in Robinson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 446, 433 S.E.2d 707, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 910 (1993); State v. Waters, 173 Ga. App. 274, 326 S.E.2d 243, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1501 (1985), superseded by statute as stated in Turner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 309, 444 S.E.2d 372, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 572 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Relation back of amended claim. — Amended claim against the property seized by the state filed after the 30-day deadline did not relate back to the date of the original answer so as to resurrect the claims. Roberts v. State, 226 Ga. App. 824, 487 S.E.2d 667, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 781 550 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Service on the defendant was proper when, to cure defendant’s initial complaints about service, the judge allowed the state to serve the defendant personally in open court and then delayed acting on the matter until the defendant had more than 30 days to respond. Owens v. State, 241 Ga. App. 140, 525 S.E.2d 150, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1490 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0477, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 345 (Ga. Apr. 28, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). State was required to perfect service of complaint of forfeiture within 60 days of the seizure of property. Griffin v. State, 250 Ga. App. 93, 550 S.E.2d 138, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 697 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). State properly initiated a forfeiture action under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 because: (1) it posted notice at the courthouse, served the parties with a copy, and published the notice in a local newspaper for three weeks running; and (2) the notice specified the date and extent of the seizure and asserted that the seized property was used or intended for use to facilitate a violation of Georgia’s anti-drug statutes. Germain v. State of Ga., 269 Ga. App. 846, 605 S.E.2d 441, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1317 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0313, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 63 (Ga. Jan. 10, 2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Dismissal of complaint. — Once the trial court dismissed the state’s complaint, there was no action pending, and the state’s amendment of the complaint was ineffective. Franklin v. State, 227 Ga. App. 30, 488 S.E.2d 109, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 826 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). After dismissal of a forfeiture proceeding by the state, all that remained pending was a claim of ownership which was uncontested because it was not shown that the property was evidence or subject to future forfeiture proceedings, and the property was properly returned to the claimant. Boone v. Sheriff of Lowndes County, 232 Ga. App. 601, 502 S.E.2d 535, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 768 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Contents of claim in response to notice of seizure. — When an interest 16-13-49 holder was responding to a notice of seizure authorized by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n)(1), the claim to property subject to forfeiture must satisfy not only the general pleading rules applicable to all civil actions, but must also specifically set forth with particularity the elements enumerated at former § 16-13-49(n)(4). Jackson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 437, 461 S.E.2d 594, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 736 (1995); Roberts v. State, 226 Ga. App. 824, 487 S.E.2d 667, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 781 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Even though more details could have been included, a claim in response to a notice of seizure of a savings passbook adequately set forth the required elements where it stated the sources of the money in the account, denied that the money was contraband, and stated that the funds were not in close proximity to any property which was subject to forfeiture. Harris v. State, 222 Ga. App. 267, 474 S.E.2d 201, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 755 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Failure to file answer. — Use of the word “may” in former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3) was only permissive insofar as the word recognized that a claimant cannot be forced to claim an interest in seized property; however, a claimant who failed to file an answer must suffer the consequence of forfeiting the claimant’s property to the state. Jett v. State, 230 Ga. App. 655, 498 S.E.2d 274, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 250 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). If no answer is made within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint, the trial court is required to order the disposition of the property; a hearing is required only when an answer is filed. Wilson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 578, 525 S.E.2d 708, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1340 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). The 60-day requirement for holding a hearing is conditioned on the filing of a timely and sufficient answer and, if no answer is filed, no hearing is required, and the court is required to order the disposition of the seized property. Owens v. State, 241 Ga. App. 140, 525 S.E.2d 150, 551 Procedure (Cont’d) 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1490 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0477, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 345 (Ga. Apr. 28, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Because an accused failed to appear or otherwise file an answer in a condemnation proceeding filed against the accused in connection with the accused’s arrest for possession of methamphetamine, and the accused failed to show that the accused’s counsel was ineffective in failing to file an answer, the state was properly granted judgment. Walters v. State of Ga., 269 Ga. App. 883, 605 S.E.2d 458, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1324 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Contents of answer. — Claimant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in a forfeiture action was not a responsive pleading in the nature of an answer since it did not raise an assertion that the property was not subject to forfeiture as required by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3), nor did it contain even a general denial of the averments of the allegations of the complaint as would have satisfied O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(b). Turner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 309, 444 S.E.2d 372, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 572 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Answer to forfeiture complaint was insufficient when the claimant falsely stated that another person did not have a security interest in the vehicle, failed to state the extent of claimant’s own interest, and did not cite any provision of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 relied on in support of claimant’s assertion that the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture. Mitchell v. State, 217 Ga. App. 282, 457 S.E.2d 237, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 397 (1995). When the claimant’s response alleged