O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6

State, 212 Ga. App. 278, 442 S.E.2d 462, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 239 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Only when evidence is wholly circumstantial is substance of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 required to be given in charge, and when there was direct evidence, as well as circumstantial, and when there was no such equality of theories of guilt or innocence as to require such charge it was not error to refuse charge as requested by defendant. Bearden v. State, 163 Ga. App. 434, 294 S.E.2d 667, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2521 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 24-14-6 Only when the case is wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence is a charge on circumstantial evidence required. Galloway v. State, 165 Ga. App. 536, 301 S.E.2d 894, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1937 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Jury charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, though requested by a defendant, is required only when the evidence relied on for conviction is entirely circumstantial. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3044 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Todd v. State, 184 Ga. App. 750, 362 S.E.2d 400, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because the state presented direct evidence that the defendant committed a drive-by shooting and the defendant did not request the full circumstantial evidence instruction in writing, the trial court did not commit reversible error; the trial court instructed the jury on the deﬁnition of circumstantial evidence and gave a full instruction on reasonable doubt. Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 763 S.E.2d 704, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 722 (2014). Charge when case totally dependent on circumstantial evidence. — Refusal to give a requested instruction on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 is not error except when the case is totally dependent upon circumstantial evidence. Heath v. State, 186 Ga. App. 655, 368 S.E.2d 346, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 426 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Lewis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 808, 403 S.E.2d 233, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 286 (1991). When there is some direct evidence against the defendant, it is not error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence. Terrell v. State, 258 Ga. 722, 373 S.E.2d 751, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 512 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant’s requested instruction on circumstantial evidence since the evidence in the case was not entirely circumstantial. Ebenezer v. State, 191 Ga. App. 901, 383 S.E.2d 373, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 865 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Rainey v. State, 216 Ga. App. 557, 455 S.E.2d 73, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 580 194 (1995), aff’d, 266 Ga. 163, 465 S.E.2d 447, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 39 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Carter v. State, 240 Ga. App. 203, 523 S.E.2d 47 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence since direct evidence of guilt obviated the requirement of such a charge. Baines v. State, 201 Ga. App. 354, 411 S.E.2d 95, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1341 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). In a case involving both direct and circumstantial evidence, it was not reversible error for the trial court to fail to give a charge on circumstantial evidence as contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, nor to fail to instruct the jury that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence was permissible only if the offense charged was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. This type of instruction was required only when the case was totally dependent upon circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 405 S.E.2d 716, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 591 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in failing to give a charge on circumstantial evidence since the requested charge was not adjusted to the principles involved in the case since a charge on how the jury should treat a defendant’s testimony in the context of a circumstantial evidence case was included but defendant did not testify. Minor v. State, 264 Ga. 195, 442 S.E.2d 754, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 423 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Failure to charge on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not reversible error when the case was not close or doubtful, the charge on reasonable doubt was full and fair, and no other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt was offered. Cato v. State, 212 Ga. App. 417, 441 S.E.2d 900, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 283 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Even if the victims were impeached, a charge on circumstantial evidence was not warranted because there was no other evidence authorizing a verdict of guilty. Miller v. State, 212 Ga. App. 193, 441 24-14-6 S.E.2d 443, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 186 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C0925, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 666 (Ga. Apr. 15, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because there was some direct evidence of defendant’s guilt and no request was made for a charge on circumstantial evidence, the trial court’s failure to give an instruction in the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not error. Brooks v. State, 265 Ga. 548, 458 S.E.2d 349, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 510 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the state’s case includes both direct and circumstantial evidence, a defendant is not relieved from the necessity of requesting the charge and, in the absence of such a request, it is not error to fail to give the charge. Yarn v. State, 265 Ga. 787, 462 S.E.2d 359, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 732 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Failure to give a requested circumstantial evidence charge was not error because the evidence was consistent only with defendant’s guilt as to the acts alleged in the indictment and was completely inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Carroll v. State, 224 Ga. App. 543, 481 S.E.2d 562 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Request of circumstantial evidence charge required. — Defendant must request a circumstantial evidence charge within a similar transaction charge since the case against the defendant is not wholly circumstantial. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 252, 511 S.E.2d 603 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because the defendant did not request a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to give the charge. Barrino v. State, 282 Ga. App. 496, 639 S.E.2d 489, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1445 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence because nothing of record showed that the defendant requested such a charge; nevertheless, the record showed that the trial court properly charged the jury sua sponte on circumstantial evidence, and when trial counsel was asked if counsel objected to the jury charge as 581 In General (Cont’d) given counsel indicated that counsel did not, which resulted in waiver on appeal. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Direct evidence presented. — Defense counsel was not ineffective in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, for failing to request a charge on circumstantial evidence based on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, which imposed certain requirements for convictions based on circumstantial evidence; the trial court adequately charged the jury on reasonable doubt, and direct evidence for both offenses was presented. Guillen v. State, 275 Ga. App. 316, 620 S.E.2d 518, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 954 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0146, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 141 (Ga. Feb. 13, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because the evidence rested largely on the direct evidence provided by the eyewitnesses to the event, and there was no reasonable likelihood that had the circumstantial evidence charge been given to the jury the outcome of the trial would have differed, the defendant’s trial counsel could not be found ineffective in failing to request the instruction. Holden v. State, 287 Ga. App. 472, 651 S.E.2d 552, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1009 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0189, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because the testimony from the medical examiner amounted to direct, and not circumstantial, evidence that: (1) the accident the defendant was charged with causing caused the decedent’s death; (2) either the defendant’s or the other impact caused the blunt force trauma to the decedent’s head; and (3) any of the impacts, alone, could have caused the trauma, the defendant’s requested circumstantial evidence charge was properly denied by the trial court. Kirk v. State, 289 Ga. App. 125, 656 S.E.2d 251, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 18 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Request for charge in writing. — Because the defendant made an oral request that the jury be charged on the law 24-14-6 under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, but did not make a written request for that charge, the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury as the defendant requested. Attaway v. State, 284 Ga. App. 855, 644 S.E.2d 919, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the evidence at trial consisted of both direct and circumstantial evidence, the defendant did not request in writing a charge regarding former O.C.G.A. § 244-6, and defense counsel stated that the trial court’s proposed charges were sufficient, it was not error not to give a charge based on former § 24-4-6. Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 765 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Must request charge on circumstantial evidence. — Unless the evidence relied upon for conviction is entirely circumstantial, it is not error to fail to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in the absence of a request to do so. Wilson v. State, 152 Ga. 337, 110 S.E. 8, 1921 Ga. LEXIS 87 (1921) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Chamblee v. State, 50 Ga. App. 251, 177 S.E. 824, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 726 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Roberts v. State, 50 Ga. App. 307, 177 S.E. 825, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 748 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wyatt v. State, 50 Ga. App. 266, 177 S.E. 840, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 735 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 119 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. State, 66 Ga. App. 655, 19 S.E.2d 40, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 264 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 430, 22 S.E.2d 65, 1942 Ga. LEXIS 605 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Miller v. State, 69 Ga. App. 847, 26 S.E.2d 851, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 194 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Newsome v. State, 69 Ga. App. 445, 26 S.E.2d 113, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 111 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Daniels v. State, 199 Ga. 818, 35 S.E.2d 362, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 370 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson 582 v. State, 84 Ga. App. 745, 67 S.E.2d 246, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 783 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Young v. State, 85 Ga. App. 122, 68 S.E.2d 219, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 1013 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Hicks v. State, 86 Ga. App. 365, 71 S.E.2d 695, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 956 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Weaver v. State, 86 Ga. App. 699, 71 S.E.2d 901, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 1032 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. 333, 72 S.E.2d 291, 1952 Ga. LEXIS 478 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); King v. State, 86 Ga. App. 786, 72 S.E.2d 502, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 1061 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Marshman v. State, 88 Ga. App. 250, 76 S.E.2d 443, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1058 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 88 Ga. App. 330, 76 S.E.2d 810, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1078 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wiggins v. State, 92 Ga. App. 65, 87 S.E.2d 652, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 522 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Nelson v. State, 92 Ga. App. 746, 90 S.E.2d 91, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 706 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Weatherby v. State, 213 Ga. 188, 97 S.E.2d 698, 1957 Ga. LEXIS 338 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Whiting v. State, 108 Ga. App. 374, 133 S.E.2d 50, 1963 Ga. App. LEXIS 649 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ryder v. State, 121 Ga. App. 796, 175 S.E.2d 882, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1362 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Bryant v. State, 229 Ga. 60, 189 S.E.2d 435, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 499 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 220 S.E.2d 448, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 909 (1975), overruled in part, Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 849 S.E.2d 425, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 738 (2020); (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 584, 255 S.E.2d 702, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 999 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Fuller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 734, 305 S.E.2d 463, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3270 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73, 24-14-6 1984 Ga. LEXIS 629 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); McGarity v. State, 212 Ga. App. 17, 440 S.E.2d 695, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 119 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C0811, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 506 (Ga. Mar. 25, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 478, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 948, 121 S. Ct. 350, 148 L. Ed. 2d 282, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6984 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court failed to give a complete jury charge on circumstantial evidence because the evidence against the defendant was both direct and circumstantial and, thus, the statutory language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not required. Evans v. State, 288 Ga. 571, 707 S.E.2d 353, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 92 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested jury instruction based on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, concerning a conviction based on circumstantial evidence because such a charge was not warranted since the state’s evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction was not circumstantial; the state relied on direct evidence in the form of the eyewitness testimony of the two police officers. Crawford v. State, 314 Ga. App. 796, 726 S.E.2d 58, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 149 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1218, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 715 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial premised on the defendant’s contention that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel failing to request a jury charge because the state adduced both direct eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence at trial in the case, thus, the trial court was not required to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 244-6. Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 1067 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because the defendant’s admissions of guilt following the killing were direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the state’s case was not based solely on circumstan- 583 In General (Cont’d) tial evidence and the additional circumstantial evidence charge requested by the defendant was not required. RodriguezNova v. State, 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 818 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Charge not required when guilt is the only reasonable hypothesis. — Even in a case which is wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence, if from the proved facts only one reasonable hypothesis presents itself, i.e., that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, then a failure to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 does not furnish cause for a new trial. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). But see Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502. Better practice to charge statute on circumstantial evidence when the evidence upon which the state depends for conviction is both direct and circumstantial. Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 706 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jackson v. State, 92 Ga. App. 774, 90 S.E.2d 29, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 711 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ramsey v. State, 212 Ga. 381, 92 S.E.2d 866, 1956 Ga. LEXIS 378 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Holton v. State, 192 Ga. App. 745, 386 S.E.2d 404, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1165 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence charge should have been given. — When state introduced circumstantial as well as direct evidence in the state’s case against defendant, defendant was entitled to have defendant’s requested charge on circumstantial evidence given to the jury. Mims v. State, 264 Ga. 271, 443 S.E.2d 845, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 452 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). A trial court’s failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 constituted reversible error, even though the defendant failed to request such a charge, because the evidence against the defendant in a cocaine trafficking case under O.C.G.A. § 16-13- 24-14-6 31(a)(1) was entirely circumstantial based on the defendant’s participation in the crime with the defendant’s sibling and a third party. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 71, 692 S.E.2d 737, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 278 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Charging precise language of statute unnecessary. — Failure of the court to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in the exact language of the statute is not error. Sellers v. State, 36 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E. 912, 1927 Ga. App. LEXIS 217 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S.E. 896, 1928 Ga. LEXIS 346 (1928) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Brent v. State, 44 Ga. App. 777, 163 S.E. 319, 1932 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Pound v. State, 180 Ga. 83, 178 S.E. 291, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 179 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Rowland v. State, 51 Ga. App. 54, 179 S.E. 585, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 551 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Sanders v. State, 71 Ga. App. 334, 30 S.E.2d 810, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 356 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Townsend v. State, 86 Ga. App. 459, 71 S.E.2d 738, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 976 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Roman v. State, 155 Ga. App. 355, 271 S.E.2d 21, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2575 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Trial court need not track the exact language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 in order to satisfy the requirement that the jury be instructed on the principle of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to warrant a conviction. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2693 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court was not required to give the exact language of former O.C.G.A. § 244-6 in the court’s charge to the jury. Richards v. State, 189 Ga. App. 146, 375 S.E.2d 278, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Charge on circumstantial evidence which added the word “alone” to the statutory phrase “to warrant a conviction on 584 circumstantial evidence,” was the functional equivalent of the statutory language because the trial court did not have to track the exact language in order to properly instruct the jury on the principle contained therein. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 476 S.E.2d 583 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Wynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 98, 511 S.E.2d 201 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Morris v. State, 239 Ga. App. 100, 520 S.E.2d 485 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When a circumstantial evidence charge given to the jury added the word “alone” to the phrase “to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence,” it was the functional equivalent of the rule contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 and was not error. Martin v. State, 235 Ga. App. 844, 510 S.E.2d 602 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in giving a circumstantial evidence charge that was the functional equivalent of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 since the trial court added the word “alone” twice, substituted the word “theory” for “hypothesis,” and ampliﬁed upon the statutory language. Johnson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 455, 554 S.E.2d 587, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1054 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Failure to track statute’s language held to be error. — Even though the trial court instructed the jury on the deﬁnitions of direct and circumstantial evidence and the difference between them, its refusal to give defendant’s requested charge tracking the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was reversible error. Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 501 S.E.2d 870 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Charge using the statutory language satisﬁed the requirement that, where the state’s case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence must be given on request. Wiley v. State, 238 Ga. App. 334, 519 S.E.2d 10 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction deﬁning circumstantial evidence and its weight approved. — Following instruction was entirely consistent with former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6: “Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts 24-14-6 or circumstances by direct evidence from which you may infer other related or connected facts which are reasonable and justiﬁed in the light of your experience. Circumstantial evidence alone will not justify a ﬁnding of guilt unless the circumstances are entirely consistent with the defendant’s guilt, wholly inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant’s innocence, and are so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Carpenter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 634, 307 S.E.2d 19, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3338 (1983), aff’d, 252 Ga. 79, 310 S.E.2d 912, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 585 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Court’s instruction was proper which instructed the jury concerning the differences between direct and circumstantial evidence and charged that the comparative weight of circumstantial evidence and direct evidence on any given issue is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Grier v. State, 217 Ga. App. 409, 458 S.E.2d 139, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 463 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s request that the court give a “two theories” charge did not constitute a request for a charge on circumstantial evidence. Grier v. State, 217 Ga. App. 409, 458 S.E.2d 139, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 463 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Charge language describing two equal theories. — Charge language describing two equal theories, one of guilt and the other of innocence, did not accurately state the principle addressed. The charge related to the weight of the evidence and therefore was not an accurate statement of the “two theories” principle. Langston v. State, 208 Ga. App. 175, 430 S.E.2d 365, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 472 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Blue v. State, 212 Ga. App. 847, 433 S.E.2d 635 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant was not entitled to an instruction that, when the facts, evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two reasonable theories, one of guilt and the other consistent with innocence, the justice and humanity of the law 585 In General (Cont’d) compels acceptance of the theory which is consistent with innocence; the requested charge was not substantially equivalent to the principle set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Jones v. State, 213 Ga. App. 11, 444 S.E.2d 89, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 450 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1213, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 854 (Ga. July 14, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the trial court properly charged the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence, the presumption of innocence and the need to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it was not error to refuse to give the “two theories” charge. Stephens v. State, 214 Ga. App. 183, 447 S.E.2d 26, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 819 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1802, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1195 (Ga. Nov. 18, 1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1803, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1196 (Ga. Nov. 18, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). It is never error to refuse to give a requested “two equal theories” charge when a trial court properly instructs the jury on circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 857, 452 S.E.2d 494, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 43 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Mitchell v. State, 233 Ga. App. 92, 503 S.E.2d 293 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Failure to charge circumstantial evidence harmless error since the case is not close or doubtful and the charge on reasonable doubt is full and fair. Germany v. State, 235 Ga. 836, 221 S.E.2d 817, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1461 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1496 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). But see Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502; 154 Ga. App. 871, 269 S.E.2d 883 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hinton v. State, 215 Ga. App. 750, 452 S.E.2d 519, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1367 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 506 S.E.2d 165 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Burks v. State, 246 Ga. App. 22, 538 S.E.2d 769, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1052 (2000), cert. 24-14-6 denied, No. S01C0124, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 116 (Ga. Feb. 2, 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court’s failure to instruct a jury on the burden of proof required to convict defendant of armed robbery with circumstantial evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming direct evidence of defendant’s guilt, which included a videotape of the robbery, defendant’s parent’s identiﬁcation of defendant as the person on the videotape with a gun, and defendant’s accomplice’s confession and implication of defendant in the crime. Bradwell v. State, 262 Ga. App. 651, 586 S.E.2d 355, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 979 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Although the state’s case against the defendant was based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the trial court’s failure to give the requested jury charge on circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Gregory v. State, 277 Ga. App. 664, 627 S.E.2d 79, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 104 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1131, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 534 (Ga. July 13, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). With regard to defendant’s malice murder conviction, the trial court did not err by refusing to give defendant’s requested jury instruction in the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, which provided that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence could be affirmed only if every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt was excluded, as defendant’s admission to having shot the victim, but claiming selfdefense, removed the case from that rule. Even assuming that the state introduced circumstantial evidence to establish some item of proof, and that defendant’s requested charge should have been given, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Thompson v. State, 283 Ga. 581, 662 S.E.2d 124, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 447 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Failure to charge reversible error. — Failure to give the defendant’s requested charge, which tracked former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, and instructed the jury that, to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the facts must exclude 586 every reasonable theory other than guilt of the accused, was reversible error in a driving under the inﬂuence case, since the officer’s opinion that the defendant was impaired was based on circumstantial evidence. Taylor v. State, 278 Ga. App. 181, 628 S.E.2d 611, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 279 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). As the defendant’s request to charge directed the trial court to the language in the pattern jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, which was a proper statement of the law as set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, the case largely depended on circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming, the failure to give the requested instruction was reversible error. