Singh v

Hammond, 292 Ga. 579, 740 S.E.2d 126, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 250 (2013). Modification outside range of guidelines. — Trial court’s order modifying child support outside the range of the Georgia Child Support Guidelines was required to state the amount of support that would have been required under the guidelines and to contain a written finding as to the father’s gross income. Faulkner v. Frampton, 216 Ga. App. 785, 456 S.E.2d 88, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 297 (1995). Order that the father pay increased child support based on a substantial change in the father’s financial condition was reversed because although the jury checked several special circumstances listed on the verdict form, the jury failed to explicitly state whether an award under the guidelines was excessive; the special circumstances checked did not imply that the jury thought the award was excessive, in fact, the checked circumstances supported an inference that the guideline award was inadequate and that the jury intended for the father to pay more, not less. Lewis v. Scruggs, 261 Ga. App. 573, 583 S.E.2d 240, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 707 (2003). Modification for private school education. — Wife was entitled to an upward modification of child support because the wife presented evidence that the husband’s gross monthly income had increased from $8,898 to $10,700.91 during the period between entry of the final divorce decree and the filing of the petition for modification and there was evidence that the husband’s net worth had increased by almost three million dollars. That evidence supported the trial court’s finding of a substantial change in income and financial status sufficient to authorize modification of the support award and supported the trial court’s deviation from the presumptive amount of child support 19-6-15 based on a parent’s financial ability to provide for private school education. Odom v. Odom, 291 Ga. 811, 733 S.E.2d 741, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 845 (2012). Modification below guidelines permitted, but no forgiveness of arrearages. — While the trial court did not erroneously set a mother’s child support obligation at a percentage well below the guidelines, the court lacked the authority to completely forgive the mother’s arrearage as the General Assembly did not intend to permit forgiveness of past-due child support arrearage, regardless of whether the modification proceeding fell under the general statutory scheme or the Child Support Recovery Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-1 et seq. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Prater, 278 Ga. App. 900, 630 S.E.2d 145, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 427 (2006). Modification of a child support obligation in a garnishment action, rather than a petition to modify, was erroneous. Twineham v. Daniel, 223 Ga. App. 25, 476 S.E.2d 814, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1047 (1996). Prejudgment garnishment not authorized. — O.C.G.A. § 19-615(h)(3)(B)(i) does not authorize garnishment for uninsured health care expenses that have not been reduced to a money judgment without compliance with the requirements of the more restrictive prejudgment garnishment procedure set out in O.C.G.A. § 18-4-40. Stoker v. Severin, 292 Ga. App. 870, 665 S.E.2d 913, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 887 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2000, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 990 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2008). In a proceeding to legitimate a child, the trial court did not err in calculating the petitioning parent’s child support obligation to be $2,200 per month as the trial court relied on the testimony of the petitioning parent’s accountant, the ex-spouse who remained a business partner, and the petitioning parent’s tax returns and selfemployment income documentation. Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 670 S.E.2d 795, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1146 (2008). Consideration of father’s new household. — In increasing a remarried father’s child support obligation based on increased income, the trial court properly 530 considered his support obligation to his child by his new wife; the trial court had considered the father’s income as well as his current wife’s income and ultimately decided that based on his obligations to his current household, the father was entitled to reduce the upward modification of child support payments. Sharpe v. Perkins, 284 Ga. App. 376, 644 S.E.2d 178, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 316 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1123, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 509 (Ga. June 25, 2007). Modifications following custody change. — Following a change of custody from mother to father, it was error to include child support formerly paid by the father in the mother’s income for purposes of calculating her child support obligation. Martin v. Greco, 225 Ga. App. 752, 484 S.E.2d 789, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 483 (1997). Modification must be tied to guidelines. — Since the parties’ settlement agreement modified custody so each would be the residential custodian of one child, the trial court erred by approving a provision in the agreement that neither would pay the other child support because the court did not determine whether this provision complied with the child support guidelines. Ford v. Hanna, 293 Ga. App. 863, 668 S.E.2d 271, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1022 (2008). Trial court did not address whether there had been a change in the financial circumstances of the husband since the original child support award. If the husband’s financial status had not substantially changed, then no modification was appropriate, if modification was appropriate, then the court was required to use the child support guidelines to calculate the new amount. Wetherington v. Wetherington, 291 Ga. 722, 732 S.E.2d 433, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 782 (2012). Trial court’s child support award was reversed and the case was remanded for reconsideration because the trial court’s award of child support was predicated on the court’s decision to change custody of the parties’ son, which change was vacated. Blue v. Hemmans, 327 Ga. App. 353, 759 S.E.2d 72, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 336 (2014). 