sufficient facts within the claimant’s personal knowledge, and not merely conclusory allegations, to establish a triable issue as to innocent ownership, a ruling that the claim was procedurally insufficient was vacated and the case remanded to allow the claimant reasonable time to supplement the claimant’s response with the material fact of the claimant’s acquittal of drug charges. Knodel v. State, 222 Ga. App. 514, 474 S.E.2d 700, 1996 Ga. 16-13-49 App. LEXIS 886 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a procedure for forfeiture of a vehicle, the claimant’s answer was sufficient to meet the pleading requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 when the answer incorporated copies of the certificate of title and the tag registration and included the date of the purchase, the name of the dealership, and information that the car was financed by the seller. Williams v. State, 222 Ga. App. 270, 474 S.E.2d 98, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 756 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Answer by person claiming to be the owner of household furnishings was sufficient even though it failed to indicate when the claimant acquired the items or the identity of their respective transferors; to require such information when an entire complement of household furnishings has been seized would fail to protect the interests of innocent owners. Dennis v. State, 224 Ga. App. 11, 479 S.E.2d 380, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1226 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Claimant’s answer to a notice of seizure of currency did not satisfy the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(n)(4) where it stated simply that the currency “represents money saved by the Claimant from numerous jobs that he has held.” Tuggle v. State, 224 Ga. App. 353, 480 S.E.2d 353, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 69 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Answer to forfeiture complaint covering a large number of guns was insufficient because claimant simply stated that claimant had obtained them through lawful means — through inheritance or purchase, or as gifts — without any dates, identity of transferors, or any other circumstances of claimant’s acquisition. Morrell v. State, 226 Ga. App. 16, 486 S.E.2d 611, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 521 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court did not err in holding that the claimant’s answer did not comply with the strict pleading requirements prescribed in former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(n)(4). Serchion v. State, 230 Ga. App. 336, 496 S.E.2d 333, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 130 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). 552 Sufficiency of the claimants’ answer under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3) was satisfied when the answer referenced a paragraph in the forfeiture complaint that incorporated a prior consent judgment involving the same property, and the consent judgment designated the claimants as owners of the property in question. Bell v. State, 234 Ga. App. 693, 507 S.E.2d 535, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1338 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Claimant’s answer pertaining to the claimant’s interest in money claimed to have been earned from house cleaning was not sufficient to meet the pleading requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 1613-49 when the claimant did not offer any specifics regarding the method of payment for the claimant’s work, nor set forth any information regarding the amount of house cleaning the claimant did to earn the money. Dearing v. State, 243 Ga. App. 198, 532 S.E.2d 751, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Claimant’s answer pertaining to the claimant’s interest in a rifle, stating that the claimant’s father gave the claimant the rifle on a certain date, asserted specific facts of the claimant’s ownership, not mere conclusory allegations, and was sufficient to meet the pleading requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49. Dearing v. State, 243 Ga. App. 198, 532 S.E.2d 751, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Property owners’ claims, asserting only that their property was not directly or indirectly used or intended for use in violation of Georgia’s anti-drug statutes, and that the property was not part of the proceeds of such illegal activity, were not the responsive pleadings required by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n)(4) because they gave no essential facts about where, how, and from whom the property was obtained; the state had no responsibility to proceed further after the property owners’ factually deficient claims were submitted and, thus, the trial court could not reach the property owners’ claims regarding the insufficiency of the evidence and did not err in entering an order of disposition on the state’s motion. Germain v. State of Ga., 269 Ga. App. 846, 605 S.E.2d 16-13-49 441, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1317 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0313, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 63 (Ga. Jan. 10, 2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court properly struck defendant’s answer in the state’s civil forfeiture action against certain items seized from defendant and others’ property pursuant to a search warrant, as defendant’s answer merely indicated the source of the funds for obtaining the property, and did not indicate the nature and extent of defendant’s interest in the seized property, how defendant had acquired the property, the statutory provision that protected the property from forfeiture, and the relief sought by defendant; further, the answer was not verified, and in the absence of statutory compliance, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3), (5), no hearing was required. Holmes v. State of Ga., 270 Ga. App. 882, 608 S.E.2d 325, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1619 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In an action for in rem forfeiture of an owner’s vehicle for purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3), the vehicle owner’s failure to meet the pleadings requirements, including the necessity of verification, meant that a hearing did not have to be held within 60 days pursuant to former § 16-13-49(o)(5). Portee v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. App. 536, 627 S.E.2d 63, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 79 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Claimant’s answer was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3) in a civil forfeiture proceeding because while the claimant asserted that the currency at issue was pay from various employers, the answer did not identify each employer, the dates worked, the amounts received, the nature of the claimant’s duties, or any other similar information. Gravley v. State of Ga., 285 Ga. App. 691, 647 S.E.2d 372, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 622 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). While an answer to an in rem complaint by the owner of a truck seized by the state failed to reference evidence, namely the transferred title, supporting an interest in the truck, but clearly stated that: (1) the interest was in the amount of $5,000; (2) the interest originated through the own- 553 Procedure (Cont’d) er’s payment of that amount to the creditor; and (3) the interest continued, the owner’s answer set forth the nature and extent of the owner’s interest in the property as required by former