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 176, 674 S.E.2d 879, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 92 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s conviction for serving alcohol to a minor, under O.C.G.A. § 3-323(a)(1), was reversed because: (1) the state relied on circumstantial evidence to show that defendant knowingly served alcohol to a minor; and (2) the trial court erroneously refused defendant’s request for an instruction on circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Butler v. State, 298 Ga. App. 129, 679 S.E.2d 361, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 612 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court’s refusal to give the defendant’s requested charge on circumstantial evidence amounted to plain error because the charges as given failed to provide the jury with the proper guideline for determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence and, thus, the error likely affected the outcome of the trial. Stroud v. State, 344 Ga. App. 827, 812 S.E.2d 309, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Effect of jury discrediting direct evidence. — When the only direct evidence comes from a witness who the jury was authorized to ﬁnd had been impeached, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law of impeachment, it is error requiring the grant of a new trial for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the law of circumstan- 24-14-6 tial evidence. Horne v. State, 93 Ga. App. 345, 91 S.E.2d 824, 1956 Ga. App. LEXIS 736 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Gibson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 718, 258 S.E.2d 537, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2353 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). It was not erroneous for the court, in the absence of a timely and appropriate request, to omit to charge the law of circumstantial evidence to be applied in the event the jury should not believe that the confession which had been introduced into evidence had been made. Ellis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 557, 181 S.E. 87, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 404 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Elaboration unnecessary. — When the judge sufficiently covered the provisions of the former statute in the judge’s charge to the jury, refusal of a request to elaborate upon the former statute was not error. Reynolds v. State, 170 Ga. 810, 154 S.E. 229, 1930 Ga. LEXIS 245 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Dacus v. State, 56 Ga. App. 439, 193 S.E. 93, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 392 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Flynn v. State, 77 Ga. App. 791, 50 S.E.2d 91, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 646 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Extraneous charge concerning circumstantial evidence. — Charge relating to circumstantial evidence, if erroneous because of contention that only direct evidence was introduced, was not injurious to the accused, as it gave a rule more favorable than the accused could claim. Latimer v. State, 188 Ga. 775, 4 S.E.2d 631, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 601 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Charge invading province of jury. — When in a prosecution for possession of beer for purposes of sale, charge to the jury that frequent presence of quantities of beer was sufficient to meet the circumstantial evidence rule was error in that it constituted an invasion of the province of the jury. Crider v. State, 98 Ga. App. 164, 105 S.E.2d 506, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Charge containing opinion of court. — When in prosecution for larceny the state’s evidence was wholly circum- 587 In General (Cont’d) stantial, charge that the state had introduced evidence tending to establish the fact that the defendant was guilty of the charge was clearly, though inadvertently, an intimation of the court’s opinion as to what had been proved in the case and constituted reversible error. Rowland v. State, 71 Ga. App. 154, 30 S.E.2d 368, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 303 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Failure to recharge not error. — When the court deﬁned direct and circumstantial evidence and then charged when circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict after a conviction is sought on circumstantial evidence, an omission to recharge the law of circumstantial evidence in immediate connection with the law of reasonable doubt did not amount to an expression of opinion that direct evidence had been introduced, and did not exclude from the consideration of the jury the law that requires the evidence to be sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused before a conviction would be authorized in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence only. Lucas v. State, 48 Ga. App. 42, 171 S.E. 850, 1933 Ga. App. LEXIS 450 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Charge using “should” instead of “must”, in quoting the former statute, did not require a new trial. Adams v. State, 34 Ga. App. 144, 128 S.E. 924, 1925 Ga. App. LEXIS 85 (1925) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Poulos v. State, 71 Ga. App. 730, 32 S.E.2d 101, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 200 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Effect of admission. — Rule of the former statute should not have been omitted from the instructions to the jury since the state relied wholly on circumstantial evidence and on an admission. Harvey v. State, 111 Ga. App. 279, 141 S.E.2d 604, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 949 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Instruction held not erroneous. — When the trial court charged the jury that “when the facts in evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two theories, one of guilt and the other consis- 24-14-6 tent with innocence, justice and humanity of the law compel the acceptance of the theory that is consistent with innocence,” instruction was at least as beneﬁcial to defendant if not more so, than a charge in the exact language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, and thus was not error. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2693 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). In a prosecution for burglary, the trial court did not err in giving an instruction as to recent possession of stolen property after a charge on circumstantial evidence. Martin v. State, 228 Ga. App. 59, 491 S.E.2d 142 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Since the state’s case was based upon direct as well as circumstantial evidence, the trial court did not err under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 by sua sponte charging the jury on the standard of proof necessary to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence. Cupe v. State, 327 Ga. App. 642, 760 S.E.2d 647, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 396 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Direct evidence was presented in the following cases, obviating the need to charge circumstantial evidence. — See Ellis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 557, 181 S.E. 87, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 404 (1935) (confession) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Gilder v. State, 52 Ga. App. 252, 183 S.E. 95, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (1935) (presumption derived from direct evidence) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kittle v. State, 54 Ga. App. 231, 187 S.E. 611, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 511 (1936) (confession) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Walker v. State, 63 Ga. App. 297, 11 S.E.2d 45, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 75 (1940) (confession) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 119 (1940) (testimony that contract never existed) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wilson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 257, 45 S.E.2d 709, 1947 Ga. App. LEXIS 427 (1947) (admission) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Lyons v. State, 90 Ga. App. 25, 81 S.E.2d 890, 1954 Ga. App. LEXIS 616 (1954) (statement of guilt) (decided under former 588 Code 1933, § 38-109); Ryals v. State, 193 Ga. App. 68, 387 S.E.2d 33, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1267 (1989); Brown v. State, 214 Ga. App. 481, 448 S.E.2d 259, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 953 (1994). (child molestation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction not warranted when evidence is not entirely circumstantial. — When a case is not entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a requested charge on circumstantial evidence is not warranted. Fuller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 734, 305 S.E.2d 463, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3270 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When there is direct evidence, the trial court does not err by not also charging that the defendant’s explanation must be taken into consideration insofar as it is consistent with the circumstantial evidence properly admitted. Brown v. State, 251 Ga. 598, 308 S.E.2d 182, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 934 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Preston v. State, 183 Ga. App. 20, 357 S.E.2d 825, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2676 (1987), cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905. When the state’s case included both direct and circumstantial evidence and the defendant did not request a charge on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the court to give such a charge was not error. Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 506 S.E.2d 165 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). No direct evidence presented in the following cases, hence charge on circumstantial evidence was required. — Turner v. State, 40 Ga. App. 662, 151 S.E. 120, 1929 Ga. App. LEXIS 696 (1929) (possession of stolen goods in burglary or larceny case) (decided under former law); Hodges v. State, 52 Ga. App. 378, 183 S.E. 216, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 636 (1936) (whiskey on property adjoining defendant’s) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); De Loach v. State, 57 Ga. App. 799, 196 S.E. 924, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 389 (1938) (possession of stolen goods in larceny case) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). 2. Offenses Against People Instruction required in child molestation conviction. — In a prosecution 24-14-6 for child molestation, it was reversible error to refuse to give defendant’s requested charge on circumstantial evidence, when defendant offered evidence of an intention other than to arouse defendant’s or the child’s sexual desires and the trial court gave the jury no instructions under which the jury could consider this evidence. Hathcock v. State, 214 Ga. App. 188, 447 S.E.2d 104 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Two different rules governed when the trial court must instruct the jury on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 were: (1) the charge must be given absent a request if the case against the defendant was wholly circumstantial; and (2) the charge must be given upon request if the case relied to any degree upon circumstantial evidence. Yarn v. State, 215 Ga. App. 883, 452 S.E.2d 537, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1380 (1994), aff’d, 265 Ga. 787, 462 S.E.2d 359, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 732 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Whenever the state introduces circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt, it is error not to charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 if such has been timely requested; however, it is not error to fail to give such a charge in the absence of a timely request when the state’s case depends both upon direct and circumstantial evidence. Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 801, 471 S.E.2d 191 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). In a prosecution for child molestation, a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not appropriate since the evidence directly contradicted defendant’s contention that inadvertent contact was made with the victim’s leg or thigh as a result of a trip and fall. Turner v. State, 245 Ga. App. 294, 536 S.E.2d 814, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 860 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1975, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 92 (Ga. Jan. 19, 2001), overruled in part, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 143 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction in kidnapping case not required when direct evidence exists. — Trial court’s failure to give a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not harmful as a matter of law because the state presented direct evidence that the 589 Offenses Against People (Cont’d) defendant committed the crime of kidnapping. Holden v. State, 287 Ga. App. 472, 651 S.E.2d 552, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1009 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0189, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Must request charge on circumstantial evidence. — Unless the evidence relied upon for conviction is entirely circumstantial, it is not error to fail to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in the absence of a request to do so. Wilson v. State, 152 Ga. 337, 110 S.E. 8, 1921 Ga. LEXIS 87 (1921) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Chamblee v. State, 50 Ga. App. 251, 177 S.E. 824, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 726 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Roberts v. State, 50 Ga. App. 307, 177 S.E. 825, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 748 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wyatt v. State, 50 Ga. App. 266, 177 S.E. 840, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 735 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 119 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. State, 66 Ga. App. 655, 19 S.E.2d 40, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 264 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 430, 22 S.E.2d 65, 1942 Ga. LEXIS 605 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Miller v. State, 69 Ga. App. 847, 26 S.E.2d 851, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 194 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Newsome v. State, 69 Ga. App. 445, 26 S.E.2d 113, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 111 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Daniels v. State, 199 Ga. 818, 35 S.E.2d 362, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 370 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 745, 67 S.E.2d 246, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 783 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Young v. State, 85 Ga. App. 122, 68 S.E.2d 219, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 1013 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Hicks v. State, 86 Ga. App. 365, 71 S.E.2d 695, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 956 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Weaver v. State, 86 Ga. App. 699, 71 S.E.2d 901, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 24-14-6 1032 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. 333, 72 S.E.2d 291, 1952 Ga. LEXIS 478 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); King v. State, 86 Ga. App. 786, 72 S.E.2d 502, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 1061 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Marshman v. State, 88 Ga. App. 250, 76 S.E.2d 443, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1058 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 88 Ga. App. 330, 76 S.E.2d 810, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1078 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wiggins v. State, 92 Ga. App. 65, 87 S.E.2d 652, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 522 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Nelson v. State, 92 Ga. App. 746, 90 S.E.2d 91, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 706 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Weatherby v. State, 213 Ga. 188, 97 S.E.2d 698, 1957 Ga. LEXIS 338 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Whiting v. State, 108 Ga. App. 374, 133 S.E.2d 50, 1963 Ga. App. LEXIS 649 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ryder v. State, 121 Ga. App. 796, 175 S.E.2d 882, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1362 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Bryant v. State, 229 Ga. 60, 189 S.E.2d 435, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 499 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 220 S.E.2d 448, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 909 (1975), overruled in part, Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 849 S.E.2d 425, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 738 (2020); (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 584, 255 S.E.2d 702, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 999 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Fuller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 734, 305 S.E.2d 463, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3270 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 629 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); McGarity v. State, 212 Ga. App. 17, 440 S.E.2d 695, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 119 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C0811, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 506 (Ga. Mar. 25, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 478, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 948, 121 S. Ct. 350, 148 L. Ed. 2d 282, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6984 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 590 Trial court failed to give a complete jury charge on circumstantial evidence because the evidence against the defendant was both direct and circumstantial and, thus, the statutory language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not required. Evans v. State, 288 Ga. 571, 707 S.E.2d 353, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 92 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested jury instruction based on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, concerning a conviction based on circumstantial evidence because such a charge was not warranted since the state’s evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction was not circumstantial; the state relied on direct evidence in the form of the eyewitness testimony of the two police officers. Crawford v. State, 314 Ga. App. 796, 726 S.E.2d 58, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 149 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1218, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 715 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial premised on the defendant’s contention that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel failing to request a jury charge because the state adduced both direct eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence at trial in the case, thus, the trial court was not required to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 244-6. Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 1067 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Because the defendant’s admissions of guilt following the killing were direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the state’s case was not based solely on circumstantial evidence and the additional circumstantial evidence charge requested by the defendant was not required. RodriguezNova v. State, 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 818 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction in felony murder case. — In a defendant’s prosecution for, inter alia, felony murder, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence as set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 because both 24-14-6 direct and circumstantial evidence were presented by the state and the defendant failed to request a circumstantial evidence instruction. Sumlin v. State, 283 Ga. 264, 658 S.E.2d 596, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 253 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence instruction in multiple offenses against individual. — In convictions of aggravated sodomy, kidnapping, burglary, and aggravated assault, a trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury about circumstantial evidence because the victims provided direct evidence of defendant’s guilt. Fortune v. State, 300 Ga. App. 550, 685 S.E.2d 466, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1222 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence instruction in death of child. — Reasonable hypothesis rule regarding circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 did not apply in a defendant’s trial for the murder and involuntary manslaughter of defendant’s 17-month-old son because the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, given the defendant’s direct admissions that the defendant had shaken defendant’s son to make the child stop crying. Lewis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 831, 698 S.E.2d 365, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 626 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1868, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 73 (Ga. Jan. 13, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the defendant makes incriminatory statements after the victim’s death, the case is not one depending entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Stewart v. State, 163 Ga. App. 735, 295 S.E.2d 112, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3244 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Yarborough v. State, 183 Ga. App. 198, 358 S.E.2d 484, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2685 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 3. Offenses Against Property Direct evidence in robbery case controlled instruction. — Since there was no request to charge on the circumstantial evidence rule, the charge was needed only if the state’s case was based wholly on circumstantial evidence, and no such charge was needed when defendant’s 591 Offenses Against Property (Cont’d) cousin testiﬁed that the cousin saw defendant rob a store; that was direct evidence, not circumstantial. Moore v. State, 268 Ga. App. 398, 601 S.E.2d 854, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 928 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction in cases of burglary, theft by taking and criminal trespass. — Prosecution against the defendant on charges of burglary, theft by taking, and criminal trespass included both direct and circumstantial evidence, and convictions on those charges were not subject to being reversed merely because the trial court failed to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 as the defendant failed to request that charge. Rodriguez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 752, 642 S.E.2d 705, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 186 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Charge required if possession of stolen goods is only evidence of burglary. — In a burglary prosecution, if the only evidence tending to connect the accused with the alleged offense is the accused’s unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen goods, it is error for the trial court to fail to give, with or without request, a charge on the principle contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2693 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 4. Drug Crimes Instruction for prosecution for trafﬁcking in cocaine. — In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine involving direct and circumstantial evidence, in the absence of any evidence evincing a plausible explanation or reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, particularly in the context of the entire charge in the case, the omission of a charge reciting the principle in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not reversible error. Roura v. State, 214 Ga. App. 43, 447 S.E.2d 52, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 767 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1717, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1139 (Ga. Oct. 28, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction required in DUI conviction. — In a prosecution for driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol, defendant was 24-14-6 entitled to defendant’s requested instruction on circumstantial evidence based on a reasonable hypothesis from defendant’s use of Benadryl that the defendant was not guilty of the crime charged. Cato v. State, 212 Ga. App. 417, 441 S.E.2d 900, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 283 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). It is error to fail to charge the substance of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 when the circumstances from which a guilty intent can be inferred are consistent with an innocent intention or an intention different from that charged against the accused. Hathcock v. State, 214 Ga. App. 188, 447 S.E.2d 104 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). In a prosecution for driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol, evidence upon which an officer based the officer’s opinion that defendant was impaired and a less safe driver was circumstantial, and the failure to give a requested charge on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was reversible error. Tomko v. State, 233 Ga. App. 20, 503 S.E.2d 300 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Instruction required in DUI conviction and operating unsafe motor vehicle. — In a prosecution for driving under the inﬂuence and driving an unsafe motor vehicle with defective equipment, the state was required to prove defendant was driving the car, proof of which was dependent in part on circumstantial evidence requiring the giving of a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Coates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 93, 453 S.E.2d 35, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1425 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the state’s case is composed solely of circumstantial evidence, a defendant is relieved from the necessity of requesting a charge on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6; even in the absence of such a request, it may be reversible error to fail to give the instruction. Yarn v. State, 265 Ga. 787, 462 S.E.2d 359, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 732 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court must charge on the law of circumstantial evidence, even absent a request, if the case against the defendant is wholly circumstantial, and if the case relies to any degree upon circumstantial evidence, a charge on circumstantial evi- 592 dence is required upon written request. Massey v. State, 270 Ga. 76, 508 S.E.2d 149 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 244-6). Instruction not required in DUI trial. — When the defendant was charged with driving under the inﬂuence with a blood alcohol percentage of .10, the evidence introduced by the state in support of this charge, the results from the breath test, was characterized as direct evidence, not circumstantial evidence, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give a circumstantial evidence instruction. Cawthon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 791, 510 S.E.2d 586 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 244-6). Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence 1. In General Sufficiency is for jury even though all evidence is circumstantial. — When, at the close of the state’s case, all six defendants move for directed verdicts of acquittal, if there is any evidence of guilt, it is for the jury to decide whether that evidence, circumstantial though it may be, is sufficient to warrant a conviction. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3279 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant must be connected with criminal act. Newman v. State, 26 Ga. 633, 1859 Ga. LEXIS 397 (1859) (decided under former law); Griffin v. State, 2 Ga. App. 534, 58 S.E. 781, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 447 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Dougherty v. State, 7 Ga. App. 91, 66 S.E. 276, 1909 Ga. App. LEXIS 548 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984). Despite defendant’s assertion that the evidence against the defendant was completely circumstantial and did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant’s guilt, any inconsistencies in the evidence presented were for the jury to resolve, and resolution of such conﬂicts did not render the evidence insufﬁcient. Sims v. State, 278 Ga. 587, 604 S.E.2d 799, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 998 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 24-14-6 Appellant’s murder conviction upheld because jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable appellant’s alternative hypotheses that unknown assailant or another killed victim and record showed that DNA expert testiﬁed that appellant’s blood overwhelmed mixed DNA sample and masked other contributor to proﬁle so signiﬁcantly that no one, other than appellant, could be identiﬁed. Carter v. State, 315 Ga. 214, 881 S.E.2d 678, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 310 (2022). Conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S.E. 357, 1902 Ga. LEXIS 54 (1902) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); McLeroy v. State, 125 Ga. 240, 54 S.E. 125, 1906 Ga. LEXIS 109 (1906) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Cook v. State, 22 Ga. App. 770, 97 S.E. 264, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 744 (1918) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Sentell v. State, 227 Ga. 153, 179 S.E.2d 234, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 623 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Hutchings v. State, 4 Ga. App. 451, 61 S.E. 837, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 436 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Hurt v. State, 18 Ga. App. 110, 88 S.E. 901, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 150 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Wright v. State, 199 Ga. 576, 34 S.E.2d 879, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 349 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hilliard v. State, 92 Ga. App. 294, 88 S.E.2d 425, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 579 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741, 1956 Ga. App. LEXIS 552 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brown v. State, 98 Ga. App. 350, 105 S.E.2d 785, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Townsend v. State, 127 Ga. App. 797, 195 S.E.2d 474, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1023 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Fingerprint evidence. — To warrant a conviction based solely on ﬁngerprint evidence, the ﬁngerprints corresponding to those of the defendant must have been found in the place where the crime was 593 In General (Cont’d) committed, and under such circumstances that the ﬁngerprints could only have been impressed at the time when the crime was committed. Jackson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 530, 281 S.E.2d 252, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2294 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Fingerprints of the defendant found on bottles at the crime scene were sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for murder since the condition of the crime scene made it clear that the bottles were left just before the victim’s death and the evidence suggested no occasion for the defendant to have left defendant’s ﬁngerprints there except during the crime. Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 506 S.E.2d 853 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 244-6). Since the defendant’s ﬁngerprints on a lamp globe were not the only evidence linking the defendant to the crimes, and there was testimony that the defendant was a close friend of the victim, the victim was perceived to have money, and the crime scene suggested that the victim knew the attackers, who were looking for something of value and tortured the victim to ﬁnd out where it was located, the evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for malice murder, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. Roberts v. State, 296 Ga. 719, 770 S.E.2d 589, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 182 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to adjudicate the defendant juvenile delinquent for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of burglary and attempted burglary because, for purposes of the ﬁrst burglary, it appeared to the investigating officers that the burglar had entered through a kitchen window at the rear of the house, and the officers found the defendant’s palm prints on the outside of the bottom lower window pane of that window; for purposes of the second burglary, the officers found the defendant’s palm prints on the outside of three windows at the back of the house; and the only reasonable hypothesis was that the defendant’s palm prints were impressed at the time of the burglaries. In the Interest of S. B., 348 Ga. App. 339, 822 S.E.2d 835, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 3 (2019). 24-14-6 Possession of pistol may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Reese v. State, 3 Ga. App. 532, 60 S.E. 122, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 364 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 76 S.E. 785, 1912 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (1912) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show speciﬁc facts in the following cases. — See Johnson v. State, 119 Ga. 446, 46 S.E. 634, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 867 (1904) (speciﬁc acts of sexual intercourse) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Jordan v. Smith, 119 Ga. 443, 46 S.E. 679, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 865 (1904) (bar to statute of limitations) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Little v. State, 3 Ga. App. 441, 60 S.E. 113, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (1908) (weapon of assault) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Glover v. State, 15 Ga. App. 44, 82 S.E. 602, 1914 Ga. App. LEXIS 12 (1914) (intention) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Burke v. State, 183 Ga. 726, 189 S.E. 516, 1937 Ga. LEXIS 382 (1937) (identity of defendant) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 497, 268 S.E.2d 714, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2246 (1980) (prior similar offense) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Baxter v. State, 160 Ga. App. 181, 286 S.E.2d 460, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2949 (1981) (similar modus operandi) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Shaw v. State, 211 Ga. App. 647, 440 S.E.2d 245, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 29 (1994) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Alford v. State, 224 Ga. App. 451, 480 S.E.2d 893 (attempted burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Gooch v. State, 249 Ga. App. 643, 549 S.E.2d 724, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 581 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1381, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 895 (Ga. Nov. 5, 2001); Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 576 S.E.2d 886, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 109 (2003) (possession of methamphetamine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); (felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a ﬁrearm) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Flight may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Terry v. State, 15 Ga. App. 108, 594 82 S.E. 635, 1914 Ga. App. LEXIS 35 (1914) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 262, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Flight of the accused is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury in determining the accused’s guilt. Brooks v. State, 63 Ga. App. 575, 11 S.E.2d 688, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 499 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kirkland v. State, 67 Ga. App. 256, 19 S.E.2d 787, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 358 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Tyler v. State, 91 Ga. App. 87, 84 S.E.2d 843, 1954 Ga. App. LEXIS 866 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Flight considered alone. — Mere fact of ﬂight alone is not an incriminatory circumstance of sufficient probative value of itself to authorize a conviction for a crime. Burchﬁeld v. State, 40 Ga. App. 506, 150 S.E. 459, 1929 Ga. App. LEXIS 613 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Seay v. State, 63 Ga. App. 286, 11 S.E.2d 54, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 68 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Flight is generally not sufficient to support a conviction even if the ﬂight was from the scene of the crime. Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 873, 303 S.E.2d 54, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2047 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Flight of concealment considered with other circumstances is sufficient to convict. Diggs v. State, 90 Ga. App. 853, 84 S.E.2d 611, 1954 Ga. App. LEXIS 833 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Inference of participation. — Confession of facts that are matter from which an inference of participation arises are circumstantial. Eberhart v. State, 41 Ga. 598, 1871 Ga. LEXIS 149 (1871) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); Riley v. State, 1 Ga. App. 651, 57 S.E. 1031, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 63 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984). Presence, and approval of act, not sufficient. — Presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to show that a defendant is a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and even approval of 24-14-6 the act, not amounting to encouragement, will not suffice. This is so because of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 as to a conviction on circumstantial evidence. Ridgeway v. State, 187 Ga. App. 381, 370 S.E.2d 216, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 695 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Direct evidence required. — Circumstances relied upon must be proved by direct evidence. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Harris, 1 Ga. App. 714, 57 S.E. 1076, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 86 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984). Evidence not entirely circumstantial. — Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, but included testimony by a person the defendant dated that the defendant paid a cousin to kill the victim, and evidence that the defendant and the victim were in ﬁnancial distress, the defendant stood to gain $600,000 from the victim’s death, and the defendant told a friend the defendant needed to collect insurance money on the victim and, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, that evidence was sufﬁcient to support the convictions. Clark v. State, 296 Ga. 543, 769 S.E.2d 376, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 128 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions because the state did not rely solely on circumstantial evidence as there was substantial direct evidence including the witnesses identifying the defendant as one of their assailants, and the defendant admitting to the defendant’s participation in the home invasion to the deceased accomplice’s older brother; furthermore, direct evidence from a witness who observed a crime was not converted into circumstantial evidence by the witness’s credibility or lack thereof, and the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to reject any other reasonable theory except that the defendant was guilty as charged. Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 777 S.E.2d 460, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 650 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence against the defendant was not wholly circumstantial as the state presented direct evidence in the form of a witness’s statements during a 9-1-1 call, identifying the defendant as the person 595 In General (Cont’d) who shot the victim; several witnesses testiﬁed that they saw the defendant with a handgun in the location where the shooting occurred, saw the defendant’s car parked nearby, saw the defendant and the victim in a ﬁst ﬁght just before hearing gunshots, and saw the defendant’s car speeding out of the neighborhood immediately after the victim was shot; and the defendant’s cell phone records conﬁrmed that the defendant was in the city where the shooting occurred the entire day of the shooting, undermining the defendant’s alibi. Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626, 859 S.E.2d 46, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 285 (2021). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder because this Code section did not apply as the case against the defendant was not wholly circumstantial; and the state presented at least some direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, namely, the recording of the defendant’s interview with a GBI Special Agent, in which the defendant admitted that the defendant intentionally ﬁred the bullet that hit the victim. Rogers v. State, 311 Ga. 634, 859 S.E.2d 92, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 284 (2021). Evidence sufficient. — Evidence sufﬁcient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of defendant’s guilt. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153, 391 S.E.2d 108, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 172 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Grover v. State, 215 Ga. App. 907, 452 S.E.2d 586, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1377 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. — See Griffin v. State, 2 Ga. App. 534, 58 S.E. 781, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 447 (1907) (gaming) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Perry v. State, 9 Ga. App. 871, 72 S.E. 446, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 388 (1911) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Brown v. State, 13 Ga. App. 144, 78 S.E. 868, 1913 Ga. App. LEXIS 76 (1913) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Smith v. State, 148 Ga. 332, 96 S.E. 632, 1918 Ga. LEXIS 330 (1918) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Shirley v. State, 168 Ga. 344, 148 S.E. 91, 1929 Ga. 24-14-6 LEXIS 138 (1929) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Cheatham v. State, 57 Ga. App. 858, 197 S.E. 70, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (1938) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 210, 53 S.E.2d 498, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 620 (1949) (illegal possession whiskey) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Fouts v. State, 96 Ga. App. 876, 101 S.E.2d 925, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 934 (1958) (possession of beer) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Blackwell v. State, 99 Ga. App. 579, 109 S.E.2d 62, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 908 (1959) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Harvey v. State, 111 Ga. App. 279, 141 S.E.2d 604, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 949 (1965) (larceny and burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Anderson v. State, 120 Ga. App. 147, 169 S.E.2d 629, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 697 (1969) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brown v. State, 125 Ga. App. 300, 187 S.E.2d 301, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1307 (1972) (larceny or burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38109); Brown v. State, 133 Ga. App. 56, 209 S.E.2d 721, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 968 (1974) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Cosby v. State, 151 Ga. App. 676, 261 S.E.2d 424, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2744 (1979) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Prescott v. State, 164 Ga. App. 671, 297 S.E.2d 362, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3340 (1982) (no one other than self and wife had access to the bedroom closet) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3129 (1983) (armed robbery) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 729, 300 S.E.2d 798, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1025 (1983) (murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1029 (1983) (murder and unlawful concealment of death) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 400, 306 S.E.2d 695, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3328 (1983) (entering motor vehicle with intent to commit theft) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Fredericks v. State, 176 Ga. App. 40, 335 S.E.2d 154, 596 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2850 (1985) (driving while under the inﬂuence of alcohol) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Holland v. State, 176 Ga. App. 343, 335 S.E.2d 739, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2874 (1985) (possession of controlled substances; no evidence that anyone other than defendants had access to bedroom where controlled substances were found) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Childs v. State, 176 Ga. App. 549, 336 S.E.2d 309, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2315 (1985) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Turner v. State, 176 Ga. App. 785, 338 S.E.2d 37, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2913 (1985) (robbery) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 4420 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 4561 (1987) (murder and concealment of death) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Smith v. State, 257 Ga. 381, 359 S.E.2d 662, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 875 (1987) (murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Chews v. State, 187 Ga. App. 600, 371 S.E.2d 124, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 836 (1988) (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Beach v. State, 258 Ga. 700, 373 S.E.2d 210, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 451 (1988); Rich v. State, 191 Ga. App. 312, 381 S.E.2d 567, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 611 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Horton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 797, 392 S.E.2d 259, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 361 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C0871, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. Apr. 12, 1990) (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Ware v. State, 198 Ga. App. 24, 400 S.E.2d 384, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1529 (1990) (intent to distribute cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Anderson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 727, 484 S.E.2d 783; Savage v. State, 229 Ga. App. 560, 494 S.E.2d 359 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); (possession of cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Ross v. State, 240 Ga. App. 563, 524 S.E.2d 255 (malice murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Lindsey v. State, 271 Ga. 657, 522 S.E.2d 459 (murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Foster v. State, 273 24-14-6 Ga. 34, 537 S.E.2d 659, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 773 (2000) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Peek v. State, 247 Ga. App. 364, 542 S.E.2d 517, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1346 (2000) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Gresham v. State, 246 Ga. App. 705, 541 S.E.2d 679, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1333 (2000) (entering automobile with intent to commit theft) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Withers v. State, 282 Ga. 656, 653 S.E.2d 40, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 836 (2007) (felony murder and possession of a ﬁrearm) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 315, 645 S.E.2d 753, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 496 (2007). Circumstantial evidence of previous felony conviction. — Circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to prove that the defendant was previously convicted of forgery in the ﬁrst degree, a felony, so as to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon as the evidence included an accusation showing the defendant’s guilty plea and no alternative hypothesis was put forward in the evidence, in argument, or in the jury instructions. McKie v. State, 306 Ga. 111, 829 S.E.2d 376, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 398 (2019). In a mother and son defendants’ trial for the murder of the son’s wife, there was direct evidence of the son’s guilt, including his statement to a fellow inmate describing in detail how he killed his wife; further, the jury could have rejected his hypothesis that some unknown assailant shot her during a road rage incident as unreasonable. Bamberg v. State, 308 Ga. 340, 839 S.E.2d 640, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 141 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1406, 209 L. Ed. 2d 139, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 1097 (2021). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of fraud in obtaining food stamps as the defendant did not disclose the wife’s income on the renewal applications and did not dispute that the defendant was ineligible for public assistance; and the state presented strong circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt because the evidence showed that an EBT card, as well as a replacement card, was issued in the defendant’s name and 597 In General (Cont’d) mailed to the defendant’s home address; that detailed and accurate personal information available only to the defendant and family members was submitted to the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services on multiple occasions; and that the wife speciﬁcally denied applying for or obtaining the beneﬁts. Clarke v. State, 365 Ga. App. 708, 880 S.E.2d 223, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 495 (2022). Evidence sufficient for forgery conviction. — Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for forgery based on the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence showing that a check was drawn on an account of a rooﬁng company for which the defendant never worked; thus, the inference arose that the defendant knew that the company did not owe any money to the defendant and that the defendant was not authorized to present the check for payment. Bettes v. State, 329 Ga. App. 13, 763 S.E.2d 366, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 608 (2014). Evidence sufficient for murder of infant child. — Defendant’s conviction for murder was upheld on appeal because the evidence established that the only possible perpetrators of the fatal abdominal trauma to the child were defendant or the mother and the expert opinion evidence established that the death would have occurred within 45 minutes after the abdominal trauma and likely sooner than that and the mother had already gone to work and the neighbor who drove the child and the defendant to the hospital testiﬁed that the child was still alive. Wilson v. State, 308 Ga. 306, 840 S.E.2d 370, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 170 (2020). Sufficient circumstantial evidence in death of child. — Comparing the child’s condition at the time the defendant took the child from the child’s mother and shortly thereafter, with the child’s condition at the time the child and the defendant appeared at the ﬁre station, and considering the acts of abuse admitted by the defendant, the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the verdict, was sufficient to have authorized a rational trier of fact in ﬁnding beyond a reasonable doubt 24-14-6 that the defendant caused the child’s death. Phipps v. State, 203 Ga. App. 128, 416 S.E.2d 319, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 387 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0740, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 291 (Ga. Apr. 9, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient when there is direct evidence. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for shoplifting, and the state was not required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to present evidence excluding every other reasonable hypothesis except defendant’s guilt because the state’s case was not based on circumstantial evidence, but on the direct testimony of an eyewitness to the shoplifting. Fitzpatrick v. State, 271 Ga. App. 804, 611 S.E.2d 95, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 176 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for theft by shoplifting because the evidence was completely circumstantial and did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant’s guilt failed; contrary to the defendant’s contention, the testimony from a store’s loss prevention employee that the employee observed the defendant remove an item from a shelf, place the item in the defendant’s back pocket, and then leave the store without presenting the item to a cashier was direct not circumstantial evidence. Walton v. State, 291 Ga. App. 736, 662 S.E.2d 820, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 630 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. — See Park v. State, 123 Ga. 164, 51 S.E. 317, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 403 (1905) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1984); Bush v. State, 7 Ga. App. 607, 67 S.E. 685, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 421 (1910) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Calhoun v. State, 9 Ga. App. 501, 71 S.E. 765, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 209 (1911) (burglary) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Henderson v. State, 147 Ga. 134, 92 S.E. 871, 1917 Ga. LEXIS 82 (1917) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Haire v. State, 38 Ga. App. 116, 142 S.E. 697, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 74 (1928) (cattle stealing) 598 (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Wallin v. State, 38 Ga. App. 194, 143 S.E. 597, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (1928) (burglary) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Smith v. State, 38 Ga. App. 741, 145 S.E. 500, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 426 (1928) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Hughie v. State, 52 Ga. App. 73, 182 S.E. 197, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 40 (1935) (larceny of automobile) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Graham v. State, 183 Ga. 381, 183 Ga. 881, 189 S.E. 910, 1937 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1937) (murder) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Orr v. State, 62 Ga. App. 774, 9 S.E.2d 917, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 433 (1940) (manufacturing whiskey) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Cheney v. State, 61 Ga. App. 726, 7 S.E.2d 335, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 242 (1940) (arson) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wells v. State, 75 Ga. App. 588, 44 S.E.2d 66, 1947 Ga. App. LEXIS 587 (1947) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Woody v. State, 99 Ga. App. 857, 109 S.E.2d 896, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 971 (1959) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Purser v. State, 104 Ga. App. 728, 122 S.E.2d 749, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 783 (1961) (voluntary manslaughter) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Crane v. State, 123 Ga. App. 226, 180 S.E.2d 289, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1173 (1971) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 350, 190 S.E.2d 785, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1144 (1972) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ennis v. State, 130 Ga. App. 716, 204 S.E.2d 519, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1236 (1974) (possession of marijuana) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Russell v. State, 132 Ga. App. 35, 207 S.E.2d 619, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1593 (1974) (possession of marijuana) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wright v. State, 147 Ga. App. 111, 248 S.E.2d 183, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2798 (1978) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kametches v. State, 242 Ga. 721, 251 S.E.2d 232, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1341 (1978) (possession for sale of obscene materials) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. 24-14-6 State, 155 Ga. App. 211, 270 S.E.2d 377, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2531 (1980) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415, 373 S.E.2d 97, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1037 (1988) (entering an automobile) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Krull v. State, 211 Ga. App. 37, 438 S.E.2d 152, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1401 (1993) (DUI, no proof of insurance, driving with suspended license, and failure to maintain lane) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Calhoun v. State, 213 Ga. App. 375, 444 S.E.2d 405, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 553 (1994) (shoplifting) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 424, 484 S.E.2d 60 (trafficking in cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 492 S.E.2d 204 (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); In re A.D.C., 228 Ga. App. 829, 493 S.E.2d 38 (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Greene v. State, 230 Ga. App. 155, 495 S.E.2d 634 (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 583, 538 S.E.2d 481, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1015 (2000) (possession of cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim, to the extent that the evidence that the defendant’s car had been parked at some point with the car’s front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt as a party, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Except as to one incident, the evidence was insufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband’s sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, because the record showed that the mother had no knowledge of seven of the eight incidents until she took the children 599 In General (Cont’d) to therapy, and the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence — including the fact of the family’s nudist lifestyle, the existence of pornographic movies in the home, and the fact that during therapy, the mother advised the girls to not talk about their father — was insufficient to prove aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1184 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of misdemeanor ﬂeeing or attempting to elude a police officer because a deputy identiﬁed the defendant as the driver; another officer followed the defendant out of the parking lot when the defendant refused to stop; and the officer activated the vehicle’s lights and siren but lost sight of the speeding car moments before a car of the same color struck another vehicle just ahead; however, the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of felony ﬂeeing or attempting to elude as no evidence was presented that the defendant was attempting to elude arrest for a non-traffic violation when the defendant struck the other vehicle. Johnson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 622, 788 S.E.2d 559, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (2016). 