O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 — Collins v

State, 251 Ga. 521, 307 S.E.2d 496, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 897 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accomplice is one who acts as result of free will and not of duress or coercion. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Action was not free will of an accomplice. — Trial court did not err by allowing the uncorroborated testimony of a witness to be admitted against two defendants as, contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the witness was not an accomplice since the evidence authorized the jury to have found that the witness was coerced into participating in the racketeering crimes for which the defendants were convicted. Overton v. State, 295 Ga. App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1358 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0654, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. Apr. 20, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Indictment for same crime does not make witness an accomplice. — Fact that witness was indicted for the same murder as the defendant does not, without more, make the witness an accomplice. Collins v. State, 251 Ga. 521, 307 S.E.2d 496, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 897 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Fact that witness was jointly indicted with defendant on trial does not of itself render such witness an accomplice. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 660 Female under the age of consent cannot be convicted of incestuous adultery and thus cannot be an accomplice. Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Informer for law enforcement agency who was cooperating with law enforcement at the time the evidence against the defendant was being gathered was not an accomplice. Marshall v. State, 98 Ga. App. 429, 105 S.E.2d 748, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 600 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Principal thief is not an accomplice of the receiver of stolen goods. Birdsong v. State, 120 Ga. 850, 48 S.E. 329, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 718 (1904), overruled in part, Selvidge v. State, 252 Ga. 243, 313 S.E.2d 84, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 675 (1984). Thief and one who receives stolen property from the thief are not accomplices. Stover v. State, 158 Ga. App. 644, 281 S.E.2d 642, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2351 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). If a thief and a receiver of stolen goods have acted pursuant to a common criminal enterprise, they are accomplices. Selvidge v. State, 252 Ga. 243, 313 S.E.2d 84, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 675, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823, 105 S. Ct. 99, 83 L. Ed. 2d 44, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 3136 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Presenter of check was not accomplice. — Uttering element was established by sufficient evidence that the defendant’s friend presented the check to a bank for cashing at the defendant’s behest; the trial court properly charged the jury on the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony even though the jury determined that the friend was not an accomplice. King v. State, 277 Ga. App. 190, 626 S.E.2d 161, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 26 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Buyer of whiskey is not an accomplice of the seller. Gamble v. State, 4 Ga. App. 845, 62 S.E. 544, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 557 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991). Person is not an accomplice to murder when the person does not know who the intended victim is or when the at- 24-14-8 tempt on the victim’s life is to be made, and the person does not in any way participate in or encourage the murder. Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 754 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Self incrimination. — Joint principals to a crime as accomplices are competent witnesses against each other, and while the one sought to be used as a witness has the right to claim the protection afforded by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI, providing that no person shall be competent to give testimony tending in any manner to criminate oneself, yet this constitutional guaranty is a personal privilege belonging to the witness and cannot be claimed for the witness for the beneﬁt of another party. Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 590 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence Rules concerning extent of corroboration required are: (1) it is not essential that the testimony of the accomplice should be corroborated in every material particular; (2) it is not required that this corroboration shall of itself be sufficient to warrant a verdict, or that the testimony of the accomplice be corroborated in every material particular; (3) such corroborating circumstances need not be enough to amount to another witness or sufficient to support one to that extent; (4) slight evidence of corroboration connecting defendant with the crime is sufficient; and (5) the sufficiency of corroboration of the accomplice is entirely a matter for the jury. Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1724 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Although a defendant may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged, the corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, and the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is a matter for the jury to determine. An accomplice’s testimony combined with a videotape of defendant in 661 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) the front seat of a car while talking to a conﬁdential police informant during a drug buy was sufficient corroboration to justify defendant’s convictions for selling drugs. Etchison v. State, 266 Ga. App. 528, 597 S.E.2d 583, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s claim to the contrary notwithstanding, the record was replete with evidence corroborating the testimony of defendant’s accomplice which identiﬁed defendant as one of the perpetrators of an armed robbery; there was no claim that a store clerk’s opinion as to the identity of the perpetrators was unfounded, the clerk’s testimony that the clerk heard a customer identify one of the perpetrators as defendant was undisputed res gestae, and the clerk’s testimony that the clerk had been sprayed in the face with mace corroborated this aspect of the accomplice’s testimony as well. Carter v. State, 266 Ga. App. 691, 598 S.E.2d 76, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 456 (2004), superseded by statute as stated in Anderson v. State, 313 Ga. 178, 869 S.E.2d 401, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 33 (2022) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Slight evidence sufficient to prove identity and participation. — Evidence independent of an accomplice’s testimony provided the slight corroboration of the accomplice’s account of the defendant’s identity and participation in the crimes necessary to sustain the defendant’s convictions. Montanez v. State, 311 Ga. 843, 860 S.E.2d 551, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 485 (2021). Independent inference of defendant’s guilt. — To sustain a conviction upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating circumstances which in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that defendant is guilty. Childers v. State, 52 Ga. 106 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); McCrory v. State, 101 Ga. 779, 28 S.E. 92 (1897) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Taylor v. State, 110 24-14-8 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161 (1900) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Braxley v. State, 17 Ga. App. 196, 86 S.E. 425 (1915) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Allen v. State, 40 Ga. App. 657, 150 S.E. 863 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Jolly v. State, 41 Ga. App. 494, 153 S.E. 432 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Bradshaw v. State, 44 Ga. App. 783, 163 S.E. 295 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Whitehead v. State, 46 Ga. App. 176, 167 S.E. 204 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Sanders v. State, 46 Ga. App. 175, 167 S.E. 207 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Austin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 217, 169 S.E. 729 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Thompson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105, 182 S.E. 414 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Perkins v. State, 59 Ga. App. 335, 200 S.E. 812 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Worley v. State, 60 Ga. App. 557, 4 S.E.2d 417 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Middleton v. State, 72 Ga. App. 817, 35 S.E.2d 317 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stebbins v. State, 78 Ga. App. 534, 51 S.E.2d 592 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325, 63 S.E.2d 682 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Ivey v. State, 91 Ga. App. 455, 85 S.E.2d 829 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); McPherson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 839, 101 S.E.2d 750 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 111 S.E.2d 70 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Patterson v. State, 109 Ga. App. 582, 137 S.E.2d 74 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Sutton v. State, 223 662 Ga. 313, 154 S.E.2d 578 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Powell v. State, 123 Ga. App. 795, 182 S.E.2d 677 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); West v. State, 232 Ga. 861, 209 S.E.2d 195 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3224, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1219 (1976).Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976).Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 225 S.E.2d 281 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Baker v. State, 238 Ga. 389, 233 S.E.2d 347, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970, 97 S. Ct. 2931, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977).Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1146 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hobbs v. State, 142 Ga. App. 782, 237 S.E.2d 16, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2142 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Felix v. State, 143 Ga. App. 376, 238 S.E.2d 734, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2328 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); J.B.L. v. State, 144 Ga. App. 223, 241 S.E.2d 40, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2645 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Eubanks v. State, 240 Ga. 544, 242 S.E.2d 41, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 704 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Llewellyn v. State, 241 Ga. 192, 243 S.E.2d 853, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1358 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Reaves v. State, 146 Ga. App. 409, 246 S.E.2d 427, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2382 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mulligan v. State, 245 Ga. 266, 264 S.E.2d 204, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 763 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1068, 102 S. Ct. 618, 70 L. Ed. 2d 603, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4598 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stanford v. State, 157 Ga. App. 633, 278 S.E.2d 175, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1945 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Gilbert v. State, 159 24-14-8 Ga. App. 326, 283 S.E.2d 361, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2592 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Contrary to defendant’s argument, the testimony of defendant’s accomplice, corroborated by two witnesses, provided sufﬁcient evidence for the jury to ﬁnd defendant guilty; the jury did not have to ﬁnd that the corroborating evidence was itself sufficient to support the verdict, or that that evidence matched the testimony of the accomplice in every detail, as slight evidence identifying defendant as a participant in the criminal act was sufficient corroboration. Mitchell v. State, 279 Ga. 158, 611 S.E.2d 15, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 233 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the defendant’s conviction of burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, was supported by sufﬁcient evidence, including a neighbor’s eyewitness testimony that the neighbor saw the defendant taking property out of the victim’s house during the time when the burglary happened, which was corroborated by the discovery of an item of stolen property at the place where the defendant was residing, evidence which was entitled to even greater weight was the discovery of a business card from the defendant’s probation officer at the victim’s home. Walker v. State, 279 Ga. App. 390, 631 S.E.2d 413, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 575 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration must be independent of the accomplice’s testimony, and the corroboration must connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1026 (1983); Allen v. State, 175 Ga. App. 128, 333 S.E.2d 11, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2780 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Hanson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 246, 387 S.E.2d 441, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1384 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); In re P.A.W., 224 Ga. App. 329, 480 S.E.2d 347 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s felony murder conviction because the defendant’s polygraph results, which 663 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) the defendant stipulated to admitting at trial, corroborated the defendant’s accomplice’s inculpatory testimony. Thornton v. State, 279 Ga. 676, 620 S.E.2d 356, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 634 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony including the 9-1-1 caller, a surveillance video seen by the jury, and the testimony of an officer as to the timing of driving from the murder scene to the car wash. Mangram v. State, 304 Ga. 213, 817 S.E.2d 682, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 465 (2018). Inadequate corroboration for armed robbery conviction. — Error in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior arrest for armed robbery was not harmless as the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming because none of the people in the bank during the robbery identiﬁed the defendant as one of the robbers; and the only witness connecting the defendant to the robbery was an accomplice, whose testimony, standing alone, would not support the defendant’s conviction as corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony was required. Blackwell v. State, 351 Ga. App. 302, 830 S.E.2d 782, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 429 (2019). Corroboration by other accomplices. — Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder as the defendant used a knife to stab the victim in the neck; a jailhouse informant testiﬁed that the defendant had admitted that the defendant and a juvenile had beat the victim with a pan, strangled the victim with a belt, and stabbed the victim in the neck; and, even if the supreme court were to assume that the only evidence of the defendant’s guilt was the testimony of accomplices, because more than one accomplice testiﬁed at trial, the testimony of one accomplice could be corroborated by the testimony of the others. Ramirez v. State, 294 Ga. 440, 754 S.E.2d 325, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 99 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 24-14-8 Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury that corroboration was required of an accomplice’s testimony because there was evidence to corroborate the testimony that the defendant was involved with the crimes because two other witnesses testiﬁed that the defendant contacted the witnesses before the burglary. Barney v. State, 333 Ga. App. 807, 777 S.E.2d 490, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 540 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony because the state presented both circumstantial and direct evidence at trial as the defendant was identiﬁed as the shooter by two different witnesses; and the ﬁrst accomplice’s testimony that the defendant shot the victim was sufficiently corroborated by the second accomplice’s testimony, the physical evidence found at the scene, the forensic evidence presented by the state’s expert witnesses, the lay witness testimony concerning the defendant’s odd behavior and statements after the shooting, and the evidence of the defendant’s ﬂight after the murder. Rivera v. State, 304 Ga. 767, 822 S.E.2d 216, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 779 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In a murder case, the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the ﬁrst codefendant’s testimony about the defendant’s participation in the crimes, including the second codefendant’s testimony that the ﬁrst codefendant was acting at the defendant’s direction and that the defendant had wanted to kidnap the victim and sell the victim to the cartel to satisfy a drug debt, was angry with the victim for stealing from the defendant, and had expressed a desire to kill the victim shortly before the victim was killed. McGarity v. State, 308 Ga. 417, 841 S.E.2d 718, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 239 (2020). Defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant participated in the brother’s crimes lacked merit because three accomplices testiﬁed, corroborating each other’s testimony, that the defendant participated by helping to plan and acting as the get-away driver. In addition, non-testimonial evidence cor- 664 roborated the testimony of the accomplices, including the gas-station video recording showing them together before the crimes. Styles v. State, 309 Ga. 463, 847 S.E.2d 325, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 528 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendants’ convictions, as the accomplice testimony was mutually corroborating as to the plan to rob the victim and the beating and shooting, and it was further corroborated by the security videos from the apartment complex and gas station and the neighbor’s testimony about hearing loud booms coming from the victim’s house around the time of the shooting. Bedford v. State, 311 Ga. 329, 857 S.E.2d 708, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 155 (2021), overruled in part, Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 883 S.E.2d 317, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 13 (2023). Appellant’s convictions for home invasion, rape, and other crimes upheld although failure to give jury charge on accomplice corroboration constituted clear or obvious error, error likely did not affect outcome of trial as two other accomplices corroborated main accomplice’s testimony that appellant participated in crimes, and victim also testiﬁed that man matching appellant’s description raped victim. Palencia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 316, 881 S.E.2d 461, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (2022). Testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity and participation of the accused which tends to connect the accused with the crime or leads to the inference that the accused is guilty. Gaddis v. Kemp, 638 F. Supp. 819, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23731 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Connection of defendant with crime. — Corroborating circumstances must connect the defendant with the crime independently of the testimony of the accomplice, and this requirement is not met by merely corroborating the accomplice as to time, place, and circumstances of the transaction, if there is nothing to connect the defendant therewith. Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534, 1 S.E.2d 405 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 24-14-8 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Rozier v. State, 68 Ga. App. 797, 24 S.E.2d 137 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Croker v. State, 101 Ga. App. 742, 115 S.E.2d 413 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968).Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 164 S.E.2d 808, 1968 Ga. LEXIS 945 (1968), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Stanford, 312 Ga. 707, 864 S.E.2d 448, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 655 (2021) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1092 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Gaudin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 252, 211 S.E.2d 189, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the fatal strangulation of the victim including: (1) volunteering to kill the victim after an accomplice claimed that the victim’s brother was responsible for the death of the accomplice’s cousin; (2) participating in the strangulation death of the victim; (3) concealing the victim’s dead body; and (4) disposing of the victim in the woods provided ample evidence to support defendant’s guilt as a party to a malice murder and other crimes. Mitchell v. State, 279 Ga. 158, 611 S.E.2d 15, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 233 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err in entering judgments of conviction on defendant’s three burglary convictions in two cases following jury verdicts ﬁnding defendant guilty of those offenses; the state introduced sufficient evidence apart from the testimony of defendant’s accomplice to warrant convictions, primarily based on the three homeowners’ identiﬁcation of the property taken and the homeowners’ testimony about the circumstances under which the relevant property went missing. Daniel v. State, 275 Ga. App. 70, 619 S.E.2d 770, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 889 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In an armed robbery prosecution, when an investigator who had viewed and heard 665 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) a videotape of the crime, in which one of the perpetrators made a high-pitched yell, testiﬁed that, while at the jail, the officer heard defendant make a sound that was so much like the sound on the tape that, “it was unreal,” this testimony authorized the jury to convict this defendant. Shannon v. State, 275 Ga. App. 550, 621 S.E.2d 540, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1031 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). On appeal from the defendant’s aggravated assault, possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime, and ﬁrstdegree criminal damage to property convictions, the court held that the testimony provided by two of the victims identifying the defendant as one of the perpetrators was sufficient to uphold the conviction as: (1) the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; and (2) under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), the credibility of a witness was a matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Reid v. State, 281 Ga. App. 640, 637 S.E.2d 62, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1184 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Passenger’s testimony stating that the defendant passed marijuana to the passenger and told the passenger to discard the marijuana was sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to support a ﬁnding of guilt of possession of more than an ounce of marijuana under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30; the marijuana found near the defendant was packaged the same way as the marijuana found outside the car, and it could, therefore, be inferred that the marijuana found outside the car had previously been in the back seat beside the defendant. Curtis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 638 S.E.2d 773, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1301 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0427, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 203 (Ga. Feb. 26, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). While the testimony of an accomplice standing alone was insufficient to convict, when the evidence identifying two of the three defendants as participants to an armed robbery of a female victim was not 24-14-8 limited to the uncorroborated testimony of the driver of the getaway car, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that both were guilty. Williamson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 779, 648 S.E.2d 118, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 642 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant’s live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Despite a juvenile’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an adjudication entered by the juvenile court on a charge of attempted rape was proper because the charge was supported not only by the testimony of the victim, but also by the corroborating testimony offered by both the victim’s neighbor, who witnessed the attack, and the victim’s sister, who chased the juvenile away from the scene. In the Interest of J.L.H., 289 Ga. App. 30, 656 S.E.2d 160, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1314 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Despite waiving error regarding a show up identiﬁcation because: (1) a victim’s identiﬁcation of the defendant as one of the perpetrators of a burglary, robbery, and battery was sufficient and non-suggestive; and (2) the corroborating testimony from the defendant’s two accomplices was admissible to support the defendant’s convictions, as both accomplices testiﬁed as to the defendant’s involvement in the crimes, those convictions were upheld on appeal; thus a new trial was properly denied. Carr v. State, 289 Ga. App. 875, 658 S.E.2d 419, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 220 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). With regard to a defendant’s convictions on one count of enticing a child for inde- 666 cent purposes, ten counts of child molestation, one count of aggravated child molestation, and three counts of cruelty to children in the ﬁrst degree, regarding actions the defendant took toward three children and what the children were forced to do to each other by gunpoint while the defendant was a babysitter for the children, the state proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt based on the testimony of the three victims and the victims’ videotaped forensic interviews. It was within the province of the jury to disbelieve the defendant’s testimony that the defendant did not commit the charged crimes. Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga. App. 145, 671 S.E.2d 180, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1259 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0624, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 215 (Ga. Apr. 20, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of armed robbery of a restaurant, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because sufficient evidence corroborated an accomplice’s testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery; the driver corroborated that the driver picked the defendant up and dropped the defendant and the accomplice off at the defendant’s residence near the restaurant about twoand-one-half hours before the robbery, the driver overheard the defendant speaking to the accomplice about committing a robbery, and two more witnesses conﬁrmed that the two were together that evening. Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 59 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the ﬁrst incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the ﬁrst crime was used in the second crime 24-14-8 and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant’s mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 558 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of methylenedioxyamphetamine, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt because based on the evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant threw a plastic bag containing drugs out the passenger side window of the defendant’s car when the state presented evidence that a deputy saw the defendant actually possessing the bag of illegal narcotics as the defendant held the bag in the car before the defendant threw the bag out the passenger’s window; an officer’s testimony that the officer saw the defendant’s hand on a plastic bag containing cocaine is sufficient to authorize a rationale trier of fact to ﬁnd that the defendant possessed the cocaine. McCombs v. State, 306 Ga. App. 64, 701 S.E.2d 496, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 798 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of malice murder and related offenses because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 since although a co-indictee could be considered an accomplice to murder and the other non-drugrelated crimes on which the defendant was tried, there was no evidence of the co-indictee’s intent to participate in any crime other than drug trafficking; assuming that the co-indictee was an accomplice, a witness’s apparent ﬁrsthand knowledge about the crime connected the defendant to the crime and thereby corroborated a co-indictee’s testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter. Moore v. State, 288 Ga. 187, 702 S.E.2d 176, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 853 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 667 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1331(a)(1), was supported by sufficient evidence under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 since the defendant and the codefendant had both made statements regarding the defendant’s involvement in the criminal activity, and the police observed the defendant’s actions; there was evidence that the defendant was an active participant and a party to the trafficking offense. Martinez v. State, 314 Ga. App. 551, 724 S.E.2d 851, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 232 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). With regard to the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, the testimony of the victim alone was sufficient to support the conviction based on the victim identifying the defendant as the assailant from a photo array, as well as the victim testifying that the defendant had a gun, that when the victim turned and ran, the victim heard a gunshot and then discovered that the victim was shot. Lomax v. State, 319 Ga. App. 693, 738 S.E.2d 152, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 50 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony implicating the defendant in the robbery because the testimony of the victim identiﬁed the defendant as the perpetrator and was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony. Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 432 (2013). With regard to the defendant’s murder conviction, the defendant’s contention on appeal that the accomplice testimony used to convict was not corroborated was found meritless because there was slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the defendant as a participant in the crime; speciﬁcally, authorities found the defendant’s blood and palm print on the car used during the crime which evi- 24-14-8 dence corroborated the accomplice’s testimony that the defendant was injured on the broken glass of the window the men used to gain entry to the victim’s house. Lewis v. State, 293 Ga. 110, 744 S.E.2d 21, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 488 (2013). With regard to the defendant’s robbery conviction, contrary to the defendant’s contention that the testimony of an accomplice was uncorroborated and thus insufficient to support the conviction, there was no conﬂict in the testimony that the defendant was a participant; thus, the corroborating evidence was more than slight and was sufficient to authorize the jury to ﬁnd that the accomplice’s testimony was corroborated. Carter v. State, 324 Ga. App. 118, 749 S.E.2d 404, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (2013), cert. denied, No. S14C0253, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 77 (Ga. Jan. 21, 2014). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery based on the victim identifying the defendant as the person who hit the victim on the head, an accomplice’s testimony, the victim’s car keys were found in a bag that the defendant had been holding when stopped by an officer, and the defendant ﬂed from the officers when the officers attempted to arrest. Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (2013). There was ample corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony, including evidence that the murder weapon was found in the defendant’s home, a cap and t-shirt like the ones that the victim said the defendant discarded near the murder scene were found near there, and the defendant’s DNA was found on a cap found in the vehicle where the victims were shot. Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 769 S.E.2d 892, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 144 (2015). Since the accomplice’s testimony was corroborated by phone records, physical evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses, including the defendant’s own statements to police, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the evidence was sufﬁcient to support the defendant’s convictions. McDonald v. State, 296 Ga. 643, 770 S.E.2d 6, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 143 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 668 Evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction as a party to the crime of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a) for ﬂeeing and eluding because the appellant testiﬁed and admitted shoplifting, admitted to having a prior record of shoplifting, had only recently been released from prison, and that getting caught on the day of the events would be a parole violation that would send the appellant back to prison. McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422, 768 S.E.2d 751, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 11 (2015). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict based on the testimony of the victim that the defendant repeatedly had sexual intercourse and engaged in other sexual acts with the victim, who was younger than 16, as well as the wife’s testimony that the defendant admitted to having sex with the victim. Jones v. State, 333 Ga. App. 796, 777 S.E.2d 480, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 539 (2015). The testimony of the victim’s brother, identifying the defendant as the shooter, was sufficient to support the convictions because two other eyewitnesses to the shooting corroborated the brother’s description of the car driven by the shooter, and another witness corroborated the brother’s description of the shooter getting out of the distinctive car a few days after the shooting at the apartment complex where the defendant was soon after arrested. Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 783 S.E.2d 652, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 203 (2016). Victim’s testimony that she had sex, including oral sex, with the defendant, her stepfather, beginning when she was 12 years old was corroborated by, among other things, the defendant’s admissions and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the statutory rape, child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and incest convictions. Jackson v. State, 339 Ga. App. 313, 793 S.E.2d 201, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 619 (2016). While the co-murderer’s statement to police did make up a signiﬁcant portion of the testimony connecting the defendant to the murders, it was not the only evidence against the defendant as cell phone evidence indicated the defendant was near the victims’ home near the time the crimes 24-14-8 took place and direct testimony established that the defendant recruited at least one participant in the robbery scheme that resulted in the murders. Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 807 S.E.2d 899, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 950 (2017). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of, inter alia, malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because, assuming that the ﬁrst witness was an accomplice, there was evidence independent of the ﬁrst witness’s testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes as cell phone records showed the defendant’s cell phone was near the towing company where the victim worked around the time of the shooting; a second witness heard gunshots and saw a blue truck with a man standing outside and a man hanging out of a window with the man’s arms formed as if shooting; and a third witness reported to police that the defendant and the co-indictee admitted to the third witness that they had killed the victim. Parks v. State, 302 Ga. 345, 806 S.E.2d 529, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 877 (2017). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon because the defendant’s girlfriend’s testimony that the defendant told the girlfriend about the defendant’s involvement in the robbery corroborated the defendant’s accomplice’s testimony and was admissible as a partyopponent against penal interest. Wilson v. State, 349 Ga. App. 386, 825 S.E.2d 843, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 166 (2019). Accomplice testimony about the appellant’s participation in the victim’s murder was adequately corroborated by independent evidence based on the appellant’s admissions, the testimony of the appellant’s girlfriend, and cell phone records, which placed the appellant in the same area at the time of the murder and showed communications with the victim and the individual who held the murder weapon after the killing. McCammon v. State, 306 Ga. 516, 832 S.E.2d 396, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 505 (2019). Evidence that the defendant shot the two victims, although given through the 669 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) testimony of an accomplice, was supported by testimony from a friend that they appeared to have been running, conﬁrming the accomplice’s testimony that they ran from police, and defendant’s DNA was found on a bottle on the side of the road near the bodies. Mattox v. State, 308 Ga. 302, 840 S.E.2d 373, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 173 (2020). There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant’s accomplice’s testimony because from the detective’s testimony regarding a witness’s report of the confession to the shooting by two men, the jury could infer that one of the men was the defendant. Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 837 S.E.2d 833, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 6 (2020). Even if the jury determined that the witness was an accomplice, there was adequate evidence to corroborate the witness’s testimony, including physical descriptions of the shooter, an eyewitness’s testimony about the shooter’s Creole or Cajun accent and use of the term “woahdie,” and the defendant’s move to Detroit after the shooting and ﬂight when officers tried to arrest the defendant. Fisher v. State, 309 Ga. 814, 848 S.E.2d 434, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 604 (2020). State corroborated the drug dealer’s testimony because the defendant was identiﬁed by the victim’s son as the man who fatally shot the victim, the defendant was identiﬁed by an acquaintance as the defendant ﬂed the crime scene, and the defendant confessed to an ex-boyfriend that the defendant had shot the victim. Studivant v. State, 309 Ga. 650, 847 S.E.2d 588, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 584 (2020). Appellant’s convictions for multiple sex and drug-related offenses was upheld because testimony of three child victims, standing alone, was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions, physical evidence of sexual abuse was not required, and jury was also permitted to consider out-ofcourt statements made by children in forensic interviews and to foster (now adoptive) mother as substantive evidence of appellant’s guilt. Rider v. State, 366 Ga. 24-14-8 App. 260, 883 S.E.2d 374, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 547 (2022). Accomplice to felony exception not applicable. — Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 burglary conviction. The former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 “accomplice to a felony” exception did not apply and the defendant’s codefendant’s evidence was admissible (and subject to cross-examination) since a neighbor also testiﬁed that the neighbor saw the defendant enter the victim’s home and remove items which were later recovered from the codefendant. Millirons v. State, 268 Ga. App. 644, 602 S.E.2d 346, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 981 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Knowledge and use of home security code. — Accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated when the victim’s body was found in a manner consistent with the accomplice’s testimony, other witnesses corroborated various details of the accomplice’s testimony, and defendant left town, as the accomplice testiﬁed defendant warned the accomplice to do likewise. Hinely v. State, 275 Ga. 777, 573 S.E.2d 66, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 1070 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of burglary, assault, and battery included an accomplice’s testimony (sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by accomplice’s knowledge and use of the defendant’s grandmother’s security code) that defendant hired an accomplice to kill the grandmother. Hill v. State, 268 Ga. App. 642, 602 S.E.2d 348, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 980 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Identity of accomplice alone is insufficient corroboration. — Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice. One who is guilty of a crime in which one participated will always be able to relate the facts of the case and if the corroboration goes only to the truth of that history, without identifying the person ac- 670 cused, it is really no corroboration at all. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 need not be sufficient to warrant guilty verdict or prove every material element of the crime; it need only tend to connect and identify the defendant with the crime charged. Whitﬁeld v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2620 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Raines v. State, 186 Ga. App. 239, 366 S.E.2d 841, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 306 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Hanson v. State, 193 Ga. App. 246, 387 S.E.2d 441, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1384 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accomplice’s testimony was corroborated for bank robbery conviction since: (1) the security guard identiﬁed defendant as a perpetrator; (2) a baseball cap dropped by the gunman was scientiﬁcally linked to defendant; (3) defendant gave the accomplice a gun before the later robberies, and the gun the accomplice discarded after a later robbery was the weapon taken from the bank security guard at the bank robbery; and (4) a still photograph of the gunman made from the bank surveillance videotape was shown to the jury. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. App. 595, 571 S.E.2d 817, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1232 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accomplice’s identiﬁcation of participants in crime must be corroborated. — When an accomplice’s testimony is corroborated in material part, other uncorroborated testimony may be believed by the jury, with one important exception: testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice. Cofer v. State, 166 Ga. App. 436, 304 S.E.2d 537, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2202 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of a defendant’s accomplice implicating the defendant in several robberies was sufficiently corroborated based on the defendant’s admission, eyewitnesses conﬁrming that two persons par- 24-14-8 ticipated, and the defendant’s use of the victims’ bank cards after the robberies. Thus, the defendant’s participation as an accessory was sufficiently corroborated by evidence other than from the accomplice. Epps v. State, 296 Ga. App. 92, 673 S.E.2d 608, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 140 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Slight evidence sufficient to prove identity. — Corroborating evidence of testimony of an accomplice, albeit slight, tended to prove defendant’s identity and participation in the crime and therefore was sufficient as a matter of law. Walker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 868, 197 S.E. 67, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 426 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); McPherson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 839, 101 S.E.2d 750, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 919 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Trull v. State, 221 Ga. 442, 145 S.E.2d 242, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 487 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1505 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Harris v. State, 165 Ga. App. 186, 299 S.E.2d 393, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3127 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Williams v. State, 198 Ga. App. 725, 402 S.E.2d 796, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 245 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Brown v. State, 199 Ga. App. 18, 404 S.E.2d 154, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 341 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Tucker v. State, 205 Ga. App. 683, 423 S.E.2d 422, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1293 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Young v. State, 213 Ga. App. 278, 444 S.E.2d 598, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 586 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Knott v. State, 225 Ga. App. 604, 484 S.E.2d 342 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Slight evidence of corroboration, which may be entirely circumstantial, that connects a defendant with the crime satisﬁes the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, and the sufficiency of the corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony is peculiarly a matter for the jury; thus, the evidence presented at defendant’s trial for multiple burglary counts was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions since the testimony of defendant’s nephew, who 671 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) acted as an accomplice, was corroborated by the testimony of the victims describing the methods used to break into their homes and the items that were taken. Gibson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 473, 600 S.E.2d 417, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 694 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was at least slight evidence from sources extraneous to the defendant’s accomplice as to the defendant’s identity and participation in a robbery, and the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict on that count. Extraneous evidence connected the defendant to at least one robbery in which the defendant employed the same modus operandi as the accomplice employed. Grimes v. State, 291 Ga. App. 585, 662 S.E.2d 346, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 579 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit burglary, and sexual battery because there was at lease slight evidence from sources extraneous to a co-conspirator as to the defendant’s identity and participation in a home invasion and robbery; the co-conspirator testiﬁed that the co-conspirator attended a meeting to plan the robbery and that the meeting occurred at the apartment where the defendant resided, and extraneous evidence connected the defendant to at least two home invasions that employed the same modus operandi. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 979 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of other witnesses sufficient. — Finding of delinquency by virtue of the minor’s having committed acts which if done by an adult would have constituted motor vehicle theft and burglary was not based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; rather, many of the details were also corroborated by the testimony of two investigators, a relative of the minor, the owner of one of the stolen vehicles and the minor 24-14-8 personally. In re J.B., 223 Ga. App. 429, 477 S.E.2d 874 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping as the testimony of at least one witness that was presented against defendant as to each offense was sufficient to establish as a fact that defendant committed the offenses. Singleton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 184, 577 S.E.2d 6, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless conduct, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and 16-5-60(b), respectively; defendant and the codefendants were involved in a physical altercation with two restaurant patrons, and a codefendant’s testimony that defendant retrieved a gun and shot the victim was sufficiently repeated by the testimony of other witnesses, who also connected defendant with the shooting pursuant to the corroboration requirement in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Baker v. State, 273 Ga. App. 297, 614 S.E.2d 904, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 481 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act because a passenger in the defendant’s truck testiﬁed that defendant purchased crack cocaine from an individual in a high drug area, a rock of crack cocaine was found in defendant’s truck, and a police officer corroborated that testimony pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 with the officer’s own observations that the individual that defendant was talking to had money in a hand as the individual lowered the hand from defendant’s truck window. Millsap v. State, 275 Ga. App. 732, 621 S.E.2d 837, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 1104 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and possession-of-a-ﬁrearm based on the testimony of three separate wit- 672 nesses, including the victim, that the defendant threateningly pointed a gun at the victim’s head. Further, regarding the need to show the victim’s reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, the state presented evidence from the victim’s mouth that the victim feared the gun and that the fear resulted in the victim urinating on the victim’s person and in the victim lying to an officer at the front door to protect the victim’s children. Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 896 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2141, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 1016 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). The testimony of a victim and the victim’s neighbor that the defendant was the person who held a gun to the victim’s side and led the victim outside to search for money in the victim’s truck, as well as a letter from the defendant to a codefendant implicating the defendant, was sufficient corroboration under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to create a jury question as to whether the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault. Decoteau v. State, 302 Ga. App. 451, 691 S.E.2d 328, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 154 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8; the testimony of the victim’s ﬁancée and the accomplice’s friend was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony directly identifying the defendant as the shooter, the physical description of the shooter that the ﬁancé provided to the police ﬁt the defendant, and the ﬁancée’s description of the shooter’s clothes was consistent with the accomplice’s trial testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the incident. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803, 708 S.E.2d 331, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 259 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions as the getaway driver’s testimony about the heights of the defendant and the codefendant was consistent with the gas station clerk’s com- 24-14-8 parison of their heights, and there was evidence that the defendant, who had no job, was spending signiﬁcant amounts of money on cars and expensive clothing. Harrell v. State, 322 Ga. App. 115, 744 S.E.2d 105, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 463 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In a case decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of an accomplice implicating the defendant was corroborated by evidence that the defendant believed the victim stole the defendant’s cocaine, witnesses identiﬁed the defendant as being involved in dragging a man into a vehicle, and the victim’s blood was found in the defendant’s sister’s basement. McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 750 S.E.2d 314, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 873 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the ﬁrst defendant of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the fourth defendant’s ex-girlfriend placed the ﬁrst defendant at the scene of the shooting when the shooting occurred, which corroborated the testimony of the state’s witness, who was a participant in the crimes, that the witness saw the ﬁrst defendant at the scene shooting a gun and then ﬂeeing with the other defendants. Grimes v. State, 296 Ga. 337, 766 S.E.2d 72, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 922 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41, 16-5-21, 16-5-41, and 16-11-106, based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank, the defendant’s clothing, a text message between the defendant and the defendant’s accomplice, and the defendant’s accomplice’s testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 114 (2015). While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty 673 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 701 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s malice murder conviction because there was evidence apart from the accomplice’s testimony from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant was a participant, including eyewitness testimony that an accomplice pointed a gun at the victim when the group attempted to rob the victim, a witness testiﬁed that the defendant did not abandon the group at this point but proceeded with the others in the victim’s direction, the defendant remained for the attempted robbery of the victim, the defendant did not seek aid for the victim after the victim was shot, and the defendant ﬂed the scene. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. 559, 832 S.E.2d 372, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 524 (2019). In a malice murder case, an accomplice’s testimony was corroborated as required since two others recounted the planning and execution of the crimes. Martin v. State, 310 Ga. 658, 852 S.E.2d 834, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 933 (2020). Corroboration by detective. — When a former detective testiﬁed without objection that a witness to a robbery gave a statement positively identifying the defendant as the gunman in an armed robbery, this testimony corroborated testimony of a co-participant, and whether it was sufficient for a conviction was for the jury to determine. Kenney v. State, 236 Ga. App. 359, 511 S.E.2d 923 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration by officer. — Because sufficient evidence was presented that a juvenile was a party to the crime of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony, and the evidence was corroborated by a police officer who questioned the juvenile’s cohort, an adjudication based on the juvenile’s commission of the act was upheld on appeal; thus, the juvenile’s motion for a directed verdict 24-14-8 was properly denied. In the Interest of B.D., 287 Ga. App. 185, 651 S.E.2d 129, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 910 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration by victim. — Because testimony from a single witness was sufﬁcient to establish a fact, testimony from both victims of an armed robbery that the defendant was the gunman during that robbery was sufficient direct evidence to establish that fact; moreover, the fact that the defendant offered another explanation for the defendant’s presence at the scene, did not render the other evidence against the defendant insufficient or circumstantial. Bakyayita v. State, 278 Ga. App. 624, 629 S.E.2d 539, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 382 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration by parent of child. — In defendant’s conviction for child molestation, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as sufficient evidence existed based on testimony of the child victim’s parent, who testiﬁed as to discovery of defendant on top of the victim; further evidence in support of defendant’s conviction included the child’s videotaped police interviews describing what happened. Lopez v. State, 291 Ga. App. 210, 661 S.E.2d 618, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 444 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1441, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 675 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration in child molestation. — Evidence was sufficient for the jury to ﬁnd a defendant guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt as it was within the jury’s province to reject the defendant’s defense denying the crime with regard to the victim as well as with regard to the witnesses who testiﬁed as to similar transactions with the defendant. The testimony of the victim was corroborated by an investigator and a forensic interviewer, who testiﬁed as to what the victim had told had occurred; the victim’s statements were corroborated by the sheriff’s investigator; and the jury was entitled to consider the victim’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence under the former Child Hearsay Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16. Lamb v. State, 293 Ga. App. 65, 666 S.E.2d 462, 2008 Ga. 674 App. LEXIS 900 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration in DUI cases. — Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive, possession of an open container of alcoholic beverage, and disorderly conduct because the testimony of the driver accosted by the defendant and the arresting officer was sufficient to enable a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. Corbin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 768, 700 S.E.2d 868, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration in forgery cases. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for forgery because although the only witness who testiﬁed to the defendant’s participation in the forgery was her boyfriend’s daughter, who testiﬁed that she and the defendant had together forged counterfeit currency, the trial court found that the daughter’s testimony was corroborated by the fact that the counterfeit currency was found in a common area of the house where the defendant was the only resident; the judgment as to the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence was for the ﬁnder of fact to determine, and the trial court clearly found that the presumption of possession raised by the defendant’s residence at the home was sufficiently corroborative. Martin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 809 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration in burglary cases. — Testimony of two codefendants that a defendant was the third man in a burglary was sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 because the codefendants corroborated each other, and one codefendant’s sibling testiﬁed that the sibling lent the three defendants the sibling’s car and later noticed the defendant carrying a ﬂat-screen television, which was taken in the burglary. Sims v. State, 306 Ga. App. 68, 701 S.E.2d 534, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 865 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Single witness sufficient for murder conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support a malice murder convic- 24-14-8 tion, although no forensic or physical evidence was presented, because the jury determined that the eyewitnesses’ testimony that the defendant fatally shot the victim during a drug transaction was credible. The testimony of a single witness was sufficient pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Handley v. State, 289 Ga. 786, 716 S.E.2d 176, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 714 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficient corroboration for aggravated assault. — Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and while the only evidence of the shotgun at the scene of the assault of the victim came from a codefendant, other evidence from the victim and the police served to corroborate it. Emerson v. State, 315 Ga. App. 105, 726 S.E.2d 600, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 331 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Counsel not ineffective for not requesting accomplice corroboration charge. — Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge on accomplice corroboration because the accomplice was not the only witness; thus, there was no error in failing to give the accomplice corroboration charge since the state relied on other evidence apart from the accomplice’s testimony. Lane v. State, 324 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 837 (2013), cert. dismissed, No. S14C0875, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 684 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2014). Corroboration by victim’s family members. — Testimony of the victim’s cousin was sufficient, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), to corroborate the accomplice’s identiﬁcation of the defendant as the shooter. Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 759 S.E.2d 846, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 496 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration of attempted armed robbery. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted armed robbery as a party to the crime because there was evidence apart from the accomplice’s testimony from 675 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) which the jury could have inferred that the defendant was a participant, including evidence that multiple witnesses identiﬁed the defendant as part of the group that approached the second victim with the accomplice pointing a gun at the second victim, the second victim testiﬁed that the defendant directed an associate to check the second victim’s pockets or socks, and after the group was unable to obtain anything from the second victim, they went in the direction of the ﬁrst victim. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. 559, 832 S.E.2d 372, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 524 (2019). Corroboration need not extend to every material detail. — Testimony of one accomplice adequately corroborated that of another accomplice to the murder of appellant’s former husband since although there were inconsistencies in that each attempted to place more culpability on the other in carrying out the scheme, they amply corroborated each other on the ultimate question of appellant’s involvement in the scheme to have her former husband killed. Blalock v. State, 250 Ga. 441, 298 S.E.2d 477, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 537 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Need not warrant conviction. — Corroborating evidence need not be in and of itself so strong as to support a verdict of guilty. Nance v. State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 S.E. 932, 1906 Ga. LEXIS 333 (1906) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Parham v. State, 3 Ga. App. 468, 60 S.E. 123, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 341 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1146 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1026 (1983). Grave suspicion not sufficient. — Corroborating evidence which merely casts a grave suspicion upon the defendant is not sufficient. McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346, 1881 Ga. LEXIS 20 (1881) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); 24-14-8 Baker v. State, 14 Ga. App. 578, 81 S.E. 805, 1914 Ga. App. LEXIS 387 (1914) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Thompson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105, 182 S.E. 414, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 65 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Worley v. State, 60 Ga. App. 557, 4 S.E.2d 417, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 83 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Ivey v. State, 91 Ga. App. 455, 85 S.E.2d 829, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 776 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 224 S.E.2d 281 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1146 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime or leading to an inference that the accused is guilty and must do more than merely cast a grave suspicion of guilt on the accused. Powell v. State, 166 Ga. App. 393, 304 S.E.2d 515, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2184 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participator in the criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a verdict. Hargett v. State, 55 Ga. App. 192, 189 S.E. 675 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); King v. State, 77 Ga. App. 720, 49 S.E.2d 790 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); McPherson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 839, 101 S.E.2d 750 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Wilkins v. State, 96 Ga. App. 841, 101 S.E.2d 912 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Lindsey v. State, 227 Ga. 48, 178 S.E.2d 848 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976).Jones v. State, 139 676 Ga. App. 643, 229 S.E.2d 121, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1928 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1932 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1395 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1146 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Felix v. State, 143 Ga. App. 376, 238 S.E.2d 734, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2328 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cummings v. State, 240 Ga. 104, 239 S.E.2d 529, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1411 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1280 (1978), overruled in part, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1984) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 S.E.2d 341, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1020 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Neal v. State, 152 Ga. App. 270, 262 S.E.2d 561, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2891 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 205, 264 S.E.2d 15, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 743 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2397 (1980), cert. dismissed, 247 Ga. 8, 273 S.E.2d 409, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 591 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 741, 270 S.E.2d 5, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2369 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Black v. State, 155 Ga. App. 798, 272 S.E.2d 762, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2795 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3037 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Inman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 209, 355 S.E.2d 119, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1636 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Thurston v. State, 186 Ga. App. 881, 368 S.E.2d 822, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 493 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Martin v. State, 209 Ga. App. 720, 434 S.E.2d 534, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1003 24-14-8 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Dalton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 217, 513 S.E.2d 745 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Only slight evidence of participation in the offense from an extraneous source will provide the necessary corroboration under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, which may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence. Chergi v. State, 234 Ga. App. 548, 507 S.E.2d 795 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Although evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony was slight, it was nonetheless sufficient to prove the defendant’s involvement in the robbery: the robbery occurred in the defendant’s apartment, the defendant was aware the victims had large amounts of cash because they were showing it off and one of them had given the defendant $100, and the defendant and others had told the victims they were planning a robbery. Brown v. State, 350 Ga. App. 104, 828 S.E.2d 110, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 250 (2019). Confession of defendant was corroborated. — Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and robbery by intimidation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-840(a)(2) and 16-8-41(a) were appropriate because the defendant’s own confessions to participating in the crimes were corroborated by the testimony of the victims, among other evidence. Likewise, the defendant’s codefendants’ statements and testimony implicating the defendant in the crimes were corroborated by the defendant’s confessions and the victims’ testimony. Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga. App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 958 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Connection with crime more than suspicion of guilt. — Corroborating evidence must, independently of the accomplice’s testimony and of itself, connect the defendant on trial with the commission of the offense and tend to show defendant’s guilt; a grave suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient. King v. State, 77 Ga. App. 720, 49 S.E.2d 790 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695, 69 S.E.2d 253 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Wilkins v. State, 96 Ga. App. 841, 677 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) 101 S.E.2d 912 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 111 S.E.2d 70 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Seay v. State, 108 Ga. App. 724, 134 S.E.2d 422 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 164 S.E.2d 808 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Caldwell v. State, 227 Ga. 703, 182 S.E.2d 789 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Felix v. State, 143 Ga. App. 376, 238 S.E.2d 734 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57 (1978) , cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928, 99 S. Ct. 1265, 59 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1979).Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2625 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Black v. State, 155 Ga. App. 798, 272 S.E.2d 762, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2795 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Need not warrant conviction but must do more than create suspicion. — Corroborating evidence need not be so strong as to support a verdict of guilty, but it must be sufficient to connect the accused with the perpetration of the offense and lead to the inference of the accused’s guilt, and more than sufficient to merely raise a suspicion against the accused. Sheppard v. State, 44 Ga. App. 481, 162 S.E. 413, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 772 (1931) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1280 (1978), overruled in part, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1984) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 S.E.2d 341, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1020 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Need not warrant conviction or be exhaustively corroborated. — Corroboration need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a verdict or be corroborated in every material particular. Hargett v. 24-14-8 State, 55 Ga. App. 192, 189 S.E. 675 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. 247, 42 S.E.2d 767 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mears v. State, 98 Ga. App. 576, 106 S.E.2d 854 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Atcheson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 152, 220 S.E.2d 483 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Turner v. State, 235 Ga. 826, 221 S.E.2d 590 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976).Jones v. State, 139 Ga. App. 643, 229 S.E.2d 121, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1928 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3037 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Evidence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony does not have to be sufficient in and of itself to support a verdict of guilty; circumstantial evidence tying the defendant to the crime and justifying an inference of guilt is satisfactory. Cofer v. State, 166 Ga. App. 436, 304 S.E.2d 537, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2202 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Slight evidence not warranting conviction and not supporting every material fact. — Law does not require that the corroborating evidence shall in and of itself alone be sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty, or that the testimony of the accomplice shall be corroborated in every material particular. On the contrary, slight evidence that the crime was committed by both defendants, and identifying the defendants with the crime, will corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and warrant a conviction. Evans v. State, 78 Ga. 351 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Boswell v. State, 92 Ga. 581, 17 S.E. 805 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, 678 § 3755); Pritchett v. State, 92 Ga. 33, 18 S.E. 350 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Chapman v. State, 112 Ga. 56, 37 S.E. 102 (1900) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S.E. 357 (1902) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Nance v. State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 S.E. 932 (1906) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Davis v. State, 25 Ga. App. 532, 103 S.E. 819, cert. denied, 25 Ga. App. 840 (1920).Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968).Caldwell v. State, 227 Ga. 703, 182 S.E.2d 789, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 821 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Mulligan v. State, 245 Ga. 266, 264 S.E.2d 204, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 763 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1068, 102 S. Ct. 618, 70 L. Ed. 2d 603, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4598 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Bennett v. State, 156 Ga. App. 617, 275 S.E.2d 701, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3143 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Powell v. State, 166 Ga. App. 393, 304 S.E.2d 515, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2184 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Whitton v. State, 178 Ga. App. 862, 344 S.E.2d 703, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2579 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Howard v. State, 181 Ga. App. 187, 351 S.E.2d 550, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2363 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155, 351 S.E.2d 683, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2815 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Slaughter v. State, 227 Ga. App. 739, 490 S.E.2d 399, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 858 (1997), cert. denied, No. S97C2034, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 152 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Direct or circumstantial evidence. — Sufficient corroboration may consist of either direct or circumstantial evidence which connects the defendant with the crime, tends to show the defendant’s participation therein, and would justify an inference of the guilt of the accused independently of the testimony of the accomplice. Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 256 24-14-8 S.E.2d 341, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1020 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). Circumstantial evidence. — Circumstantial evidence, when taken with the accomplice testimony, showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient corroboration. Whitﬁeld v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2620 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Although corroboration may be by circumstantial evidence, the evidence must do more than merely cast a grave suspicion of guilt on the accused. Claybrooks v. State, 189 Ga. App. 431, 375 S.E.2d 880, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1432 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Circumstantial evidence presented at trial sufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice. — See Howard v. State, 187 Ga. App. 74, 369 S.E.2d 271, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 592 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 474 S.E.2d 708 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 244-8). Testimony of other witnesses linking the defendant to the crime was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd defendant guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanchez v. State, 203 Ga. App. 61, 416 S.E.2d 139, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 398 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony in a prosecution for burglary of a store since the corroborating evidence included a burglary call to the police, a store security video which showed events testiﬁed to by the accomplice, and an incriminating statement made by the defendant. Williams v. State, 234 Ga. App. 191, 506 S.E.2d 237 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficient corroborating evidence enabled the jury to conclude that the defendant was a party to the robbery based on testimony that the defendant and an accomplice met before and immediately following the robbery, defendant’s own testimony of being in the drug business, 679 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) cellular phone records indicating the defendant was in the vicinity of the robbery when the robbery occurred, eyewitness testimony, and evidence that the defendant sent the amount of money taken from the victim to another. Jackson v. State, 294 Ga. 34, 751 S.E.2d 63, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 889 (2013). Corroboration by second accomplice. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-524(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A.§ 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A.§ 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and 16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the evidence sufficed to sustain the defendant’s conviction where an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the ﬁrst accomplice. Both codefendants testiﬁed that the defendant was present from the robbery’s inception through the robbery’s execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim’s money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim’s residence by supplying the defendant’s car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 295 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration circumstantial and consistent with innocence. — When corroboration of the alleged accomplice’s testimony is entirely circumstantial and is of itself as consistent with innocence as with guilt, such evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict. Reed v. State, 127 Ga. App. 458, 194 S.E.2d 121, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 915 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Source of corroboration. — Corroboration of an accomplice must come from a 24-14-8 source or sources other than his or her own testimony, were it otherwise the rule as to corroboration would obviously be nugatory and worthless. Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161, 1900 Ga. LEXIS 339 (1900) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Butler v. State, 17 Ga. App. 522, 87 S.E. 712, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 748 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). Corroboration of accomplice’s testimony. — Sufficient corroborating evidence existed to support accomplice’s testimony that defendant kicked in the door of the victim’s residence and committed other crimes inside that residence against the victim, as another person, other than defendant and the other two men who committed the crimes, gave a statement to police regarding defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and that statement was introduced at trial through the police officer who witnessed the statement. Moore v. State, 261 Ga. App. 752, 583 S.E.2d 588, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 760 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Because of the corroborating testimony from the defendant’s two accomplices, the accomplice testimony was admissible to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-521(a)(3), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Scott v. State, 302 Ga. App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 70 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of the defendant’s two accomplices was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes (murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault) for which the defendant was convicted. Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 258 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury’s determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by receiving because in addition to the accomplice’s testimony, a deputy with the county sheriff’s office observed the accomplice and a codefendant appear to shoplift at a store, after which they got 680 into the defendant’s car; the defendant did not stop when police were chasing the defendant but instead continued to drive evasively while the codefendant threw items out of the passenger window, and there were no receipts showing that the items had been purchased. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1057 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0656, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 398 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0654, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 373 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2012), overruled in part, Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 800 S.E.2d 356, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 375 (2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In an armed robbery prosecution, the testimony of the defendant’s accomplice was corroborated as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, in that the accomplice’s testimony regarding the defendant’s planning of the crime was corroborated by telephone records, the store’s security video tape, and the fact that money was deposited into the defendant’s account only two days after the crime. Bell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 28, 722 S.E.2d 871, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 110 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the ﬁrst defendant of felony murder of two of the victims, the aggravated assault of another two victims, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to possess cocaine because the accomplice’s testimony that the ﬁrst defendant participated in the crimes was corroborated both by an assault victim’s identiﬁcation of the ﬁrst defendant at trial as well as the rap lyrics the ﬁrst defendant composed in jail which referenced the use of an AK-47 that resulted in the ﬁrst defendant becoming a co-defendant of the shooter. Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 772 S.E.2d 630, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 307 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony, including evidence that all three participating were members of a gang and text messages regarding the removal of ﬁngerprints, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 243 (2016), overruled in part, Jones v. Missis- 24-14-8 sippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 209 L. Ed. 2d 390, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2110 (2021), overruled in part as stated in Holmes v. State, 311 Ga. 698, 859 S.E.2d 475, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 296 (2021) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In addition to accomplice testimony, evidence that the defendant was in possession of the murder weapon in the days preceding the crimes, placed calls from the vicinity of the crime scene in the early morning hours on the day of the crimes, and was with the victim the night before and the morning of the crimes was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a ﬁrearm by a ﬁrst offender probationer. McCain v. State, 300 Ga. 400, 794 S.E.2d 58, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 768 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of felony murder, violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and other offenses because the second defendant was a member of a local street gang; the accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated as there was a recorded cell phone call in which the second defendant stated that the second defendant was carrying weapons and seeking a criminal opportunity; the second defendant was tied to the ﬁrst set of crimes in which the second defendant’s victim was killed through ballistic evidence; and the second defendant’s involvement in the second set of crimes was corroborated by the second defendant’s own statements to a cousin. Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 805 S.E.2d 80, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 770 (2017), overruled, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of, inter alia, malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and attempted armed robbery as the state presented ample evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony because a witness testiﬁed that the defendant was present when the victim opened the victim’s wallet to reveal a large amount of cash; the defendant agreed to do a controlled phone call with the accomplice, which was re- 681 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) corded by police and played for the jury; and, in that phone call, the defendant made incriminating statements regarding the location of the murder weapon, retrieving the weapon, and getting their story straight. Robinson v. State, 303 Ga. 321, 812 S.E.2d 232, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 171 (2018). After the defendants were convicted of two counts of armed robbery and three counts of aggravated assault stemming from a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, in addition to the testimony of the getaway driver, who the state believed to be the defendants’ accomplice, the testimony of the two store employees and DNA evidence presented by the state allowed the jury to infer that, during the robbery, the ﬁrst defendant was wearing a black ski mask and a letterman-style jacket and carrying a revolver, while the second defendant was dressed in a Halloween mask and carrying a set of brass knuckles; thus, the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony presented by the defendants’ accomplice. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 179 (2018). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder as there was more than slight, independent evidence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony that the defendant was a participant in the shooting because the accomplice testiﬁed that the defendant said that the defendant had shot the victim; after ﬁrst lying about the defendant’s presence, the defendant admitted to being at the murder scene; and the jeans that the defendant admitted that the defendant was wearing when the victim was shot had a bloodstain on them. Coley v. State, 305 Ga. 658, 827 S.E.2d 241, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 233 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder as, even assuming the jury found another gang member to be an accomplice, there was other evidence that did not come from the accomplice, including a pawn shop video; a witness’s description of the shooter’s 24-14-8 clothing, location, and physical characteristics that was consistent with the accomplice’s trial testimony; and cell phone record evidence. Barber v. State, 314 Ga. 759, 879 S.E.2d 428, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 270 (2022). Physical evidence corroborated crime. — Evidence of defendant’s participation in the crimes and defendant’s gang membership was sufficiently corroborated by the physical evidence collected from the crime scene, by a witness’s testimony regarding the events that occurred the evening of the crimes, by postings on defendant’s social media accounts, and by cell phone data. Poole v. State, 312 Ga. 515, 863 S.E.2d 93, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 630 (2021). Other evidence supporting conviction. — Although the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant was insufficient to convict defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, there was other evidence, including defendant’s statements to police that defendant urged the codefendant to kill the victim, to show that defendant aided and abetted and counseled another to commit the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) and (4). Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 153 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficient corroborating evidence in armed robbery. — Evidence that the defendant was linked to the getaway vehicle, and that the defendant was present the next morning at a hotel with the vehicle, the co-indictee, the ﬁrst defendant, the marijuana, and the cash was sufficient corroborating evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the armed robbery of the four victims and the subsequent shootings that killed the ﬁrst victim and injured the second victim. Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 751 S.E.2d 399, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 964 (2013). Evidence sufficiently corroborated victim’s testimony. — Evidence sufficiently corroborated the victim’s testimony that the defendant, along with the three co-defendants, kidnapped the victim for ransom because the proprietor of a business located in the same strip mall as the victim’s clothing store saw the victim 682 being forcibly taken away; on conversations monitored from one of the co-defendant’s telephones, the victim was overheard pleading that the defendants not kill the victim; the victim was overheard asking the victim’s family for money; after an investigatory stop, the defendant was found in the back seat, along with the victim and a hidden gun; and the victim stated that the victim’s life had been threatened. Deleon-Alvarez v. State, 324 Ga. App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 920 (2013), cert. denied, No. S14C0447, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 261 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0445, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 278 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2014). Corroboration of violation of stalking order. — Complaining witness’s testimony that the defendant violated the 12-month stalking protective order by repeatedly shining a light on the witness when the witness took out the trash, shining the light into the witness’s house, and yelling obscenities at the witness was sufﬁcient to establish that the defendant violated the protective order where video evidence supplemented such testimony. Birdsong v. Barnett, 334 Ga. App. 120, 778 S.E.2d 372, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 583 (2015). There was adequate corroboration. — See Cain v. State, 212 Ga. App. 531, 442 S.E.2d 279, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 274 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1070, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 742 (Ga. June 3, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Bush v. State, 267 Ga. 877, 485 S.E.2d 466 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Givens v. State, 227 Ga. App. 861, 490 S.E.2d 530 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); In re J.L., 229 Ga. App. 447, 494 S.E.2d 274 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779, 505 S.E.2d 4 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Sparks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 11, 505 S.E.2d 555 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Dalton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 217, 513 S.E.2d 745 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Purvis v. State, 239 Ga. App. 900, 522 S.E.2d 499 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 523 S.E.2d 294 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Crumpton v. State, 244 Ga. App. 57, 534 24-14-8 S.E.2d 809, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 638 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Blair v. State, 246 Ga. App. 533, 541 S.E.2d 120, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1279 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 731, 541 S.E.2d 701, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1348 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Callaway v. State, 247 Ga. App. 310, 542 S.E.2d 596, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1386 (2000), cert. denied, No. S01C0563, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 483 (Ga. June 4, 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 543 S.E.2d 81, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1407 (2000), cert. denied, No. S01C0522, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 388 (Ga. May 7, 2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0492, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 395 (Ga. May 7, 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Eidson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 26, 543 S.E.2d 100, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1411 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 546 S.E.2d 524, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 340 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Parker v. State, 249 Ga. App. 530, 549 S.E.2d 154, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 555 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and aggravated assault because the independent corroborating evidence in the case was substantial; an accomplice’s testimony implicating the defendants was corroborated by the aggravated assault victim, who positively identiﬁed one of the defendants, that defendant’s own admission to a woman in the defendant’s apartment, evidence that the second defendant had sustained shotgun wounds on the evening of the crimes, ballistics evidence tying that defendant to the crime scene, and the presence of that defendant’s blood on the ﬁrst defendant’s clothing and in the getaway vehicle. Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 706 S.E.2d 430, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 157 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of ﬁve counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud because, although only the defendant’s alleged ac- 683 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) complice testiﬁed that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to obtain possession of the controlled substances by fraud and deception, the state presented evidence of corroborating circumstances that proved the defendant’s intent as the defendant went to the pharmacy on one occasion to pick up a medication that was clearly labeled as having been dispensed for the defendant, purportedly on the authority of a doctor who had never provided care for the defendant. Hopkins v. State, 328 Ga. App. 844, 761 S.E.2d 896, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 574 (2014). Adequate corroboration for RICO conviction. — Testimony by defendant’s cousin that the cousin saw defendant deliver packages to defendant’s mother on several occasions corroborated defendant’s mother’s testimony that defendant supplied cocaine for sale by family members and was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction under the Georgia Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organization Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. McGee v. State, 255 Ga. App. 708, 566 S.E.2d 431, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 745 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1566, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 802 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1058, 123 S. Ct. 633, 154 L. Ed. 2d 539, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8872 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for marijuana conviction. — Sufficient corroboration existed to support a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute based on the testimony of an accomplice after the police saw that defendant was in a house that had marijuana in many rooms, the marijuana was divided into different colored baggies, implying different ownership, and defendant’s ﬂight from the scene showed defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Ellison v. State, 265 Ga. App. 446, 594 S.E.2d 675, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 140 (2004), overruled on other grounds, Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 846 S.E.2d 73, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 476 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 24-14-8 In a trial for attempted trafficking in marijuana, a codefendant’s statements were sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by the testimony of a case agent that a loaded pistol was found at the defendant’s feet and that a bag containing the currency used in the drug transaction was found within arm’s reach of the defendant. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 566 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for burglary conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for burglary after an accomplice’s testimony that defendant was an active participant in the burglary was corroborated by: (1) a police officer’s testimony that defendant was in a vehicle with two accomplices shortly after the burglary; (2) another officer’s testimony that handguns were found in a pillowcase retrieved from the vehicle; and (3) the pawn shop owner’s testimony that the guns found in the vehicle were the guns stolen from the owner’s shop. Reynolds v. State, 267 Ga. App. 148, 598 S.E.2d 868, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 550 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of defendant’s accomplice was sufficiently corroborated by defendant’s possession of tools used in the crime, the fact that defendant was found near the scene of a bank burglary covered in grease that could have come from a bank machine, the fact that defendant was sweaty, as if defendant had been working, and the fact that pine straw similar to the pine straw in front of the burglarized bank was found in defendant’s car. McNair v. State, 267 Ga. App. 872, 600 S.E.2d 830, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 799 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s burglary convictions were affirmed based on the defendant’s accomplice’s testimony that the defendant was present with the accomplice during two of the three burglaries, corroborated by the property owners’ testimony that items were stolen during unauthorized entries into their respective residences, evidence that the stolen items were found in the defendant’s bedroom shortly thereafter, 684 and the defendant’s inconsistent explanations for the defendant’s possession of the stolen items. Mays v. State, 306 Ga. App. 507, 703 S.E.2d 21, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 978 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for aggravated assault conviction. — Sufficient evidence supported aggravated assault conviction because both the victim and another witness testiﬁed that defendant stabbed the victim, and a nurse testiﬁed that the victim’s injury was serious. Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 273, 612 S.E.2d 96, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 266 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) after the defendant’s companions used metal knuckles, a metal pipe, and a gun to beat the victim; the defendant was a party to the offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as the victim, whose testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, testiﬁed that, during the incident, the defendant summoned the companions to help beat the victim, and the defendant and the companions repeatedly warned the victim not to testify in court in the defendant’s criminal case. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1103 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. Jan. 8, 2007), overruled in part, Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for malice murder conviction. — Sufficient nonaccomplice evidence was presented to corroborate the testimony by accomplices of both defendants in trial on charges of malice murder and other related offenses, speciﬁcally, that: (1) the ﬁrst defendant admitted to the victim’s killing, via a note from that defendant to a non-accomplice witness, in order to prevent the victim from testifying; and (2) independent evidence was presented regarding the second defendant’s participation in the crimes to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 584, 630 24-14-8 S.E.2d 370, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 262 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder because, when the victim turned the victim’s back on the defendant, and started walking away, the defendant pulled out a gun, put it to the back of the victim’s head, and fatally shot the victim; the ﬁrst co-defendant saw the defendant running back to the car with a gun in the defendant’s hand; the second co-defendant testiﬁed that the defendant shot the victim; the testimony of the victim’s friend supported the testimony of the two co-defendants, though the friend was unable to unequivocally identify the defendant as the shooter; and, although some of the evidence was conveyed through the testimony of co-defendants, that evidence was properly corroborated. Fisher v. State, 299 Ga. 629, 791 S.E.2d 58, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 572 (2016). Assuming that a testifying witness who initially agreed to participate in the robbery but then ﬂed was an accomplice, sufficient evidence corroborated the witness’s testimony that the defendant shot the victim, a cab driver, including the defendant’s own statement that the defendant was at the scene, the defendant’s description of the crime to others, and the defendant’s resisting arrest and attempting to escape. Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 820 S.E.2d 679, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 687 (2018). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions because the jury was authorized to reject defendant’s testimony and ﬁnd, based upon other direct and circumstantial evidence, that both defendant and the co-defendant were parties to the victim’s murder, and that defendant killed the victim because the victim had quit the victim’s job while owing defendant thousands of dollars. The co-defendant’s statement to the police was sufficiently corroborated as the forensic evidence and witness testimony corroborated the co-defendant’s statement and showed that defendant participated in the murder. Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 797, 884 S.E.2d 877, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 57 (2023). Adequate corroboration for methamphetamine conviction. — Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant’s 685 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, and defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based upon the uncorroborated testimony of defendant’s accomplice alone failed as the incriminating testimony by the accomplice was adequately corroborated by independent evidence, including defendant’s possession of essential items for manufacturing methamphetamine; defendant’s statement to a passenger in the back of the patrol car that a store likely had ratted about the matchbook purchases; and the large quantity of matchbooks found discarded along the route defendant had just traveled. Kohlmeier v. State, 289 Ga. App. 709, 658 S.E.2d 261, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 191 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Because the accomplice testimony presented against a juvenile was sufficiently corroborated by two other witness, the juvenile’s prior similar acts, and the juvenile’s ﬂight from the scene, the appeals court rejected the juvenile’s sufficiency challenge. In the Interest of S.K., 289 Ga. App. 672, 658 S.E.2d 220, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 173 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s girlfriend’s statement to police that the defendant was selling methamphetamine from her home was corroborated by more than slight evidence: the defendant admitted to police that a handgun at the home belonged to the defendant; police discovered $ 1,021 in cash on the defendant’s person; and the investigator testiﬁed that these items, coupled with the drug paraphernalia in the home, were consistent with somebody who was selling drugs. Benton v. State, 356 Ga. App. 441, 847 S.E.2d 625, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 460 (2020), cert. denied, No. S21C0110, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 253 (Ga. Apr. 5, 2021). Adequate corroboration for armed robbery and hijacking motor vehicle conviction. — Trial court properly convicted defendant of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle because: (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant committed the crimes based on 24-14-8 the testimony of the victim, who identiﬁed defendant as the individual who approached the victim’s vehicle, pointed a gun, and demanded the vehicle; (2) two officers testiﬁed as to observing defendant driving the stolen vehicle the same night; and (3) the victim’s cell phone was found on defendant’s person when the defendant was arrested. Culver v. State, 290 Ga. App. 321, 659 S.E.2d 390, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 187 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for robbery, burglary, and related crimes conviction. — With regard to a defendant’s convictions for robbery, burglary, and other related crimes, the testimony of a codefendant that implicated defendant was sufficiently corroborated by other testimony and evidence at trial. Burton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 822, 668 S.E.2d 306, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1087 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for armed robbery conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s armed robbery conviction since an accomplice, who was wearing a mask and holding a gun when the accomplice entered the victim’s bedroom, testiﬁed that the defendant had given the accomplice the mask and the gun and that the accomplice had shouted downstairs to the defendant during the robbery; the testimony was corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by the victim’s recognition of the defendant’s voice from the shouted conversation during the robbery and by the defendant’s resistance and ﬂight when police arrived. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 969 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of armed robbery since the testimony of a 14-year-old accomplice was corroborated by testimony from a clerk in the store that was robbed by the defendant and others, and the state presented physical evidence—clothing worn by the robbers—that linked the defendant to the robbery. Sellers v. State, 294 Ga. App. 536, 669 S.E.2d 544, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1230 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 686 In an armed robbery prosecution, as the victim identiﬁed the defendant as the driver of a car and the codefendant as the passenger who robbed the victim at gunpoint, and the pistol used in the robbery was found in the car’s locked glove compartment, to which only the defendant had the key, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the codefendant in the robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 and sufficiently corroborated the codefendant’s accomplice testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 244-8. Bailey v. State, 295 Ga. App. 480, 672 S.E.2d 450, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 16 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). While no witness could speciﬁcally identify the dark clothes that were recovered by the police from the crawl space of the defendant’s parent as having been worn by one of the robbers of a grocery store, these articles of clothing matched descriptions given to an officer that the two suspects wore dark attire with full sleeves. This evidence sufficiently corroborated an accomplice’s testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery. Jupiter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 386, 707 S.E.2d 592, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 192 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for directed verdict after the defendant was convicted of armed robbery because there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 since there was evidence from which a jury could ﬁnd sufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony to support the defendant’s conviction; the testimony of the victims corroborated the accomplice’s testimony because the victims physical description of the perpetrator was consistent with the accomplice’s testimony about what the defendant was wearing on the day of the robbery. Harris v. State, 311 Ga. App. 336, 715 S.E.2d 757, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 717 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery because, even if the driver was the defendant’s accomplice, there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the driver’s testimony that the 24-14-8 defendant stated that the defendant robbed the victim as video surveillance images corroborated the driver’s testimony that the driver drove the defendant to the scene to buy two pounds of marijuana; the discovery of a packet of marijuana on the victim’s body corroborated the nature of the deal; and neither the two pounds of marijuana corroborated by another person’s testimony nor the $2,400 conﬁrmed by the defendant, was found in the car with the victim after the defendant shot and killed the victim and returned to the driver’s car. Ngumezi v. State, 300 Ga. 764, 798 S.E.2d 229, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 188 (2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for weapons possession conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime as the testimony of the defendant’s accomplice that the defendant raped the victim at gunpoint was corroborated by the victim’s out-of-court and incourt identiﬁcation of the defendant as the rapist, and the fact that the defendant’s DNA was found on the victim’s clothing. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1335 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for rape conviction. — Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of rape as the testimony of the defendant’s accomplice that the defendant raped the victim was corroborated by the victim’s out-of-court and in-court identiﬁcation of the defendant as the rapist and the fact that the defendant’s DNA was found on the victim’s clothing. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1335 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for sodomy conviction. — Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion for new trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to prove aggravated sodomy since the only evidence of the victim performing oral sodomy upon the defendant came from the uncorroborated testimony of the victim’s parent, who was an accomplice to the sexual abuse and because 687 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) there was insufficient evidence of force. To the contrary, the victim’s testimony as to the sexual abuse committed by the defendant sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the victim’s parent, and the testimony of the victim that the defendant kept multiple guns around the outbuilding where the trio lived and that the defendant had repeatedly threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not engage in the sexual acts was sufficient to prove the element of force. Driggers v. State, 295 Ga. App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 81 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for cocaine conviction. — While a defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to exclude the possibility that the cocaine belonged solely to the defendant’s passenger, the testimony of the passenger that the passenger dropped the drugs out of the truck after the defendant threw the drugs in the passenger’s lap was adequately corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 by the facts that the defendant had more than $2,000 in the defendant’s pocket and that the defendant was the owner and driver of the truck from which the drugs were thrown; the defendant was, thus, properly convicted of trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) and possession of cocaine as a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute. Wingﬁeld v. State, 297 Ga. App. 476, 677 S.E.2d 704, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 454 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s accomplice’s testimony that the defendant was knowingly in possession of cocaine found in their vehicle was corroborated by evidence of 575 grams of cocaine in the vehicle, that the defendant was extremely anxious when stopped by police, and the fact that there were 18 air fresheners hung throughout the vehicle, and was therefore sufficiently corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, supporting the defendant’s conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Richardson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 850, 700 S.E.2d 738, 24-14-8 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 827 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for robbery conviction. — Evidence that the defendant committed a robbery was not based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant’s accomplice. A store employee corroborated the accomplice’s testimony, and items similar to those taken during the robbery, as well as items taken during a later robbery, were recovered from the defendant’s car, which was occupied by the defendant and the accomplice. Savage v. State, 298 Ga. App. 350, 679 S.E.2d 734, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 593 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accomplice cannot corroborate the accomplices own testimony by something the accomplice told another witness. The corroborating circumstances must be independent of the testimony of the accomplice. Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1632 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Corroboration required for each offense. — Although slight evidence of corroboration connecting the defendant with the crime is sufficient, when the defendant is charged with the commission of several offenses, there must be corroborating evidence for each offense charged. Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2397 (1980), cert. dismissed, 247 Ga. 8, 273 S.E.2d 409, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 591 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). Testimony corroborated in murder trial. — Testimony of the principal witness, an accomplice in the murder of which the accused was tried, was corroborated and the conviction was authorized by the evidence. George v. State, 167 Ga. 532, 146 S.E. 120, 1928 Ga. LEXIS 184 (1928) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). When appellant was convicted of burglary, armed robbery, and felony murder, and appellant admitted that the appellant went to the victim’s house with an accomplice, but insisted that the accomplice killed the victim, and contends that the only evidence that the appellant commit- 688 ted the murder is the uncorroborated testimony of the appellant’s accomplice, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, since appellant’s own statement is sufficient evidence of the appellant’s participation in the crime to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. Wisenbaker v. State, 259 Ga. 416, 383 S.E.2d 132, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 335 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the defendant’s convictions did not rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice as the timing and circumstances supported the identity of the defendant as the mastermind. The defendant had ample motive to kill the victim to prevent the victim from testifying against the defendant and the plain inference that the defendant was responsible for menacing phone calls was uncontradicted. Lindsey v. State, 295 Ga. 343, 760 S.E.2d 170, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 500 (2014), superseded by statute as stated in Belcher v. State, 344 Ga. App. 729, 812 S.E.2d 51, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder and the unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony because the defendant and the accomplice planned to rob the victim; the accomplice heard two gunshots, and the defendant ran back to the car and pulled out some cash and a bank card with the victim’s name on it; the victim later died; and the accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated as the defendant had ﬁnancial problems and, thus, had a motive for robbery; and, in a recorded phone call, the defendant told the accomplice that the defendant had not used the bank card, which amounted to at least slight evidence that the defendant possessed the victim’s property. Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 785 S.E.2d 869, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 351 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder and the unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony as a party because the witness testiﬁed that the witness was 24-14-8 sleeping in the co-defendant’s car when the witness awoke to the sound of gunshots, the co-defendant returned to the car and put down a revolver, and the witness jumped out of the car, saw the victim’s body, and ran; and, if the witness was an accomplice, the witness’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence as, inter alia, a jailhouse informant described a conversation in which the codefendant complained that the witness was telling everything about a drug sale that went wrong, and the co-defendant admitted to shooting the victim. Anderson v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 787 S.E.2d 202, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 404 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroborating evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to felony murder and armed robbery as the coindictee broke into the victim’s home; the defendant hit the victim twice with a baseball bat; the defendant and the coindictee put the victim’s body into a burn pit and tried to burn it; and, when the defendant was arrested, the defendant was wearing the victim’s Army ring. Downer v. State, 314 Ga. 617, 878 S.E.2d 537, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 254 (2022). Evidence of tenancy and drug paraphernalia. — Evidence that the defendant lived in an apartment and quantities of methamphetamine were located there, along with the implements of trafficking, a triple-beam scale, cutting materials, and baggies for packaging was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Lowe v. State, 208 Ga. App. 49, 430 S.E.2d 169, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 421 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony corroborated for drug possession. — When defendant’s ﬂight itinerary was identical to drug courier’s and defendant made voluntary statements that defendant would have cooperated with officials had the officials talked to defendant ﬁrst instead of talking to “that girl ﬁrst,” the conviction was authorized by the evidence. Warren v. State, 207 Ga. App. 53, 427 S.E.2d 45, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 60 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 689 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) There was sufficient corroboration when the testimony of the detective regarding what the detective heard about setting up the deal, the detective’s observation of the drug transaction, and the detective’s later ﬁnding the marked bill was at least slight evidence from which the jury could conclude that evidence, independent of the accomplice’s testimony, connected defendant to the crime and led to the inference that defendant was guilty. Black v. State, 242 Ga. App. 271, 529 S.E.2d 410, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 153 (2000), rev’d, 276 Ga. 691, 583 S.E.2d 4, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 551 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine since defendant’s two accomplices testiﬁed as to their purchase of cocaine and their being stopped by the police while enroute to a motel to smoke the cocaine and since the police found cocaine in the back seat of the car defendant was driving to the motel. Heard v. State, 257 Ga. App. 505, 571 S.E.2d 524, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1200 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony corroborated in sudden snatching robbery. — Independent testimony of two separate victims sufficiently established evidence that defendant participated in accomplice’s crimes, and thus was sufficient corroboration of accomplice’s testimony. Daniel v. State, 207 Ga. App. 720, 429 S.E.2d 130, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 319 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of victim sufficient to corroborate accomplice’s testimony. — Jury charge that defendant may not have been convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the charged home invasion was unwarranted since, inter alia, the victims’ testimony corroborated the accomplice’s testimony regarding defendant’s involvement. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 248, 596 S.E.2d 743, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 349 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon 24-14-8 the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice’s testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testiﬁed that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury’s determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 995 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of defendant sufficient to corroborate accomplice’s testimony. — In a prosecution for malice murder, even though defendant and defendant’s accomplice each accused the other of being the actual perpetrator, defendant’s own testimony — placing oneself at the scene and as a participant in disposing of some of the evidence, including the murder weapon — provided ample corroboration for the accomplice’s testimony to support a conviction of defendant either as a party to the crime or as an actual perpetrator in the murder. Parkerson v. State, 265 Ga. 438, 457 S.E.2d 667, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 355 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s testimony sufficiently corroborated that of a codefendant to support the defendant’s conviction of armed robbery since the defendant testiﬁed that the defendant was present during the planning of an armed robbery and that the defendant supplied the gun used during the robbery. Short v. State, 234 Ga. App. 690 633, 507 S.E.2d 514 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s statement concerning willing accompaniment of friends despite knowing those friends were involved in criminal activity and defendant’s knowledge about items that were taken during such activity was sufficient evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony inculpating the defendant. Moore v. State, 245 Ga. App. 641, 537 S.E.2d 764, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 948 (2000), cert. denied, No. S01C0012, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 169 (Ga. Feb. 16, 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). When defendant robbed the victims at gunpoint with two accomplices, the testimony of one accomplice that defendant was involved in the robbery was sufficient to corroborate testimony to the same effect from defendant’s other accomplice and sustain defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (2) and 16-8-41(a). Gallimore v. State, 264 Ga. App. 629, 591 S.E.2d 485, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1545 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was sufficient corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony as required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 based on the defendant’s own testimony admitting that the defendant deliberately drove to the scene of the murder and shooting with others, knew that the men doing the shooting were armed, and moved to the crime scene rather than away from the scene. Laye v. State, 312 Ga. App. 862, 720 S.E.2d 233, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1021 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0534, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 280 (Ga. Mar. 5, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of state’s witness sufficient to corroborate testimony of accomplice. — See Herndon v. State, 187 Ga. App. 77, 369 S.E.2d 264, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 593 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Recent possession of stolen property, not satisfactorily explained, is sufficient basis for the corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony. Inman v. State, 182 Ga. App. 209, 355 S.E.2d 119, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1636 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Guns and ski mask sufficient corroboration. — Testimony of the codefen- 24-14-8 dant, corroborated by circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery, since the codefendant testiﬁed that defendant actively participated in the robbery and guns and a ski mask identiﬁed as those used in the commission of the crime were found in the defendant’s trailer. Eschena v. State, 203 Ga. App. 621, 417 S.E.2d 214, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 553 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0851, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 564 (Ga. July 8, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Identiﬁcation by robbery victim. — Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony, when one of the robbery victims identiﬁed the defendant as one of the robbers. Telfair v. State, 234 Ga. App. 444, 507 S.E.2d 195 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) because even though the defendant was found near a car similar to that involved in the robbery, with a shotgun similar to that used in the attack, and the defendant admitted being present at the scene of the robbery, the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Law v. State, 308 Ga. App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 129 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony corroborated in prosecution for armed robbery. — An accomplice’s speciﬁc, extensive testimony linking the defendant to an armed robbery was sufficiently corroborated by substantial evidence of the defendant’s immediate, unexplained possession of stolen checks, forged identiﬁcation cards, and the vehicle used during the robbery. Smith v. State, 234 Ga. App. 586, 506 S.E.2d 406 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In a prosecution for armed robbery and possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted felon, the defendant’s presence at a convenience store identiﬁed by defendant’s ac- 691 Sufficiency of Corroborating Evidence (Cont’d) complice, at the speciﬁc time identiﬁed by the accomplice, in the type of vehicle identiﬁed by the accomplice, with the array of loaded weaponry — including a 9mm weapon — identiﬁed by the accomplice, was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony regarding the defendant’s participation as a party to the crime. House v. State, 237 Ga. App. 504, 515 S.E.2d 652 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd that the defendant participated in an armed robbery because an accomplice’s testimony, which implicated the defendant as a party to the crimes, was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony and evidence at trial when the testimony of a second accomplice regarding the circumstances surrounding the planned robbery, the defendant’s participation in the planning of the robbery, and the party’s actions before and after the robbery sufficiently corroborated the ﬁrst accomplice’s testimony; the ﬁrst accomplice’s testimony was further corroborated by the victims’ descriptions of the events surrounding the robbery, and the police chief testiﬁed at trial that police found two sets of shoe prints at the scene of the robbery, but only one set where the second accomplice waited with the car, which also corroborated the accomplice’s testimony about what happened after the robbery. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 95 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0943, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 660 (Ga. Sept. 7, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In a malice murder action, an accomplice’s testimony that defendant was the shooter was corroborated by the evidence of defendant’s animosity towards the victim, the fact that defendant had previously pulled a handgun on the victim, and the fact that defendant had celebrated the victim’s murder. Moreover, defendant’s confession to another that defendant shot the victim corroborated the accomplice’s testimony. Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 955 24-14-8 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Violation of former statute not grounds for habeas corpus relief. — Corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice is a statutory requirement, not a constitutional right. Since violation of a state law no longer constitutes a basis for habeas corpus relief, there is no constitutional nor habeas corpus ground for relief since the contention is the absence of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice. Gunter v. Hickman, 256 Ga. 315, 348 S.E.2d 644, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 836 (1986). (concurring opinions); . Corroborated by other testimony and physical evidence. — Although there was one witness who implicated defendant in the commission of aggravated assault and recanted the witness’s statements at trial, the evidence was sufﬁcient to convict defendant since the witness’s statements to police implicating defendant in the fatal assault were corroborated by other testimony and the physical evidence. Kinney v. State, 271 Ga. 877, 525 S.E.2d 91, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 14 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was sufficient evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to convict defendant of ﬁrearms offenses and drug possession, after the codefendant testiﬁed that defendant owned ﬁve of the guns and the drugs that were found in the stopped vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, and the police officer who stopped defendant’s vehicle corroborated the codefendant’s testimony by stating that the officer found a gun under defendant’s seat in the car. Spratling v. State, 255 Ga. App. 500, 565 S.E.2d 839, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 662 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accomplice’s testimony corroborated. — Although a conviction cannot be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, slight evidence of defendant’s identity and participation from an extraneous source is all that is required to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony, and thus, support the verdict. Leonard v. State, 241 Ga. App. 899, 528 S.E.2d 540, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 74 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). 692 Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a ﬁrearm during the commission of a felony following a drug deal in which the victim took pills without paying for the pills because the shooter’s testimony as an accomplice or party to the crime was not the only evidence identifying the defendant as a participant as the defendant’s statement to police placed the defendant on the scene; the defendant’s witnesses testiﬁed that the defendant engaged in the pursuit; the shooter testiﬁed that the defendant told the shooter to take a pistol from the front console and recover the pills, or else the defendant would kill the shooter; and the shooter ﬁred multiple rounds, killing the victim. Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807, 796 S.E.2d 688, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 52 (2017). Accomplice’s testimony not sufficiently corroborated. — Juvenile adjudications were reversed since the testimony of an accomplice witness was not sufficiently corroborated to support the guilty ﬁndings; the victim’s prior report to a school concerning two of the three defendants did not connect defendants to the crime, and was insufficient corroboration. In the Interest of M.B., 267 Ga. App. 721, 601 S.E.2d 370, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 772 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accomplice’s testimony that the second defendant participated in the crimes of felony murder of two of the victims, the aggravated assault of another two victims, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to possess cocaine was not sufficiently corroborated to sustain the second defendant’s convictions because the testimony of the shooter’s girlfriend that the girlfriend saw the second defendant in a vehicle with the ﬁrst defendant and the shooter on the evening after the murder did nothing to indicate that the second defendant actually participated in the crimes. Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 772 S.E.2d 630, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 307 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for new trial because the witness was a party to the crime of armed robbery as the witness was with 24-14-8 the victim before the armed robbery, was present for the robbery’s planning, and had prior knowledge the robbery was going to occur; the witness was present when the armed robbery and shooting occurred, ﬂed the scene with the co-conspirators, and received $50 to stay quiet about the robbery and murder; and the witness’s accomplice testimony was insufﬁciently corroborated. State v. Grier, 309 Ga. 452, 847 S.E.2d 313, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 517 (2020). Lay opinion testimony of deputy admitted. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of distribution of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt; a deputy’s lay opinion testimony was sufficient to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Strickland v. State, 302 Ga. App. 44, 690 S.E.2d 638, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Retrial of defendant permissible. — Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions, and the state could retry the defendant as the cell phone records showed the accomplice’s extensive communications with the defendant on the day of the murder, and the defendant’s attempt to ﬂee arrest constituted at least slight corroborating evidence of the accomplice’s testimony. State v. Thomas, 311 Ga. 407, 858 S.E.2d 52, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 198 (2021). Evidence Constituting Corroboration Testimony of one accomplice may be corroborated by the testimony of another accomplice. Chance v. State, 33 Ga. App. 137, 125 S.E. 730 (1924) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Pope v. State, 171 Ga. 655, 156 S.E. 599 (1930), answer conformed to, 42 Ga. App. 680, 157 S.E. 211 (1931); Austin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 217, 169 S.E. 729 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Wise v. State, 52 Ga. App. 98, 182 S.E. 535 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Wise v. State, 53 Ga. App. 363, 186 S.E. 142 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Walker v. State, 57 693 Evidence Constituting Corroboration (Cont’d) Ga. App. 868, 197 S.E. 67 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Rozier v. State, 68 Ga. App. 797, 24 S.E.2d 137 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Greeson v. State, 90 Ga. App. 57, 81 S.E.2d 839 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968).Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Baker v. State, 238 Ga. 389, 233 S.E.2d 347, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970, 97 S. Ct. 2931, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977).Eubanks v. State, 240 Ga. 544, 242 S.E.2d 41, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 704 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 741, 270 S.E.2d 5, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2369 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Whitﬁeld v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2620 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Rule barring conviction based on uncorroborated testimony of a single accomplice was inapplicable to a robbery case since the evidence against each of three juvenile defendants was derived from more than one witness and was supported by corroborating evidence after the victim identiﬁed one juvenile defendant and one of the two coconspirators, but the victim could not identify the others, and an officer testiﬁed regarding statements given to the officer by one of the coconspirators and another of the juvenile defendants which implicated all three juvenile defendants in the crime; although all three juvenile defendants argued that the corroborating evidence was not credible, the trial court was the sole arbiter of credibility. In the Interest of C.L.B., 267 Ga. App. 456, 600 S.E.2d 407, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 684 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, defendant juvenile’s statements to the po- 24-14-8 lice corroborated an accomplice’s testimony that the juvenile struck a woman unconscious, caused her serious bodily injury, used force to steal her pocketbook, and dragged her down onto her front yard; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2), 16-5-40(a), and 16-8-40(a)(1). In re D. T., 294 Ga. App. 486, 669 S.E.2d 471, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1267 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). First defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for malice murder and related offenses because the only evidence directly incriminating the defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice failed because the accomplice’s testimony was adequately corroborated by a second accomplice. Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 837 S.E.2d 362, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 844 (2019). Felony conviction based on testimony of accomplice. — In order to sustain a felony conviction based upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts and circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime or lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty, and are more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. The necessary corroboration may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that defendant participated in the crime. Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512, 421 S.E.2d 523, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 846 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 501 S.E.2d 810 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s possession of the gun identiﬁed by the victim as used in the crime was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony as to the sequence of events and acts perpetrated by defendant and the accomplice with regard to the crimes of armed robbery, rape, and aggravated sodomy with the accomplice agreeing to testify against the defendant in 694 return for a lighter sentence. Palmer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 751, 650 S.E.2d 255, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 618 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1770, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 678 (Ga. Sept. 24, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Uncorroborated testimony of accomplices is sufficient to authorize a felony conviction; thus, convictions of defendant for hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, and armed robbery that were based upon the testimony of defendant’s two accomplices to the crimes were affirmed. Boles v. State, 257 Ga. App. 240, 570 S.E.2d 677, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1119 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Conduct on the part of the defendant may act to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Holton v. State, 61 Ga. App. 654, 7 S.E.2d 202, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 209 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1092 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1053 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928, 99 S. Ct. 1265, 59 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1979). Defendant’s attempts to conceal defendant’s participation in an offense can corroborate defendant’s accomplice’s testimony regarding defendant’s participation. Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 168, 263 S.E.2d 910, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 728 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798, 267 S.E.2d 237, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 940 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). Evidence of conduct as corroboration may be circumstantial or direct. — Conduct of a defendant before, during the time of, and after the commission of a crime can corroborate the testimony of an accomplice and can be shown by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1146 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stanford v. State, 157 Ga. App. 633, 278 S.E.2d 175, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1945 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Jury may consider the conduct of the defendant before, during, and after the 24-14-8 commission of the crime to determine the defendant’s intent and defendant’s participation in the crime to determine whether defendant’s conduct is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony to sustain the conviction. Whitﬁeld v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2620 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). The necessary corroboration required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that defendant participated in the crime. Berry v. State, 248 Ga. 430, 283 S.E.2d 888, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1053 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). While a conviction based upon uncorroborated testimony of an alleged accomplice is insufficient, corroboration itself is peculiarly a matter for the jury, and may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence tending to show defendant’s participation. Howell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 445, 295 S.E.2d 329, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3209 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroborating evidence connecting a defendant to a crime may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that the defendant participated in the crime; whether the corroborating evidence was sufficient in a given context was a matter for the jury, and even slight evidence of corroboration connecting an accused to a crime was legally sufficient. Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 582 S.E.2d 575, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 657 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1500, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 868 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize the defendant’s conviction as a party to the crimes charged as it was established that the defendant and the accomplice entered the store together, the defendant watched the accomplice brandish a gun and reach toward the cash drawer, a witness observed the pair running out of the store in the same direction together, and it was a reasonable infer- 695 Evidence Constituting Corroboration (Cont’d) ence for the jury to conclude that the defendant lied to police about knowing the accomplice. Daniels v. State, 339 Ga. App. 837, 795 S.E.2d 94, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 671 (2016). Modus operandi evidence in the case was sufficient to corroborate a witness’s testimony identifying the appellant as a participant in two additional home invasion crimes because the perpetrators were all Spanish speaking and conducted themselves the same way as to all four home invasions that occurred and each happened over the course of only three weeks and were committed within the same county. Cisneros v. State, 299 Ga. 841, 792 S.E.2d 326, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 656 (2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 63, 199 L. Ed. 2d 45, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5262 (2017). Confession is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Lancaster v. State, 54 Ga. App. 243, 187 S.E. 617, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 519 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Wade v. State, 195 Ga. 870, 25 S.E.2d 712, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 304 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1092 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1888 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Spencer v. State, 192 Ga. App. 822, 386 S.E.2d 705, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1255 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of the codefendant that the murder defendant was the triggerman in the armed robbery was corroborated by the defendant’s confession in which defendant admitted participation in the robbery. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28073 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 1817 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant’s own testimony regarding defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime provided corroboration for defendant’s brother’s testimony linking the defendant with the crime. Mosier v. State, 24-14-8 223 Ga. App. 75, 476 S.E.2d 842 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Proof of corpus delicti as corroboration. — Proof of the corpus delicti independently of the evidence of the accomplice is corroborative of the guilt of the accomplice, but does not at all corroborate the accomplice’s testimony as to the guilt of another. Childers v. State, 52 Ga. 106, 1874 Ga. LEXIS 247 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346, 1881 Ga. LEXIS 20 (1881) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); Altman v. State, 5 Ga. App. 833, 63 S.E. 928, 1909 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Smith v. State, 7 Ga. App. 781, 68 S.E. 335, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 519 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Sanders v. State, 46 Ga. App. 175, 167 S.E. 207, 1932 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 111 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Statement describing burglary corroborated by officer’s observations and guilty plea. — Defendant’s videotaped statement describing a burglary, which statement conﬂicted with defendant’s subsequent testimony denying knowledge of or participation in the burglary, could be corroborated by: (1) the officer’s independent observations of the items taken which corresponded with defendant’s description; and (2) the district attorney’s testimony as to defendant’s plea of guilty to the burglary. Dixon v. State, 172 Ga. App. 803, 324 S.E.2d 780, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2672 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Recent unexplained possession of stolen property is sufficient basis for the corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony and for a conviction of burglary. Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1932 (1976); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3037 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Unexplained recent possession of goods taken in an armed robbery and burglary has some corroborative value. Brady v. State, 169 Ga. App. 316, 312 696 S.E.2d 632, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3469 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Pregnancy of the unmarried prosecutor, unless it be shown that such pregnancy resulted from the act of the defendant, does not constitute corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutor. Wilkins v. State, 96 Ga. App. 841, 101 S.E.2d 912, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 920 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). When testimony of defendant’s wife-accomplice was corroborated by testimony of wife’s sister who observed defendant beating the same victim on an earlier occasion, such evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for cruelty to children. Jackson v. State, 178 Ga. App. 378, 343 S.E.2d 122, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2530 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Polygraph test results are sufficient corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony. Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 205, 264 S.E.2d 15, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 743 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). Defendant’s prior inconsistent statements, which constituted substantive evidence, were sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony. Arnold v. State, 243 Ga. App. 118, 532 S.E.2d 458, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 402 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Video evidence and testimony of other witnesses. — In an action for felony murder and related offenses, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions, including accomplice testimony that the accomplice and the defendant were gang members, that the gang’s leader directed them to kidnap the victim, and describing the events leading to the victim being fatally shot, which was corroborated by each other, video evidence and testimony of other witnesses. Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421, 826 S.E.2d 1, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 156 (2019). Evidence from extraneous source. — First defendant and second defendant were incorrect in asserting that their convictions arising out of the robbery and murder of a drug dealer were supported by insufficient evidence as their convictions were not based solely on the uncor- 24-14-8 roborated testimony of accomplices; rather, those convictions also rested on extraneous source evidence identifying the defendants as participants in the crime, including the testimony and identiﬁcation of the defendant’s by a person present at the drug dealer’s apartment when the crimes were committed as well as substantial forensic evidence linking the defendants to the crimes. Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 611 S.E.2d 3, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 239 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony and cell phone records sufficient corroboration. — Defendant’s convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, and other crimes were not based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 as: 1) a victim testiﬁed that intruders took a wallet that police later found in the defendant’s home; and 2) cell phone tower records established that the defendant and the accomplice were exchanging phone calls during the times when the crimes were committed and within the vicinity of the crime sites. Jackson v. State, 289 Ga. 798, 716 S.E.2d 188, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 716 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Slight physical evidence sufficient to corroborate. — Evidence of a large bag of marijuana, digital scales, and plastic baggies in a bedroom belonging to defendant slightly corroborated defendant’s brother’s girlfriend’s testimony that defendant possessed the marijuana and gave it to the girlfriend to sell, and a tax return and receipt belonging to defendant corroborated the girlfriend’s contention that this room belonged to defendant. Slight corroboration was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. Williams v. State, 299 Ga. App. 798, 683 S.E.2d 860, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 971 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Adequate corroboration for gang related beating. — In addition to an accomplice’s testimony linking the defendants to the beatings of the victims, there was evidence that one defendant was involved in a conversation about retribution, that the defendant was near the exit to an amusement park among the larger group shortly before the assault, and that 697 Evidence Constituting Corroboration (Cont’d) the defendant rode home in a car with an admitted participant in the beating. Morey v. State, 312 Ga. App. 678, 719 S.E.2d 504, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 960 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0451, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 592 (Ga. June 18, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Perjury Perjury is never presumed. Georgia Power Co. v. Owen, 207 Ga. 178, 60 S.E.2d 436, 1950 Ga. LEXIS 425 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). In general. — To convict of perjury, there must be two witnesses, or one witness and proof by corroborating circumstances. McLaren v. State, 4 Ga. App. 643, 62 S.E. 138, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 499 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Davis v. State, 7 Ga. App. 680, 67 S.E. 839, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 463 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). ; SeeFlemister v. State, 81 Ga. 768, 7 S.E. 642, 1888 Ga. LEXIS 344 (1888); Rodenberry v. State, 37 Ga. App. 359, 140 S.E. 386, 1927 Ga. App. LEXIS 678 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Potts v. State, 78 Ga. App. 799, 52 S.E.2d 575, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 982 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Evidence was insufficient to support a ﬁnding that the juvenile committed perjury and, thus, was not sufficient to support the juvenile’s adjudication as a delinquent since the state’s perjury case against the juvenile rested solely on the testimony of a codefendant, and was not supported by the required two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances. In the Interest of C.H., 262 Ga. App. 630, 585 S.E.2d 921, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 970 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Sufficiency of corroboration. — Nature and sufficiency of the corroboration necessary to prove the perjury must in each case be determined by the jury, but the equilibrium between the oath of the alleged perjurer and the oath of the contradicting witness should be destroyed by material and independent circumstances 24-14-8 strongly corroborative of the positive testimony of the witness. Bell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63 S.E. 860, 1909 Ga. App. LEXIS 111 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for armed robbery since: (1) defendant affirmatively lied by denying that defendant knew one accomplice in defendant’s initial statement to the police; (2) defendant was driving the getaway car when it was stopped by the police; and (3) defendant was in possession of the handgun used in the armed robbery and the money stolen in the armed robbery. The sufficiency of the corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony that defendant participated in the planning of the robbery as required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 was a matter for the jury to determine. Clemons v. State, 265 Ga. App. 825, 595 S.E.2d 530, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1128, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 505 (Ga. June 7, 2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). State satisﬁed the corroboration requirement as to the defendant’s perjury conviction based on the defendant’s denial that the defendant and the man who murdered the defendant’s husband had a romantic relationship because the state produced testimony from a bartender at a night club who saw the defendant and the man at the club on the dance ﬂoor pressing their bodies together while the man cupped the defendant’s buttocks and they engaged in passionate kissing; and the state produced corroborating circumstances in the form of romantic email messages between the man and the defendant and evidence that they shared hotel rooms on out-of-town business trips. Sneiderman v. State, 336 Ga. App. 153, 784 S.E.2d 18, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 143 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1152, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 641 (Ga. Oct. 3, 2016), overruled in part, Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 460 (2016). Conspirator’s testimony sufficient. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate a cocon- 698 spirator’s testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 and for the jury to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes for which the defendant was convicted; the state presented the testimony of numerous witnesses and other evidence that sufficiently corroborated the coconspirator’s testimony about the defendant’s participation in the crimes. Walker v. State, 310 Ga. App. 223, 713 S.E.2d 413, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 537 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Proof based on circumstantial evidence. — Former statute did not apply to a case where the proof of perjury was necessarily based upon circumstantial evidence. Mallard v. State, 19 Ga. App. 99, 90 S.E. 1044, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 64 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). Charging part of former statute when inapplicable. — Court did not err in giving in charge the former statute as to the number of witnesses necessary to convict of perjury and certain other offenses, although a part of the statute was not applicable to the case where the inapplicable part was explained. Pence v. State, 36 Ga. App. 270, 136 S.E. 820, 1927 Ga. App. LEXIS 6 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). Jury When state does not rely solely upon evidence of accomplice to connect the accused with an offense, it is not incumbent upon the court, without request, to instruct the jury on corroboration. Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 741, 270 S.E.2d 5, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2369 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Charge unnecessary when two witnesses testify. — When two witnesses swear to the same state of facts, the fact that the witnesses are accomplices or are not accomplices, or that one is an accomplice and other not an accomplice, does not require a charge by the court, in the trial of a defendant alleged to be a party to a joint crime, that “where the only witness is an accomplice” the accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated. Wilson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 570, 181 S.E. 134, 1935 24-14-8 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Farley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 580, 436 S.E.2d 770, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1246 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Reeves v. State, 244 Ga. App. 15, 534 S.E.2d 179, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 550 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1489, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 842 (Ga. Oct. 27, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on the requirement for corroboration of accomplice testimony based on the state relying heavily on the testimony of the girlfriends who drove the gang members because not only did the women corroborate each other’s testimony, but their testimony was corroborated by a jailhouse admission from the defendant, thus, it was unlikely that the omission of the instruction affected the outcome of the defendant’s trial. Jordan v. State, 307 Ga. 450, 836 S.E.2d 86, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 801 (2019). Failure to charge connection with crime. — In charging upon the subject of corroboration of an accomplice, the court having instructed that the extent of corroborative testimony was a question for the jury, it was not error, in the absence of a proper request, to fail to charge further that the evidence in corroboration should connect the accused with the commission of the crime. Jones v. State, 200 Ga. 793, 38 S.E.2d 429, 1946 Ga. LEXIS 331 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 229 S.E.2d 737, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1395 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Charge on corroboration required. — Because there was evidence to support a ﬁnding that the witness was an accomplice, the trial court erred, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, in refusing to give the defendant’s requested instruction on the need for corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony. Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 756 S.E.2d 507, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court committed plain error by not providing a jury charge on the necessity of corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony because by failing to give the required accomplice corroboration charge 699 Jury (Cont’d) and instead charging the jury that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was generally sufficient to establish a fact, the trial court impermissibly empowered the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty based solely on the accomplice’s testimony; while there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support a verdict, that evidence was in no way overwhelming; the outcome of the trial court proceedings was likely affected by the error; and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125, 786 S.E.2d 672, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 383 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Defendant demonstrated prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction regarding the corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony as to the defendant’s identity as the shooter, as the accomplice’s identiﬁcation of the defendant as the sole shooter was directly contradicted by the testimony of the bank manager, who identiﬁed the accomplice as the shooter, and other circumstantial evidence pointing to the accomplice. Burns v. State, 342 Ga. App. 379, 803 S.E.2d 79, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 316 (2017). Trial court properly granted the defendant a new trial because the court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony required corroboration as the trial court’s instructions deviated from the rule that unequivocally required corroboration of accomplice testimony in felony cases; the trial court impermissibly empowered the jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty based solely on the accomplice’s testimony; the outcome of the trial court proceedings was likely affected by the trial court’s failure to provide that charge to the jury because virtually all of the incriminating evidence ﬂowed from the accomplice; and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 824 S.E.2d 317, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2019). Trial court clearly and obviously erred in instructing the jury as to how the jury could consider the codefendant’s statements because the trial court not only 24-14-8 erred in failing to inform the jury of the accomplice-corroboration requirement, but also erroneously instructed the jury that the testimony of a single witness if believed was sufficient and that generally there was no legal requirement of corroboration of a witness. Finney v. State, 311 Ga. 1, 855 S.E.2d 578, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 82 (2021). Court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court did not plainly err by failing to charge the jury on the requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated because corroboration was required for the jury to credit any of the accomplices’ testimony identifying the defendant as a perpetrator. Palencia v. State, 313 Ga. 625, 872 S.E.2d 681, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 130 (2022). When charge on corroboration not required. — Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury that an accomplice’s testimony alone, without corroboration, was insufficient to support a conviction because trial counsel did not request this charge and because the state did not rely wholly on the accomplice’s testimony. Wooten v. State, 240 Ga. App. 725, 524 S.E.2d 776 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Because the state relied on evidence other than the accomplice’s testimony, the trial court was not required to submit the issue of the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence to the jury and was therefore not required to charge the jury on corroboration. Jenkins v. Byrd, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8944 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 273 F.3d 397, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 28492 (11th Cir. 2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice had to be corroborated because, pretermitting whether the failure to instruct the jury on corroboration was error, the defendant could not successfully demonstrate that it was plain error as evidence from multiple witnesses, including the defendant’s witnesses and the defendant personally, corroborated the shooter’s testimony. Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807, 796 S.E.2d 688, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 52 (2017). Jury could have determined that the witness who identiﬁed the defendant as 700 the shooter was not an accomplice and, therefore, the witness’s testimony did not need to be corroborated because the properly charged jury was authorized to credit the witness’s testimony that the witness had no prior knowledge that the defendant would shoot or kill the victim and that the witness drove the defendant away from the shooting out of fear that the defendant might shoot the witness too. Fisher v. State, 309 Ga. 814, 848 S.E.2d 434, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 604 (2020). In a malice murder case, the defendant’s claim that the trial court plainly erred in not instructing the jury that an accomplice’s testimony had to be corroborated failed as any error did not likely affect the outcome of the proceeding because multiple witnesses, including the defendant, corroborated that the defendant participated in the crimes, and the state presented expert testimony that, as an elder in the gang, the defendant would have had the authority to order others to commit the crimes. Jackson v. State, 314 Ga. 751, 879 S.E.2d 410, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 267 (2022). Charge not harmful. — Charge in regard to the provision of the former statute, relating to corroboration of testimony of an accomplice in a felony case was not harmful to the defendants. Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3037 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Accomplice jury instruction proper. — Trial court did not commit plain error by giving the jury a pattern jury instruction excluding certain witnesses from the deﬁnition of “accomplice” because, even assuming that there was at least slight evidence that two witnesses were accomplices whose testimony required corroboration, the provision of an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction did not preclude the trial court from also giving a jury charge on a witness’s unknowing participation as the state introduced at least slight evidence that the witnesses were unknowing participants. Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 864 S.E.2d 85, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 640 (2021). Jury instruction proper. — Trial court did not err in charging the jury as follows while deleting the bracketed word 24-14-8 “generally”: “The testimony of a witness is :generally] sufficient to establish a fact if the jury believes the witness.” Thomas v. State, 249 Ga. App. 556, 548 S.E.2d 71, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 500 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a jury charge that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was generally sufficient to establish a fact because the trial court did not err in giving the charge. Bellamy v. State, 312 Ga. App. 899, 720 S.E.2d 323, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err by charging the jury that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was generally sufficient to establish a fact because the ﬁrst sentence of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 was not a truism that the jury could only be instructed on when the case involved one of the exceptions. Bellamy v. State, 312 Ga. App. 899, 720 S.E.2d 323, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Jury charge regarding corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony as given properly informed the jury of what corroboration was required; and the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt, participation in a crime, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and that grave suspicion did not authorize a conviction; thus, there was no likelihood that the failure to instruct the jury using the complete language of the suggested pattern jury instructions affected the outcome of the trial, and there was no plain error. Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 805 S.E.2d 80, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 770 (2017), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020). Whether witness was an accomplice is a question for the jury. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 354 (1937); Maddox v. State, 131 Ga. App. 86, 205 S.E.2d 31, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1337 (1974); Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1632 (1975); Durham v. State, 243 Ga. 408, 254 S.E.2d 359, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 915 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). 701 Jury (Cont’d) Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 requires that accomplice testimony be corroborated in felony cases when the only witness is the accomplice, but only slight evidence from an extraneous source as to a defendant’s identity and participation is needed to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, and, such evidence may be entirely circumstantial. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. App. 595, 571 S.E.2d 817, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1232 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Submitting question as to whether witness was accomplice. — It is not error to submit to the jury the question of whether a witness for the state was or was not an accomplice even if the witness had confessed to being an accomplice and had been jointly indicted with the defendant on trial. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Supreme Court of Georgia found that jury heard signiﬁcant amount of incriminating testimony that was neither alleged hearsay testimony by detectives nor statements by accomplices, and defendant showed no reasonable probability that jury convicted defendant based on uncorroborated statement of single witness who was accomplice or that result of trial would have been different in absence of alleged hearsay. Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 877 S.E.2d 202, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 213 (2022). Jury determines whether participation voluntary. — When a witness testiﬁes that the witness was forced to accompany the defendants out of fear of one or both of the defendant’s, it is for the jury to determine whether the witness is an accomplice. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Jones v. State, 268 Ga. 12, 483 S.E.2d 871 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Instruction to jury on status as accomplice is expression of opinion of guilt. — To be accomplices of each other, both the defendant and the state’s witness must have been involved in the criminal enterprise. One cannot be the “accom- 24-14-8 plice” of an innocent man. It therefore constitutes an expression of opinion by the court as to the guilt of the accused to instruct the jury that a witness who testiﬁed as to the defendant’s guilt and admitted the witness’s participation in the crime would be an accomplice of the accused. Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1066 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Failure to request accomplice corroboration instruction. — Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel was deﬁcient in failing to request an accomplice corroboration instruction regarding the testimony of the state’s witness as the admission of the involvement of the state’s witness with the defendant in the events before, during, and after the shooting, along with the initial lies of the state’s witness to the police at the crime scene, could support a ﬁnding that the state’s witness was an accomplice and not merely present for the crimes; and defense counsel’s deﬁcient performance prejudiced the defendant as the lynchpin of the state’s case against the defendant was the credibility of the state’s witness. Fisher v. State, 299 Ga. 478, 788 S.E.2d 757, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 470 (2016). Corroboration instruction. — Although it was clear and obvious error for the trial court not to instruct the jury as to the corroboration requirements so that the jurors could properly evaluate the accomplice’s testimony and the need to have the testimony corroborated, it did not amount to plain error because the defendant failed to establish that omitting the corroboration instruction probably affected the outcome of the trial since the defendant testiﬁed to driving the accomplice to the house. Showers v. State, 353 Ga. App. 754, 839 S.E.2d 245, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 78 (2020), cert. denied, No. S20C0926, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 728 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2020). Trial court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration because defendant failed to show that omitting the instruction probably affected the outcome of the trial, as the evidence against defendant was substantial and included two eyewitness identiﬁ- 702 cations of defendant as the perpetrator and incriminating text messages from defendant’s cell phone to gang-affiliated contacts acknowledging that defendant participated in the home invasion and shooting. Rucker v. State, 315 Ga. 568, 883 S.E.2d 790, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 25 (2023). Charge on single witness rule. — Trial court did not err in charging the jury on the single witness rule because the state presented testimony from witnesses who were not accomplices of the defendant and, therefore, the accomplice corroboration instruction was not warranted. Gay v. State, 351 Ga. App. 811, 833 S.E.2d 305, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 496 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0264, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. Apr. 20, 2020). Instruction on slight evidence. — Judge should not charge the jury as matter of law that slight evidence is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice; but as a matter of fact slight evidence is sufficient, if it is satisfactory to the minds of the jury. Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 691 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Trial court’s pattern charge that “slight evidence” connecting the defendant to the crime may have been sufficient to support the testimony of an accomplice stated the law accurately. Richardson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 429, 626 S.E.2d 518, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 42 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1032, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 310 (Ga. May 8, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Trial court did not err when the court charged the jury on a dictionary deﬁnition of “corroborating evidence” in response to the jury’s question asking for a deﬁnition of the term “slight corroboration” as the jury was properly instructed on the full scope of accomplice testimony; the deﬁnition of “corroborating evidence” given by the trial court was an accurate statement consistent with the law; the instruction on accomplice testimony was devoid of the term “slight corroboration” but rather used the terms “supporting evidence” and “slight evidence from another source.” Grimes v. State, 296 Ga. 337, 766 S.E.2d 72, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 922 (2014). 24-14-8 Sufficiency of corroboration of accomplice’s testimony is a question for the jury. Powers v. State, 44 Ga. 209 (1871) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3702); Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351 (1876) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3755); Bell v. State, 73 Ga. 572 (1884) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Evans v. State, 78 Ga. 351 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Sikes v. State, 105 Ga. 592, 31 S.E. 567 (1898) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Parham v. State, 3 Ga. App. 468, 60 S.E. 123 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Gilbert v. State, 27 Ga. App. 604, 109 S.E. 697 (1921) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Sheppard v. State, 44 Ga. App. 481, 162 S.E. 413 (1931) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Hargett v. State, 55 Ga. App. 192, 189 S.E. 675 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Garner v. State, 72 Ga. App. 819, 35 S.E.2d 317 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319, 144 S.E.2d 372 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Sutton v. State, 223 Ga. 313, 154 S.E.2d 578 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Lindsey v. State, 227 Ga. 48, 178 S.E.2d 848 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 222 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3224, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1219 (1976).Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S.E.2d 248, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S. Ct. 654, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976).Jones v. State, 139 Ga. App. 643, 229 S.E.2d 121, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1928 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Green v. State, 139 Ga. App. 652, 229 S.E.2d 129, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1932 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Davis v. State, 154 Ga. App. 803, 269 S.E.2d 874, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2397 (1980), cert. dismissed, 247 Ga. 8, 273 S.E.2d 409, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 591 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 741, 270 S.E.2d 5, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2369 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cody 703 Jury (Cont’d) v. State, 195 Ga. App. 318, 393 S.E.2d 692, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 487 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Jury must infer guilt. — Sufficiency of circumstances proved to corroborate the accomplice is entirely a matter for the jury, provided the circumstances proved, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty, and in some way connect the defendant with the guilty act. Potts v. State, 86 Ga. App. 779, 72 S.E.2d 553, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Mears v. State, 98 Ga. App. 576, 106 S.E.2d 854, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 631 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Slight evidence to support jury’s determination. — Extent of corroboration is a question to be determined by the jury; it may be strong, or it may be slight, but in each case it must be of such character as to satisfy the minds of the jury as to the connection of the accused with the criminal enterprise. Sheppard v. State, 44 Ga. App. 481, 162 S.E. 413 (1931) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Walker v. State, 57 Ga. App. 868, 197 S.E. 67 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 189 Ga. 169, 5 S.E.2d 762 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Newman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 417, 11 S.E.2d 248 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. 247, 42 S.E.2d 767 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 282, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Croker v. State, 101 Ga. App. 742, 115 S.E.2d 413 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467, 162 S.E.2d 359, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980, 89 S. Ct. 449, 21 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1968).Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Townsend v. State, 141 Ga. App. 743, 234 S.E.2d 368 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 640, 235 S.E.2d 17 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Al- 24-14-8 derman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 246 S.E.2d 642, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, 99 S. Ct. 593, 58 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1978).Haynes v. State, 149 Ga. App. 179, 253 S.E.2d 851, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1776 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Butler v. State, 150 Ga. App. 751, 258 S.E.2d 691, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2365 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 421, 265 S.E.2d 341, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1832 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cole v. State, 156 Ga. App. 288, 274 S.E.2d 685, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3037 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1026 (1983). Jury to decide sufficiency of corroborating evidence. — Sufficiency of corroboration evidence is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine. If the verdict is founded on slight evidence of corroboration connecting a defendant with the crime, the verdict is legally sufﬁcient. Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512, 421 S.E.2d 523, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 846 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8); Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 501 S.E.2d 810 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 244-8); Pinkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 737, 534 S.E.2d 192, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 548 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Failure to charge statute. — When a person accused of perjury is on trial, the judge should instruct the jury that, before the jury would be authorized to convict the accused, the charge must be established by the testimony of two witnesses or by one witness and corroborating circumstances. However, the failure so to charge could not be harmful to the cause of the defendant, since the defendant introduced no evidence, and two or more witnesses for the plaintiff testiﬁed positively to each of the material allegations in the indictment. Oxford v. State, 40 Ga. App. 511, 150 S.E. 466, 1929 Ga. App. LEXIS 618 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). Trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury of the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony because the evidence presented 704 could have supported a ﬁnding that the accomplice intentionally aided in the shooting as the accomplice testiﬁed that the accomplice drove the defendant and codefendant after hearing them discussing getting payback, the accomplice saw that they had guns, the accomplice drove them away from the scene after hearing gunshots, and the accomplice did not report the shooting. The trial court’s failure to give the accomplice-corroboration in conjunction with the single-witness charge violated O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 837 S.E.2d 833, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 6 (2020). Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give a jury instruction about the requirement of accomplice corroboration because the defendant failed to show the failure affected the outcome given the overwhelming evidence against the defen- 24-14-8 dant and the fact that the accomplice statements played at trial made no mention of the defendant. Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 880 S.E.2d 158, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 280 (2022). Failure to request instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. — Trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction regarding the requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated amounted to ineffective assistance as it was error and prejudiced the defendant as the accomplice’s identiﬁcation of the defendant as the sole shooter was directly contradicted by the testimony of the bank manager who affirmatively identiﬁed the accomplice as the shooter. Burns v. State, 342 Ga. App. 379, 803 S.E.2d 79, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 346 (2017).