19-6-15 Temporary child support judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order that complied with O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(4)(D) because the order showed on the order’s face that the guidelines were not used and that the trial court was unable to calculate various items relating to child support and arrears; if modification was appropriate, then the trial court was required to use the child support guidelines to calculate the new amount. Neal v. Hibbard, 296 Ga. 882, 770 S.E.2d 600, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 183 (2015). Trial court did not err in including the $1400 per month in work-related expenses from the original child support calculation as determined at the time of divorce because the trial court found, and the father does not dispute, that neither party demonstrated that there had been any change in the monthly work-related child care expenses nor did either party allege a change in the needs of the children; thus, the modification was based solely on the increase in the father’s income. Steed v. Steed, 356 Ga. App. 194, 843 S.E.2d 21, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 272 (2020). Modification for extracurricular activities prohibited. — Trial court’s apportionment of the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities on a pro rata basis was in error because the costs of extracurricular activities were included in the presumptive amount of child support and a deviation from that amount required the trial court to follow Georgia’s statutory child support guidelines and justify the deviation with written findings of fact; thus, a remand was required on that issue. Park-Poaps v. Poaps, 351 Ga. App. 856, 833 S.E.2d 554, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 507 (2019). Travel too speculative to fall within guidelines. — In a father’s cross-appeal, the trial court erred by ruling that the mother could deduct the future costs of plane tickets that she purchased for the children to visit her, not to exceed five trips per year, because the travel deviation granted failed to include any cost information and, therefore, was too speculative to fall within the parameters of the 531 Modification of Award (Cont’d) child support guidelines. Park-Poaps v. Poaps, 351 Ga. App. 856, 833 S.E.2d 554, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 507 (2019). Modification improper when no consideration of child’s needs or financial circumstances of parent. — Child support award made in the final order was reversed because the trial court did not address whether there had been a change in the financial circumstances of the father or the needs of the child since the 2013 order denying any child support, but instead the trial court summarily denied the father’s request to pay child support as the court found that it was still not in the child’s best interests to have contact with the father. Selvage v. Franklin, 350 Ga. App. 353, 829 S.E.2d 402, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 299 (2019). Delay in effective date of modification improper. — A 15-month delay in the effective date of an upward modification of child support was improper under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(3)(B). When a modification award involved at least a 30% difference, as in the instant case, the new child support award could be phased in over a period of up to two years with at least an initial immediate adjustment of not less than 25 percent of the difference. Hampton v. Nesmith, 294 Ga. App. 514, 669 S.E.2d 489, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1254 (2008). Child support available even though child reached age 18. — Trial court could properly award child support to a parent who filed a petition for change of custody and child support, even though the child had reached the age of 18 by the time the petition was considered. The parent was not divested of the right to seek child support for the period of time between the filing of the petition and the date on which the child turned 18, and as the child had not yet completed high school, an order for support beyond the child’s 18th birthday could be entered. Wade v. Corinthian, 283 Ga. 514, 661 S.E.2d 532, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 421 (2008). Monetary gifts count as income and impact ability to modify. — Parent did not prove entitlement to a modification of child support because, even assuming the 19-6-15 money the parent received from a trust of which the parent and the children’s grandparent were the sole beneficiaries was a gift, it had to be included in the parent’s gross income under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(A)(xvii). In the Interest of R.F., 295 Ga. App. 739, 673 S.E.2d 108, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 71 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0894, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 270 (Ga. Apr. 28, 2009). Waiver of objection to child support modification requirements. — Because the father consented to the modification of the father’s monthly child support obligation, although the father disputed the amount that the father should be required to pay under the statutory guidelines, the father waived any objection to whether the threshold requirements for the child support modification were otherwise met, including a change in the father’s financial status or a change in the needs of the child. Moore v. Moore, 346 Ga. App. 58, 815 S.E.2d 242, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 316 (2018). Modification properly denied. — When a parent agreed to child support in excess of the O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 support guidelines and did not subsequently show a reduction in the parent’s financial status and income, a downward modification of child support under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a) was properly denied. Moccia v. Moccia, 277 Ga. 571, 592 S.E.2d 664, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 64 (2004). Because two years had not elapsed from a prior court order disposing of an earlier petition for support modification filed by one parent, the trial court did not err when the court dismissed under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(2) the portion of a petition seeking modification of the child-support award. Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 377 (2011). Modification improperly granted. — Portion of the juvenile court’s order modifying child support had to be reversed because the order did not reflect a finding by the juvenile court of a substantial change in either the parents’ income, financial status, or the child’s needs. Grailer v. Jones, 349 Ga. App. 625, 824 S.E.2d 118, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 135 (2019). Mother required to pay support to father. — Trial court properly designated a father as the custodial parent pursuant 532 to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(a)(9), and required the mother to pay child support to the father because it was undisputed that the child was spending equal time with the parents and that the mother had the higher income. Stoddard v. Meyer, 291 Ga. 739, 732 S.E.2d 439, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 783 (2012). Trial court did not err by imputing income to the mother because there was evidence that the mother and new husband had determined that it was to the advantage of their children that the mother not work outside the home. CarrMacArthur v. Carr, 296 Ga. 30, 764 S.E.2d 840, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 822 (2014). Evidence did not support upward modification. — Trial court record was devoid of evidence that a parent had the ability or means to earn an amount found by the trial court, such that the court’s grant of the other parent’s request for an upward modification of the parent’s child support obligation could not stand; the evidence was uncontroverted that the parent’s income and earning capacity had dramatically decreased. Herrin v. Herrin, 287 Ga. 427, 696 S.E.2d 626, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 502 (2010). Increase of child support obligation improper. — Trial court abused the court’s discretion in increasing a mother’s child support obligation because the court failed to determine whether her income had substantially changed from the entry of the divorce decree pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(4), and even if the trial court correctly disregarded the reduction in the mother’s income, the evidence failed to show an increase in the mother’s income since her divorce; while it appeared that the trial court modified the child support award consistent with existing child support guidelines, the court had no valid basis to do so. Harris v. Williams, 304 Ga. App. 390, 696 S.E.2d 131, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (2010), overruled in part, Viskup v. Viskup, 291 Ga. 103, 727 S.E.2d 97, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 353 (2012). Increase in support obligation justified based on increase in income. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by increasing the mother’s child support obligation based on the mother’s increased income because the affidavits 19-6-15 the mother submitted established that her gross monthly income increased from $5,917 to $8,673 per month, and the mother presented no evidence at the 2019 hearing that her financial status was different from her wage income. Park-Poaps v. Poaps, 351 Ga. App. 856, 833 S.E.2d 554, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 507 (2019). Annual payment of child support based on commissions. — Trial court, by including an additional child support provision requiring a father to pay an annual payment of 25 percent of his gross commissions on top of the presumptive child support amount, circumvented the requirement that a court only may deviate from the presumptive amount after making the necessary findings in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(i)(1)(B). Stowell v. Huguenard, 288 Ga. 628, 706 S.E.2d 419, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 152 (2011). Consideration of new spouse’s income erroneous. — Child support award was reversed because nothing in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 authorized the trial court to consider the income or other resources of the father’s new spouse as a part of the calculation of the child support obligation as his new wife had no legal obligation to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the support of the parties’ three children. Blumenshine v. Hall, 329 Ga. App. 449, 765 S.E.2d 647, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (2014), cert. denied, No. S15C0419, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 56 (Ga. Jan. 20, 2015). Parent’s voluntary underemployment. — Trial court’s finding that the father was engaging in voluntary underemployment was upheld because the trial court found that a downward modification of the amount of child support was not in the child’s best interest, the father was unable to produce documentation to support his claims of income and that after his lay-off, he was working only part time, and the record showed that the father was able to afford to take vacations while falling behind in child support and visitation. Spirnak v. Meadows, 355 Ga. App. 857, 844 S.E.2d 482, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 329 (2020). Judicial notice. — It was error for the trial court in modifying a child support award to take judicial notice of an in- 533 Modification of Award (Cont’d) crease in the needs of the children because the question of whether there had been such an increase would be a matter of proof if it had been placed in issue; the error was harmless, however, as the modification order did not expressly mention an increase in the children’s needs as a basis for increasing the child support. Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 642 S.E.2d 652, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 242 (2007). Accrual pending modification petition. — Father’s child support obligation did not continue to accrue at the same rate after the mother was served with the father’s petition to modify child support. Under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(j), support due before the entry of a modification order did not accrue to the extent that the obligation was based on the father’s income from employment from which the father had been involuntarily terminated. Morgan v. Bunzendahl, 316 Ga. App. 338, 729 S.E.2d 476, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 553 (2012). No duty to pay miscellaneous expenses when whole support order modified. — Since the modification order encompassed and modified the entire child support obligation including the duty to pay miscellaneous expenses, and the order modified child support without deviation for miscellaneous expenses, the order did not leave the prior miscellaneous expense provision in full force and effect and the father could not be in contempt for failure to pay those expenses. East v. Stephens, 292 Ga. 604, 740 S.E.2d 156, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 256 (2013). Deviations No deviation from guidelines. — Based on the applicable version of the revised child support guidelines under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15, the trial court properly exercised the court’s discretion when the court imposed the presumptive amount of child support on a wife without applying a discretionary deviation under § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E) and (i)(1)(B); since no deviation was made, there was no requirement that an explanation be given of how that decision was reached. Rumley-Miawama v. Miawama, 284 Ga. 811, 671 S.E.2d 827, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 10 (2009). 