O.C.G.A. § 1613-49(o)(3)(C) with sufficient particularity. State of Ga. v. Howell, 288 Ga. App. 176, 653 S.E.2d 330, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1082 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0454, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 224 (Ga. Feb. 25, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a forfeiture case involving $20,620 found in a footlocker in the home of a drug defendant’s grandparent, the grandparent’s answer asserting a claim to the cash did not satisfy former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349. It did not adequately explain how the grandparent had obtained the money in question, which was found in the same room with drugs and with clothing belonging to the grandchild. Edwards v. State of Ga., 290 Ga. App. 467, 659 S.E.2d 852, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 349 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court did not err by striking appellants answer to the state’s complaint for forfeiture and dismissing appellants’ claims as to some items because the entries did not contain sufficient information to satisfy the pleading requirement under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3)(D); for those entries there was a blank or no information describing appellants’ property interest, and certain additional items were listed with only vague information. Arreola-Soto v. State of Ga., 314 Ga. App. 165, 723 S.E.2d 482, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1048, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 593 (Ga. June 18, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court erred in striking appellants’ answer to the state’s complaint for forfeiture as to certain items because the information appellants provided in the answer was sufficient to plead an interest in the property under former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(o)(3)(D); appellants’ ownership interest was described with the name of the transferor and a year of purchase. Arreola-Soto v. State of Ga., 314 Ga. App. 165, 723 S.E.2d 482, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 16-13-49 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1048, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 593 (Ga. June 18, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a forfeiture action, a trial court properly struck the answer of one of the four claimants to the seized property because the answer was insufficient by setting forth only conclusory allegations of ownership. Morgan v. State of Ga., 323 Ga. App. 852, 748 S.E.2d 491, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 761 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Under Georgia law, the sufficiency of an answer to a forfeiture petition must be judged in light of the specific statutory requirements. Furthermore, while a claimant must satisfy each of the pleading requirements contained in former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3), the trial court must consider the claimant’s compliance with those requirements in a reasonable manner. Morgan v. State of Ga., 323 Ga. App. 852, 748 S.E.2d 491, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 761 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a forfeiture action, a trial court erred by striking three answers from claimants of the seized property because each set forth the nature and extent of their interest in the property, the date and identity of transferors, the circumstances of acquisition, and that they were innocent owners under former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(e)(1)(B), though two cited the wrong statute subsection. Morgan v. State of Ga., 323 Ga. App. 852, 748 S.E.2d 491, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 761 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a civil forfeiture case under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49, the trial court erred by granting the State of Georgia’s motion to strike the answers of the defendants and thereafter entering an order of disposition and distribution of the seized property because, while the defendants’ answer was inartfully drafted and poorly presented, it was sufficient as a whole with attachments to survive a motion to strike. Crimley v. State of Ga., 330 Ga. App. 639, 768 S.E.2d 813, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 32 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Condemnation of two amounts of cash and other personal property was affirmed 554 because the claimant did not include in the answer the date of the transfer of the cash, the identity of the transferor, or the circumstances of the claimant acquiring the cash; thus, the claimant failed to satisfy the specific statutory pleading requirements and the trial court, therefore, did not err by striking the claimant’s answer as legally insufficient and by entering a default judgment of forfeiture. Loveless v. State of Ga., 337 Ga. App. 250, 786 S.E.2d 899, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 306 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a civil in rem forfeiture action, a claimant’s answer must be in strict compliance with the special pleading requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(o)(3). A forfeiture action under former § 16-13-49 was a civil proceeding; when the answer did not contain the requisite facts to support the claimant’s ownership assertions, the answer did not comply with the statute’s specific pleading requirements. Loveless v. State of Ga., 337 Ga. App. 250, 786 S.E.2d 899, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 306 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Under former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(o)(3)(D), the answer filed by an owner of property subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding which asserted a claim against the property must set forth: the date, identity of the transferor, and circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property. Loveless v. State of Ga., 337 Ga. App. 250, 786 S.E.2d 899, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 306 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). State must respond to answer. — Because the trial court found the state had failed to prosecute the complaint and had failed to show good cause as to why the hearing should be continued for a second time, the trial court did not err in dismissing the forfeiture complaint on the grounds that no hearing was conducted within 60 days as required by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49. State v. Gonzales, 213 Ga. App. 661, 445 S.E.2d 808, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 694 (1994). (but see Alford v. State, 208 Ga. App. 595, 431 S.E.2d 393 (1993)). Dismissal of a forfeiture proceeding was not required where the state attempted to 16-13-49 schedule a hearing 43 days after service of the complaint, and a continuance beyond the 60-day period was caused by the court’s crowded calendar. Hinton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 49, 479 S.E.2d 424, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1276 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0597, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 396 (Ga. Apr. 24, 1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Refusal to answer alleging self incrimination. — Considerable authority that in a civil forfeiture action, the court may as a matter of law draw inferences from a property claimant’s invocation of the right against self-incrimination, and such inferences may constitute admissions unfavorable to them; the burden is on the individual