Green v

State, 221 Ga. App. 436, 472 S.E.2d 1 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence that a child rape victim had sex with her boyfriend six months before the alleged rape was properly excluded since, while relevant to show that the victim’s pregnancy was not caused by the defendant, it was insufficiently probative due to the time frames involved. (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). “Quite possibly pregnant” evidence disallowed. — Cross-examination of the victim with regard to sexual acts with males other than the defendant and the fact that she was “quite possibly pregnant” was properly disallowed since the only proffer made by the defendant concerning the possible pregnancy as a motive for lying was counsel’s mere statement, and the defendant denied ever having sexual relations with the victim. Gibbs v. State, 196 Ga. App. 140, 395 S.E.2d 387, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 828 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Miscarriage by victim. — With regard to a defendant’s convictions for aggravated sodomy and kidnapping, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by excluding as barred by the former rape shield statute evidence of the victim’s prior miscarriage since the former rape shield statute barred evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness. Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 692, 670 S.E.2d 191, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1295 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Parent status of minor victim was irrelevant fact. — Trial court correctly excluded all reference to the fact that the 16-year-old victim had a child of approximately 21 months of age. Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 690, 538 S.E.2d 766, 2000 280 Ga. App. LEXIS 1057 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former rape shield statute provided the exclusive means for admitting evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness in prosecutions for rape. The res gestae rule, impeachment techniques, and other traditional means for introducing evidence which was otherwise inadmissible could have no effect in this situation. Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2319 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Former rape shield statute superseded all evidentiary exceptions, including the res gestae rule. Phillips v. State, 196 Ga. App. 267, 396 S.E.2d 57, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 877 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 did not prohibit testimony of previous false allegations by the victim; however, before such evidence could be admitted, the trial court must make a threshold determination outside the presence of the jury that a reasonable probability of falsity existed. Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 128 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825, 110 S. Ct. 88, 107 L. Ed. 2d 53, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3991 (1989), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019), overruled in part as stated in Ray v. State, 356 Ga. App. 266, 841 S.E.2d 477, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 225 (2020), overruled in part as stated in State v. Ray, 367 Ga. App. 329, 884 S.E.2d 414, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 89 (2023) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Once the court determined that a childvictim’s previous allegation of abuse was unreliable, testimony of the previous allegation was no longer subject to the former rape shield statute protection and should have been admitted. Hines v. State, 221 Ga. App. 193, 470 S.E.2d 787 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of prior false claims improperly barred. — Evidence concerning allegedly false prior rape claims made by the prosecutor was not barred by former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 as the subject testimony was admissible, not merely to im- 24-4-412 peach the witness credibility, but as substantive evidence tending to establish that there had been no rape, but mere consensual sexual intercourse; accordingly, the trial court abused the court’s discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Humphrey v. State, 207 Ga. App. 472, 428 S.E.2d 362, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 244 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C0883, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 601 (Ga. May 13, 1993), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of the admittedly false accusation by the victim, the defendant’s stepdaughter, was not barred by the rape shield statute as evidence of the victim’s alleged false allegations of sexual misconduct by persons other than the defendant did not involve the victim’s past sexual conduct but rather the victim’s propensity to make false statements regarding sexual misconduct. Burns v. State, 345 Ga. App. 822, 813 S.E.2d 425, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 226 (2018), aff’d, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019). Evidence of prior false claims properly barred. — In a sexual molestation case, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in concluding that the defendant’s evidence that the victim once falsely alleged that another man had molested the victim did not establish by a reasonable probability that the prior allegation was in fact false. Walker v. State, 308 Ga. App. 176, 707 S.E.2d 122, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former rape shield statute prohibited all evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness, including marital history, mode of dress, general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards; in other words, her reputation concerning past sexual activity with persons other than the defendant. The exceptions were, if so found by the judge after an in camera hearing, that the past behavior involving participation by the accused, or that the evidence supported an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the com- 281 General Consideration (Cont’d) plaining witness consented to the conduct complained of. Parks v. State, 147 Ga. App. 617, 249 S.E.2d 672, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2868 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Evidence of prior sexual experience was not permitted by former O.C.G.A. § 242-3. Roberts v. State, 158 Ga. App. 309, 279 S.E.2d 753, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2177 (1981) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1); Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App. 743, 382 S.E.2d 738, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 762 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not err in refusing to admit evidence of the victim’s past marital problems when the defendant admitted that the victim did not tell him which type of marital problem it was. Hence, his lack of knowledge that the victim’s marital problem related to infidelity could have had no reasonable bearing on whether the victim would consent to the conduct complained of. Burley v. State, 190 Ga. App. 75, 378 S.E.2d 328, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 128 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former rape shield statute precluded the introduction of evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior. Obviously, a prior rape committed against the victim had nothing to do with her past sexual behavior. Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App. 743, 382 S.E.2d 738, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 762 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court properly disallowed the defendant’s proffer that the victim might have said the defendant raped her on occasions other than the two charged since it was not clear how such evidence would have aided the defendant and there was no indication that the victim was lying about the other incidents of rape. Gibbs v. State, 196 Ga. App. 140, 395 S.E.2d 387, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 828 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of portions of a conversation between the defendant and the victim that involved her past sexual abuse by family members and others was properly excluded. Hicks v. State, 222 Ga. App. 828, 24-4-412 476 S.E.2d 101 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of character or other crimes. — Proffered testimony of a defense witness that the witness had exchanged sex with the victim for money and that defendant knew of this at the time of the incident was not admissible under the “highly material category” of subsection (c)(2) of former O.C.G.A. § 242-3. Brown v. State, 214 Ga. App. 676, 448 S.E.2d 723, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1012 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Victim’s testimony that victim had not had intercourse in five months admissible. — After the state attempted to prove the defendant’s rape of the victim by showing that the defendant passed herpes to the victim, the trial court’s permission for the victim to testify that the victim had not had sex for five months prior to the rape did not violate the rape shield law, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, as the victim’s testimony was relevant to exclude the possibility that someone other than defendant had sexual contact with the victim and gave the victim herpes. (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Testimony of defendant concerning overheard conversations was properly disallowed. — Even though the trial court allowed defendant to testify that the defendant had prior sexual intercourse with the complaining witness, the court properly disallowed testimony from defendant that the defendant had overheard conversations by the victim’s family members that the victim “ran around.” Marks v. State, 192 Ga. App. 64, 383 S.E.2d 626, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 887 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility listed in the former statute were exclusive and those exceptions were provided solely for the benefit of the defendant who, by proper and timely objection, could prevent the state from introducing the evidence excluded by the former statute. Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2319 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Two exceptions contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 were exclusive. 