Department of Human Resources v

Siggers, 219 Ga. App. 1, 463 S.E.2d 544, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 921 (1995), cert. denied, No. S96C0355, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 325 (Ga. Feb. 2, 1996); Department of Human Resources v. Jones, 219 Ga. App. 580, 472 S.E.2d 331 (1996). Modification below guidelines permitted, but no forgiveness of arrearages. — While the trial court did not erroneously set a mother’s child support obligation at a percentage well below the guidelines, the court lacked the authority to completely forgive the mother’s arrearage as the General Assembly did not intend to permit forgiveness of past-due child support arrearage, regardless of whether the modification proceeding fell under the general statutory scheme or the Child Support Recovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Prater, 278 Ga. App. 900, 630 S.E.2d 145, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 427 (2006). State agency’s standing to seek downward child support modification. — State legislature did not intend to give a state agency the power to seek child support to the same extent that a parent can do so; thus, there existed a total absence of any statutory authority or case law to permit the state agency’s initial participation in a case for the purpose of a downward modification action on behalf of a non-custodial parent. Accordingly, the state agency’s authority to bring a downward modification action under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12 is limited to cases in which there is a prior court order establishing or enforcing a child support obligation which the state agency participated in obtaining. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Allison, 276 Ga. 175, 575 S.E.2d 876, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 3 (2003). Department’s failure to follow procedures. — Department of Human Resources’ filing of a petition to establish a child support obligation when one already existed under the divorce decree and the department’s failure to follow the specific procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 1911-12 for modifying a child support obligation was not harmless error. Ward v. 1134 Department of Human Resources, 273 Ga. 52, 537 S.E.2d 70, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 685 (2000). Although a trial court was authorized to conclude that parents had agreed to submit the parties’ settlement agreement to the court, the court was not authorized to enforce the terms of the agreement as to the past-due arrearage, or to modify future child support payments without ensuring that such a modification was in the best interests of the child. Wright v. Burch, 331 Ga. App. 839, 771 S.E.2d 490, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 243 (2015). Need for additional support not required. — When the Department of Human Resources petitions the superior court to adopt the department’s recommendation, the court is not required to find a need for additional support but, without regard to whether the child is receiving public assistance, may increase child support based solely on a significant inconsistency between the existing order and the amount which would result from application of the child support guidelines. Falkenberry v. Taylor, 278 Ga. 842, 607 S.E.2d 567, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 23 (2005). In a child support modification action, the trial court erred in concluding that evidence of the need for additional support was necessary and that the Department of Human Resources (DHR) lacked standing to file a modification action on behalf of a child not receiving public assistance unless it could show the child’s need for additional support, and in failing to apply the child support guidelines of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 and to justify any departure therefrom; by express statutory amendment, the General Assembly no longer reserved for the private bar those modification actions which involved children who did not receive public assistance and needed no additional support, but whose court-ordered provider enjoyed an enhanced financial status. Falkenberry v. 19-11-12 Taylor, 278 Ga. 842, 607 S.E.2d 567, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 23 (2005). Written findings insufficient. — Trial court erred in not fully adopting the recommendation of the Department of Human Resources to reduce a father’s child support obligation to $718 per month and in ordering that the father’s child support obligation be reduced to $1,000 per month because the trial court’s written order failed to state how application of the presumptive amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate and how the best interest of the children for whom support was being determined would be served by the deviation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E) and (i)(1)(B); O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12(e) does not authorize the trial court to refrain from written findings or any other compliance with § 19-6-15 because like § 19-6-15(d), § 19-11-12(e) serves to emphasize that the qualitative determinations of whether special circumstances make the presumptive amount of child support excessive or inadequate and whether deviating from the presumptive amount serves the best interest of the child are committed to the discretion of the court. Spurlock v. Dep’t of Human Res., 286 Ga. 512, 690 S.E.2d 378, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 166 (2010). Jury trial. — There is neither a fundamental constitutional nor a statutory right to a trial by jury in a child support modification proceeding brought under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12. Kelley v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources ex rel. Kelley, 269 Ga. 384, 498 S.E.2d 741, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 423 (1998). Appeal. — Father’s appeal from the superior court’s order under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12, modifying the amount of his child support obligation, should have been brought as a discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Fitzgerald v. Department of Human Resources, 231 Ga. App. 129, 497 S.E.2d 659, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (1998).