claiming the self incrimination privilege to state the general reason for their refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination existed with respect to each question. Loveless v. State of Ga., 337 Ga. App. 250, 786 S.E.2d 899, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 306 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Attachment of deed to correct deficiencies in answer. — Claimants in a forfeiture action corrected any deficiencies in their answer when the claimants filed an amended answer that incorporated by reference a recorded warranty deed, which provided necessary information and corrected the lack of verification by one of the claimants. Bell v. State, 234 Ga. App. 693, 507 S.E.2d 535, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1338 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Amendment to correct error in filing answer. — When the failure to file a legally sufficient answer under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3) was clearly the result of a mistake, an amendment to correct the mistake should have been allowed. Lee v. State, 225 Ga. App. 733, 484 S.E.2d 777, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 478 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Since the claimant contesting the forfeiture of property was authorized to amend claimant’s answer to a forfeiture complaint, the court erred in granting the state’s motion to strike the amendment. Jackson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 320, 498 555 Procedure (Cont’d) S.E.2d 159, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 434 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C0888, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 602 (Ga. May 22, 1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). An amended answer could relate back to a timely-filed but insufficient initial answer. Rojas v. State, 269 Ga. 121, 498 S.E.2d 735, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 271 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Defendant waived the issue of whether the trial court improperly forbade amending defendant’s answer by failing to take any action to amend the answer for almost 30 days before the court’s order was entered, despite defendant’s ability to do so as a matter of right. Waters v. State, 239 Ga. App. 897, 522 S.E.2d 493, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1189 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by striking the claimants’ answers to the complaint in a forfeiture proceeding because the claimants were permitted by law to amend the claimants answers to correct the lack of verification, but never did so and although the claimants claim that the trial court failed to afford the claimants an opportunity to amend the claimants’ pleadings, the claimants failed to show that the trial court refused to consider such an amendment or did anything to preclude or bar the filing thereof. Howard v. State of Ga., 321 Ga. App. 881, 743 S.E.2d 540, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 428 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Answer begins running of 60-day period. — The 60-day time period in former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(5), within which the state was to hold a hearing on the issue of forfeiture, did not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of former § 16-13-49(o)(3) prescribing what must be set forth in the answer. State v. Alford, 264 Ga. 243, 444 S.E.2d 76, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 447 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). When the defendant’s answer did not comply with the specific pleading require- 16-13-49 ments of former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(o)(3), it was insufficient to commence the 60-day time period for holding a hearing; reversing in part State v. Adams, 212 Ga. App. 309, 444 S.E.2d 372 (1994). State v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 452 S.E.2d 117, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 25 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Verification of answer. — Answers including verifications signed under oath before a notary public satisfied the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3). Dearing v. State, 243 Ga. App. 198, 532 S.E.2d 751, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Vehicle owner failed to sufficiently support the claim that, while incarcerated, the owner was denied access to legal information and to an individual who would notarize an answer to the state’s civil in rem forfeiture proceeding; it was not error to deny a continuance in order to have the answer verified, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(3), or in striking the owner’s answer. Portee v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. App. 536, 627 S.E.2d 63, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 79 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Legally insufficient answer tolls 60-day period. — State’s forfeiture complaint did not have to be held within the 60-day deadline imposed by former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 since the claimant’s answer was legally insufficient when the claimant’s verification was not executed under penalty of perjury, and the complaint did not satisfy the specific pleading requirements as required to substantiate claimant’s claims of ownership of the seized property. State v. Miller, 234 Ga. App. 650, 507 S.E.2d 521, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1327 (1998), cert. denied, No. S99C0189, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 132 (Ga. Feb. 5, 1999), overruled in part, Dearing v. State, 243 Ga. App. 198, 532 S.E.2d 751, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Time period of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(h)(2). — By failing to request the return of seized currency prior to the entry of judgment, the owners were precluded from asserting a claim to the property, even though the state did not file 556 its complaint for civil forfeiture within 60 days after the seizure. Yoder v. State, 211 Ga. App. 226, 438 S.E.2d 689, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1454 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Actual date of the seizure is not counted for purposes of determining the running of the 60-day limitation period. Nash v. State, 243 Ga. App. 800, 534 S.E.2d 492, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 567 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Time provisions. — Time provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n) operate independently of the 60-day requirement of former § 16-13-49(h)(2) and provide an alternative procedure for cases which involve personal property with a value of $25,000 or less. If the provisions of former subsection (n) are followed, the 60-day period outlined in former paragraph (h)(2) may be extended. Robinson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 446, 433 S.E.2d 707, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 910 (1993); State v. Profitt, 213 Ga. App. 270, 444 S.E.2d 356, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1361, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 950 (Ga. Sept. 9, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In the forfeiture complaint, described in former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(o)(1), the state was not required to plead essential facts. Hinton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 49, 479 S.E.2d 424, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1276 