282 Jones v. State, 190 Ga. App. 416, 379 S.E.2d 189, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 257 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Virginity irrelevant. — Admitting testimony that an alleged victim was not a virgin to support an inference that an accused reasonably believed she consented to his advances is erroneous since it is against just such reasoning that rape shield laws have been enacted. Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2319 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Admission of victim’s testimony that during the attack she told defendant she was a virgin was harmless error since the defense was based upon a claim of mistaken identity, not alleged consent by the victim. Veal v. State, 191 Ga. App. 445, 382 S.E.2d 131, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 634 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence inadmissible despite physician’s testimony that victim was sexually active. — Inquiry into the victim’s past sexual experiences was properly refused, even after a physician testified that in examining the victim it was obvious she had been sexually active. Worth v. State, 183 Ga. App. 68, 358 S.E.2d 251, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1876 (1987), cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Harmless error in admission of rape kit evidence. — Even though the trial court plainly erred when the court admitted the state’s evidence that the rape kit exam showed signs of male DNA, but not the defendant’s, because the victim had voluntary intercourse the day before the attack with a different man, the error was harmless because the evidence’s admission was not likely to affect the outcome of the proceedings given that the defendant’s accomplice pled guilty to the rape and admitted to the jury that the accomplice had thrown water on the victim and that the accomplice and the defendant acted in concert in assaulting the victim in front of the victim’s children. Palencia v. State, 359 Ga. App. 307, 855 S.E.2d 782, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 161 (2021), rev’d in part, 313 Ga. 625, 872 S.E.2d 681, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 130 (2022), 24-4-412 vacated in part, 366 Ga. App. 316, 881 S.E.2d 461, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (2022). Applicability to noncomplaining witness. — Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 included cross-examination of the other witnesses about the sexual conduct of the complaining witness so the argument that the former statute applied only to crossexamination of the complaining witness was without merit. Ellis v. State, 181 Ga. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d 822, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2570 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Harmless to deny examination as to incident victim denied. — Any error in denying the defendant a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the victim concerning a past sexual experience with the defendant was harmless when the defendant subsequently testified to such an experience and the victim then denied the experience. Clarke v. State, 169 Ga. App. 433, 313 S.E.2d 716, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 1580 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). When the defendant had never seen or known the victim prior to her abduction, evidence of past sexual activity was not admissible on the question of consent. Fuller v. State, 169 Ga. App. 488, 313 S.E.2d 505, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 1603 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Prohibition inapplicable to impeachment as to victim’s attire. — Former rape shield law was not applicable to evidence offered to impeach the victim as to her mode of dress at the time in question. Villafranco v. State, 252 Ga. 188, 313 S.E.2d 469, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 638 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Reversible error when defendant was not allowed to show wife’s medical records. — When a physician testified that the victim had a venereal disease and that she maintained she had not had sexual intercourse with anyone else, it was reversible error not to allow the defendant to show by his wife’s medical records, or otherwise, that his wife was then undergoing medical treatment and tests for pregnancy and showed no sign of the disease and therefore, by logical ex- 283 General Consideration (Cont’d) tension, that defendant did not have the disease. Reece v. State, 192 Ga. App. 14, 383 S.E.2d 572, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 872 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of infectious discharge in victim’s body. — Exclusion of medical testimony regarding an infectious discharge discovered in the victim’s body within hours after the alleged rape was reversible error since the excluded testimony was relevant to defendant’s claim that he did not penetrate the victim because of the victim’s gross physical condition. White v. State, 201 Ga. App. 53, 410 S.E.2d 441, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1187 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence victim dropped out of school and missed prior court date not barred. — Defense’s question to the victim concerning her status as a high school dropout and her failure to keep a previous court appointment did not violate former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, since the questions did not directly reflect on her past sexual behavior. George v. State, 257 Ga. 176, 356 S.E.2d 882, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 778 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidentiary exhibit properly excluded. — Exhibit, which was apparently a fictional work about someone’s sexual experiences and was to be used in an attack upon the victim’s reputation for prior sexual behavior, was properly excluded under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3. Kilgore v. State, 195 Ga. App. 884, 395 S.E.2d 337, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 709 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Identification of alternate sexual partner. — When the defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated child molestation, and enticing a child for indecent purposes, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to investigate alternate sources of the victim’s pregnancy and injuries because trial counsel testified that identifying an alternate sexual partner might have conflicted with the rape shield statute; any sexual contact after the crime would not have been relevant to the vic- 24-4-412 tim’s injuries and would have been highly prejudicial; and, in light of the victim’s testimony, the victim’s immediate outcry, and the evidence of male DNA found inside the victim and the victim’s vaginal injury, it was not reasonably likely that the result of the trial would have been different. Davis v. State, 329 Ga. App. 797, 764 S.E.2d 588, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Denial of hearing held error. — When defendant offered to prove that the complaining witness had prior sexual encounters with the defendant and others and that the defendant knew about the others and of her reputation at the time of the incident on trial, it was error to deny a hearing on the defendant’s offer of proof relating to the witness’s past sexual behavior. Hamilton v. State, 185 Ga. App. 536, 365 S.E.2d 120, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2872 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Appellate standard of review. — Appellate court reviewed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence under the former rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 242-3, for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 562, 562 S.E.2d 847, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 428, aff’d sub nom. Curtis v. State, 275 Ga. 576, 571 S.E.2d 376, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 918 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Child Molestation Former rape shield law applicable in child molestation cases. — In a prosecution for child molestation, evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior and preoccupation with sex was properly excluded. McGarity v. State, 224 Ga. App. 302, 480 S.E.2d 319 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court properly refused to allow defense counsel to question an investigator about the victim’s prior sexual activity in a child molestation case as the rape shield law, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (prohibiting the introduction of evidence of the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness in rape cases), was also applicable in child molestation cases, and no exceptions to the rape shield law was implicated. Flowers v. State, 255 Ga. App. 660, 284 566 S.E.2d 339, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 672 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b) was applicable in child molestation cases and excluded evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness with some limited exceptions which include: (1) to show that someone other than the defendant caused the injuries to the child; (2) to show lack of victim credibility if the victim’s prior allegations of molestation were false; and (3) to show other possible causes for the symptoms exhibited. Since no exception applied, inquiry into a later rape of defendant’s victim was properly foreclosed in defendant’s rape and incest trial. Taylor v. State, 268 Ga. App. 333, 601 S.E.2d 815, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 915 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In 2005, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 was amended to provide expressly that the former rape shield law applied to prosecutions for child molestations. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 854 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0113, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 33 (Ga. Jan. 17, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Early masturbation of victim irrelevant evidence. — In a child molestation case, evidence of the victim’s possibly engaging in masturbation at an early age would not have been admissible as the defendant made no allegation that the victim had any unusually early or sudden sexual knowledge; thus, the victim’s sexual history was irrelevant under the circumstances. Hughes v. State, 297 Ga. App. 581, 677 S.E.2d 674, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 388 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1440, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 560 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Admission of evidence that victim molested at age six. — Trial court did not err in excluding the evidence that the victim was molested at the age of six because even if the evidence arguably bore some minimal relevance to defendant’s guilt in the case, the trial court acted within the court’s discretion in concluding that the minor probative value of any such evidence was substantially outweighed by 24-4-412 the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time. Vallejo v. State, 362 Ga. App. 33, 865 S.E.2d 640, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (2021). State may not introduce evidence of victim’s sexual activity. — In the defendant’s trial for child molestation against three victims, the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce evidence of one victim’s prior sexual activity involving the defendant’s molestation of the defendant’s two step-sisters; this evidence was inadmissible under the Rape Shield Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, even if introduced by the state for the purpose of showing the effects of the defendant’s molestation of the victim. However, the error was harmless. White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 823 S.E.2d 794, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 66 (2019). Expert testimony on abuse accommodation syndrome. — Defendant’s claim that the defendant should have been able to question witnesses about the victim’s alleged molestation by her stepfather and step-uncle was rejected as a nurse’s testimony that the victim’s behavioral characteristics were consistent with those of a child who had been sexually molested fell far short of the expert testimony regarding abuse accommodation syndrome that warranted the admission of evidence of previous molestation by others. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 884, 635 S.E.2d 240, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 972 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Rape shield law inapplicable in child molestation cases. — By the former statute’s plain terms the former rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-23(a), applied only in prosecutions for rape and not to child molestation cases; however, the trial court did not err by applying former § 24-2-3(a) to defendant’s case because defendant was prosecuted for, among other offenses, rape, and the fact that defendant was acquitted of the rape charge did not require a new trial on the other charges. Abdulkadir v. State, 279 Ga. 122, 610 S.E.2d 50, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 161 (2005), superseded by statute as stated in Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 285 Child Molestation (Cont’d) 281, 620 S.E.2d 394, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 854 (2005), superseded by statute as stated in Segura v. State, 280 Ga. App. 685, 634 S.E.2d 858, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 928 (2006), superseded by statute as stated in Krirat v. State, 286 Ga. App. 650, 649 S.E.2d 786, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 778 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Child abuse accommodation syndrome. — Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court properly excluded evidence consisting of any prior abuse committed against the victims by persons other than the defendant on relevancy grounds, given that the state’s fact witness, a social worker, did not testify that the victims’ demeanor exhibited symptoms consistent with child abuse accommodation syndrome. The court noted that the evidence was not excludable under the former rape shield statute as contended by the state. Segura v. State, 280 Ga. App. 685, 634 S.E.2d 858, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 928 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of a child sexual abuse victim’s previous sexual activity was properly excluded under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b) because medical evidence indicated the child had been sexually violated within the last 48 hours. Callahan v. State, 256 Ga. App. 482, 568 S.E.2d 780, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 927 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1766, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 895 (Ga. Sept. 30, 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In a rape case, the trial court properly found that under former O.C.G.A. § 242-3, the defendant failed to show that the child victim had made three prior false allegations of sexual misconduct. In the first case, the defendant asserted a vague claim unsupported by any evidence that when the child was two years old, the child might have made some unspecified allegation against a relative against whom no charges were brought; in the second case, the allegations led to a guilty plea; in the third case, police found that a minor had touched the victim but that no crime had been committed. Osborne v. State, 291 Ga. App. 711, 662 S.E.2d 792, 24-4-412 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 621 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1643, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 783 (Ga. Sept. 22, 2008), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). With regard to defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and child molestation of a step-child, the trial court properly excluded defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence of a purported false allegation by the victim that the victim was the victim of date rape in 2006 under the former rape shield law as defendant did not seek to introduce the evidence to show that the victim had psychological problems, rather, defendant argued that the victim had made a previous false allegation. Birkbeck v. State, 292 Ga. App. 424, 665 S.E.2d 354, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 703 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1917, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 874 (Ga. Oct. 27, 2008), overruled in part, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 121 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not violate Georgia’s rape shield statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, in determining that proposed testimony regarding a separate, independent investigation into child molestations allegations by the victim against another man was inadmissible because the proposed statements were not false allegations of sexual misconduct but were statements that another man had not engaged in sexual misconduct with the victim when, in fact, some sort of sexual misconduct had occurred. Frye v. State, 344 Ga. App. 704, 811 S.E.2d 460, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 128 (2018), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019). Evidence not admissible in child molestation case. — In a prosecution for child molestation, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by granting the state’s motion to exclude evidence that the victim told her physician that she was sexually active with her boyfriend. Cox v. State, 241 Ga. App. 388, 526 S.E.2d 887, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1641 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence not admissible. — At a trial in which defendant was accused of sexual offenses against the daughter, the 286 trial court did not err under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b) in refusing to admit evidence of the possibility that the daughter was previously sexually molested by the babysitter; such evidence was inadmissible in a molestation case to show the victim’s reputation for nonchastity or the victim’s preoccupation with sex, and an exception to this rule did not apply as the state presented neither medical evidence showing that the victim had been molested nor evidence showing that the victim had indicated symptoms consistent with the child abuse accommodation syndrome. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga. App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1285 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0610, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 224 (Ga. Mar. 27, 2006), overruled in part, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 182 (2007), overruled in part, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not err by excluding letters the victim wrote to the defendant during the time period between the defendant’s arrest and the trial pursuant to the former Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, because the evidence was cumulative to the extent that a portion of a letter from the victim recounting the victim’s prior sexual activity supported an inference that the victim consented to sexual conduct since the jury was aware that the victim was pregnant with the defendant’s child; to the extent that the portion of a letter from the victim in which the victim described future sexual activities that the victim would like to engage in with the defendant was relevant and admissible to show that the victim still had feelings for the defendant, that evidence was cumulative to the victim’s testimony that the victim still loved the defendant and remained in contact with the defendant. Morgan v. State, 303 Ga. App. 358, 693 S.E.2d 504, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 66 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1272, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 736 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not err by excluding letters the victim wrote to the defendant during the time period between the defen- 24-4-412 dant’s arrest and the trial pursuant to the former Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, because although the trial court initially indicated that the former Rape Shield Statute prohibited admission of the letters, the court clearly indicated that it would consider any future proper attempt to admit the evidence, but the defendant declined to do so; assuming that the ruling was erroneous, the verdict was sustainable because the evidence in the letters that the victim had a previous sexual relationship with the defendant before the incident and wanted to have one with the defendant in the future was not relevant to the charges for which the defendant was convicted, namely kidnapping, kidnapping with bodily injury, family violence aggravated assault, and false imprisonment. Morgan v. State, 303 Ga. App. 358, 693 S.E.2d 504, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 66 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1272, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 736 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) and sexual battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1(b) were vacated because the trial court erred by applying former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(a) to the case and striking the testimony regarding the victim’s previous alleged sexual conduct with the victim’s brother based on the court’s conclusion that the former rape shield statute prohibited the defendant from presenting evidence regarding the victim’s prior sexual history, and the error in excluding the evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history could have contributed to the jury’s verdict since the only direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt was the victim’s testimony that the defendant sexually abused the victim; the former provisions did not apply to prosecutions for child molestation or sexual battery. Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 562, 708 S.E.2d 303, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 235 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Under Georgia’s Rape Shield Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the alleged prior false allegation of child molestation made by the victim against the 287 Child Molestation (Cont’d) victim’s father as the testimony at a hearing supported the trial court’s finding that falsity was not established by a reasonable probability. Vallejo v. State, 362 Ga. App. 33, 865 S.E.2d 640, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (2021). Even if the evidence of the scientific testing of the bed sheet were relevant to the victim’s knowledge of sexual acts, it was inadmissible as it did not fall within one of the limited exceptions in the Rape Shield Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, because the evidence of the victim’s prior allegation against the victim’s father was not relevant to explain the victim’s knowledge of the sexual acts that the victim described at trial; and that evidence would not have been admissible even if the defendant’s trial counsel had objected to the state’s argument regarding the victim’s sexual knowledge. Vallejo v. State, 362 Ga. App. 33, 865 S.E.2d 640, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (2021). In an action for various sexual offenses involving the defendant’s daughter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to pierce the Rape Shield Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, excluding evidence the victim made an allegation of sexual abuse against another man when she was seven years old, because such evidence did not fall within the sole statutory exception of the applicable Rape Shield Statute. Priddy v. State, 362 Ga. App. 434, 868 S.E.2d 831, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 47 (2022). Evidence may be excluded even if the charge was not aggravated molestation. — Although the former rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, did not require the exclusion of evidence of a child molestation victim’s past boyfriends and difficult past because the charge was not an aggravated charge, the trial court was authorized to evaluate the relevance of any evidence and exclude the evidence on that basis. Cantu v. State, 304 Ga. App. 655, 697 S.E.2d 310, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 594 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1767, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 868 (Ga. Nov. 24-4-412 1, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Sexual activity of household excluded. — Evidence that a child sexual abuse victim was raised in a household where sexual activity was open was properly excluded, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b), because nothing in the proffered evidence showed that this would cause the victim to have knowledge of the sexual acts performed on the victim by defendant. Callahan v. State, 256 Ga. App. 482, 568 S.E.2d 780, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 927 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1766, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 895 (Ga. Sept. 30, 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence that victim had venereal disease not admissible. — Trial court did not err in granting the state’s motion to suppress evidence that the victim had a venereal disease one year after the last act of molestation since there was no evidence or offer of proof that the defendant did not have the disease. Van Ricks v. State, 249 Ga. App. 80, 546 S.E.2d 919, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 365 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1136, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 702 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Exception did not apply. — When the state did not offer any medical evidence to prove the girl had been molested or any testimony to show that she had displayed symptoms consistent with the child abuse accommodation syndrome, the exception to the admissibility of past sexual activity did not apply and inquiry into the victim’s sexual history was precluded by former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b). Rocha v. State, 248 Ga. App. 53, 545 S.E.2d 173, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 430 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence in child sexual abuse cases. — Trial court did not err in refusing to allow cross-examination of a child sex abuse victim concerning alleged prior false accusations of molestation made against the victim’s half brother after the trial court conducted a hearing to determine if the allegations at issue had a “reasonable probability of falsity,” and ruled that the defense had not carried the defense’s burden of showing a reasonable 288 probability that the victim’s accusation against the victim’s half-brother was false; it was apparent that the trial court was faced with the conflicting testimony of the victim and the victim’s half-brother and found that of the victim more credible. Williams v. State, 266 Ga. App. 578, 597 S.E.2d 621, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1346, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 751 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Reference to evidence prohibited by rape shield law did not create manifest necessity for mistrial. — At defendant’s trial for various sexual offenses based on allegations by his stepdaughter, which were later recanted, there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial over defendant’s objection when a child abuse investigator mentioned, in violation of the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine based on former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, that the stepdaughter had viewed pornographic movies even though the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in granting the state’s motion in limine to exclude the evidence; defense counsel’s question to the investigator did not call for the improper response and, once the issue had been injected, the defense was entitled to clarify that defendant bore no responsibility for the victim’s viewing of the pornographic movies. (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Child molestation victim was not entitled to a new trial based on the victim’s testimony that she was a virgin prior to his first assault of her. Even assuming that the testimony violated the former rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 242-3(a), the challenged testimony was cumulative of other testimony to which defendant did not object. Collins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 623 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Although the trial court erred by excluding evidence of one child victim’s alleged homosexual relationship in defendant’s trial on 14 counts of child molestation and 11 counts of aggravated child molestation, it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict; even if defendant was 24-4-412 given the opportunity to cross-examine the victim about the victim’s past sexual behavior, the judge would have been unlikely to have adjudged that evidence as credible, completely disregarding defendant’s guilty plea and the other evidence that such a similar transaction did occur. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 854 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0113, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 33 (Ga. Jan. 17, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Constitutional challenge of rape shield statute denied. — Evidence that the victim was molested by her stepfather would not have diminished evidence that defendant molested the victim; therefore, application of the former rape shield statute did not deny him a fair trial. Rouse v. State, 204 Ga. App. 845, 420 S.E.2d 779, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1025 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1314, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Question regarding victim’s previous accusation against defendant. — Defense counsel was properly prohibited from asking the 11-year-old victim on cross-examination whether she had previously accused the defendant, her stepfather, of molesting her. Allen v. State, 210 Ga. App. 447, 436 S.E.2d 559, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1219 (1993), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019), overruled, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Questioning about motive to fabricate allegations not barred. — Limitation on cross-examination of an alleged child molestation victim, precluding examination of whether she was dating an older man, did not preclude questioning whether she had a motive to fabricate the allegations due to conflicts with defendant over parental discipline. Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 507 S.E.2d 833 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of victim’s sexually transmitted disease allowed. — Since the defendant was convicted of incest and child molestation, the trial court erred in disallowing the defendant to introduce medical evidence of a sexually transmit- 289 Child Molestation (Cont’d) ted disease for which the victim had tested positive for the purpose of corroborating defendant’s defense, not for the purpose of exploring the victim’s past or other sexual behavior. Chambers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 78, 421 S.E.2d 326, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1073 (1992), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Questioning about promiscuity precluded. — In a prosecution for child molestation and incest, the defendant was properly precluded from questioning the victim about her alleged promiscuity. Walker v. State, 234 Ga. App. 40, 506 S.E.2d 179 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Because evidence of the victim’s disease was inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(a), trial counsel’s performance could not be considered deficient based on a failure to contest the receipt of the medical information; thus, an order granting defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was reversed because even if counsel had requested a continuance for the purpose of testing the defendant, no reasonable likelihood existed that the outcome of the trial would have been different, and in fact, a negative result for defendant at the time of trial would not have established the medical condition at the time of the crimes, or rule out the possibility that the defendant had molested the victim. Murrell v. Ricks, 280 Ga. 427, 627 S.E.2d 546, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 153 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of victim’s sexual activity improperly excluded. — Trial court abused the court’s discretion in excluding evidence that a child molestation victim had been having sex with her boyfriend because the evidence would provide an alternate explanation as to why the victim’s hymen had been penetrated, and absent the evidence of the sexual relationship with the boyfriend, the obvious inference was that the defendant had caused the penetration injuries; the state decided to present evidence of the penetration damage to the victim’s hymen, and it was 24-4-412 the state’s affirmative act of “opening the door” to the area that required the trial court to allow the defendant to present evidence that someone other than the defendant caused the injury. Tidwell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 307, 701 S.E.2d 920, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 921 (2010), overruled in part, White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 823 S.E.2d 794, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 66 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Inapplicable to victim’s prior alleged molestations. — Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 did not bar the introduction of victim’s prior alleged molestations to show that someone other than defendant caused the injuries to the two victims. Lemacks v. State, 207 Ga. App. 160, 427 S.E.2d 536, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 112 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of child victim’s alleged viewing of pornography. — Trial court did not err in limiting inquiry into a child victim’s alleged viewing of the victim’s brother’s pornographic materials because there was no showing of relevance when the victim denied seeing the movies and did not use words of a sexual nature that normally would not be in the victim’s vocabulary. Montgomery v. State, 277 Ga. App. 142, 625 S.E.2d 529, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 9 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In the absence of a showing of relevance, evidence of a sexual molestation victim’s exposure to sexually explicit photographs or sexually explicit conversation was wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant committed the acts alleged by the victim, and was thus properly excluded by the trial court pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(a). Walker v. State, 308 Ga. App. 176, 707 S.E.2d 122, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of sexually transmitted disease. — Trial court did not err in refusing to allow the offered testimony regarding other sexual assaults upon the victim after defendant failed to offer proof that the victim’s stepfather was also infected with gonorrhea. Any evidence of the victim’s sexual activity with her stepfather would have shed no light on the origin of the victim’s sexually transmitted 290 disease. Rouse v. State, 204 Ga. App. 845, 420 S.E.2d 779, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1025 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1314, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Charge stating child under 16 could not consent to sexual intercourse. — Trial court did not plainly err in charging the jury that a child under the age of 16 years could not consent to sexual intercourse. Algren v. State, 330 Ga. App. 1, 764 S.E.2d 611, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 727 (2014). Harmless error. — Although the defendant in a child molestation case should have been allowed to question one of the teenagers involved about her sexual relationship with the defendant’s child because at the time of the trial, the former rape shield statute applied only to rape cases, the error was harmless; such a relationship was placed into evidence by the teenager’s own statements. Krirat v. State, 286 Ga. App. 650, 649 S.E.2d 786, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 778 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1788, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 745 (Ga. Oct. 9, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Incest Incest. — Former rape shield statute was applicable in prosecution for incest. Estes v. State, 165 Ga. App. 453, 301 S.E.2d 504, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1902 (1983), overruled in part, Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 549 S.E.2d 107, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 534 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Flirtation between child and parent inadmissible. — Trial court did not err by excluding evidence concerning daughter’s alleged flirtation with her stepfather because the former rape shield statute bars such evidence. Murphy v. State, 195 Ga. App. 878, 395 S.E.2d 76, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 695 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Incest was a sexual crime included within former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3. Haynes v. State, 180 Ga. App. 202, 349 S.E.2d 208, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2091 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In the defendant’s trial for rape, incest, and aggravated child molestation of the 24-4-412 defendant’s daughter over a period of years, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a sexual incident between the victim and the victim’s older brother because the evidence did not come within the exception to the Rape Shield Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412; the evidence was not admissible to show that the older brother’s testimony was biased. Torres v. State, 353 Ga. App. 470, 838 S.E.2d 137, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 25 (2020). Rape Evidence not admissible in rape case. — In a prosecution for rape and other offenses, the trial court properly precluded defendant from examining an officer regarding intimate photographs and letters written by the victim to her husband while he was in prison. Martin v. State, 219 Ga. App. 277, 464 S.E.2d 872, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1016 (1995), cert. denied, No. S96C0547, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 417 (Ga. Mar. 8, 1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Victim impact statement in which the victim stated that defendant “took her virginity” was not admissible for impeachment purposes under the former rape shield statute. Fetterolf v. State, 223 Ga. App. 744, 478 S.E.2d 889 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In a rape trial, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach the victim with a certified copy of a misdemeanor conviction for prostitution because moral turpitude was no longer the impeachment standard. The prostitution conviction was inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609) because the conviction did not involve an element of dishonesty or false statement, and the conviction was barred from admission by the rape shield statute because the conviction related to the victim’s past sexual behavior and did not come within an exception in former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3. Green v. State, 291 Ga. 287, 728 S.E.2d 668, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 630 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to seek to introduce evidence at trial that the victim had consensual sexual intercourse with the victim’s partner be- 291 Rape (Cont’d) fore the sexual assault because the defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting from the alleged deficiency as the victim identified the defendant as the victim’s attacker at trial and in a show-up identification and photographic lineup before trial and unequivocally testified that the defendant forced the victim to have sexual intercourse. Lanham v. State, 345 Ga. App. 657, 813 S.E.2d 184, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 239 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1287, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 768 (Ga. Nov. 15, 2018). When the defendant was convicted of rape, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by refusing to allow the defendant to introduce sexually explicit photographs the victim allegedly sent to the defendant, which the defendant argued would communicate to the jury that the defendant could have assumed that the victim consented to have sex with the defendant because the defendant conceded that the photographs were sent before the defendant and the victim had ended their relationship, at least 10 months before the rape; and it was undisputed that the parties had a consensual, sexual relationship when the photographs were sent. Bryant v. State, 346 Ga. App. 176, 815 S.E.2d 596, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 344 (2018). Evidence concerning a romantic relationship between the victim and a recused prosecuting attorney was inadmissible. Griffin v. State, 224 Ga. App. 225, 480 S.E.2d 608 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). There was no error in the trial court’s refusal to allow defendant to introduce evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior to explain how her hymen became perforated. Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 492 S.E.2d 564 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Even though defendant obtained a pretrial order allowing him to present testimony that he and the victim had previously had consensual intercourse, his asking a nurse about the victim’s statement to her about a prior act of voluntary intercourse violated the former rape shield statute since this evidence was not 24-4-412 included in defendant’s proffer. Banks v. State, 230 Ga. App. 258, 495 S.E.2d 877 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court properly excluded evidence as to the victims’ past sexual behavior in defendant’s rape and aggravated assault trial as defendant failed to satisfy either prong of former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b) since: (1) the victims were beaten; (2) one victim testified that she was pushed to the ground and hit in the face; (3) the other victim was dragged to an abandoned yard and told repeatedly to “shut up” while being punched in the face; and (4) the victims testified that they never had sex with defendant before the night in question. Williams v. State, 257 Ga. App. 54, 570 S.E.2d 362, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1043 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Since the victim never claimed that defendant was the father of her child, evidence of her sexual conduct was irrelevant pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 242-3(b). Carson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 21, 576 S.E.2d 12, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1565 (2002), overruled in part, Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 663 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In a prosecution for rape and sodomy, the trial court properly refused to allow the defendant to present evidence as to the victim’s past conduct in which she allegedly consented to sex in exchange for drugs as defendant did not proffer any evidence to demonstrate the basis for his belief that the victim consented to his conduct. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 77, 579 S.E.2d 87, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 317 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0934, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 565 (Ga. June 9, 2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former rape shield statute was properly used to exclude testimony of the victim’s mother and in limiting victim’s cross-examination; the evidence excluded under the former rape shield statute involved the victim’s sexual act with a third party and was also excludable on relevancy grounds. Abdulkadir v. State, 264 Ga. App. 805, 592 S.E.2d 433, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1513 (2003), aff’d, 279 Ga. 122, 610 S.E.2d 50, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 161 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). 292 Evidence of the sexual history of defendant’s wife was properly excluded under the former Georgia Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, as defendant was charged with the aggravated assault of his wife in conjunction with a rape charge; trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that evidence of the prior sexual history of defendant’s wife was admissible. Osterhout v. State, 266 Ga. App. 319, 596 S.E.2d 766, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 363 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court properly refused to allow testimony that a victim of domestic violence had been seen working as a prostitute because that information had no relevance to the aggravated assault and false imprisonment charges for which a defendant was convicted and, further, the defendant failed to produce any evidence that could have provided a nexus between the alleged prostitution and a conclusion that someone else might have inflicted the victim’s injuries. Moorer v. State, 290 Ga. App. 216, 659 S.E.2d 422, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 286 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in excluding the defendant’s testimony regarding statements the victim allegedly made to the defendant because the statements were prohibited by the former Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(a), since the statements made reference to the victim’s past sexual behavior by implying that the victim had sex in the past with her boyfriend and with older men; the defendant would not have reasonably believed that the victim consented to sex because there was testimony that the victim was intoxicated, in and out of consciousness, and unable to move. Turner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 315, 718 S.E.2d 545, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 944 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to cross-examine his daughter, the victim’s friend, about a comment she posted on a website concerning the victim because the testimony the defendant sought to elicit, that the victim had sex with other men, was the very type of evidence prohibited by the former Rape 24-4-412 Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-23(a). Turner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 315, 718 S.E.2d 545, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 944 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of past sexual behavior not admissible when it did not involve participation by defendant. — When the state also prosecuted the defendant for the rape of the victim’s older sister, the rape shield statute barred the evidence sought by the defendant because the evidence related to the past sexual behavior of the older sister and did not fall within the statutory exceptions as the past sexual behavior of the older sister having sex with boys for money did not involve the participation of the defendant and did not support an inference that the defendant reasonably believed that the older sister consented to the defendant’s alleged sexual activities with the older sister. Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 568, 798 S.E.2d 87, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 101 (2017). Rape shield law precluded fishing expedition. — Trial court did not err in prohibiting the defendant from seeking testimony regarding the victim’s prior sexual activity because the defendant wanted to perform a fishing expedition for all possible persons who could have been the father of the victim’s child and then backtrack for a motive to lie, which was the type of unfettered exploration the statute was designed to prevent. Atkins v. State, 304 Ga. 240, 818 S.E.2d 567, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 542 (2018). Testimony about ongoing customer-prostitute relationship should be allowed. — Defendant’s aggravated sodomy conviction was reversed after the trial court erroneously refused to allow testimony concerning defendant’s fiveyear relationship with the victim, a prostitute, under Georgia’s former Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3; the ongoing customer-prostitute relationship between the two would support a reasonable inference that defendant believed that the defendant’s sexual relationship with the victim on the night in question was consensual; the evidence also had a direct bearing on the victim’s motivation to fabricate the rape allega- 293 Rape (Cont’d) tion, and therefore was admissible; defendant’s proposed cross-examination of the victim was confined to the existence of an ongoing relationship between them. Ivey v. State, 264 Ga. App. 377, 590 S.E.2d 781, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1484 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Use of term “virgin” prohibited. — Any evidence of physical injuries a victim received during the commission of a rape, including the condition of the hymen, was admissible, but the term “virgin” was a comment on prior sexual history and therefore not admissible. Herndon v. State, 232 Ga. App. 129, 499 S.E.2d 918 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Inquiry about dress prohibited. — Trial court properly refused to permit defendant to introduce evidence or to make inquiry about the mode of the victim’s dress on the night of the rape. Alford v. State, 243 Ga. App. 212, 534 S.E.2d 81, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 427 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Victim’s desire to keep knowledge of sexual activity from parents. — Despite defendant’s contention that defendant should have been allowed to present evidence that the victim had the motive to fabricate her claim of rape in order to prevent her parents from knowing that she had become sexually active, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in restricting defendant’s cross-examination of the victim regarding her past sexual history based on Green v. State, 221 Ga. App. 436 (1996). Lloyd v. State, 263 Ga. App. 234, 587 S.E.2d 372, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1123 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0214, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 170 (Ga. Feb. 16, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of victim’s prior sexual history properly excluded. — Trial court did not err in failing to grant a motion in limine in which the defendant’s counsel sought to cross-examine the victim as to the victim’s prior sexual history as an exception to Georgia’s Rape Shield Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412, because nothing about the victim’s past sexual behavior with other people showed that the victim knew the defendant or con- 24-4-412 sented to the sexual encounter with the defendant. Freeman v. State, 367 Ga. App. 57, 885 S.E.2d 27, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 110 (2023). Effectiveness of counsel in questioning. — Failure of defense counsel to cross-examine rape victim regarding her prior sexual history was not ineffective assistance of counsel since such questioning was clearly prohibited under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3. Brown v. State, 225 Ga. App. 49, 483 S.E.2d 318. Inquiring about areas of victim fabrication. — When defendant was charged with raping a victim who accepted defendant’s offer of a ride as the victim was on her way to return a jacket to a former boyfriend, the former rape shield law, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(a), did not prohibit defendant from inquiring of the victim about a theory that the victim fabricated the rape charge to explain semen stains on the boyfriend’s jacket, resulting from the sexual encounter, because she wanted to reestablish a romantic relationship with the boyfriend because defendant was not seeking to inquire about the victim’s character for sexual behavior. Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 639, 581 S.E.2d 528, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 544 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by excluding cross-examination and testimony concerning a 15-year-old rape victim’s alleged past sexual encounters under the former Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, despite the defendants’ claims that the victim fabricated her story in retaliation for the defendant telling her mother that she was sexually active. McIntyre v. State, 311 Ga. App. 173, 715 S.E.2d 431, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 589 (2011), aff’d, 291 Ga. 45, 727 S.E.2d 465, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 439 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Applies to any prosecution for rape, making no distinction between the different phases of the trial. Singleton v. State, 157 Ga. App. 192, 276 S.E.2d 685, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1731 (1981) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Statutory rape. — Although the former rape shield statute was applicable by the statute’s terms to rape cases, logic and the intent of the former statute showed 294 that it should be equally applicable in statutory rape cases, except that the exceptions in the former statute relating to consent and the accused’s prior participation would be inapplicable in statutory rape cases. Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 260 S.E.2d 40, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1217 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1); Hill v. State, 159 Ga. App. 489, 283 S.E.2d 703, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2661 (1981) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1); Brown v. State, 173 Ga. App. 640, 327 S.E.2d 515, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2661 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence of sexual intercourse between the victim and other individuals was properly excluded under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3; in the absence of any indication that the prior acts of sexual intercourse were forcibly accomplished, evidence of sexual intercourse with others would relate to past sexual behavior and reflect upon the character of the victim. Berry v. State, 210 Ga. App. 789, 437 S.E.2d 630, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1350 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0243, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 166 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of other sexual activity with defendant allowed. — Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 permitted introduction of evidence of other sexual activity of the complaining witness only if such behavior involved the defendant or if such evidence supported an inference that the defendant reasonably believed the complaining witness would have consented to his actions. Rouse v. State, 204 Ga. App. 845, 420 S.E.2d 779, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1025 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1314, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence that victim had contracted gonorrhea three months before she was raped, that she wore sexually suggestive clothing and acted promiscuously when she frequented nightclubs, and that she demanded money from another man threatening to claim that he raped her was properly ruled inadmissible. Ford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 395, 376 24-4-412 S.E.2d 418, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1446 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Victim’s statements to defendant about past relationships. — Former rape shield statute applied to victim’s statements to defendant about her having had sexual relations with black men and having had children by these men which defendant sought to introduce as evidence that defendant believed the victim consented to have sex with him. Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 442 S.E.2d 883, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 398 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1164, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 843 (Ga. July 1, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Exclusion of previous consensual sexual relationship. — In a case decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, the trial court did not err in granting the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that the defendant and the victim had a prior sexual relationship as there was no way, given the circumstances of the episode, that the defendant reasonably believed the victim consented to sexual intercourse, even if the victim had previously done so. Johnson v. State, 322 Ga. App. 612, 744 S.E.2d 903, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 573 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Reasonable belief that victim consented. — Since the defendant knew the victim for only one hour before the alleged rape occurred, and since in that time, it was unlikely that the defendant discovered any past sexual activity on the part of his victim that could justify his claim that she consented to intercourse, the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence as to the victim’s prior sexual experience was not a denial of defendant’s right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. Lamar v. State, 243 Ga. 401, 254 S.E.2d 353, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 913 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Proffered testimony of two young men regarding the victim’s advances toward them was inadmissible in a rape case since there was no evidence of consent by the victim, nor any evidence that defendant had knowledge of the alleged conduct between the victim and the two young men. Moore v. State, 195 Ga. App. 851, 295 24-4-412 Rape (Cont’d) 395 S.E.2d 13 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence that a victim of an attempted rape had recorded a phone-sex tape did not support an inference that the defendant could have reasonably believed that she consented to the attempted sexual intercourse. Sweeney v. State, 233 Ga. App. 862, 506 S.E.2d 150 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Refusal to allow cross-examination of rape victim on existence of pubic hairs found on victim inconsistent with those of appellant and victim was not error. Tremble v. State, 162 Ga. App. 761, 292 S.E.2d 442, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2330 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In rape cases, proof of prior consent without regard to identity of persons or similarity of circumstances may be admitted to allow the jury to weigh or calculate the probability of consent with respect to an entire class of “unchaste” women when the court finds that the evidence supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained of. Hardy v. State, 159 Ga. App. 854, 285 S.E.2d 547, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2848 (1981) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). State’s introduction of evidence that victims contracted gonorrhea after rape and that defendant had gonorrhea during time in question did not authorize defendant to question victims concerning their prior sexual conduct. McNeese v. State, 170 Ga. App. 118, 316 S.E.2d 564, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 1821 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Sexual Battery No application in sexual battery cases. — Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that it could consider the victim’s character in determining whether the sexual contact with defendant was consensual or against the victim’s will since the former rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, on which defendant relied in arguing for the instruction, did not apply directly to sexual offenses such as sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery, and also because there was no evidence of any past sexual behavior between defendant and the victim. Stinson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 902, 569 S.E.2d 858, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 700 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1912, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 987 (Ga. Oct. 28, 2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence not admissible in sexual assault case. — Trial court correctly granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning the sexual assault victim having had consensual sex with her boyfriend before defendant sexually assaulted her because the former Georgia rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, barred the sexual assault victim’s prior sexual history as having any relevance to defendant’s intent at the time of his sexual assault on the victim. Bing v. State, 256 Ga. App. 88, 567 S.E.2d 731, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 841 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 was applicable to prosecutions for aggravated assault with intent to rape, and trial court did not err in sustaining the state’s objection to defense counsel’s questions concerning the prosecutors’ previous sexual conduct. Blount v. State, 172 Ga. App. 120, 322 S.E.2d 323, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2423 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Sodomy Evidence not admissible in sodomy case. — Evidence of any previous consensual homosexual fantasies the victim may have had was not admissible because it would in no way support an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the conduct complained of in the prosecution, which included armed robbery and kidnapping, as well as non-consensual aggravated sodomy at knife point. Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 543 S.E.2d 81, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1407 (2000), cert. denied, No. S01C0522, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 388 (Ga. May 7, 2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0492, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 395 (Ga. May 296 7, 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). In a prosecution for aggravated sodomy, even though the former rape shield statute did not apply, evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior with persons other than the defendant was properly excluded as not relevant since the defendant’s defense was that he was not there, rather than that the victim had consented. Mobley v. State, 212 Ga. App. 293, 441 S.E.2d 780, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 227 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Evidence of victim’s prior relationships with defendant. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in excluding evidence of a rape victim’s alleged past sexual behavior with defendant as the evidence of alleged prior sexual encounters with the victim did not lead to an inference of consent since the evidence established that defendant could not have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the sodomy and intercourse at issue based on defendant brandishing a gun and threatening to shoot the victim’s friend and the victim if the victim did not comply with defendant’s demands for sex. Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 718 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Procedure Defense must notify court of need for in camera hearing. — Before a trial court can be faulted for refusing an in camera hearing as provided for by former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, the court must be placed on notice as to the intent of the defense to seek to introduce such evidence, and the defense must specifically notify the court of the need for an in camera hearing for its offer of proof. Tucker v. State, 173 Ga. App. 742, 327 S.E.2d 852, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2672 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3); Evans v. State, 180 Ga. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 561, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2070 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Defendant was not entitled to an in camera hearing on defendant’s offer of proof of the victim’s past sexual behavior 24-4-412 when the defendant later testified before the jury that the defendant had consensual sex with the victim and the defendant never made a proffer of anticipated testimony of an independent witness who would testify that the witness saw the consensual sex. Nelson v. State, 210 Ga. App. 249, 435 S.E.2d 750, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1125 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Victim may not appeal finding of admissibility. — Since the victim is not the defendant, the court does not consider any prejudice to her that admission of sexual history evidence may allow as against its probative value; nor is she provided any right of appeal against a finding of admissibility. Once the pertinence of a woman’s lack of chastity, and hence its admissibility, is determined at the in camera inspection, this character trait may be proved. Hardy v. State, 159 Ga. App. 854, 285 S.E.2d 547, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2848 (1981) (decided under Ga. L. 1976, p. 741, § 1). Retrial Reprosecution not barred when evidence inappropriately introduced. — Defendant’s introduction of evidence that was prohibited by the former rape shield statute gave the court grounds to find manifest necessity for a mistrial; therefore, state and federal double jeopardy provisions did not bar reprosecution. Banks v. State, 230 Ga. App. 258, 495 S.E.2d 877 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s plea in bar of former jeopardy with regard to kidnapping, rape, and other charges for alleged crimes committed against the defendant’s estranged wife as defense counsel violated the former Rape Shield Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3, in questioning the defendant’s spouse as to how often the spouse had engaged in sexual intercourse after the alleged rape, which entitled the state to a mistrial. The defendant did not have the right to force the state either to endure a prejudiced trial or forego prosecution entirely. Birdsong v. State, 298 Ga. App. 322, 680 S.E.2d 159, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 675 297 Retrial (Cont’d) (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Retrial not barred by double jeopardy clause. — Trial judge did not abuse the judge’s discretion in determining that declaration of a mistrial was required because prejudicial and inadmissible matter injected by the defense in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 made it impossible for an impartial verdict to be reached, and retrial of defendant was not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. Abdi v. State, 249 Ga. 827, 294 S.E.2d 506, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1200 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Declaration of a mistrial by the trial judge, on the judge’s own motion, in a rape prosecution, following the cross-examination of the alleged victim, which culminated in a question by defense counsel concerning the past sexual behavior of the witness, a violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 that was “highly improper” and prejudicial, was proper and did not bar a second trial of the defendant for the alleged offense. Abdi v. Georgia, 744 F.2d 1500, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1006, 105 S. Ct. 1871, 85 L. Ed. 2d 164, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 260 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3). Given the nature of the question, which violated the Rape Shield Statute, defense counsel’s suggestion that the victim told the defendant that the victim was not a virgin, the prejudice to the state’s case, and the trial court’s careful consideration of the law, facts, and possible alternatives, the trial court did not abuse the court’s broad discretion in declaring a mistrial based on defense counsel’s improper questioning of the witness, and the defendant’s subsequent plea in bar of former jeopardy was properly denied. Chisholm v. State, 355 Ga. App. 19, 842 S.E.2d 327, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 247 (2020). Evidence of victim’s character irrelevant. — With regard to a defendant’s conviction for child molestation as well as the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court did not err by limiting the defendant’s cross- 24-4-412 examination of the victim by refusing to allow the defendant to cross-examine the 11-year-old victim regarding an alleged Internet profile page that listed the victim’s age as 17 years old and having an occupation as a cheerleader for a professional sports team. The victim’s age was not at issue in the case nor was the fact that the victim had previously stated that the victim was a cheerleader for a professional sports team, thus, the trial court properly ruled that the defendant was merely attempting to run around the prohibition on the admission of prior bad acts and impeach the victim about an immaterial issue. Daniel v. State, 296 Ga. App. 513, 675 S.E.2d 472, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1192, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 326 (Ga. June 8, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2). Evidence of nonchastity of victim inadmissible in trial of child molestation charge. — To the extent that the alleged evidence, sought to be introduced by the defendant, concerning the general reputation and character of the victim, dealt with the victim’s reputation for nonchastity, it was inadmissible at trial in a prosecution for child molestation. Lively v. State, 157 Ga. App. 419, 278 S.E.2d 67, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1852 (1981) ((decided under former Code 1933, § 38-202). Evidence of nonchastity of victim inadmissible. — When the defendant was charged with rape and aggravated sodomy, the Rape Shield Statute barred defense counsel’s question about the victim’s nonchastity because it related to the victim’s past sexual behavior, and it did not fall within the single statutory exception as it did not directly involve the participation of the accused. Chisholm v. State, 355 Ga. App. 19, 842 S.E.2d 327, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 247 (2020). Whether or not the victim was a prostitute was not relevant to the determination of who killed the victim. Bryant v. State, 249 Ga. 242, 290 S.E.2d 75, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1125 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2). School disciplinary record of victim inadmissible. — Trial court did not err in granting the state’s motion in limine, which sought to prevent the defendant from introducing the victim’s school 298 records in an attempt to show that the victim had disciplinary problems, since such evidence was absolutely irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution for child molestation. Lively v. State, 157 Ga. App. 419, 278 S.E.2d 67, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1852 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-202). Victim’s bomb threat irrelevant. — Because making a bomb threat did not unambiguously reflect on a child victim’s credibility, honesty, or imagination, was not related to the victim’s testimony, and was not material to the issues on trial, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in refusing to allow the defense to introduce the evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-404 and 24-4-405). Bentley v. 24-4-412 State, 277 Ga. App. 483, 627 S.E.2d 61, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 72 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1050, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. June 12, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2). Victim’s involvement in charitable civic organization inadmissible. — In a rape prosecution, while the prosecutor should not have been allowed to question the victim about the victim’s involvement with a civic organization that helped mentally ill children, the admission of such irrelevant material did not warrant a mistrial. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 77, 579 S.E.2d 87, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 317 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0934, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 565 (Ga. June 9, 2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2).