19-6-15 Trial court’s findings supporting the court’s child support and alimony awards were proper because the trial court considered, inter alia, the husband’s personal expenses paid by the husband’s companies and the husband’s loan application and financial affidavit in arriving at the court’s determination of the husband’s income; additionally, the trial court took into account the wife’s status as a stay-at-home mother since the birth of the parties’ son, the husband’s conduct towards the wife, and the wife’s potential income from the trial court’s award to the wife of one of the husband’s companies. The evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that no deviation from the presumptive child support award was warranted under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(i) based on the alimony award. Walton v. Walton, 285 Ga. 706, 681 S.E.2d 165, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 429 (2009). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in declining to make a deviation to the presumptive amount of child support because under O.C.G.A. § 19-615(c)(2)(E)(iii) the trial court stated that the court did not find that the presumptive amount of child support was excessive or inadequate, or that it was unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances and also did not find that a downward deviation in the husband’s support amount would be in the child’s best interests; in order to grant any deviation, the trial court must find that the application of the presumptive amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate and that the best interest of the child for whom support is being determined will be served by deviation from the presumptive amount of child support under § 19-615(c)(2)(E)(iii). Willis v. Willis, 288 Ga. 577, 707 S.E.2d 344, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 941 (2010). High income deviation not allowed. — In a mother’s paternity suit to establish the legitimation, custody, and support of her minor child by the father who worked as an NFL football player, the trial court did not err in failing to allow for a high income deviation under O.C.G.A. § 19-615(i)(2)(A). The trial court considered the fact that the combined adjusted income of the parents exceeded $30,000 per month 534 by $1,261.50, but exercised the court’s discretion not to provide for a high income deviation. Jackson v. Irvin, 316 Ga. App. 560, 730 S.E.2d 48, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 612 (2012). For purposes of the child support award, the juvenile court did not abuse the court’s discretion in refusing to award the mother a deviation for the mother’s visitation-related travel expenses because, although the parties had previously agreed to a deviation for travel expenses, which was incorporated into an earlier child support order, the juvenile court was not bound by the earlier consent order; and, furthermore, the mother’s failure to cite in the mother’s appellate brief to any legal authority supporting the mother’s position was fatal to that claim of error. Noble v. Noble, 345 Ga. App. 799, 815 S.E.2d 150, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 287 (2018). Deviation based on foregone support. — Large deviation from the child support guidelines could not stand insofar as the deviation was premised, in part, on an attempt to compensate the child for foregone support. Cousin v. Tubbs, 353 Ga. App. 873, 840 S.E.2d 85, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 101 (2020). Deviation based on parenting time. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in declining to make a deviation to the presumptive amount of child support based on parenting time since the parties were awarded joint physical custody. Calloway-Spencer v. Spencer, 355 Ga. App. 743, 845 S.E.2d 715, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 373 (2020). Deviation from guidelines. — Trial court properly deviated from the child support guidelines under O.C.G.A. § 196-15(c) based on the court’s finding that the husband earned an average of $1 million per year during the marriage and continued to have the potential to earn this sum; the trial court took into account the income and earning potential of both spouses as well as the historical needs of the children. Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 282 Ga. 108, 646 S.E.2d 207, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 421 (2007). Trial court erred in denying a wife’s motion for a new trial, which argued that a divorce decree contained a deviation 19-6-15 from the child support guidelines without including any findings stating why the deviation was appropriate because the separation agreement between the wife and her husband, as well as the trial court’s order incorporating that agreement, contained a deviation since there was, at least, an $18 difference in the amount of child support mandated by the child support guidelines and that which was actually being paid by the parties, and the trial court’s order contained none of the findings required by O.C.G.A. § 196-15; because the parties’ separation agreement did not comply with the provisions contained in § 19-6-15 and did not contain findings of fact as required to support a deviation, the trial court should have rejected the agreement. Holloway v. Holloway, 288 Ga. 147, 702 S.E.2d 132, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 834 (2010). In determining a father’s child support obligation, the trial court erred in applying a nonspecific deviation from the presumptive amount of child support to account for his support obligations to another child because the current version of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 does not contemplate a specific variance of a child support award based on a party’s support obligations to another household. The record failed to show that the father was paying any support for the subsequent child, and his ability to pay all of his child support obligations was a matter of speculation. Jackson v. Irvin, 316 Ga. App. 560, 730 S.E.2d 48, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 612 (2012). Trial court did not err in issuing written findings for the deviations in child support as the amended decree contained the presumptive amount of child support, why the presumptive amount of child support would be inappropriate, the reasons for deviating due to private school and extracurricular activities, and why the deviations were in the best interest of the children. Johnson v. Johnson, 358 Ga. App. 638, 856 S.E.2d 17, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 107 (2021). Mother’s claim that the trial court erred by imposing child support obligations lacked merit, as the mother failed to point to what information from the father was not clear and verified or show how any 535 Deviations (Cont’d) deviations from the guidelines harmed the mother when the court deviated downward and reduced the mother’s presumptive support obligation by $400 to allow the mother to travel to see the minor child. Hooper v. Townsend, 362 Ga. App. 532, 868 S.E.2d 286, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 27 (2022). Trial court erred by entering a child support award that deviated from the statutory guidelines without making mention of whether the deviations served the best interests of the children and in considering the husband’s employer-paid health insurance premiums in a determination of his gross income. Williams v. Williams Two Cases, 362 Ga. App. 839, 870 S.E.2d 462, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 108 (2022). Deviation for life insurance premiums. — Trial court abused the court’s discretion by ordering a deviation for life insurance premiums because the court failed to justify the deviation by setting forth the court’s findings; thus, a remand was required on that issue. Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 740 S.E.2d 613, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 301 (2013). Deviation for visitation-related travel expenses was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court because the mother had the option to remain with the children in the marital home for which the father was financially responsible, but chose instead to move to New York and incur unnecessary expenses. Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 740 S.E.2d 613, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 301 (2013). Deviation for extraordinary educational expenses. — Trial court erred in applying a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support for extraordinary educational expenses without complying with O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E) as the trial court did not make any findings as to what the presumptive amount would have been or why an application of the guideline would have been unjust or inappropriate. Heintz v. Heintz, 301 Ga. 209, 800 S.E.2d 293, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 367 (2017). Special circumstances must warrant deviation. — In modifying a father’s child support obligation, the trial 19-6-15 court erred in increasing support above the amount in the guidelines without making a finding of special circumstances warranting such a deviation; furthermore, the trial court erred in not applying the guidelines to the father’s counterclaim for an increase of the support the mother was to pay the father during the summer. Eubanks v. Rabon, 281 Ga. 708, 642 S.E.2d 652, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 242 (2007). History of parties not ground for deviation. — In the mother’s petition to modify child support, there was no articulated basis for application of a specified discretionary deviation from the presumptive child support obligation because the history of the parties was not a ground for deviation in child support, and the modified physical custody awarded the father fell far short of being substantially equal to that with the mother. Crook v. Crook, 293 Ga. 867, 750 S.E.2d 334, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 876 (2013). Abatement determination must include how deviation in child’s best interest. — Trial court erred by abating a portion of the father’s child support obligation for the period that the child was residing with the father and concluding that allowing an abatement during a time of deployment would not do injustice to the mother because the award of the trial court did not state how deviation was in the best interest of child, which required a remand for those necessary findings. Dingle v. Carter, 350 Ga. App. 255, 829 S.E.2d 604 (2019). Failure to show that discretionary parenting-time deviation applied. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by refusing to apply discretionary parenting-time deviation from the presumptive child support amount set forth in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(i)(2)(K) as sought by a parent because the parent failed to show a special circumstance showing the presumptive amount of support excessive or that the child’s best interest would be served by subtracting from the presumptive amount. Hamlin v. Ramey, 291 Ga. App. 222, 661 S.E.2d 593, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 411 (2008). Written findings for deviation based on extraordinary educational expenses. — When a final child support order included a specific deviation for ex- 536 traordinary educational expenses under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(i)(2)(J)(i), but the trial court failed to make the statutorily required written findings necessary to support the deviation, remand was required for a redetermination of the order, with any deviation to be based upon proper written findings. Brogdon v. Brogdon, 290 Ga. 618, 723 S.E.2d 421, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 205 (2012). Downward deviation required written findings. — Order of modification deviating from the presumptive child support obligation was flawed because the modification failed to comply with the statutory requirements of supporting findings and documentation for a discretionary downward deviation in the amount of child support. Crook v. Crook, 293 Ga. 867, 750 S.E.2d 334, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 876 (2013). In a child support case, although both parties waived findings of fact, the trial court in deviating from the child support guidelines was nevertheless required to set forth how application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, or how the best interests of the children would be served by a deviation, under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E). Wallace v. Wallace, 296 Ga. 307, 766 S.E.2d 452, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 939 (2014). In action concerning child custody and child support, the trial court’s final order had to be reversed because the order did not contain the requisite findings of fact to support the court’s conclusions regarding child support and there was no child support worksheet or schedules attached to the order as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-615(c)(2)(E). Black v. Ferlingere, 333 Ga. App. 789, 777 S.E.2d 268, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 532 (2015). Written finding of fact not required when the court orders the statutory presumptive amount. If no deviation applies and the trial court or jury decides not to deviate from the presumptive amount of child support, then the order need not explain how the trial court or jury reached that decision. Hamlin v. Ramey, 291 Ga. App. 222, 661 S.E.2d 593, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 411 (2008). Father failed to show that a trial court’s determination that the mother had no 19-6-15 monthly gross income constituted a “deviation” that required the trial court to make findings of fact under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15. The statute contemplated that a deviation was an increase or decrease from the presumptive amount of child support. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 309 Ga. App. 590, 711 S.E.2d 103, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 404 (2011). In a divorce action in which the mother earned $5,097 monthly and the father earned $54,732 monthly, the trial court in granting a $2,000 upward deviation from the presumptive amount of support failed to explain how the guidelines amount would be unjust or inappropriate and how the best interest of the children was served by deviation as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E)(iii); remand was required for such written findings. Fladger v. Fladger, 296 Ga. 145, 765 S.E.2d 354, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 899 (2014). Trial court erred by failing to include findings in the court’s child support award as to the court’s deviation from the presumptive amount of child support based on the parent’s military deployment. CarrMacArthur v. Carr, 296 Ga. 30, 764 S.E.2d 840, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 822 (2014). Deviation from guidelines requires findings of fact. — Trial court erred by failing to support the court’s deviation from the child-support guidelines with findings of fact and, therefore, the ruling was vacated and the case remanded because the court awarded the father primary custody but split the custodial time fairly evenly, but after noting the parents’ respective incomes, the trial court determined that neither parent would pay child support without ever stating what the presumptive amount of child support would have been. The court then, rather cursorily, claimed that this deviation from the unstated presumptive amount was in the best interests of the child because the deviation would allow the mother to better meet the child’s needs when in her custody. Spruell v. Spruell, 356 Ga. App. 722, 848 S.E.2d 896, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 514 (2020). Writing Requirement Written findings required. — Trial court, upon modifying an award of child 537 Writing Requirement (Cont’d) support, must enter written findings of special circumstances in order to deviate, up or down, from the child support guidelines. Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 449 S.E.2d 840, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 900 (1994). Award of child support in the case sub judice being beyond the range of statutory guidelines, the trial court erred in failing to provide the required written findings. Kennedy v. Adams, 218 Ga. App. 120, 460 S.E.2d 540, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 663 (1995). Even though O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 was amended since the finding in Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 449 S.E.2d 840 (1994), the requirement for written findings remains. Department of Human Resources v. Wilcox, 219 Ga. App. 757, 466 S.E.2d 662, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 4 (1996). Trial court erred in setting aside a father’s child support obligation because the trial court failed to make a written finding of the gross income of the father and the mother as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-615(a), or of the presence or absence of special circumstances justifying a departure from the guidelines applicable range as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c). Eleazer v. Eleazer, 275 Ga. 482, 569 S.E.2d 521, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 656 (2002). Trial court erred in not fully adopting the recommendation of the Department of Human Resources to reduce a father’s child support obligation to $718 per month and in ordering that the father’s child support obligation be reduced to $1,000 per month because the trial court’s written order failed to state how application of the presumptive amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate and how the best interest of the children for whom support was being determined would be served by the deviation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2)(E) and (i)(1)(B); O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12(e) does not authorize the trial court to refrain from written findings or any other compliance with § 19-6-15 because like § 19-6-15(d), § 19-11-12(e) serves to emphasize that the qualitative determinations of whether special circumstances make the presumptive amount of child support excessive or inadequate and whether deviating from 19-6-15 the presumptive amount serves the best interest of the child are committed to the discretion of the court. Spurlock v. Dep’t of Human Res., 286 Ga. 512, 690 S.E.2d 378, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 166 (2010). Juvenile court erred in awarding child support without making the written findings required by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(c)(2), including a determination of the parents’ gross income and certain findings regarding the child’s health insurance coverage and apportionment of the child’s uninsured health care expenses. Roberts v. Tharp, 286 Ga. 579, 690 S.E.2d 404, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 176 (2010). While there was evidence to support the trial court’s application of a parentingtime deviation in the mother’s favor in the amount of $300 because the father did not exercise visitation for the four and onehalf years leading up to the hearing, the trial court did not incorporate the court’s findings into the court’s final order and, thus, remand for the court to enter appropriate factual findings, supported by the record, was required. Perez v. Cunningham, 355 Ga. App. 393, 844 S.E.2d 253, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2020). Failure to include health insurance premiums and child care expenses. — Trial court erred in omitting the amount of health insurance premiums and all work-related child care expenses the parent was paying from the child support worksheet. Bridger v. Franze, 348 Ga. App. 227, 820 S.E.2d 223, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 636 (2018). Uninsured healthcare expenses.— Trial court erred by failing to include uninsured healthcare expenses for the minor children in the child support worksheet incorporated into the divorce decree. Pryce v. Pryce, 359 Ga. App. 590, 859 S.E.2d 554, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 247 (2021). Written finding as to the gross incomes required. — Award was vacated and the case remanded after the trial court awarded child support without making a written finding as to the gross incomes of the child’s parents, without applying the applicable statutory percentage range, and without making a written finding of special circumstances justifying the departure from the guidelines’ applicable 538 range. Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 Ga. 548, 533 S.E.2d 80, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 534 (2000). Georgia Supreme Court has noted that an award of child support may be based on the earning capacity of the obligor and not on gross income in certain circumstances; but it is also apparent that the obligor’s gross income is the starting point for a child support determination under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b). However, an order awarding child support was vacated since the trial court failed to determine the father’s gross income, but made a child support award based on the earning capacity of the father; therefore, the section of the child support award as to attorney fees and the fees of the guardian ad litem was also vacated inasmuch as the trial court made these determinations in the context of the court’s ruling awarding child support. Eldridge v. Ireland, 259 Ga. App. 44, 576 S.E.2d 44, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1617 (2002). O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(a) requires a divorce decree to include a written finding of the gross income of the father and the mother; when the decree included a finding of the husband’s income, but did not include a finding of the wife’s income, it was necessary that the case be remanded to the trial court with direction to make a finding of the wife’s income, to reconsider the award of child support based on that finding, and to amend the decree accordingly. Southerland v. Southerland, 278 Ga. 188, 598 S.E.2d 442, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 402 (2004). Because the trial court’s order failed to specify the amount of child support to be paid, include a written finding of the gross income of each parent, and discuss the presence or absence of special circumstances in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 196-15(c), the failure to include these requisite findings constituted reversible error. Simmons v. Williams, 290 Ga. App. 644, 660 S.E.2d 435, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 382 (2008). Findings not required if court adheres to child support obligation table. — Trial court adhered to the child support obligation table and, thus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(i)(1)(B), was not 19-6-15 required to make any fact findings or explain the court’s decision to forego applying the children’s private school tuition to the child support calculations. Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Ga. 366, 667 S.E.2d 350, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 747 (2008). Court erred in not making best interests findings in modification. — Although in making adjustments to a mother’s income for other qualified children, the trial court was not required to make the type of findings that would support a deviation from presumptive child support, the trial court erred in not making findings regarding the child’s best interests under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(5)(C). Wheeler v. Akins, 327 Ga. App. 830, 761 S.E.2d 383, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 434 (2014). Education of Children Court may include in decree provision for educational funds including expenses for attending a college during minority when the circumstances of the case warrant it. Coleman v. Coleman, 240 Ga. 417, 240 S.E.2d 870, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1514 (1977). Providing for education acceptable. — Jury is not prohibited from providing for the education of minor children of an unsuccessful marriage. Bateman v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20, 159 S.E.2d 387, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 653 (1968). Extraordinary educational expenses not required to be factored into child support calculation. — Trial court did not err in leaving the children’s private school tuition out of the court’s child support calculations because, under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(i)(2)(J)(i), extraordinary educational expenses were not required to be factored into that calculation. Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Ga. 366, 667 S.E.2d 350, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 747 (2008). Verdict merely finding amount for education of child is contrary to law. While it would scarcely be possible to educate a child without supporting the child, such a verdict leaves the question of support undecided and in such case a new trial should be granted. Flynn v. Flynn, 149 Ga. 693, 101 S.E. 806, 1920 Ga. 539 Education of Children (Cont’d) LEXIS 371 (1920); Bateman v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20, 159 S.E.2d 387, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 653 (1968). Award of tuition outside of support award without necessary findings was unexplained deviation. — Trial court’s order regarding child support did not comply with O.C.G.A. § 19-615(c)(2)(E) and (i)(1)(B) because the order failed to include the necessary findings; the trial court’s award of tuition outside of the support award was an unexplained deviation. Johnson v. Ware, 313 Ga. App. 774, 723 S.E.2d 18, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 80 (2012). Deviation from guidelines for educational expenses. — Trial court was authorized to exercise the court’s discretion by deviating from the presumptive child support amounts because the settlement agreement provided that the parties would split tuition and reflected the parties’ intention to alter the legal presumption that the custodial parent would pay that child-rearing expense. Rose v. Clark, 360 Ga. App. 440, 859 S.E.2d 137, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 286 (2021). Obligation for educational expenses terminates on majority or marriage. — Any obligation to pay educational expenses of a child imposed by the decree terminates when the child reaches majority or marries. Coleman v. Coleman, 240 Ga. 417, 240 S.E.2d 870, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1514 (1977). Indirect costs considered to vary final award. — In determining the amount of child support to be paid, the trial court can give consideration to indirect costs paid by the obligor, e.g., health insurance premiums, in departing from guidelines, but such indirect payments can be considered only to vary the final award. Ehlers v. Ehlers, 264 Ga. 668, 449 S.E.2d 840, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 900 (1994). Modification due to continuing education. — Modification action to extend support payments to allow a child who had reached the age of majority to complete a secondary school education was not required to be filed before the child’s 18th birthday. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 267 Ga. 886, 485 S.E.2d 475, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 161 (1997). 