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0597, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 396 (Ga. Apr. 24, 1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Hearing on in rem proceedings. — Requirement of former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(5) that a hearing be held within 60 days of service of a complaint was mandatory, not directory. Henderson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 542, 422 S.E.2d 666, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1251 (1992), aff’d, 263 Ga. 508, 436 S.E.2d 209, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 790 (1993); State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 436 S.E.2d 209, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 790 (1993); Blanks v. State, 240 Ga. App. 175, 522 S.E.2d 770; State v. Carter, 244 Ga. App. 560, 536 S.E.2d 230, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 791 (2000); Griffin v. State, 250 Ga. App. 93, 550 S.E.2d 138, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 697 (2001). Failure to make findings in response to excessiveness argument. — In an in rem civil forfeiture action, a 16-13-49 trial court erred by ordering the defendant’s truck forfeited without making findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as to whether the court considered the mandatory guidelines set forth in case law as to whether the forfeiture was excessive. Buchanan v. State of Ga., 319 Ga. App. 525, 737 S.E.2d 321, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 5 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a civil in rem forfeiture action, the trial court erred in entering an order granting the forfeiture because the record did not indicate whether the trial court considered whether the forfeiture was constitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment as the trial court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as required by the case law. Mikell v. State of Ga., 329 Ga. App. 830, 766 S.E.2d 233, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Continuance inappropriate. — It was error to grant a continuance to the state where the state failed to comply with the statutory time requirements applicable to the hearing on a forfeiture complaint and where the only “cause” for granting the continuance was the claimant’s refusal to go forward with a hearing about which they had prior notice. Jackson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 340, 441 S.E.2d 811, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 251 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Continuance appropriate. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in granting the State of Georgia’s motion for a continuance beyond the 60-day limit of a hearing in a civil forfeiture action in order that the state would have more time to perfect service on a second claimant so that one forfeiture proceeding could be held to resolve the matter as to all potential claimants; such constituted good cause for a continuance pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(5). State of Ga. v. Richardson, 276 Ga. App. 784, 625 S.E.2d 52, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1320 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0758, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 299 (Ga. May 8, 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1054, 127 S. Ct. 688, 166 557 Procedure (Cont’d) L. Ed. 2d 517, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9052 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court required to give notice of order denying application to recover seized currency. — In an application to recover seized currency under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(q)(4), a trial court erred in denying the owner’s motion to set aside the order denying the application without making the finding required by O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(c) as to whether the owner or the owner’s counsel had received notice of the order. Remand was required. Grant v. State, 302 Ga. App. 739, 691 S.E.2d 623, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 221 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 was a special statutory proceeding which must be strictly construed and complied with, and as such, not all provisions of the Civil Practice Act apply including O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55, the default judgment statute. Fulton v. State, 183 Ga. App. 570, 359 S.E.2d 726, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2034 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Dismissal for failure to respond appropriate. — Uniform Superior Court Rule 14 provides for dismissal of a pleading (not a final adjudication on the merits) “where appropriate” for failure to respond to a calendar call. Because a proceeding for forfeiture is a special statutory proceeding to which default is not applicable, this would not be “appropriate.” Fulton v. State, 183 Ga. App. 570, 359 S.E.2d 726, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2034 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Dismissal of an appeal was not justified when a losing party in a drugrelated forfeiture proceeding failed to take affirmative action to prevent enforcement of the complained-of judgment prior to the expiration of the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal. State v. Vurgess, 182 Ga. App. 544, 356 S.E.2d 273, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1716 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Dismissal of appeal denied when notice timely. — In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the state’s motion to dismiss a 16-13-49 claimant’s appeal was denied since the claimant’s notice of appeal was timely filed within 30 days following the entry of the order of distribution. Weaver v. State, 299 Ga. App. 718, 683 S.E.2d 361, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 747 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0024, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 128 (Ga. Feb. 1, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). It was error to enter protective order suspending discovery indefinitely in a forfeiture condemnation case based on statements of the district attorney which were conclusional and bereft of facts. Christopher v. State, 185 Ga. App. 532, 364 S.E.2d 905, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 169 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In petitions for condemnation, district attorney’s verification that allegations are true and correct to the best of the district attorney’s knowledge and belief is a proper verification “by a duly authorized agent of the state.” Chester v. State, 168 Ga. App. 618, 309 S.E.2d 897, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2869 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Substantial compliance sufficed. — Consistent with former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(z), where the state amended its complaint to include the requisite verification and, therefore, substantially complied with that section, the trial court did not err in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. McMichen v. State, 209 Ga. App. 169, 433 S.E.2d 92, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 816 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Document insufficient. — Document filed by claimant was not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the 30-day requirement for the filing of claims in former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n). State v. Cannon, 214 Ga. App. 897, 449 S.E.2d 519, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1094 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Failure of claim filed. — Failure of purported claim filed rendered it ineffective as a trigger to require the district attorney to file a complaint under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n)(5) in response to it. State v. Cannon, 214 Ga. App. 897, 449 S.E.2d 519, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1094 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). 