2. Crimes Against the Person Defendant’s conviction of murder and armed robbery was supported by sufficient evidence; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence had to exclude all reasonable hypotheses other than the defendant’s guilt, and there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have excluded all reasonable hypotheses other than defendant’s guilt, based on the facts that defendant was the last person in the victim’s store on the night of the murder, the victim’s blood was found on defendant’s shoes, and defendant began spending money heavily after the crime even though the defendant did not have a job at the time. Bibbs v. State, 275 Ga. 659, 571 24-14-6 S.E.2d 770, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 962 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for assault and rape conviction. — State presented direct evidence of the defendant’s assault and rape of the victim in the form of the victim’s testimony, and thus former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 did not apply, and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt. Tarver v. State, 280 Ga. App. 89, 633 S.E.2d 415, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 756 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for aggravated sexual battery conviction. — Circumstantial evidence that a defendant chastised the defendant’s two-year-old child for soiling a diaper by poking the child’s anus with a stick, resulting in perineal lacerations, was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b). Viers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 387, 693 S.E.2d 526, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 202 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for conviction of sexual exploitation. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of 15 counts of sexual exploitation of children based on the child pornography found on the defendant’s girlfriend’s computer because a Georgia Bureau of Investigation expert in computer forensics explained that there was no evidence that a virus had downloaded any of the illegal ﬁles, and that there was no evidence that anyone had hacked into the computer; the defendant’s mother, the defendant’s girlfriend, and the defendant’s girlfriend’s mother and brothers testiﬁed that they did not download the illegal ﬁles onto the computer; and the downloads began just one month after the defendant moved in with the defendant’s girlfriend and only on days when the defendant was not incarcerated. Beaver v. State, 330 Ga. App. 496, 767 S.E.2d 503, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 839 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for kidnapping conviction. — Because the eyewitness testimony showed that the defendant pushed, pulled, and then carried the vic- 600 tim out of a restaurant as the victim yelled for a coworker to call the police, and which was direct, not circumstantial, evidence that the victim did not go with the defendant willingly, sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s kidnapping conviction. Holden v. State, 287 Ga. App. 472, 651 S.E.2d 552, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1009 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0189, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Aggravated battery. — Trial court properly denied a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) since there was ample circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 for the jury to have found that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-524(a); defendant’s claim that the defendant tripped and fell while carrying the infant son was contradicted by expert testimony that the injury to the infant’s brain was caused by Shaken Baby Syndrome. Lindo v. State, 278 Ga. App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 300 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Victim was struck from behind with a beer bottle; the victim’s head was cut, requiring stitches. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because: (1) the victim saw the defendant standing close behind the victim after the blow was struck, and defendant began ﬁghting with the victim; (2) similar transaction evidence showed the defendant’s history of making unprovoked attacks on unsuspecting victims; and (3) a bartender’s testimony that someone else committed the crime was internally inconsistent and uncorroborated. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1192 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0507, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 116 (Ga. Mar. 9, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Jury’s verdict ﬁnding the defendant guilty of ﬁrst degree cruelty to children and aggravated battery was not unsupportable because an expert testiﬁed that the injuries suffered by the defendant’s baby were caused by some type of trauma to the body; at trial, the defendant offered 24-14-6 no alternative hypothesis for the injuries; and, to the extent that the defendant offered on appeal the alternative hypothesis that the defendant’s mother could have injured the baby, the jury was entitled to reject that hypothesis as unreasonable as the parties entered a stipulation that law enforcement had ruled out the defendant’s mother as a suspect, and that stipulation was read to the jury. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 420 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. Feb. 10, 2020). Jury’s verdict ﬁnding the defendant guilty of ﬁrst degree cruelty to children and aggravated battery was not unsupportable because an expert testiﬁed that the injuries suffered by the defendant’s baby were caused by some type of trauma to the body and that the injuries were most consistent with at least two different instances of child physical abuse; at trial, the defendant offered no alternative hypothesis for the injuries; and the jury speciﬁcally considered whether the defendant’s boyfriend could have injured the baby when the jury addressed the charges against the boyfriend, ﬁnding the boyfriend not guilty on all counts. Weaver v. State, 351 Ga. App. 167, 830 S.E.2d 618, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 420 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1502, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 113 (Ga. Feb. 10, 2020). Malice murder. — Defendant’s conviction for malice murder was affirmed as it could be concluded that the evidence of malice murder, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, save that of the guilt of the accused since: (1) the defendant was upset with the victim; (2) the defendant got a riﬂe and carried the riﬂe into the bedroom; (3) the victim asked the defendant to put the riﬂe down twice, but the defendant refused; (4) the defendant then shot the victim in the head; and (5) the defendant gave the police three versions of the events and the ﬁrst two were refuted by a ﬁrearms expert and a supervisor in the criminal investigations division. Yeager v. State, 281 Ga. 1, 635 S.E.2d 704, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 584 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s conviction for felony murder and related charges was upheld on 601 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) appeal because the evidence showed that the defendant had admitted to killing the defendant’s girlfriend and others and the gun used to shoot the victim was the same that the defendant had shot at a party earlier in the evening; the defendant had asked the victim for a ride home from the party and the evidence indicated that defendant shot the victim twice and dumped the body in a wooded area. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 511, 640 S.E.2d 287, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 27 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s malice murder conviction of her husband because they had a tumultuous marriage; she was faced that day with explaining her entanglement with the victim’s ﬁnances; she was in ﬁnancial difficulty, as she had ﬁled for bankruptcy, and she was the beneﬁciary of the victim’s insurance policies; defendant could not account for 30 minutes of her whereabouts during the relevant time; and defendant’s gun, which had recently been used, matched the type used to kill the victim. Merritt v. State, 285 Ga. 778, 683 S.E.2d 855, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 469 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of malice murder because the jury was authorized to ﬁnd that the defendant met with the victim’s husband and other codefendants on at least two occasions to discuss the murder of the victim, that the defendant accepted money from the husband prior to the murder, that the defendant instructed one of the codefendants on how to kill the victim, that the defendant drove to the victim’s home with the husband and another codefendant on the morning of the murder, and that the defendant demanded and accepted money from the husband as compensation for the murder. Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 693 S.E.2d 490, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 331 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 866, 131 S. Ct. 156, 178 L. Ed. 2d 93, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6512 (2010), overruled in part, Shelton v. Lee, 299 Ga. 350, 788 S.E.2d 369, 2016 Ga. 24-14-6 LEXIS 452 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in denying the codefendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence the state presented was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the codefendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of a girlfriend’s child; both the girlfriend and the codefendant were with the child during the time period within which the fatal injuries were believed to have been inﬂicted upon the child. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 85 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s murder conviction and the defendant’s argument that the state relied solely on circumstantial evidence was belied by the admission of the defendant’s statement to police that the defendant hit the victim with the ax handle. Bunnell v. State, 292 Ga. 253, 735 S.E.2d 281, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 2 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of the malice murder because the defendant and the victim had a domestic dispute over the money that the defendant had borrowed from the victim; two days later, human body parts that were later identiﬁed as the victim’s were found scattered around a secluded, wooded area near a house owned by the defendant; a coroner examined the remains and determined that the cause of death was homicide by unknown cause; the defendant never reported the victim missing; the defendant told conﬂicting stories about the victim’s disappearance and the defendant’s activities around that time; and the defendant towed the victim’s car to a hotel parking lot and left the car. Benson v. State, 294 Ga. 618, 754 S.E.2d 23, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 70 (2014). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and possession of a ﬁrearm in the commission of a felony because an eyewitness identiﬁed the defendant as the man leaving the victim’s apartment wearing a camouﬂage jacket and with a gun in the defendant’s hand; video from the 602 convenience store at the time the defendant and the co-defendant encountered the victim showed the defendant wearing a camouﬂage jacket; the same or a similar jacket was later given to police by the defendant’s aunt; and the defendant’s own testimony placed the defendant at the scene, even though the defendant initially denied having been present and attempted to hide from police. Neely v. State, 302 Ga. 121, 805 S.E.2d 18, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 771 (2017). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the malice murder of a girlfriend’s nine-month-old child because the medical examiner concluded that the cause of the child’s death was blunt force injuries to the child’s head and extremities, with the bleeding in the child’s brain causing the child’s organs to shut down and stop the child’s breathing; the defendant was alone with the child just before the child’s death; the medical examiner concluded that the child’s injuries did not likely occur the way the defendant described; and the jury was authorized to reject the defendant’s hypothesis that the child’s mother caused the child’s death. Bennett v. State, 301 Ga. 874, 804 S.E.2d 360, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 703 (2017). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of the victim because the investigators visited the defendant at the defendant’s house and found three .32-caliber shell casings inside a trash can on top of the defendant’s other trash, which matched the caliber of the gun used in the shooting; the defendant admitted that the defendant was at the victim’s house on the night of the murder; all of the evidence supporting the defendant’s alternative hypothesis could be characterized as presenting inconsistencies in the evidence; and the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt. Clark v. State, 309 Ga. 473, 847 S.E.2d 364, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 514 (2020). Defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and posses- 24-14-6 sion of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony as the defendant’s mother told police officers and an EMT that the mother heard a gunshot and saw the defendant standing over the victim with the murder weapon in the defendant’s hand; the defendant took off when the police arrived; ballistics evidence indicated that the defendant’s pistol ﬁred the fatal shot, and gunshot primer residue was found on the defendant’s hands; and the defendant revealed the location of the murder weapon, which was recovered by the investigator in the place the defendant described. Taylor v. State, 313 Ga. 5, 867 S.E.2d 88, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 734 (2021). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of malice murder and other crimes because days before the victim was reported missing the victim exchanged text messages with defendant about money, the victim told defendant the victim had no choice but to tell defendant’s wife about defendant’s drug activities, shortly before the victim’s disappearance defendant bought a revolver that could have ﬁred the two bullets recovered from the victim’s body, defendant admitted to sending a text message claiming to be the victim, defendant acted nervous when appearing to look through the area where the victim’s body was later found, and soil samples recovered from the shovel found at defendant’s house were indistinguishable from samples taken near the gravesite. Anglin v. State, 312 Ga. 503, 863 S.E.2d 148, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 628 (2021). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of malice murder because it showed that the gang members planned the victim’s murder to retaliate for defendant’s arrest, defendant was angry that the victim had identiﬁed him, during phone calls from jail defendant encouraged his fellow gang members to kill the victim, and defendant expressly relief when he found out that the victim had been killed. Drennon v. State, 314 Ga. 854, 880 S.E.2d 139, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 282 (2022). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party of, inter alia, malice murder and a violation the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act as the de- 603 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) fendant and the codefendant were active members of the same gang; cell phone records placed the defendant’s phone near the victims’ apartment, various ATMs, and the gang house on the day of the murders; the jury was free to reject as unreasonable the possibility that some other unidentiﬁed person was using the defendant’s SUV and phone; and the jury could infer that the murders were committed in order to obtain status within the gang. Beamon v. State, 314 Ga. 798, 879 S.E.2d 457, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 261 (2022). Evidence sufficient for malice murder. — Defendant’s convictions on ﬁve counts of malice murder and other crimes was upheld because evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions under O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6 and as matter of constitutional due process as the factﬁnder was authorized to reject the defendant’s shifting stories and alternative hypothesis as unreasonable. Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 878 S.E.2d 247, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 241 (2022). Evidence sufficient to show murder, not suicide. — Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s murder conviction because the defendant’s own expert witness testiﬁed that it was unlikely that the victim shot herself in the back of the head, and the state’s forensic pathology expert and crime scene investigation expert both determined the case to be a homicide rather than a suicide. Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 846 S.E.2d 83, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 479 (2020). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of malice murder because the defendant admitted that the defendant was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the tinted windows when shots were ﬁred from the driver’s side window, killing the victim, the defendant admitted that a short time later the defendant ﬂed from the police, the police found the riﬂe from which the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were lifted discarded in the wooded area near the vehicle, the riﬂe was the only weapon found in or around the vehicle that could not be excluded as the weapon that ﬁred the fatal shot, and the defendant’s ﬁngerprints and DNA placed 24-14-6 the defendant in the vehicle. Frazier v. State, 309 Ga. 219, 845 S.E.2d 579, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 460 (2020). Evidence sufficient for spouse’s felony murder conviction arising out of killing officer. — Defendant’s conviction for felony murder arising out of the defendant’s spouse’s shooting and killing a police officer was supported by circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a party to the spouse’s crime of possessing a ﬁrearm as a convicted felon and that the crime was the proximate cause of the officer’s death. Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 808 S.E.2d 724, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 965 (2017). Circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain conviction in death of child. — Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder in connection with the beating death of the victim, the defendant’s 10month-old daughter, because, at the time the victim died, the victim had sustained numerous injuries in the days and hours leading up to the victim’s death; the defendant was the sole adult with the victim in the hours preceding the victim’s death; the jury heard expert testimony that the victim’s injuries were not consistent with a fall; and the defendant had made an incriminating statement in a letter to the victim’s mother while awaiting trial. Walker v. State, 308 Ga. 33, 838 S.E.2d 792, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 97 (2020). Evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that the father killed the adopted child and instead to ﬁnd that the appellant mother was responsible. While the evidence did not show exactly how the victim’s fatal injuries were inﬂicted, the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s murder and child cruelty convictions, as the father said consistently that the father was out by the car at the time the injuries occurred, whereas the appellant admitted to being alone in the room with the victim and changed the appellant’s story several times, each time giving an account that was dubious in light of the physical and medical evidence. Long v. State, 309 Ga. 721, 848 S.E.2d 91, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 609 (2020). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder 604 and cruelty to children in the ﬁrst degree because the defendant had sole responsibility for the eight-month-old child from the time that the child’s mother left for work until the defendant brought the child downstairs to the defendant’s sister for help (though the defendant asked the sister not to call 911), at which point the child had suffered the blunt force trauma to the head that led to the child’s death; and the mother testiﬁed that the child was acting normally when the mother left for work. Norris v. State, 316 Ga. 119, 884 S.E.2d 371, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 35 (2023). Murder of two-year old child. — Evidence presented was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to ﬁnd that the state had excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of appellant’s guilt with regard to the felony murder of a two-year-old child left in appellant’s care based on the child being healthy when left in appellant’s care, died as the result of blunt force trauma to the head which could not have resulted from the normal activities of a child or a fall down the stairs, and appellant was alone with the child. Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 751 S.E.2d 408, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 962 (2013). Murder of child. — Evidence that the defendant, the child’s mother, and the child’s father were the child’s sole caregivers and were the only ones with access to the child in the timeframe of the fatal injury, that the defendant was the primary caregiver, that the fatal blow would have caused immediate and visible symptoms, that the child suffered many additional injuries, and that the defendant did not seek medical care for the child was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children. Akhimie v. State, 297 Ga. 801, 777 S.E.2d 683, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 640 (2015). Revenge killing of infant daughter rejected. — Defendant’s conviction for murder of defendant’s infant daughter was upheld as the state presented testimony that there was no evidence connecting anyone besides the defendant to the child’s death and defendant’s suggestion that another kidnapped and killed the child as an act of revenge was impossible, given that the accused was in jail at the time the crime was committed. McNabb v. 24-14-6 State, 313 Ga. 701, 872 S.E.2d 251, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 159 (2022). Evidence sufficient for felony murder and armed robbery convictions. — Given the testimony provided by both the codefendant and the codefendant’s former wife, to whom the defendant admitted to ﬁring the fatal shots killing the victim, which netted the victim’s cellular phone and pager and evidence describing how the defendant participated in the events that happened before, during, and after the commission of the crimes, sufficient evidence was presented to uphold the defendant’s convictions for felony murder and armed robbery as a party to the crimes. Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 644 S.E.2d 837, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 347 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s conviction for felony murder and armed robbery was not based upon insufficient circumstantial evidence because there was directed evidence of the defendant’s guilt; the conviction was supported by an eyewitness identiﬁcation, DNA consistent with the defendant’s on the crack in the windshield of the getaway car, the defendant’s ﬁngerprint on the handle of the driver’s door of the getaway car, and the defendant’s birth certiﬁcate and mail in the getaway vehicle. Sanders v. State, 290 Ga. 637, 723 S.E.2d 436, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 209 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a ﬁrearm. — Given that the circumstantial evidence presented against the defendant sufficiently showed that: (1) the victim shot one of the intruders who committed the burglary; (2) shortly after the burglary, the defendant was treated for a gunshot wound and arrived at the hospital in a vehicle matching the description of the automobile seen leaving the crime scene; (3) the DNA evidence on ski masks found at the scene matched that of the owner of the car and the other passenger, who was also the defendant’s brother; and (4) according to the defendant’s brother, the driver of the car admitted to shooting the victim, the defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony 605 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) were affirmed on appeal. Sherman v. State, 284 Ga. App. 809, 644 S.E.2d 901, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 407 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for involuntary manslaughter conviction. — There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter of the defendant’s romantic friend given the evidence of the defendant’s admission that the defendant placed the friend in a headlock during a ﬁght, and the medical examiner’s ﬁndings that the friend was strangled to death. As a result, the jury was authorized to exclude all other reasonable hypotheses and conclude that the defendant unintentionally caused the friend’s death while committing simple battery. Lemon v. State, 293 Ga. App. 488, 667 S.E.2d 654, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 984 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for felony murder but insufficient for rape. — In the defendants’ joint trial for rape, murder, and other crimes against three separate victims, the evidence supported the felony murder verdict against one defendant because witnesses placed the defendants together prior to the murder, text messages on the defendant’s phone discussed robbing the victim, and the defendant ﬂed the state after the murder; but the evidence as to the rape merely placed the defendant at the scene, requiring reversal. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 796 S.E.2d 242, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 27 (2017). Evidence sufficient for aggravated battery conviction. — Defendant’s attempt to invoke the circumstantial evidence rule of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was rejected and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery as the evidence was not entirely circumstantial since there was direct evidence that: (1) defendant said that defendant was going to set the victim on ﬁre; (2) defendant was present and poured the gasoline on the victim; (3) defendant reached in defendant’s pocket for something just before the ﬁre started; and (4) the victim questioned why defendant had done it. Miller v. State, 265 Ga. 24-14-6 App. 402, 593 S.E.2d 943, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 134 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Convictions of arson, O.C.G.A. § 16-760(a), and stalking, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90, were proper because the circumstantial evidence presented at trial included a kerosene-soaked, partially burned, mailing label addressed to the defendant found at the scene of a ﬁre at the victim’s home; the state also presented evidence of the defendant’s escalating obsession with the victim and the threatening phone calls the defendant made to the victim shortly before the ﬁre. Although the circumstantial evidence must have excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save defendant’s guilt, the evidence need not have excluded every inference or hypothesis. Ransom v. State, 297 Ga. App. 902, 678 S.E.2d 574, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 577 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Conviction not entirely circumstantial in child molestation. — State’s evidence was not entirely circumstantial as the retail store’s surveillance video constituted direct evidence that the defendant touched the clothing around the defendant’s genital area in a manner consistent with masturbation while in close proximity to and watching the victim. Gonzalez v. State, 359 Ga. App. 147, 857 S.E.2d 88, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 165 (2021). Evidence held sufficient to support murder conviction. — Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder, armed robbery, and related crimes in connection with the death of the victim because the defendant was identiﬁed by a witness as the person the witness saw coming upstairs from the victim’s apartment just before the witness discovered the crimes; the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were found on the car used in the crimes; and the defendant’s own statements, both via text message and in person, corroborated the defendant’s participation in the murder and robbery. Babbage v. State, 296 Ga. 364, 768 S.E.2d 461, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 2 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s appeal from the defendant’s convictions for murder and other crimes arising out of the defendant’s 606 shooting a car repair shop worker (son) and shooting at the shop’s owner (father) on the basis that the evidence was merely circumstantial was rejected because there was eyewitness testimony that the defendant shot at the father without provocation, ﬂed the scene immediately, and attempted to evade law enforcement by running into a residential area and taking off the defendant’s shirt. Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 781, 822 S.E.2d 203, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 777 (2018). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of evidence tampering because, based on the circumstantial evidence, the defendant retrieved a ﬁrearm that the defendant’s child had hidden and that the defendant’s child had used to shoot and kill the victim; a friend drove the defendant to a ﬁshing pond and heard a splash; law enforcement recovered a ﬁrearm matching the description of the murder weapon in the exact place where the friend heard the splash; and there was no evidence presented at trial to support a reasonable inference that the defendant disposed of a different gun than the one used by the defendant’s child to commit murder. Elkins v. State, 350 Ga. App. 816, 830 S.E.2d 345, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 383 (2019). In the defendant’s murder trial, circumstantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict: the evidence included text messages showing the defendant and the victim were meeting for sex; the defendant’s saliva was on the victim’s penis; the murder weapon was found in the defendant’s backpack; however, the defendant’s ﬁnancial transaction fraud conviction was reversed because, despite the defendant’s attempts, the defendant was not able to obtain anything of value using the victim’s debit card. Carter v. State, 305 Ga. 863, 828 S.E.2d 317, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 325 (2019). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of felony murder based upon aggravated battery because the evidence showed that the defendant was the only adult in the home in the time leading up to the child victim’s injuries, the victim’s injury was profound and would have immediately incapacitated the victim, and the defendant’s account of 24-14-6 events did not explain the severity of the injury, which could only have resulted from massive trauma inconsistent with a typical fall down a staircase. Hamilton v. State, 309 Ga. 1, 843 S.E.2d 840, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 364 (2020). Although circumstantial, sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for murder and aggravated assault, given video evidence of defendant and the victim in a school courtyard before midnight, evidence that the victim was bludgeoned to death with a bloody rock found at the scene, DNA evidence showing the victim’s blood on the defendant’s clothes, and the defendant’s attack of a pedestrian for the pedestrian’s coat a few blocks away 20 minutes later. Carson v. State, 308 Ga. 761, 843 S.E.2d 421, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 348 (2020). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions because the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant not only knew of the felons’ plans but shared a common criminal intent and acted in concert with them in committing the crimes. Poole v. State, 312 Ga. 515, 863 S.E.2d 93, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 630 (2021). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of felony murder and other offenses, even though it was based on circumstantial evidence, because it showed that defendant was a gang member, the defendant was attacked by rival gang members days before the drive-by shootings, the rival gang members tended to congregate at the house where the drive-by shootings occurred, when police attempted an arrest the defendant barricaded himself in a room with a gun, a witness’s testimony placed the defendant in a particular vehicle minutes before one of the shootings, and the defendant claimed on social media to possess a gun that could have ﬁred the shell casings recovered at the scene of both shootings. Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 869 S.E.2d 461, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 37 (2022). Even though there was no direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the circumstantial evidence allowed the jury to infer that the defendant murdered the victim as, shortly before the victim was killed, the victim told the defendant’s cousin that 607 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) the victim was afraid of the defendant; the victim was alone with the defendant in the house before the victim’s death, and no witness saw the defendant leave the residence; and the victim told a cousin on the phone around the time the victim was estimated to have been killed that the victim was in the closet, and then the victim immediately hung up the phone after the victim said that the defendant was coming toward the victim. Adkins v. State, 314 Ga. 477, 877 S.E.2d 582, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 225 (2022). Circumstantial evidence for malice murder. — Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for malice murder and theft by taking because: (1) after the victim, who was the defendant’s roommate, disappeared, the defendant began driving the victim’s car; (2) a witness who lived on a street on which the defendant used to live and that was miles away from the defendant’s residence noticed a ﬁre on the side of the road and a person squatting by the road watching the ﬁre; (3) the victim’s burned body was later found at the road side; (4) the victim’s body had been burned, decapitated, drained of almost all blood, and cut into pieces; (5) the defendant told the police detectives who went to the defendant’s apartment that the victim was on vacation and that the defendant did not know where the victim was; (6) the defendant’s apartment had been recently cleaned and cleaning supplies were found in the apartment; (7) Luminol testing faintly revealed the presence of blood on the bathtub and surrounding walls of the apartment; (8) the trash which was collected from the apartment’s dumpster included the victim’s wallet, driver’s license, and debit card; and (9) broken furniture, socks, and a sheet with the victim’s blood were found in the trash. Adel v. State, 290 Ga. 690, 723 S.E.2d 666, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 286 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Death of a child. — Comparing the child’s condition at the time the defendant took the child from the child’s mother and shortly thereafter, with the child’s condition at the time the child and the defen- 24-14-6 dant appeared at the ﬁre station, and considering the acts of abuse admitted by the defendant, the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the verdict, was sufficient to have authorized a rational trier of fact in ﬁnding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the child’s death. Phipps v. State, 203 Ga. App. 128, 416 S.E.2d 319, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 387 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0740, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 291 (Ga. Apr. 9, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence that the defendant, the child’s mother, and the child’s father were the child’s sole caregivers and were the only ones with access to the child in the timeframe of the fatal injury, that the defendant was the primary caregiver, that the fatal blow would have caused immediate and visible symptoms, that the child suffered many additional injuries, and that the defendant did not seek medical care for the child was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children. Akhimie v. State, 297 Ga. 801, 777 S.E.2d 683, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 640 (2015). Appellant’s conviction for vehicular homicide was affirmed because the verdict led to the strong inference that the appellant, while driving under the inﬂuence, killed the victim with a vehicle appellant was driving at a high rate of speed and there was no other evidence that another car or anything else struck the victim while alive with such force as to kill. Taylor v. State, 337 Ga. App. 486, 788 S.E.2d 97, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 357 (2016). While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 701 (2016). Evidence sufficient for murder conviction. — Physical evidence of signs of struggle at victim’s residence, defendant’s attempts to remove these, and defendant’s subsequent behavior regarding the dis- 608 posal of victim’s body sufficed to permit the jury to exclude every other hypothesis save the guilt of the accused in a prosecution for murder. White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 409 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of armed robbery and malice murder because the victim went missing shortly after coming into a substantial amount of cash, the defendant had access to the victim’s home, and the defendant was seen driving around in the victim’s two vehicles, selling the victim’s property, and with a large amount of cash; the victim died from blunt trauma to the head, a mallet with blood on the mallet was found inside the house, and a witness testiﬁed that the defendant conﬁded to the witness that the defendant killed the victim, placed the victim’s body in a freezer, and took the victim’s money. Cutrer v. State, 287 Ga. 272, 695 S.E.2d 597, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 475 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support the defendant’s convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, ﬁnancial transaction card fraud, and recidivism because there was evidence placing the defendant at the victim’s home during the time of the murder and evidence of the victim’s blood on the defendant’s shoes, which the defendant intentionally chose not to wear when being questioned by police; the evidence, together with the defendant’s own statements regarding his use of the victim’s debit card, was sufficient to authorize the jury to determine that the state excluded all reasonable hypotheses save that of the defendant’s guilt and to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 167 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support the defendant’s felony murder conviction because the evidence established that a witness saw the defendant in 24-14-6 possession of a gun, that the defendant went to the victim’s home, that the defendant used the defendant’s gun to coerce the victim into the victim’s car and to drive as the defendant instructed, that the victim stopped the victim’s car and the victim and the defendant exited and went behind some bushes, that multiple gunshots were heard, that a witness saw the defendant step from behind the bushes and run back toward the car, and that the victim’s body was found behind the bushes with 10 gunshots, including ﬁve shots to the head. Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 708 S.E.2d 294, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 266 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence, including that there was no evidence that the victim died from a cause other than asphyxia due to strangulation, the fact that the victim tested negative for drugs at the time of death, negating any theory about a lethal combination of alcohol and drugs, and the lack of evidence of forced entry to a room that the defendant and the victim shared was sufficient to support the defendant’s murder conviction. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. 131, 744 S.E.2d 49, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 494 (2013). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder as the victim’s daughter saw that the victim had about $600 in the victim’s wallet the day before the murder; after the murder, the victim’s purse had no cash in it; the defendant’s girlfriend identiﬁed the knife handle and blade found near the victim’s body as the steak knife with a loosened handle that the girlfriend had used in cooking at the defendant’s apartment; and the defendant admitted to another prisoner that the defendant stabbed the victim. Bates v. State, 293 Ga. 855, 750 S.E.2d 323, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 866 (2013). Jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant called the defendant’s gang members to retrieve the defendant from an apartment where someone was threatening the defendant, as well as the defendant’s celebrating with the gang that evening after the shooting, that the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(4) by advising, encouraging, counseling, or procuring others to commit the crime. Slaton 609 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) v. State, 296 Ga. 122, 765 S.E.2d 332, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 884 (2014). Evidence sufficient for murder of infant child. — Defendant’s conviction for murder was upheld on appeal because the evidence established that the only possible perpetrators of the fatal abdominal trauma to the child were defendant or the mother and the expert opinion evidence established that the death would have occurred within 45 minutes after the abdominal trauma and likely sooner than that and the mother had already gone to work and the neighbor who drove the child and the defendant to the hospital testiﬁed that the child was still alive. Wilson v. State, 308 Ga. 306, 840 S.E.2d 370, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 170 (2020). Sufficient evidence of murder conviction of child. — Evidence was sufficient to for the jury to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that the defendant’s boyfriend alone killed the defendant’s twoyear-old child and instead to ﬁnd that the defendant was responsible because the jury heard evidence that the defendant forcefully shook and slapped the child close to the time that the child became stiff and unresponsive, the defendant did not immediately seek help for the child even though the defendant was a nurse, and once the defendant ﬁnally did get help the defendant did not seem upset and apologized to the defendant’s boyfriend at the hospital. Smith v. State, 307 Ga. 680, 838 S.E.2d 321, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 52 (2020). After the state presented evidence collected from the defendant’s house and the crime scene connecting the defendant to the victim’s death, the defendant gave conﬂicting accounts of events to police, and there was similar-transaction evidence regarding a prior serious of domestic violence incidents between the defendant and a former girlfriend, the evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of malice murder and concealing the death of another. Shaw v. State, 307 Ga. 233, 835 S.E.2d 279, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 719 (2019). Evidence sufficient for malice murder conviction. — There was sufficient evidence to enable a rational trier of fact 24-14-6 to ﬁnd defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder after the victim, found in defendant’s home, had been beaten and died from a severe blow to the head. Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 599 S.E.2d 177, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 548 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to support a malice murder conviction since witnesses saw the defendant arguing with the victim, go with the victim into an area behind a motel where the victim lived, heard shots from the area behind the motel, and later the victim’s body was found in that area; also, the defendant was seen at a house with an item wrapped in cloth, and later, the defendant’s gun, the murder weapon, was found in the yard of that house, wrapped in cloth. Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 161, 625 S.E.2d 766, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 17 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Bloody jogging suit belonging to the defendant found at the defendant’s girlfriend’s house with the victim’s blood on it, witnesses’ description of the defendant wearing that same jogging suit after the shooting, and a .380 pistol found hidden in a cinder block at the girlfriend’s house that matched the type of gun used to kill the victim were sufficient evidence to support convictions for malice murder and other related crimes with regard to the killing of the girlfriend’s neighbor. Hooks v. State, 280 Ga. 164, 626 S.E.2d 114, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 70 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence that the defendant threatened to kill the victim on numerous occasions, sometimes while brandishing a knife; that shortly before the victim was fatally stabbed, the defendant was seen in the victim’s front yard; and that police matched the boots the defendant was wearing that night to a footprint at the crime scene was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 304, 667 S.E.2d 65, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 753 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault beyond a reason- 610 able doubt because although the defendant denied to police that the defendant had any contact with the silver car that was connected to the robbery, the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were found on the outside of the car; an eyewitness’s physical description of the second gunman from the robbery matched the defendant. Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 253 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crimes of malice murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault because the evidence showed that, during a drug deal and the subsequent shootings, the defendant was in the apartment and the defendant’s blood was found there; witnesses saw two men matching the defendant’s and the codefendant’s descriptions leaving quickly; ammunition of the type used to kill the victim was found in a car that was owned by the codefendant with whom the defendant was living; and the defendant denied knowing any of the other defendants and fabricated a story that the defendant had been shot in a confrontation at a gas station. Dixon v. State, 298 Ga. 200, 779 S.E.2d 290, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 912 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of directly committing the crimes of malice murder and concealing the death of another or that the defendant was a party to the crimes because there was evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim, including evidence that the defendant had acted violently against the victim a few months before the victim’s body was found; evidence that days before the victim’s body was found, the defendant’s son used the victim’s cell phone to call their relatives; and evidence that the police found the victim’s personal items, including items which could have been used to inﬂict the fatal injuries to the victim’s body, inside the defendant’s bags. Miller v. State, 303 Ga. 1, 810 S.E.2d 123, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 79 (2018). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and concealing the death of another be- 24-14-6 cause, inter alia, the evidence showed that the defendant compressed the victim’s neck until the victim asphyxiated; and that the defendant placed the victim’s body face up in a brush pile and failed to inform the police of the victim’s location. Collett v. State, 305 Ga. 853, 828 S.E.2d 362, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 331 (2019). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder because the defendant had been in a relationship with the victim for about 12 years; after the relationship ended, the victim began a romantic relationship with another man; the defendant repeatedly told the victim that it was not over between them; weeks before the shooting, the defendant told another individual that the defendant was going to kill the victim and the other man; and the gun used in the murder was found about two and a half miles from the scene of the shooting. Moss v. State, 305 Ga. 878, 828 S.E.2d 309, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 332 (2019). Evidence sufficient for rape conviction. — Combination of circumstantial and direct evidence, including the victim’s identiﬁcation of the attacker, DNA evidence, and the testimony of several eyewitnesses who saw a man ﬁtting the defendant’s description in the area near the time of the attack, was sufficient to sustain a rape conviction. McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga. App. 14, 616 S.E.2d 489, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 650 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for malice murder and attempted arson convictions. — Malice murder and attempted arson convictions were upheld as: (1) the evidence presented showed that an attempted arson was inextricably linked to the victim’s murder, and the jury was authorized to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty; (2) the admission of two handwritten documents that defendant had penned was proper, as their prejudicial impact did not outweigh their probative value; and (3) the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in determining that any prejudicial impact of a religious prayer asking for strength, and an expression of uncertainty as to what “makes me tick,” did not outweigh the probative value of the evi- 611 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) dence. Fortson v. State, 280 Ga. 376, 628 S.E.2d 104, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 196 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for felony murder while in commission of cruelty to children conviction. — Evidence that a defendant’s 13-month-old child died while in the defendant’s care from brain trauma caused by being struck by or against an object or violently shaken at a time when one other person and that person’s child were in the defendant’s apartment provided sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to enable a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder while in the commission of cruelty to a child; questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses were to be decided by the jury, and the jury’s ﬁnding was not to be disturbed unless the guilty verdict was insupportable as a matter of law. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 637 S.E.2d 652, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 965 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for malice murder and armed robbery convictions. — Evidence, which included uncontroverted testimony from an eyewitness who saw the defendant order a store employee into the street shortly before the employee was shot, the testimony of two other eyewitnesses, and the fact that calls had been made from the employee’s stolen cellular phone to the defendant’s mother, was sufﬁcient to enable a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and a number of other associated crimes. Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 642 S.E.2d 659, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 240 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for felony murder and arson convictions. — Circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support the defendant’s arson and felony murder convictions and to exclude the theory that an intruder set the ﬁre in the house since the defendant rented a room from the victim: (1) testimony of neighbors contradicted the defendant’s claim that the defendant was asleep and unaware of the ﬁre; (2) 24-14-6 there was no evidence of a forced entry other than that of the neighbors who tried to save the victim; (3) the layout of the house authorized the jury to ﬁnd that the defendant would have noticed an intruder; and (4) a motive could be inferred from the fact that the defendant owed rent to the victim and that the victim was planning to ask the defendant for the rent. Green v. State, 283 Ga. 126, 657 S.E.2d 221, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 137 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for felony murder conviction. — Circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of the felony murder of the defendant’s two-month-old child. The victim’s grandparent had not had contact with the victim on the day of the murder, and the evidence that the victim was well when the victim’s other parent left the house, combined with a medical examiner’s testimony and time line regarding the time of the child’s death, excluded the other parent’s guilt as well. Nixon v. State, 284 Ga. 800, 671 S.E.2d 503, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 11 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence authorized the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime because there was substantial corroborating evidence in addition to the accomplice’s testimony; the defendant stated that the defendant had killed someone, other witnesses corroborated the accomplice’s testimony regarding the arrival and departure of the two men on the night of the shooting, and blood was found on the shirt the defendant wore that night and tried to have destroyed. Gonnella v. State, 286 Ga. 211, 686 S.E.2d 644, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 733 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder predicated upon aggravated assault because the evidence at the crime scene showed there had been a struggle; the victim’s injuries were consistent with strangulation; male DNA taken from the victim’s body was later matched to the defendant’s DNA; no other male DNA was found in the samples taken from the vic- 612 tim’s body; and the state excluded all reasonable hypotheses except that of the defendant’s guilt. Reeves v. State, 294 Ga. 673, 755 S.E.2d 695, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 165 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for felony murder given that the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were found inside the victim’s home, the defendant was seen standing outside the home several times on the day the victim was murdered, and one time the defendant was carrying the victim’s television, and the defendant confessed details of the murder that were not public to a cellmate. Brown v. State, 304 Ga. 435, 819 S.E.2d 14, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 595 (2018). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crimes of felony murder and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of one of the accomplices to an attempted armed robbery because the defendant was not just an innocent bystander as the defendant admitted that the defendant was with the accomplices before the shooting; the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant was the person whom two witnesses overheard in the background of a call encouraging the armed robbery; and the defendant admitted that the defendant accompanied the accomplices knowing that the buyer and the group the defendant was with planned to rob each other during a purported drug deal. Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 841 S.E.2d 692, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 231 (2020). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder predicated on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because the victim was found dead from gunshot wounds; the victim’s wallet was missing when the victim was found; the suspect ﬂed the scene in a small, silver sedan; the defendant’s co-indictee was driving a vehicle matching that description in the area at the time of the murder; and the defendant stated in a jailhouse telephone conversation that the defendant was involved in the week-long crime spree. Perdomo v. State, 307 Ga. 670, 837 S.E.2d 762, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 9 (2020). 24-14-6 Circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s contentious relationship with the victim, who lived in a cabin on the defendant’s property, that the victim was struck multiple times with a hatchet found in the defendant’s trailer, and that a gun found in the defendant’s hotel room was used to shoot the victim, supported the defendant’s felony murder conviction. Eggleston v. State, 309 Ga. 888, 848 S.E.2d 853, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 663 (2020). Evidence sufficient for felony murder and aggravated assault conviction. — Contrary to a defendant’s contention that the state presented only circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 that did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses except that of the defendant’s guilt, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder and aggravated assault; the defendant’s infant child died of a massive closed head trauma complicated by blunt force chest trauma, and the defendant had the sole care of the child just before the child suffered rib injuries allegedly due to the defendant pushing on the child’s chest while the child was choking and just before the child suffered seizure-like symptoms. Berryhill v. State, 285 Ga. 198, 674 S.E.2d 920, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 100 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence authorized the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony because contrary to the defendant’s arguments, the evidence showed that the person who was sitting in the back seat of the victim’s car was not sitting directly behind the victim, but instead, that person was in the rear seat on the passenger’s side of the car; the forensics testing showed that the murderer was located to the left of the victim, not the right, and there was blood spatter on the seat behind the victim from which the jury could have inferred that no one was sitting there at the time of the shooting. Julius v. State, 286 Ga. 413, 687 S.E.2d 828, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 90 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault) and the ag- 613 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) gravated assaults because there were warning signs on the off-ramp indicating that anyone driving in that direction was going the wrong way; once the defendant was on the parkway, the defendant drove at approximately 80 miles per hour, and four vehicles had to swerve out of the way to avoid colliding with the defendant; there were at least ﬁve places where the defendant could have safely pulled over before entering the curve where the collisions occurred; and the defendant was driving in excess of 75 miles an hour with the vehicle’s cruise control engaged when the defendant collided with the felony murder victim. Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 772, 843 S.E.2d 411, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 347 (2020). Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault conviction. — Evidence was sufﬁcient to authorize a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because even though the defendant did not actually use a weapon, there was evidence that an accomplice brandished a handgun and pointed the handgun at both the manager and the clerk of the video store, and the accomplice’s use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant; one who intentionally aids or abets the commission of a crime by another is a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal, and reasonable apprehension of injury can be proved by circumstantial or indirect evidence as well as by direct or positive evidence since the presence of a gun would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1121 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault. — Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. The reasonable hypothesis rule in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not applicable in the case as the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, in that the state presented direct evidence of the 24-14-6 defendant’s participation in the events at issue, that the defendant carried a shotgun from the scene of the assault, that the defendant rode away with the weapon near the defendant in the car, and that the defendant ﬂed from police, both in the car and on foot. Emerson v. State, 315 Ga. App. 105, 726 S.E.2d 600, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 331 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for aggravated child molestation conviction. — Evidence, including that defendant had access and opportunity to infect a victim at least two weeks prior to the victim exhibiting symptoms, and that the victim’s immediate outcry was consistent with the victim’s statement to a doctor identifying defendant, and excluding the hypothesis that the victim’s father was present prior to the onset of the victim’s symptoms, was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c). Zuniga v. State, 300 Ga. App. 45, 684 S.E.2d 77, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 953 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0169, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 125 (Ga. Feb. 1, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. — See Park v. State, 123 Ga. 164, 51 S.E. 317, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 403 (1905) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1984); Bush v. State, 7 Ga. App. 607, 67 S.E. 685, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 421 (1910) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Calhoun v. State, 9 Ga. App. 501, 71 S.E. 765, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 209 (1911) (burglary) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Henderson v. State, 147 Ga. 134, 92 S.E. 871, 1917 Ga. LEXIS 82 (1917) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Haire v. State, 38 Ga. App. 116, 142 S.E. 697, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 74 (1928) (cattle stealing) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Wallin v. State, 38 Ga. App. 194, 143 S.E. 597, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (1928) (burglary) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Smith v. State, 38 Ga. App. 741, 145 S.E. 500, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 426 (1928) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Hughie v. State, 52 Ga. App. 73, 182 S.E. 614 197, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 40 (1935) (larceny of automobile) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Graham v. State, 183 Ga. 381, 183 Ga. 881, 189 S.E. 910, 1937 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1937) (murder) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Orr v. State, 62 Ga. App. 774, 9 S.E.2d 917, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 433 (1940) (manufacturing whiskey) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Cheney v. State, 61 Ga. App. 726, 7 S.E.2d 335, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 242 (1940) (arson) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wells v. State, 75 Ga. App. 588, 44 S.E.2d 66, 1947 Ga. App. LEXIS 587 (1947) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Woody v. State, 99 Ga. App. 857, 109 S.E.2d 896, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 971 (1959) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Purser v. State, 104 Ga. App. 728, 122 S.E.2d 749, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 783 (1961) (voluntary manslaughter) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Crane v. State, 123 Ga. App. 226, 180 S.E.2d 289, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 1173 (1971) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 350, 190 S.E.2d 785, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1144 (1972) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ennis v. State, 130 Ga. App. 716, 204 S.E.2d 519, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1236 (1974) (possession of marijuana) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Russell v. State, 132 Ga. App. 35, 207 S.E.2d 619, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1593 (1974) (possession of marijuana) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wright v. State, 147 Ga. App. 111, 248 S.E.2d 183, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2798 (1978) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kametches v. State, 242 Ga. 721, 251 S.E.2d 232, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1341 (1978) (possession for sale of obscene materials) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. State, 155 Ga. App. 211, 270 S.E.2d 377, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2531 (1980) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415, 373 S.E.2d 97, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1037 (1988) (entering an automobile) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Krull v. State, 211 Ga. App. 37, 438 S.E.2d 152, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1401 (1993) 24-14-6 (DUI, no proof of insurance, driving with suspended license, and failure to maintain lane) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Calhoun v. State, 213 Ga. App. 375, 444 S.E.2d 405, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 553 (1994) (shoplifting) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 424, 484 S.E.2d 60 (trafficking in cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 492 S.E.2d 204 (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); In re A.D.C., 228 Ga. App. 829, 493 S.E.2d 38 (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Greene v. State, 230 Ga. App. 155, 495 S.E.2d 634 (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 583, 538 S.E.2d 481, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1015 (2000) (possession of cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim, to the extent that the evidence that the defendant’s car had been parked at some point with the car’s front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt as a party, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Except as to one incident, the evidence was insufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband’s sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, because the record showed that the mother had no knowledge of seven of the eight incidents until she took the children to therapy, and the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence — including the fact of the family’s nudist lifestyle, the existence of pornographic movies in the home, and the fact that during therapy, the mother advised the girls to not talk about their father — was insufficient to prove aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 615 Crimes Against the Person (Cont’d) S.E.2d 383, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1184 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of misdemeanor ﬂeeing or attempting to elude a police officer because a deputy identiﬁed the defendant as the driver; another officer followed the defendant out of the parking lot when the defendant refused to stop; and the officer activated the vehicle’s lights and siren but lost sight of the speeding car moments before a car of the same color struck another vehicle just ahead; however, the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of felony ﬂeeing or attempting to elude as no evidence was presented that the defendant was attempting to elude arrest for a non-traffic violation when the defendant struck the other vehicle. Johnson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 622, 788 S.E.2d 559, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (2016). Evidence insufficient for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and ﬁrearm possession conviction. — Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant’s conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6; the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testiﬁed that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant’s brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 24-14-6 510 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for malice murder, aggravated assault, and ﬁrearm possession convictions. — Evidence did not show that defendant intentionally or knowingly provided handguns to two cousins who used the guns to commit murder and other crimes, and because defendant was not present when the crimes were committed and the evidence did not exclude all possibilities except guilt, the state supreme court reversed defendant’s convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon. Clyde v. State, 276 Ga. 839, 584 S.E.2d 253, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 625 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault. — Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant and the defendant’s codefendant of aggravated assault because based on the circumstantial evidence, the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant and the codefendant accompanied their accomplice to a convenience store knowing that the accomplice intended to assault the victim because of their past differences, that the defendant had speciﬁcally served as the getaway driver, and that the codefendant had accompanied the accomplice inside the store as a lookout, making both individuals parties to the aggravated assault. Romero v. State, 307 Ga. App. 348, 705 S.E.2d 195, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1027 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0642, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 634 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0627, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 650 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 3. Crimes Against Property Evidence insufficient to show knowledge that car was unregistered. — Evidence that a defendant received and drove a car following the defendant’s father’s death was insufficient to prove a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15 because there was no evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant knew that the car was not registered. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 722 S.E.2d 446, 616 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 71 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for armed robbery conviction. — Although defendant was convicted on circumstantial evidence, the conviction was properly supported by that evidence as the facts that were proven at trial were not only consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of defendant since the defendant could not explain the presence of a distinctive boot print on the bathroom ﬂoor of the store defendant was accused of burglarizing, the presence of defendant’s ﬁngerprints on the bathroom wall seven feet off the ground, or defendant’s ﬁngerprints on a drink bottle in a space above the bathroom ceiling where defendant had hidden while defendant waited for the store to close so defendant could commit an armed robbery of the store. Lighten v. State, 259 Ga. App. 280, 576 S.E.2d 658, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 80 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). From the defendant’s words, demeanor, companionship, and conduct before and after an armed robbery, a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the state established the requisite intent; the evidence authorized the jury to ﬁnd that before an armed robbery, the defendant had planned to take money from a convenience store, the defendant’s accomplice went into the store, took the money from the clerk at gunpoint, and then joined the defendant with the money, and that when the cohorts realized moments later that the police suspected the pair of the armed robbery, the defendant disobeyed police commands to stop, acted as the getaway driver in a high speed chase, and then tried to ﬂee the police on foot. Espinosa v. State, 285 Ga. App. 69, 645 S.E.2d 529, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 160 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1281, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. Oct. 9, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Rational trier of fact was authorized to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a party to the crime of robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 162-20 and 16-8-40 because the defendant’s admission that the defendant was present at the scene of the robbery, in conjunction 24-14-6 with the defendant’s possession of the recently stolen item, which the jury could ﬁnd was unsatisfactorily explained by defendant, was sufficient to support the defendant’s robbery conviction; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s version of events because although the defendant contended that the defendant’s videotaped police interview and defendant’s trial testimony created a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, defendant’s interview and trial testimony were not consistent with one another in all material respects, and defendant’s statements also were inconsistent with the testimony of the pursuing patrol officers. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 599 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence of the circumstances was sufﬁcient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator and the defendant’s guilt of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-841, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-521, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11106, because the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by both a convenience store clerk and another store employee; when the defendant was apprehended, an officer recovered next to the defendant’s person the contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission of the robbery. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 608 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery as a party to a crime given evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle with three other occupants to the site of the robbery, that there were four black masks for the four men, that the defendant hid a shotgun and showed police where to ﬁnd the shotgun, and that the defendant was found one street over from the robbery site and was the only person in the area. Clemente v. State, 331 Ga. App. 84, 769 S.E.2d 790, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 110 (2015). Defendant’s armed robbery conviction was not based on insufficient circumstantial evidence based on the fact that the victim could not identify the defendant as 617 Crimes Against Property (Cont’d) one of the men who robbed the victim because the state presented evidence that two men, one taller and one shorter, used handguns to take property from the victim, and within minutes the police located the defendant’s vehicle, which matched the victim’s description and contained the victim’s stolen belongings as well as two handguns; and, when stopped, the defendant spontaneously stated that the defendant committed the crime. Demps v. State, 337 Ga. App. 657, 788 S.E.2d 525, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 382 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime because, although it might be plausible that the defendant left a driver’s license, wallet, and social security card in the girlfriend’s car at some unknown time before the robbery took place, that hypothesis was not a reasonable one as it would mean that two strangers with no apparent relationship to the defendant’s girlfriend somehow gained access to the girlfriend’s car the night of the robbery, and then, right after robbing the store, they for some reason placed and received a ﬂurry of phone calls and text messages to and from people close to the defendant’s girlfriend. Drake v. State, 363 Ga. App. 653, 872 S.E.2d 306, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 191 (2022). Evidence insufficient for armed robbery conviction. — Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because the evidence supported two equally reasonable hypotheses, which did not meet the standard of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6; there was no direct evidence regarding where the victim was when the defendant entered the victim’s kitchen, and there was no evidence, like signs of forced entry, from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the victim heard and confronted the defendant before the defendant could take anything or that the victim usually kept the victim’s wallet on the victim’s person or in the victim’s bedroom, 24-14-6 which could support an inference that the defendant had to confront the victim before taking the wallet. Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 709 S.E.2d 202, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 148 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s armed robbery conviction had to be overturned because the evidence failed to establish that the victim’s debit card was taken with force before or contemporaneous with the taking, and the evidence failed to establish whether the defendant ﬁrst took the debit card and then killed the victim or whether the defendant killed the victim and then took the debit card; the evidence incriminating the defendant of armed robbery was wholly circumstantial, and both scenarios were equally reasonable. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 167 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Several counts of the defendant’s robbery and burglary convictions and one count of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery were reversed because the ﬁnding of the proceeds of some of the robberies at an apartment did not show that the defendant was in possession of the property taken and no witness testiﬁed connecting the defendant with some of the home invasions; thus, the evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that the defendant did not participate in some of the crimes. Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga. App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 703 (2015), aff’d, 299 Ga. 841, 792 S.E.2d 326, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 656 (2016). Evidence sufficient for armed robbery and aggravated assault conviction. — When the testimonies of the victim, a doctor, and other witnesses were a sufficient indication under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 of the severity of the blow to show that a bludgeon device was used as an offensive weapon, there was sufficient competent evidence to ﬁnd defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-521(a) and 16-8-41(a). Garrett v. State, 263 Ga. App. 310, 587 S.E.2d 794, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1193 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Ample evidence concerning the child victim’s condition and expert testimony 618 regarding the child’s condition was presented to authorize the jury to ﬁnd defendant guilty of committing felony murder by holding the child in scalding water, and guilty of committing cruelty to a child by failing to provide medical attention, and to reject the evidence and hypotheses defendant presented in an attempt to refute the charges. Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 1018 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Despite the defendant’s claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1128 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for shoplifting conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions on three counts of shoplifting following eyewitness testimony that the defendant had concealed cologne bottles under the defendant’s shirt at a drugstore and had walked out of a grocery store carrying items that had not been paid for supported two of the counts; also, testimony that video games had been taken from a video store without being purchased, and that the defendant had the games on the defendant’s person about 20 minutes after leaving the video store and at the time of the defendant’s apprehension for shoplifting at the drug store was sufficient circumstantial evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant’s innocence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Crosby v. State, 287 Ga. App. 109, 650 S.E.2d 775, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). To the extent that a defendant’s criminal intent to commit a shoplifting could only be shown by circumstantial evidence, based on the uncontroverted direct evidence that the defendant and the defen- 24-14-6 dant’s accomplice took a cart with merchandise into a restricted area, lied about their purpose of being in the area, surveyed various emergency exits from the store defendants were in, abandoned the merchandise when an emergency exit jammed, and lacked any means for paying for the merchandise, no reasonable hypothesis for the defendant’s innocence existed that was consistent with the evidence. Alford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 514, 664 S.E.2d 870, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 800 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for criminal trespass conviction. — Because all the evidence was circumstantial as a defendant was not seen removing anything from the alleged victim’s barn, the defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 was inappropriate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 because although the defendant was on the victim’s property without permission, it was not proven that the defendant was there for a criminal purpose as the evidence indicated that the defendant was at the barn to drop off a saw that the defendant wanted to sell to the victim. Parker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 384, 677 S.E.2d 345, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 319 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for burglary conviction. — Because all the evidence was circumstantial as a defendant was not seen removing anything from the alleged victim’s barn, the defendant’s conviction for burglary was inappropriate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 as the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was only at the victim’s barn to drop off a saw the defendant wanted to sell to the victim based on a telephone message left by the defendant for the victim and eyewitness testimony. Parker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 384, 677 S.E.2d 345, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 319 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the burglary of two residences where defendant’s shoe prints and tire tracks were found; both tire tracks and shoe prints connected defendant to these burglaries, and defendant was caught by 619 Crimes Against Property (Cont’d) the police wearing the same shoes and driving the same car while in the process of participating in the burglary of a third residence, located near the ﬁrst two residences. Wise v. State, 325 Ga. App. 377, 752 S.E.2d 628, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 998 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Burglary conviction. — Sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant’s intent supported defendant’s burglary conviction as defendant admitted entering the victim’s home, and the victim testiﬁed that medications and cash were missing from the victim’s home after the incident and that no one else had been in the victim’s home from the time that the victim last saw the items until the victim noticed the items missing; the trial court’s comments as to defendant’s intent referred to the trial court’s reason for ﬁnding defendant not guilty of burglary with intent to commit rape, and did not go to defendant’s burglary with intent to commit theft. Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 599 S.E.2d 286, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 631 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Regarding defendants’ convictions for burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, sufficient evidence authorized the jury’s decision to reject one defendant’s version of events — that defendants believed that the property involved belonged to an accomplice — because, with regard to one of the burglarized residences, the fact that defendants were unsuccessful in taking anything from the home was irrelevant to the burglary convictions since the crime was completed upon entry into the dwelling. As to the second residence, the fact that property from that residence was found in the vehicle in which defendants were in was sufficient to establish that the property had been stolen. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 160 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence supported a defendant’s conviction of burglarizing a garden center. On the morning the garden center burglary was discovered, the defen- 24-14-6 dant was caught burglarizing a car dealership two doors down; gloves that fell from the defendant’s pocket at the dealership came from the garden center; a shoe print on another glove from the center matched the defendant’s boots; an investigator who drove by the area the previous evening testiﬁed that neither building showed signs of forced entry at that time; and the defendant stated that the defendant could have committed the garden center burglary but did not remember doing so. Johnson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 253, 661 S.E.2d 642, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 457 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s burglary conviction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 was supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant entered the victim’s house without permission and there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft therein since there was money in the house before the defendant entered, but the money was gone after the defendant left. Hall v. State, 294 Ga. App. 274, 668 S.E.2d 880, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1165 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). The victim’s stolen computer was discovered in the attic area between the victim’s side of a duplex and the defendant’s side, and an officer noticed a path in the insulation from the defendant’s side to the victim’s attic access door. Norful v. State, 296 Ga. App. 387, 674 S.E.2d 633, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 231 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant entered the victim’s apartment without permission when although the victim, who owned the apartment, did not testify at trial, the evidence was that the victim had changed the locks after the defendant moved out and that the defendant could no longer use the defendant’s keys; on the day of the burglary, the defendant at- 620 tempted unsuccessfully to use the defendant’s keys and then went around to the patio, climbed over the railing around the patio, and went, uninvited, into the apartment through the patio door. Ursulita v. State, 307 Ga. App. 735, 706 S.E.2d 123, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 64 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 for defendant’s conviction of burglary because: (1) an investigating officer, who responded to a burglary alarm at a townhouse, found the defendant coming from the back of the townhouse; (2) the defendant said that the defendant had just put the defendant’s dog away through the back door of the defendant’s neighboring townhouse; (3) the defendant’s shoe print was found outside the broken window of the townhouse with the alarm, and the defendant had a remote control in the defendant’s pocket that operated a television set that had been unplugged and was put on the ﬂoor by the front door of the townhouse; and (4) the defendant’s ﬁngerprints were found on the television. Reggler v. State, 307 Ga. App. 721, 706 S.E.2d 111, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 60 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of burglarizing a tool supply store because the defendant’s blood was found on the smashed-in door and the defendant had two prior convictions for strikingly similar hardware store burglaries. Although the evidence was circumstantial, there was no other evidence of how the defendant’s blood could have been at the scene. The trial court’s deﬁnition of “entry” as entry on to real estate was not error or if error was not harmful, because the charge as a whole required that the defendant enter the building. Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. App. 681, 710 S.E.2d 878, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 428 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because the defendant was caught within four minutes of the burglary in a truck matching the victims’ description of the truck outside their home, and the defendant was carrying a crowbar, had the victims’ television, and 24-14-6 ﬂed from police. Veasley v. State, 312 Ga. App. 728, 719 S.E.2d 585, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1031 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence that a cigarette butt with the defendant’s DNA on the butt was found in a burglary victim’s home, that the defendant was seen standing in a neighbor’s yard, that the defendant was wet and muddy, and that some of the stolen items were also wet and near a creek near the victim’s home was sufficient to support the defendant’s burglary conviction. Stokes v. State, 327 Ga. App. 511, 759 S.E.2d 585, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 375 (2014). Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary because the blood pools and drag marks found at the crime scene indicated that the victims were shot before being dragged inside their home, and the medical examiner testiﬁed to the absence of soot in one of the victim’s lungs showing that that victim was not breathing during the ﬁre; thus, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant entered the home without the victims’ consent and that the defendant did so with the intention of committing the felony of arson once inside. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 236 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Defendant’s convictions for burglary and smash and grab burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(c) and 16-7-2(b) were supported by circumstantial evidence, including cell phone evidence that the defendant was near the scenes of the two burglaries and DNA evidence from a cigarette butt found in a very similar burglary days after the charged crimes. Nations v. State, 345 Ga. App. 92, 812 S.E.2d 346, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 176 (2018). Burglary and aggravated assault. — Defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, were affirmed as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to prove that the defendant was the person who committed the acts in question, based on witness testimony and the discovery of clothes and a gun used in the robbery in the defendant’s room. Moore v. State, 277 621 Crimes Against Property (Cont’d) Ga. App. 474, 627 S.E.2d 107, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 129 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Possession of stolen goods may authorize conviction. — Fact that stolen goods were in defendant’s possession shortly after commission of the burglary would, in and of itself, authorize the jury to infer that defendant was guilty, unless the defendant explained satisfactorily the defendant’s possession of such stolen goods. McGee v. State, 159 Ga. App. 763, 285 S.E.2d 224, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2797 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Robbery. — When a defendant was arrested for one robbery, but connected to three prior robberies by witnesses who identiﬁed the mask taken from the defendant’s car as being the mask worn in the three prior robberies, and other similarities were shown between the methods used in all of the robberies, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. Gamble v. State, 194 Ga. App. 765, 391 S.E.2d 801, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 324 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When the defendant jumped out of defendant’s vehicle and began running away upon the approach of officers, narcotics were found in the immediate area of defendant’s residence, the defendant was in possession of large amounts of money in small denominations, and no other persons were present in the area, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. Jones v. State, 208 Ga. App. 559, 430 S.E.2d 877, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 632 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Even though the evidence that defendant forcibly entered the elderly victims’ home, attacked and robbed the victims, inﬂicted fatal injuries, then later sold or attempted to sell items stolen from the victims, along with similar transaction evidence that defendant was involved in a pattern of conduct of forcing defendant’s way into the homes of elderly victims, attacking the victims, and then stealing items from them to trade for crack cocaine, was largely circumstantial, the 24-14-6 largely circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except defendant’s guilt of the armed robbery and murder of the victims. Weston v. State, 276 Ga. 680, 580 S.E.2d 204, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 359 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for robbery by sudden snatching conviction. — Although the victim never saw the defendant with the wallet, there was sufficient evidence to show that at the moment the defendant’s companion darted in front of the victim’s cart distracting the victim’s attention, the defendant snatched the wallet from the victim’s purse; despite the victim’s detection of the defendant’s efforts, nothing more was needed to prove the elements of the crime of robbery by sudden snatching. Andrews v. State, 270 Ga. App. 362, 606 S.E.2d 587, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1436 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession of tools for commission of crime conviction. — Items stolen from victims’ vehicles found in the defendant’s car, stopped as the vehicle left the area of the thefts were sufficient to sustain convictions of entering an auto with the intent to commit theft, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18; however, as there was no similar testimony as to items stolen from different victims, insufficient evidence supported other convictions, because the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, without any other direct evidence, was insufficient to convict the defendant of the crimes that a passenger admitted to committing. Along with the stolen items found in the defendant’s vehicle, and the defendant’s presence at the crime scene where cars were broken into with the kind of tools found in the defendant’s vehicle, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of tools for the commission of a crime. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 94, 635 S.E.2d 577, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1014 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a ﬁrearm conviction. — After two intruders burglarized and robbed a home at gunpoint, a pickup truck near the home 622 ﬂed from a patrol car and crashed, then two people matching the victims’ description of the intruders ﬂed from the truck. Since the defendant was trapped behind the steering wheel, and the items stolen from the home and a handgun were found in the truck, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a burglary. Olds v. State, 293 Ga. App. 884, 668 S.E.2d 485, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1089 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence held sufficient to support conviction for arson. — Given evidence of defendant’s serious altercation with a woman-resident of the subject arson house prior to the house’s burning, defendant’s identiﬁcation at and around the premises minutes prior to, and after the ﬁre, and other circumstantial indicia of motive, opportunity, and inconsistency, the evidence, though wholly circumstantial, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for arson. Jenkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 500, 428 S.E.2d 410, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 224 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence presented at trial: that the defendant and the defendant’s family were to leave a house they bought for failure to make payments, that the defendant was upset about the fact that the defendant was not going to receive the return of the earnest money, that defendant was alone in the house at the time of the ﬁre, and that defendant appeared nervous was sufficient to convict defendant of arson. Burchette v. State, 260 Ga. App. 739, 580 S.E.2d 609, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 405 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1195, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 772 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2003), aff’d, 278 Ga. 1, 596 S.E.2d 162, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 332 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Jury was authorized to ﬁnd defendant guilty of arson even though the evidence was circumstantial as the proven facts were consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and excluded every other reasonable hypothesis other than defendant’s guilt as defendant’s burning of three trucks using gasoline at a truck-driving school where defendant failed truck-driving courses, 24-14-6 defendant’s presence at a gas station around the time of the ﬁre, and defendant’s admission that defendant burned the trucks because an instructor “burned” defendant, meant defendant’s conviction was supportable as a matter of law. Denson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 342, 577 S.E.2d 29, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 104 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for arson conviction. — Conviction of ﬁrst degree arson, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-60(a)(2), was not supported by sufficient evidence since there was no showing that a truck allegedly burned by the defendant was designed for use as a dwelling, and there was no showing of a lack of consent to the burning by the lienholder on the truck or by the joint owner, the defendant’s wife; neither the wife’s insurance claim form stating that she did not procure the loss, nor an insurance payment to the lienholder showed the required lack of consent, and there was no evidence in the entirely circumstantial case from which a jury could have excluded the very reasonable alternate hypothesis that the lien holder consented to the ﬁre so as to recover the insurance proceeds for payment on a loan owed by a ﬁnancially-troubled debtor, the defendant. Prater v. State, 279 Ga. App. 527, 631 S.E.2d 746, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 625 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence for theft of motor vehicle. — Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft of a motor vehicle because the victims’ missing vehicle was found with one of the victim’s blood on it and abandoned on railroad tracks near where the defendant’s girlfriend picked the defendant up on the night of the murders. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 236 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient to support conviction of credit card fraud. — Jury was authorized to ﬁnd that the defendant acted with guilty knowledge and intent to commit credit card theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(a)(1) because the evidence established that the defendant obtained unauthorized possession of the vic- 623 Crimes Against Property (Cont’d) tim’s credit card, and there was circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the defendant had knowledge that the defendant was accepting the credit card without authority and as part of an unlawful scheme; when the defendant was confronted by police officers, the defendant ﬂed, and the defendant maintained unauthorized possession of a different credit card, along with additional items that could be used to engage in fraudulent credit transactions. Amaechi v. State, 306 Ga. App. 333, 702 S.E.2d 680, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 937 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for burglary convictions. — Circumstantial evidence of the burglary was sufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save defendants’ guilt as was required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 since defendants were seen at the burglarized property at the time that the burglary occurred, defendants ﬂed the scene, and one of the defendants gave the police inconsistent stories as to what defendants were doing on the property. Bollinger v. State, 259 Ga. App. 102, 576 S.E.2d 80, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 26 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence supported defendant’s burglary conviction because: (1) defendant drove a truck that exactly matched the truck in the surveillance tape; (2) defendant had a board in defendant’s truck with glass particles embedded in the board that were of the same thickness and physical chemical properties as the glass of the window that was broken during the crime; (3) a sweater cap and white gloves found in the truck appeared to match those worn by the perpetrator in the surveillance tape; and (4) the stolen television and videocassette recorder were found approximately 500 yards from the defendant’s mother’s home. Brooks v. State, 273 Ga. App. 691, 615 S.E.2d 829, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 607 (2005), overruled in part, Schoﬁeld v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 182 (2007), overruled in part, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 24-14-6 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the factﬁnder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant juvenile committed burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2) because the defendant was in the vicinity of the victim’s apartment shortly after the burglary, wearing a jacket that matched the victim’s description of the jacket worn by the perpetrator, carrying a loaded pistol, and wearing shoes that matched the tread pattern and size of the muddy footprints found in the victim’s apartment. In the Interest of J.D., 305 Ga. App. 519, 699 S.E.2d 827, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 743 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for robbery convictions. — There was sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to participate in the robbery of a delivery man since the evidence showed that defendant was privy to the robbery plan, participated in the robbery, and convened with the codefendants after the robbery. In the Interest of C.L.B., 267 Ga. App. 456, 600 S.E.2d 407, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 684 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial was affirmed as defendant’s ﬁngerprint was on the robbery note, the victim eliminated all but the defendant’s and one other’s photos from a photo lineup, the victim’s description matched the defendant’s appearance, and the victim in a similar robbery positively identiﬁed the defendant as the robber; a defense witness’s testimony that the witness saw defendant playing with cards in the hotel lobby a few days before the robbery did not exonerate the defendant as the witness did not see the defendant playing with cards similar to the one on which the robbery note was written. Dailey v. State, 271 Ga. App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 83 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. — Jury was authorized to conclude that the evidence excluded every reasonable hy- 624 pothesis except the defendant’s guilt of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because the defendant surreptitiously watched others at a fast food restaurant, wore a mask, and drew a BB handgun that resembled a semi-automatic weapon when the defendant was confronted by a police officer. New v. State, 270 Ga. App. 341, 606 S.E.2d 865, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1421 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for ﬁnancial identity fraud. — Because the state’s evidence failed to demonstrate that the defendant accessed the resources of another by using identifying information to procure a cell phone, and a service contract for the cell phone, and failed to establish that defendant either knew that a store clerk: (1) could not issue a phone without accessing the resources of a speciﬁc individual; (2) would need to use the identifying information of that individual to access such resources; or (3) in fact used such identifying information to access the resources of another for the purpose of providing defendant with a cell phone, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction of ﬁnancial identity fraud. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 822, 648 S.E.2d 133, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 657 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for theft by taking conviction. — Evidence did not support the ﬁnding that a juvenile defendant committed theft by taking. Although there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant had a key to the home from which items were taken and had been in and out of the home at the time of the theft, the defendant testiﬁed that the defendant had left the door unlocked and returned to the home to ﬁnd the home ransacked; the circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the state’s and thus did not warrant a ﬁnding of guilt under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. In the Interest of M.H., 288 Ga. App. 663, 655 S.E.2d 249, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1268 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for theft by receiving stolen property. — Juvenile court erred by adjudicating the defendant 24-14-6 juvenile delinquent for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) by committing theft by receiving a stolen motorcycle because the evidence did not support the ﬁnding that the defendant should have known that the motorcycle was stolen; the defendant’s testimony permitted an inference that only after learning of the theft did the defendant realize that the motorcycle was stolen, the defendant rode the motorcycle on the street in front of the victim’s house, and there was no evidence that the defendant tried to conceal the motorcycle; absent evidence of the real value of the motorcycle at the time of the theft, the evidence did not support a ﬁnding that the price the defendant offered to pay for the motorcycle was grossly disproportionate to the value. In re J. L., 306 Ga. App. 89, 701 S.E.2d 564, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 869 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for theft by taking conviction. — Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that the defendant was guilty of theft by taking because an ATM was removed from a bank’s property without authorization, defendant’s vehicle was observed at the bank approximately two hours before the theft was reported and shortly after the alarm was activated; tire tracks at the scene matched the tire prints on the defendant’s vehicle, the vehicle had a tow strap with a large metal hook tied to it, scrape marks consistent with a heavy object being drug on the pavement led from the ATM’s location in the direction of a nearby grassy lot, where the ATM was later found, and the defendant possessed black electrical tape and gloves upon the defendant’s arrest; the jury was authorized to consider the defendant’s ﬂight from the scene and police as circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Tauch v. State, 305 Ga. App. 643, 700 S.E.2d 645, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 778 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Rational trier of fact was authorized to ﬁnd that the evidence was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt and to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 625 24-14-6 Crimes Against Property (Cont’d) the defendant was guilty of theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, because there was evidence that the defendant was alone for 20 minutes or more on the ﬂoor of the house where the money was kept and where no cleaning was to be performed; while there was circumstantial evidence that also implicated another house cleaner, reasonable jurors could have found from the evidence that the hypothesis that the house cleaner took the money was excluded based on testimony that the defendant had been alone in the area of the house where the money was kept, and there was no such evidence regarding the house cleaner. Cookston v. State, 309 Ga. App. 708, 710 S.E.2d 900, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 434 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence that a defendant showed an interest in a car that was for sale and took a test drive and returned the car, that the car was stolen the next day, that the defendant was found driving the car hours after the car was stolen using a duplicate key, and that the defendant ﬂed from an officer was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking (automobile) in violation of O.C.G.A. § 168-2(a). Kelly v. State, 313 Ga. App. 582, 722 S.E.2d 175, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 27 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for theft by receiving property conviction. — Circumstantial evidence of a larcenous taking was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving beyond a reasonable doubt because the officer’s testimony that radio dispatch identiﬁed the pistol as stolen was non-probative hearsay and the fact that the weapon was labeled for law enforcement use only and loaded with police-issue ammunition did not exclude the possibility that the weapon may have been given away or sold “on the black market” in violation of the warning. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 257 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0933, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 583 (Ga. June 2, 2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for weapons conviction. — Circumstantial evidence was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to prove that defendant had constructive possession of a gun found in a car in which defendant was riding as a passenger or to support defendant’s convictions for carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(a) or possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) since: (1) the car was stopped for a traffic offense, and was searched, revealing the gun; (2) all of the occupants in the car denied possessing the gun; (3) the gun was found under a seat where defendant had been sitting; (4) the arresting officers did not see defendant bend over or appear to put anything under the seat; and (5) because defendant was only a passenger in a car that defendant did not own or control, there was no presumption that defendant possessed the gun. Wofford v. State, 262 Ga. App. 291, 585 S.E.2d 207, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 887 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 4. Drug Crimes Evidence sufficient for DUI conviction. — When evidence of defendant’s intoxication may have been circumstantial in nature, but the defense put up no evidence of a reasonable alternative hypothesis, and the arguments that were offered by the defense were rejected by the jury, the evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd that defendant was intoxicated so as to support a DUI conviction. Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 565, 536 S.E.2d 240, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to support the defendant’s convictions given that: (1) the defendant admitted to drinking and driving the vehicle that an officer testiﬁed to as having a warm engine; (2) the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and swaying movements; and (3) the surrounding circumstances helped to show that the defendant had been drinking and driving recently enough to satisfy the three-hour requirement under O.C.G.A. § 40-6391(a)(5). O’Connell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 835, 648 S.E.2d 147, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 626 652 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for marijuana conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s conviction for possessing more than one ounce of marijuana because the defendant was presumed to have exclusive possession and control of the marijuana that a police officer found in the car the defendant was driving; as the factﬁnder, the jury was entitled to reject the testimony of the defendant’s friend that the marijuana was the friend’s and to determine that the presumption of the defendant’s possession of the marijuana had not been rebutted. Nix v. State, 312 Ga. App. 43, 717 S.E.2d 550, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 880 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendants of felony possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the defendants had equal access to and joint constructive possession of the marijuana that was found in a minivan and that the defendants participated as parties to the drug possession offense; the defendants, who were passengers in the back of the minivan, knew that marijuana was inside the minivan, and the driver informed an officer that the passengers were hiding marijuana inside the minivan. Dennis v. State, 313 Ga. App. 595, 722 S.E.2d 190, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 31 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession with intent to distribute. — Evidence of a defendant’s unusual behavior in lifting up and kneeling next to the only doghouse in a dog pen that concealed contraband, the defendant’s attempt to hide in the bushes when law enforcement officers arrived, and the defendant’s previous history of selling drugs to passers-by from the same property, provided sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the contraband, access to it, and the power and intention to exercise control over it. Price v. State, 303 Ga. App. 859, 694 S.E.2d 712, 2010 24-14-6 Ga. App. LEXIS 377 (2010), cert. dismissed, No. S10C1470, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 743 (Ga. Oct. 4, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because during the execution of a search warrant at the defendant’s residence, police officers seized eighteen baggies of marijuana individually packaged in a manner that was indicative of possession with intent to distribute, and the residence belonged to the defendant, which permitted an inference that the defendant controlled the premises and was in constructive possession of the drug contraband; the circumstantial evidence implied the defendant’s consciousness of guilt and further supported the defendant’s conviction because when the officers approached the residence, the defendant ﬂed inside to the closet area where the drugs were later located, and when the officers searched the closet, the officers discovered that the jacket the defendant had been wearing was placed over the box containing the drugs. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 321 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana because the defendant was in possession of clear, plastic baggies, smaller baggies of suspected marijuana, a digital scale, and cash, and a police officer testiﬁed that in the officer’s capacity as a marijuana tester for the county sheriff’s office, the officer tested a total of 11 bags, containing approximately 190 grams of a substance that tested positive for marijuana; possession of a scale, baggies, and large amounts of currency along with drugs can constitute circumstantial evidence of intent to distribute. Hardaway v. State, 309 Ga. App. 432, 710 S.E.2d 634, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 353 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Appellate court refused to disturb the jury’s verdict convicting defendant of possession of drugs with the intent to distribute because after hearing the evidence 627 Drug Crimes (Cont’d) and having the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the jury properly concluded that the only reasonable hypothesis was that defendant possessed the drugs found hidden in the kitchen, despite defendant’s argument that others had equal access. King v. State, 325 Ga. App. 777, 755 S.E.2d 22, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 74 (2014). Although circumstantial, evidence of the defendant’s behavior in attempting to obtain the package including questioning the recipient about whether the recipient contacted police and opened the package, use of a false name to conceal identity, and prior convictions for conspiracy to sell marijuana and possession of cocaine was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the marijuana in the package and the power and intent to control the package. Murray v. State, 335 Ga. App. 634, 782 S.E.2d 694, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 45 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C0916, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. June 20, 2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient to show substance cocaine. — Trial court did not err in revoking probation on the ground that the probationer committed the felony offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because the trial court did not manifestly abuse the court’s discretion when the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance found in the car in which the probationer was riding was cocaine; in addition to an officer’s opinion on the identity of the substance, the record contained other circumstantial evidence indicating that the substance was cocaine, and the circumstantial evidence of the substance’s identity was not offered to convict the probationer of possession of cocaine, but was offered to show that the probationer had violated a term of probation and, as such, was subject to a different standard of proof. Thurmond v. State, 304 Ga. App. 587, 696 S.E.2d 516, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. — There was insuf- 24-14-6 ﬁcient evidence of intent to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 1613-30 as there was no evidence that the cocaine had been divided and packaged for individual sale or as to a personal use quantity; thus, the circumstantial evidence did not permit a rational trier to exclude the reasonable hypothesis, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, that the defendant intended to use the cocaine. Florence v. State, 282 Ga. App. 31, 637 S.E.2d 779, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1306 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). While the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine found in a pill bottle in the defendant’s vehicle, it was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) because the state produced no evidence that the defendant had scales, cutting implements, weapons, a large amount of cash, a customer list, or drug packaging materials; there was no evidence of prior convictions of drug possession with intent to distribute, no testimony that the defendant was seen selling or trying to sell drugs, no expert testimony that the amount of drugs seized was inconsistent with personal use, and no evidence as to the amount of cocaine seized. Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, storing drugs in a pill bottle, and possessing an unidentiﬁed number of sales-size pieces of the drug, without more, equally supported the hypothesis that the person found with the drugs was a user rather than a dealer. Hicks v. State, 293 Ga. App. 830, 668 S.E.2d 474, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1226 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Codefendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b), was unsupportable as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by denying the codefendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom were insufficient to connect the code- 628 fendant to the cocaine, which was found in an upstairs bedroom occupied by the codefendants; no evidence was introduced to show that the codefendant resided in the apartment where the cocaine was found, which could authorize an inference that the codefendant possessed the property therein. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession of dangerous drugs conviction. — Jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant intended to possess a dangerous drug in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-72, even if the defendant was subjectively unaware of the precise chemical compound in the bottle and its regulated nature because there was evidence supporting an inference that the defendant used a dangerous drug to sedate the defendant’s sexual battery victim, and that conduct demonstrated the defendant’s knowledge of the harmful effect of the compound; the term “dangerous drug” was deﬁned to include alkyl nitrite, which was the compound the defendant possessed. Serna v. State, 308 Ga. App. 518, 707 S.E.2d 904, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 222 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession of drugs. — If the totality of the evidence was sufficient to connect defendant to possession of drugs, even though there was evidence to authorize a contrary ﬁnding, the conviction would be sustained. Blair v. State, 216 Ga. App. 545, 455 S.E.2d 97, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 214 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for cocaine possession and possession with intent to distribute conviction. — Defendant’s convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant’s live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the 24-14-6 crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Given an alternative school’s security officer’s actual observation of a hand-tohand exchange from a juvenile to another student at the school and the discovery of marijuana in the recipient’s hand immediately thereafter, the only reasonable hypothesis was that the juvenile had just possessed the marijuana satisfying former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. In the Interest of T. M., 303 Ga. App. 322, 693 S.E.2d 574, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 351 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for methamphetamine possession conviction. — An officer found methamphetamine in a portion of a truck where the defendant kept personal belongings; the defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. The defendant’s testimony denying possession of the drugs and stating that others had equal access to the truck did not establish under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine. Bryson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 392, 667 S.E.2d 170, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 946 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine because the totality of the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to reject as speculative and unreasonable the hypothesis that someone else discarded the drugs in a patrol car; the defendant possessed a homemade smoking pipe containing methamphetamine residue, there was similar transaction evidence, and the patrol officer testiﬁed that the officer had exclusive control of the officer’s patrol car, the officer stayed with the officer’s car whenever the car was serviced by third parties, the officer searched the backseat immediately after the defendant exited from the car, and the officer discovered the drugs directly up under the seat where the defendant had 629 Drug Crimes (Cont’d) been sitting. Taylor v. State, 305 Ga. App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 807 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction for methamphetamine possession was sufficient because the presumption of possession and control attached since the state presented evidence that the defendant was the sole resident of the house present during the execution of the search warrant when the methamphetamine was found in a common area of the house; the presumption of possession was not the sole evidence connecting the defendant to the crime of possession because the arresting officer testiﬁed that the defendant exhibited clear signs of methamphetamine intoxication. Martin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient to support conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine. — Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction, and the jury was authorized to conclude that the circumstances excluded the hypothesis that another passenger had placed drugs in the bed of a truck; the passenger testiﬁed at trial that the passenger did not place the drugs in the truck bed, and a police officer testiﬁed that the passenger, whom the officer had in sight the entire time, never came within ﬁve-to-six feet of the truck and that the officer not only saw the defendant place the defendant’s arm in the truck bed but heard an accompanying thump. Haggard v. State, 302 Ga. App. 502, 690 S.E.2d 651, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 57 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in denying a codefendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine because based upon the circumstantial evidence presented, the jury was authorized to ﬁnd that the codefendant was in joint constructive possession of the methamphetamine with the defendant, which was located at the kitchen 24-14-6 table where the defendant had been sitting; the defendant lived at the residence with the codefendant, the defendant was present at the time of a controlled buy, and the defendant had access to the drugs that were seized from the kitchen table. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 628 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1942, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 229 (Ga. Feb. 28, 2011), overruled in part, McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 745 S.E.2d 646, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 594 (2013), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1331(f)(1) because given the evidence, the jury was authorized under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to ﬁnd that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as either the actual perpetrator or as a party to the crime of the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine as charged in the indictment; officers executing a search warrant for a house discovered the defendant on a couch with a codefendant and baggies of methamphetamine. Hughes v. State, 309 Ga. App. 150, 709 S.E.2d 900, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 325 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Others having access to drugs. — Evidence that cocaine was found hidden on the outside of defendant’s mobile home, which was parked in an area to which a large number of persons, not only visitors to the unit occupied by defendant but anyone having business in the mobile home park had potential access was insufﬁcient to sustain defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine. Prescott v. State, 164 Ga. App. 671, 297 S.E.2d 362, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3340 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j) because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to show that the defendant was in sole constructive possession of the 630 contraband when the defendant alone was charged with possessing the marijuana although the passenger in his car had equal access to it, and the only legal evidence linking the defendant to the marijuana in the back seat was his spatial proximity to it; an officer’s testimony concerning scales that were found in the car, to the extent it suggested some deception on the passenger’s part, that deception did not give rise to the sole, reasonable inference that defendant was in sole constructive possession of the marijuana, and because the inference did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of defendant, it was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in sole constructive possession of the marijuana. Rogers v. State, 302 Ga. App. 65, 690 S.E.2d 437, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 47 (2010), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Mere presence of contraband on premises occupied by an accused is insufficient to sustain a conviction when there is also evidence of access by others. Shockley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 182, 303 S.E.2d 519, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2092 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Acquaintance, proximity, and dress insufficient for drug conviction. — Fact that defendant knew a momentarily detained drug suspect, had been seen associating with the suspect in the past, and was dressed in a fashion not uncommon to drug vendors was insufficient circumstantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had joint constructive possession over controlled substances found in a nearby cache. Brooks v. State, 206 Ga. App. 485, 425 S.E.2d 911, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1683 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession of cocaine conviction. — Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession of marijuana, O.C.G.A. § 1613-2(b), because the circumstantial evidence established a meaningful connec- 24-14-6 tion between the defendant and the contraband, evidence which showed the defendant exercising power and dominion over the drugs found inside the wheel well on the front passenger’s side of a car; the jury could infer that the drugs had been recently placed in the wheel well, and because the defendant had ﬂed from the police, had been caught within arm’s reach of the drugs, and had a large amount of cash in his pockets, the jury could infer that the defendant was a drug dealer and that the defendant had placed the drugs in the wheel well to avoid being prosecuted for possessing them. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 332, 690 S.E.2d 654, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 56 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for conviction of assorted drugs. — Any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of methylenedioxyamphetamine, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt because based on the evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant threw a plastic bag containing drugs out the passenger side window of the defendant’s car; the state presented evidence that a deputy saw the defendant actually possessing the bag of illegal narcotics as the defendant held the bag in the car before the defendant threw the bag out the passenger’s window, and another deputy assigned to the drug suppression task force testiﬁed, without objection, that the amount of cocaine in the bag was more than a user would have in a user’s possession and that would be the amount that a mid-level dealer would have in a dealer’s possession. McCombs v. State, 306 Ga. App. 64, 701 S.E.2d 496, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 798 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Insufficient circumstantial evidence of drug possession by inmate. — Defendant’s conviction for possession of drugs by an inmate in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-18(c) was reversed because the state failed to present any evidence to support even an inference that the defendant had any prior knowledge of drugs that were found in a bag or any idea what was in the bag; the state failed to 631 Drug Crimes (Cont’d) demonstrate that the defendant had the bag in the defendant’s possession for any reason other than the performance of the defendant’s assigned duties of cleaning the visitation lobby in the prison and, thus, failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was merely performing the job when the defendant removed the bag from one trash can and placed the bag in the other. Strozier v. State, 313 Ga. App. 804, 723 S.E.2d 39, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 84 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for trafficking in cocaine and possession of heroine with intent to distribute. — Defendant’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and 16-13-31(a), were supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 244-6, since it was shown that a witness stated that defendant was residing in an apartment and selling drugs, a search of the apartment revealed drugs, cash, and photographs and papers with defendant’s name on them, as well as a sweater which defendant was seen wearing, and defendant had changed the locks on the apartment; accordingly, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motions for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 and for a new trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23 were properly denied. Williams v. State, 262 Ga. App. 67, 584 S.E.2d 625, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 713 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient to support trafficking heroin. — Defendant’s convictions for trafficking heroin and other drug offenses were reversed because insufficient evidence supported a link between the defendant and the drugs and guns found in the home as the defendant did not own or lease the home, the defendant’s driver’s license listed a different address, and identiﬁcations were found in the house in several other peoples’ names. Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143, 860 S.E.2d 893, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 318 (2021). Evidence sufficient for possession of drugs conviction. — Jury could rationally ﬁnd from circumstantial evidence 24-14-6 that defendant committed the offenses of possession of both amphetamine and GHB because substances found in defendant’s gym locker were tested and found to be amphetamine and GHB, the amount of GHB found could be for personal use over a long period of time, and the containers in which the substances were found contained several prints that could not be identiﬁed but contained one that matched defendant’s ﬁnger. Hobbs v. State, 272 Ga. App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 235 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). As the defendant was the driver, owner, and sole occupant of a vehicle, and 250 grams of methamphetamine were found hidden beneath the steering column, within arm’s reach of the driver, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s “knowing” possession of the drugs as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e). The mere possibility that someone other than the defendant committed the crime was not such a reasonable hypothesis as had to be excluded in order for circumstantial evidence to authorize a verdict of guilty under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Garcia v. State, 293 Ga. App. 422, 667 S.E.2d 205, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 961 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession of cocaine conviction. — Circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 244-6 was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, as the defendant was approached by two undercover officers and upon seeing that one of the officers had a badge, defendant turned around and made a throwing motion with a clenched ﬁst in the direction of a trash barrel; defendant was in an area known for drug sales, and three pieces of crack cocaine were found in the vicinity of the trash barrel. Woods v. State, 275 Ga. App. 471, 620 S.E.2d 660, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 997 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Police officer testiﬁed about searching a patrol car before transporting the defendant in the car, and about the officer’s suspicions that the defendant had stuffed something underneath the backseat be- 632 cause the officer saw debris on the back of the defendant’s pants and on the backseat. This circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to convict the defendant of possessing the cocaine found wedged underneath the backseat. Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court was authorized to ﬁnd a defendant guilty of possession of cocaine on the basis that the evidence excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant’s guilt, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, as the state presented evidence other than the defendant’s mere spatial proximity to the pipe containing cocaine to show that the defendant had constructive possession over it, in that the pipe, which was found on the grass where the defendant had been arrested, was dry, although it had been raining and the surrounding area was “soaked”; from this evidence the factﬁnder could infer that the pipe had been on the ground for a very short period of time. In addition, the state introduced similar transaction evidence that the defendant had been carrying a small crack pipe in the pocket of the defendant’s jacket on the occasion of an earlier arrest. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 212, 723 S.E.2d 504, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 152 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and proximity to housing project convictions. — Defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1330(b) and 16-13-32.5(b), were based on sufficient evidence since the state proved by circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 that defendant had been walking back and forth to an overturned bucket when people approached from the street in what appeared to be drug transactions, and the drugs were found under the bucket; there was evidence that the amount of drugs recovered were more than one would use for personal use, indicating an intent to 24-14-6 distribute, and there was also evidence indicating the proximity of the bucket to a nearby public housing complex. Reason v. State, 283 Ga. App. 608, 642 S.E.2d 236, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 136 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), because the evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the cocaine, and the state established by overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the defendant was in either constructive or actual possession of the cocaine; the defendant was found kneeling over the contraband, the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant had been “ﬁdgeting” with a piggy bank in which 37 small bags of cocaine were hidden, and pants with the defendant’s driver’s license and cash were found in the same corner of the bedroom as the cocaine. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence sufficient for trafficking marijuana conviction. — There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for trafficking marijuana as the jury was authorized to conclude that it was not reasonable, as the defendant suggested, that someone other than the defendant placed over 21 pounds of marijuana in open view in the back of a trailer of which the defendant had the only key, without the defendant’s knowledge. Mora v. State, 292 Ga. App. 860, 666 S.E.2d 412, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 829 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for cocaine possession conviction. — When: (1) defendant’s only connection to cocaine that was found in a jacket was that defendant picked up the jacket after the jacket had been lying outside on an air conditioner in close proximity to a juvenile who was suspected in drug transactions and an unidentiﬁed woman; and (2) there was no evidence as to who placed the jacket on the air conditioner, the evidence against defendant was entirely circumstantial 633 Drug Crimes (Cont’d) and did not exclude every other hypothesis except guilt; therefore, the evidence was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support defendant’s conviction of possessing cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq. Stephens v. State, 258 Ga. App. 774, 575 S.E.2d 661, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1503 (2002), cert. denied, No. S03C0590, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 271 (Ga. Mar. 10, 2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). State failed to prove the state’s case that defendant, a minor, was delinquent under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 1613-31 as the state did not prove the necessary connection between defendant and the drugs, other than spatial proximity, which was insufficient; the fact that defendant was in a house in the middle of the night with non-family members, that a large amount of cocaine and cash were found in the house, although not visible, and that defendant was sitting on a couch where a bag containing crack cocaine was found did not establish the necessary connection, and did not exclude all other possibilities except the guilt of defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. In re E.A.D., 271 Ga. App. 531, 610 S.E.2d 153, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 93 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient to show constructive possession of controlled substance. — Trial court erred in ﬁnding that the defendant violated the defendant’s probation by committing the new felony of possessing a controlled substance, piperazine or TFMPP, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show the defendant’s constructive possession of the TFMPP pills; the only evidence linking the defendant to the drugs was spatial proximity, but it was at least equally likely that the pills belonged to the driver of the truck where the pills were found. Scott v. State, 305 Ga. App. 596, 699 S.E.2d 894, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 761 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for methamphetamine possession. — Evidence of a 24-14-6 defendant’s unconsciousness, possibly due to consumption of alcohol or other legal substances, and the defendant’s spatial proximity to methamphetamine and pipes used to smoke it, to which two codefendants had equal access, was insufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that the defendant possessed methamphetamine. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. O’Neill v. State, 285 Ga. 125, 674 S.E.2d 302, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 73 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show constructive possession of methamphetamine found in a car, in which defendant was a passenger, because there was no evidence, besides spatial proximity, connecting the defendant with the contraband since there was no evidence showing that the defendant knew that a baggy found in the car contained contraband or the defendant hid the baggy in the car. Millsaps v. State, 300 Ga. App. 383, 685 S.E.2d 371, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1177 (2009), overruled in part, Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 617 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1331(e)(3) because although the evidence raised grave suspicions of the defendant’s guilt, the state failed to establish that the defendant had both the power and the intention at the time of the defendant’s arrest to exercise dominion or control over the drugs and failed to show that other men did not have equal access to the house and the items within the house; all of the evidence was circumstantial with regard to the defendant’s constructive possession of the contraband, there was nothing in the case linking the defendant to the drugs or manufacturing equipment in the house, and several other people with access to the house were unaccounted for and were not charged. Aquino v. State, 308 Ga. App. 163, 706 S.E.2d 746, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Evidence insufficient for marijuana possession conviction. — Evidence did 634 not support defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute as the mere fact that a package of marijuana was addressed, but not delivered, to an apartment leased by defendant did not tie defendant to the drugs; the evidence was circumstantial and it was equally plausible that the codefendants were independently dealing in marijuana. Patten v. State, 275 Ga. App. 574, 621 S.E.2d 550, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1040 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Trial court erred in revoking the defendant’s probation because the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s ﬁnding that the defendant committed the new offense of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana since the state presented no evidence other than the defendant’s mere spatial proximity to the marijuana to support a ﬁnding that the defendant had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the marijuana; there was no drug paraphernalia, the defendant was cooperative with the police and did not try to ﬂee, there was no evidence that the defendant tried to hide or conceal anything in the vehicle or that the defendant had continuous access and control over the vehicle, and the defendant did not have any marijuana in the defendant’s possession and was not under the inﬂuence of drugs. Smith v. State, 306 Ga. App. 54, 701 S.E.2d 490, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0204, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 111 (Ga. Feb. 7, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Intoxication causing accident. — Circumstantial evidence that defendant’s alleged intoxication caused the accident was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to exclude defendant’s reasonable hypotheses of innocence due to mechanical failure. Griffin v. State, 242 Ga. App. 878, 531 S.E.2d 752, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 361 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Appeal Question on appeal is whether there were sufficient circumstances to enable twelve men who found the facts to conclude that the accused was guilty. Brown 24-14-6 v. State, 13 Ga. App. 144, 78 S.E. 868, 1913 Ga. App. LEXIS 76 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010). Appellate courts do not undertake to weigh circumstantial evidence, but look only to seek if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Hopkins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 811, 307 S.E.2d 707, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2626 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Presumption in favor of verdict. — After the verdict, the testimony is construed in the testimony’s most favorable light to the prevailing party, which is in this case, the state, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict. This rule has been applied when the evidence is circumstantial. Townsend v. State, 127 Ga. App. 797, 195 S.E.2d 474, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1023 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Should a trial court decline to direct the verdict and the jury then ﬁnds the defendant guilty, the appellate court is obliged to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict. Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 873, 303 S.E.2d 54, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2047 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Verdict will not be disturbed when circumstances are aided by direct evidence. McGinnis v. State, 31 Ga. 236, 1860 Ga. LEXIS 321 (1860) (decided under former law); Hudson v. State, 92 Ga. 472, 17 S.E. 847, 1893 Ga. LEXIS 137 (1893) (decided under former law); Coney v. State, 101 Ga. 582, 28 S.E. 918, 1897 Ga. LEXIS 275 (1897) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984). Verdict not disturbed unless unsupportable as matter of law. — If a jury is authorized to ﬁnd that the evidence, circumstantial though it may be, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless the verdict is insupportable as a matter of law. Brewer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 468, 274 S.E.2d 817, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3070 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Lawhorn v. State, 200 Ga. App. 451, 408 S.E.2d 425, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1047 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). 635 Appeal (Cont’d) Questions of reasonableness are generally decided by the jury, and the appellate court will not disturb the jury’s ﬁnding that the evidence was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt unless the verdict is unsupportable as a matter of law. Shockley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 182, 303 S.E.2d 519, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2092 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). Questions as to reasonableness are generally to be decided by the jury which heard the evidence and when the jury is authorized to ﬁnd that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, the appellate court will not disturb the ﬁnding, unless the verdict is unsupportable as a matter of law. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3129 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6). When verdict overturned. — Supreme Court is admittedly without au- 24-14-6 thority to interfere with a verdict supported by direct evidence; it may declare, however, even though the jury has found otherwise, and the trial judge has approved their ﬁnding, that the proven circumstances do not sustain by their consistency the claim of the state as to the guilt of the defendant. Willoughby v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 180, 177 S.E. 527, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 682 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Hypothesis consistent with innocence. — When there appears a hypothesis from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence and the defendant’s statement, pointing to the innocence of the accused and which, tested by all human experience, is a reasonable one, an appellate court, may declare it so as a matter of law. Wood v. State, 156 Ga. App. 810, 275 S.E.2d 694, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3209 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Walker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 728, 278 S.E.2d 487, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1991 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).