19-6-15 In order to extend support payments to allow a child who had reached the age of majority to complete a secondary school education, it was not required that provision for such possibility have been made in the temporary or final support order. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 267 Ga. 886, 485 S.E.2d 475, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 161 (1997). Continuous full-time student. — Because the superior court erroneously focused on a son’s absences, tardiness, and failure to attend summer school when the court concluded that the son was not a “continuous full time student” when the son reached the age of majority, the decision was not in accord with the parties’ agreement or the legislative purpose of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15. Bullard v. Swafford, 279 Ga. 577, 619 S.E.2d 665, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 521 (2005). Trial court erred when the court determined that a father’s child-support obligation terminated because the child was not enrolled in and attending school on a full-time basis between June and August because the agreement between the father and the mother did not require the child’s continuous attendance in school during the summer months but required only the child’s full-time attendance in school; fulltime school does not require attendance in school during the summer months. Draughn v. Draughn, 288 Ga. 734, 707 S.E.2d 52, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 182 (2011). Child enrolled in online courses. — Trial court erred in finding that a child’s enrollment in online courses did not satisfy a modification order’s requirement that the child “attend” school in order to have the father pay child support beyond the child’s attainment of majority; once a child enrolls in approved online courses in an effort to graduate from a secondary school, the child’s online attendance constitutes “attending school” for purposes of extending child support beyond the child’s attainment of the age of majority. Draughn v. Draughn, 288 Ga. 734, 707 S.E.2d 52, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 182 (2011). Custodial parent to pay education expenses. — Res judicata did not bar a father’s claim for interpretation and enforcement of child support provisions in the parties’ settlement agreement; the agreement clearly gave the father final 540 authority over the children’s school and the mother, as custodial parent, was obligated to pay the children’s tuition from the support she received. Hardman v. Hardman, 295 Ga. 732, 763 S.E.2d 861, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 737 (2014). Free tuition was not fringe benefit. — For purposes of the child support award, the juvenile court erred in considering free tuition that the mother received through the mother’s employer as a fringe benefit to be included in the mother’s gross income as the tuition benefit did not significantly reduce the mother’s personal living expenses. Noble v. Noble, 345 Ga. App. 799, 815 S.E.2d 150, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 287 (2018). Attorney’s Fees Only one party can be prevailing party in determining attorney’s fees. — In a child support modification action that resulted in an increase in the father’s child support, even if not to the extent requested by the mother, the mother was the prevailing party under O.C.G.A. § 196-15(k)(5), and only the mother could be awarded attorney’s fees; the trial court erred in finding that there could be, and were, two prevailing parties. Mironov v. Mironov, 296 Ga. 114, 765 S.E.2d 326, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 883 (2014). Remand of attorney fee award required. — In a child custody modification proceeding, the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to the father in the amount of $4,000 under O.C.G.A. § 199-3 as the award was not supported by the record since the trial court did not explain the statutory basis for the award and did not enter any findings necessary to support the award as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(5). Kuehn v. Key, 325 Ga. App. 512, 754 S.E.2d 103, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 6 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0726, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 412 (Ga. May 19, 2014). In an action to modify child custody, the trial court was authorized to award attorney fees under O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-15(k)(5) and 19-9-3(g); however, because the mother and the trial court did not state a statutory basis for the award, the award 19-6-15 was vacated and the case was remanded for the trial court to explain the statutory basis for the award and to enter any necessary factual findings. Hill v. Davis, 337 Ga. App. 683, 788 S.E.2d 570, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 394 (2016). Failure to specify basis for attorney fee award. — Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees without specifying a statutory or factual basis for the award as there were two plausible statutory bases for the award, O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 or O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15, and the record contained no statement regarding the amount attributable to the pursuit or defense of claims for which attorney fees were recoverable or how the trial court calculated the court’s award, which was less than requested. Hall v. Hall, 335 Ga. App. 208, 780 S.E.2d 787, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 715 (2015), dismissed, No. S16C0751, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 375 (Ga. May 9, 2016). Attorney fees award not supported by statutory basis or factual findings. — Order awarding a mother attorney fees was vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court as other than the mother’s testimony as to the amount paid and still owed, there were no bills presented, no testimony from either of the mother’s attorneys as to the reasonableness of their fees, and no breakdown to establish what services were provided by the attorneys. Steed v. Steed, 356 Ga. App. 194, 843 S.E.2d 21, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 272 (2020). Findings in order awarding attorney fees not clear. — Award of attorney fees to a mother in a child custody and support proceeding was vacated because although in the modification order the trial court made references to factors that indicate that the award was being made under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) due to sanctionable conduct, the trial court also referred to the relative financial position of the parties, which would indicate the award was being made under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2; thus, further proceedings on the issue of attorney fees was required. Wilson v. Guerrero, 353 Ga. App. 501, 838 S.E.2d 588, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 27 (2020). 541 19-6-15