558 When claimant’s answer was deficient under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n), the trial court could not reach the claimant’s claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and did not err in entering an order of forfeiture. Greene v. State, 220 Ga. App. 292, 469 S.E.2d 428, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (1996). To raise a valid double jeopardy claim based on an earlier in rem forfeiture, a defendant must first file an effective answer claiming an interest in the property forfeited. Eaton v. State, 220 Ga. App. 578, 469 S.E.2d 740, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 192 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Hearsay information from informant allowed into evidence. — Trial court did not err in allowing hearsay testimony into evidence, i.e., information from an informant which eventually led to obtaining a search warrant for the defendant’s property. Rabern v. State, 221 Ga. App. 874, 473 S.E.2d 547, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 738 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Criminal prosecution not barred by double jeopardy. — Civil forfeiture proceeding in a drug case was not a criminal prosecution for purposes of double jeopardy. Sutton v. State, 223 Ga. App. 721, 478 S.E.2d 910, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1285 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0522, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 344 (Ga. Mar. 7, 1997); Murphy v. State, 219 Ga. App. 474, 465 S.E.2d 497, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1076 (1995), aff’d, 267 Ga. 120, 475 S.E.2d 907, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 712 (1996); Rojas v. State, 226 Ga. App. 688, 487 S.E.2d 455, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 744 (1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1646, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 971 (Ga. Oct. 31, 1997); Cuellar v. State, 230 Ga. App. 203, 496 S.E.2d 282, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 102 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Proving weight of cocaine. — Evidence that a 1.8-gram sample tested “positive” for cocaine did not meet the state’s burden of proving that the contraband involved more than a gram of cocaine. State v. Foote, 225 Ga. App. 222, 483 S.E.2d 628, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 328 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Because evidence established probable cause that defendant possessed cocaine 16-13-49 with the intent to distribute, it was unnecessary for the state to establish possession of more than one gram of cocaine merely because defendant had pled guilty to possession of cocaine rather than possession with intent to distribute. Wilson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 578, 525 S.E.2d 708, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1340 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Evidence that a seized substance tested positive for cocaine and that it weighed 6.8 grams was insufficient to show that the substance constituted more than one gram of cocaine because it was not tested for purity. Bell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 296, 548 S.E.2d 35, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 490 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a forfeiture proceeding, expert testimony that 1.2 grams of cocaine were seized from defendant’s vehicle was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that more than one gram of cocaine was involved in the case. Furthermore, it was not necessary to prove the purity of the cocaine seized from defendant’s vehicle as such a showing was not required under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(e)(2) because the statute specifically referenced “mixtures.” Turner v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 40, 592 S.E.2d 864, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 8 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Automatic stay. — Pending civil forfeiture action against the property of bankruptcy debtors’ estate was subject to automatic stay, notwithstanding the “police or regulatory power” stay exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). In re Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 215 B.R. 266, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1932 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Klein (In re Chapman), 264 B.R. 565, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Determining whether a forfeiture is excessive requires the trial court to consider Thorp v. State, 264 Ga. 712, 450 S.E.2d 416, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 910 (1994), vacated, 217 Ga. App. 275, 457 S.E.2d 234, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 395 (1995), and to make findings on the three factors required by that decision. Salmon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 591, 549 S.E.2d 421, 2001 559 16-13-49 Procedure (Cont’d) Ga. App. LEXIS 565 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Evidence insufficient for forfeiture. — Because it was determined that a parcel of land which contained defendant’s residence was subject to forfeiture, but the state failed to prove which of the parcels described in the complaint contained the residence, the evidence was insufficient to support forfeiture. Stancil v. State, 230 Ga. App. 240, 495 S.E.2d 870, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 95 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Trial court could not order the forfeiture of a piece of property and thereafter receive evidence in order to determine which piece of property the court had ordered forfeited. Stancil v. State, 230 Ga. App. 240, 495 S.E.2d 870, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 95 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Evidence other than confidential informant’s testimony was ample. — Trial court’s finding that, except for the description the confidential informant gave of the vehicle and occupants, no other evidence was presented, was error as a matter of fact since there was an ample amount of other evidence to establish the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge. State v. Tucker, 242 Ga. App. 3, 528 S.E.2d 523, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 75 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C0909, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 712 (Ga. Sept. 29, 2000), cert. denied, No. S00C0891, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. Sept. 29, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Failure to show harm. — When the claimant did not show how the claimant was harmed by the state’s mere recitation in its forfeiture notice of the applicable provision for filing answers, without expressly informing the claimant of the 30-day period within which a claim must be submitted, the trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the state’s notice. Serchion v. State, 230 Ga. App. 336, 496 S.E.2d 333, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 130 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Dismissal not appropriate even though state filed complaint late. — Claimant was not entitled to dismissal of a former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n) forfeiture action, even though the complaint was not timely filed by the state, because the claimant’s remedy—return of the car pending further forfeiture proceedings—served no useful purpose since a hearing on the merits of the forfeiture claim was pending when the claimant filed the motion. Smith v. State, 301 Ga. App. 870, 690 S.E.2d 208, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 11 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Seizure Extent of property subject to forfeiture. — Legislature did not intend that all of the property on which a drug violation occurred was subject to forfeiture. State v. Wilbanks, 208 Ga. App. 422, 430 S.E.2d 668, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 485 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1153, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 871 (Ga. Sept. 20, 1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Seized property cannot be assigned to a third party. — Condemnee’s attempt to assign property seized after a civil forfeiture action is against legislative intent because the legislature did not intend that property owners of seized property be allowed to execute a post-seizure assignment of that property to a third party. Allmond v. State, 202 Ga. App. 902, 415 S.E.2d 924, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 216 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Property improperly seized. — Forfeiture order for property seized during a search of defendant’s home was reversed as there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into defendant’s home after drugs, drug-related items, and a weapon were found in defendant’s car during a traffic stop, even though defendant did not end a cell phone call immediately as instructed by a police officer; the state did not show 560 that the warrantless entry was required to prevent the destruction of contraband or that securing the home until a warrant could be obtained was not sufficient. Curry v. State, 271 Ga. App. 672, 610 S.E.2d 635, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 133 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Abandoned cocaine properly seized. — After law officers observed the defendant throw a paper napkin containing a quantity of cocaine from a car, defendant affirmatively abandoned the cocaine by throwing the cocaine from the vehicle as the officers approached, and placed the cocaine within plain view on the public highway. Since neither abandoned property nor items in plain view of law enforcement officers who are where the officers have a right to be can be the subject of a motion to suppress when the abandonment of the evidence and the simultaneous placing of the evidence in plain view occurs during the course of a legal stop, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Howell, 180 Ga. App. 449, 349 S.E.2d 476, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2183 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Pursuit and seizure found reasonable. — Once law enforcement officers made one unsuccessful attempt to apprehend a car and the car’s driver as the car left the scene of an earlier narcotic “buy” and when defendant came to the parked vehicle while officers had the car under observation as the officers awaited the arrival of paperwork authorizing seizure of the car, it became necessary, once authorization to make a warrantless seizure was received, to devise a practical means of seizing the car (and the car’s driver) before the car left the jurisdiction, calling for a marked police car, equipped with lights and sirens, to effect the actual pursuit and seizure was reasonable, and the state had probable cause to effect a seizure of the vehicle. State v. Howell, 180 Ga. App. 449, 349 S.E.2d 476, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2183 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). There was substantial compliance with former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 after the supervisor of the seizing officer, rather 16-13-49 than the seizing officer personally, signed the letter notifying the district attorney of the seizure. State v. Battise, 177 Ga. App. 583, 340 S.E.2d 240, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1477 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Seizure not pursuant to judicial process. — Since a Georgia county investigator did not take possession of a vehicle pursuant to judicial process, but simply took the vehicle from the custody of the Tennessee authorities, who had allegedly seized the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant; although former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 allowed for the seizure of property without benefit of judicial process under certain specified circumstances, reliance on the search warrant exception was misplaced because the Georgia officials did not seize the vehicle under the authority of the Tennessee warrant and also because there was not evidence to support the allegation that the seizure of the vehicle was authorized by the Tennessee warrant, and reliance on the “probable cause” exception was also misplaced, as that provision clearly did not purport to authorize Georgia law enforcement officers to seize property located outside of the state, nor, in any event, would such authorization be of any legal effect. Morrow v. State, 186 Ga. App. 615, 367 S.E.2d 854, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 396 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Reasonable suspicion found for Terry stop thereby allowing forfeiture. — Civil forfeiture order was affirmed and suppression motion was properly denied as drugs were found in defendant’s possession after an arrest following a Terry stop as the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity where the officer had been advised of defendant’s banishment, which defendant acknowledged to be violating; the officer was charged with enforcing court orders and, although the banishment was illegal, the order had not been challenged at the time of the Terry stop. Sanders v. State, 259 Ga. App. 422, 577 S.E.2d 94, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 121 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Unpublished decision: In an in rem forfeiture case in which: (1) the federal gov- 561 Seizure (Cont’d) ernment lawfully seized the currency under 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(A)-(C) since the search and seizure of a van’s contents were lawful under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the seizure was lawful under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(e)(2); and (3) the claimant argued that the federal government did not have standing to initiate the forfeiture proceeding because Georgia did not lawfully seize the currency, the claimant’s argument failed. United States v. $ 175,722.77, in United States Currency, 307 Fed. Appx. 257, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10899 (11th Cir. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Forfeiture of funds recovered from the owner’s vehicle was proper as the officer was authorized to conduct a brief investigative stop after observing illegally tinted windows, the search was proper after the officer observed that the owner was nervous, a strong odor of air freshener was coming from the vehicle, and a drug dog alerted, and the determination that the currency was used or intended for use in a drug transaction was supported by expert testimony as to the bundling of large amounts of cash, the use of multiple cell phones by those in the drug trade, and the drug dog alert indicating that a controlled substance had recently been in the car. Mordica v. State of Ga., 319 Ga. App. 149, 736 S.E.2d 153, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 1045 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Law enforcement officers. — Former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(j) did not apply to a law enforcement officer who, in the performance of the officer’s official duty, supplied information leading to the seizure of property which the state may cause to be forfeited under that section. Palmer v. State, 250 Ga. 219, 297 S.E.2d 22, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1024 (1982). Property need only fall into one subsection (d) category. — State need only prove that the property as to which forfeiture was sought fell within one of the six categories listed in former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(d) in order to prevail. Pitts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 606, 428 S.E.2d 650, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 310 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). 16-13-49 Company owner of truck could not claim “innocent ownership” because the company offered no evidence to meet the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that, with the exercise of ordinary care, the company could not reasonably have known of defendant’s conduct or that the conduct was likely to occur. State v. Tucker, 242 Ga. App. 3, 528 S.E.2d 523, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 75 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C0909, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 712 (Ga. Sept. 29, 2000), cert. denied, No. S00C0891, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. Sept. 29, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). In a forfeiture action, a relative failed to prove that the relative was an innocent owner under former O.C.G.A. § 16-1349(e)(1)(A) of two luxury vehicles seized from a relation, who was arrested for drug violations, as the evidence showed that the relative did not acquire title to the vehicles until after the relation’s arrest and, therefore, the relative was merely a “straw man” set up to hold the cars and prevent the seizure. Martin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 902, 663 S.E.2d 307, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 673 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Search of vehicle subject to forfeiture. — Defendants’ vehicle became subject to forfeiture when law enforcement officers witnessed an illegal transaction therein and defendants then had no property right in the vehicle or right to object to its search and seizure. United States v. Major, 915 F. Supp. 384, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1274 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Money found on defendant’s person. — Money found on defendant’s person, which was not in close proximity to the areas in which the contraband was found, which was not shown to have directly or indirectly used or intended for use in a manner to facilitate a violation of the Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq., and which was not shown to have been subject to forfeiture under any other provision of the Act was not subject to forfeiture. Pitts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 606, 428 S.E.2d 650, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 310 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Proximity of money and contraband close enough. — Evidence 562 factually established proximity close enough to warrant forfeiture of the money where the $4,010 was located in the cab of the pickup truck, and the contraband was located in the bed of the same pickup truck. State v. Tucker, 242 Ga. App. 3, 528 S.E.2d 523, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 75 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C0909, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 712 (Ga. Sept. 29, 2000), cert. denied, No. S00C0891, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. Sept. 29, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Transaction involving an imitation controlled substance. — Forfeiture statute did not apply to a transaction involving an imitation controlled substance; reversing State v. White, 210 Ga. App. 876, 437 S.E.2d 826 (1993). White v. State, 264 Ga. 547, 448 S.E.2d 354, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 765 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Impoundment and subsequent inventory search of a vehicle were valid since the vehicle was subject to possible seizure as property used to facilitate illegal drug distribution. Hightower v. State, 249 Ga. App. 495, 548 S.E.2d 473, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 544 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Vehicles properly forfeited. — Denial of the owner’s motion to suppress was proper since the police officer was rightfully on the premises to ask questions about an anonymous letter; the owner’s vehicles were properly forfeited because they facilitated, or were in close proximity to, illegal drug activity. Hodge v. State, 257 Ga. App. 203, 570 S.E.2d 666, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1107 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Forfeiture of a pickup truck and a trailer used to commit a burglary was upheld since: (1) the state’s burden of proof was “by a preponderance of the evidence” and not “beyond a reasonable doubt” as alleged by the property owner; 16-13-49 (2) the state was not required to prove a burglary conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, or that charges were even filed; and (3) whether a burglary took place without the owner’s knowledge or consent was a fact question to be resolved by the court, which as the trier of fact, was not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony was uncontradicted. Walker v. State of Ga., 281 Ga. App. 526, 636 S.E.2d 705, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1156 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Lien for towing service. — Because former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 had no clear and explicit terms providing a lien for towing and storing a vehicle at the request of a law enforcement agency, it provided the operator of a towing business no lien for the services. Purser Truck Sales, Inc. v. Horton, 276 Ga. App. 17, 622 S.E.2d 405, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1141 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49). Security interest not barred. — After a father sold a truck to the son in exchange for the son’s personal pledge and acknowledgement of a security interest in the truck, although a security interest or lien was never filed, the trial court erred in the state’s forfeiture proceeding in denying enforcement of the father’s security interest after the truck was seized due to the son’s possession of drugs, as the father’s evidence that the father had no actual or constructive knowledge of the son’s illegal activities was uncontradicted; the fact that the security interest was never perfected did not bar the father’s assertion of the interest or the enforcement thereof pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(e)(1). Tolliver v. State of Ga., 276 Ga. App. 755, 625 S.E.2d 403, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1001 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0703, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 316 (Ga. May 8, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49).