O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1

Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 633 S.E.2d 655, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 831 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1966, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 112 (Ga. Jan. 8, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Noting that “it is proper to consider and give weight to constructions placed on the federal rules by federal courts when applying or construing a statute based on those rules”, and that since former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b) “was based on Fed. R. Evid. Rule 702, which in its present form is based on the holdings in . . . Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 SC 1167 (1999)”, it was appropriate to apply the standards of Daubert in determining whether a witness is qualiﬁed to render an opinion as an expert. Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 658 S.E.2d 603, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 249 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967.1). Application of Daubert standard. — After a trial court found that an expert’s testimony failed the ﬁrst element of Daubert because the expert’s theory was essentially untestable and had not been 24-7-702 tested, the trial court properly exercised the court’s discretion in weighing the fourth Daubert factor—whether the theory had attained general acceptance within the scientiﬁc community—less heavily than the other three Daubert factors. Butler v. Union Carbide Corp., 310 Ga. App. 21, 712 S.E.2d 537, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 495 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1620, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 857 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). As the trial court’s ﬁnding that the plaintiff’s expert was a “quintessential expert for hire” was supported by the evidence, it was within the trial court’s discretion to apply the Daubert factors with greater rigor in determining the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. Butler v. Union Carbide Corp., 310 Ga. App. 21, 712 S.E.2d 537, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 495 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1620, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 857 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Asbestos ﬁber exposure testimony not allowed. — Expert medical witness could not give an opinion on the cause of death based on lab report which had not yet been admitted into evidence, but error in allowing such opinion was cured when the lab report was later introduced into evidence. Vaughn v. State, 249 Ga. 803, 294 S.E.2d 504, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1199 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Trial court did not err in refusing to permit the testimony of two of the manufacturer’s expert witnesses in an asbestos exposure case as to the asbestos ﬁber counts on its packing material that had been determined by an outside laboratory, even though such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses, because the experts were not entitled to give an opinion based upon the outside laboratory’s report which was prepared by other people and which was not in evidence. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 262 Ga. App. 531, 586 S.E.2d 26, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 852 (2003), aff’d, 278 Ga. 747, 604 S.E.2d 822, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 996 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). Trial court’s denial of Daubert motion presumed correct. — Trial court’s evidentiary ruling, denying a property 698 owner’s Daubert motion to exclude a bank’s appraiser’s expert testimony pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703), was presumed correct since no transcript from the hearing thereon appeared in the record. Vill. at Lake Lanier, LLC v. State Bank & Trust Co., 314 Ga. App. 498, 724 S.E.2d 806, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 220 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Court determines expert’s qualiﬁcations. — Qualiﬁcation of a witness as an expert is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Clary v. State, 8 Ga. App. 92, 68 S.E. 615, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 45 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Hines v. Hendricks, 25 Ga. App. 682, 104 S.E. 520, 1920 Ga. App. LEXIS 149 (1920) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Western & Atl. R.R. v. Fowler, 77 Ga. App. 206, 47 S.E.2d 874, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 521 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); McDowell v. State, 78 Ga. App. 116, 50 S.E.2d 633, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Carroll v. Hayes, 98 Ga. App. 450, 105 S.E.2d 755, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 607 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 129 Ga. App. 881, 201 S.E.2d 654, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1182 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Johnson v. State, 130 Ga. App. 704, 204 S.E.2d 302, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1234 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Barrow v. State, 235 Ga. 635, 221 S.E.2d 416, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 951 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); McCoy v. State, 237 Ga. 118, 227 S.E.2d 18, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1167 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753, 243 S.E.2d 16, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 821 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Kelly v. Floor Bazaar, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 163, 264 S.E.2d 697, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1724 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Wilkie v. State, 153 Ga. App. 609, 266 S.E.2d 289, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1922 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Haygood v. State, 154 Ga. App. 633, 269 S.E.2d 480, 1980 Ga. 24-7-702 App. LEXIS 2317 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Rose Mill Homes, Inc. v. Michel, 155 Ga. App. 808, 273 S.E.2d 211, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2800 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Hicks v. State, 157 Ga. App. 69, 276 S.E.2d 129 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Hicks v. State, 196 Ga. App. 311, 396 S.E.2d 60, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 864 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). For deﬁnitions of expert, see Macon Ry. & Light Co. v. Mason, 123 Ga. 773, 51 S.E. 569, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 597 (1905) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); see also Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24, 1858 Ga. LEXIS 2 (1858); White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232, 1869 Ga. LEXIS 207 (1869) (decided under former law); Hines v. Hendricks, 25 Ga. App. 682, 104 S.E. 520, 1920 Ga. App. LEXIS 149 (1920) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876). An expert is one who practices a business or profession requiring the person to have technical knowledge in that ﬁeld. Smith v. State, 127 Ga. 56, 56 S.E. 116, 1906 Ga. LEXIS 735 (1906) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 564 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022). Expert testimony must relate to scientiﬁc or technical knowledge. McLain v. State, 71 Ga. 279, 1883 Ga. LEXIS 179 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868); McClendon v. State, 7 Ga. App. 784, 68 S.E. 331, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 521 (1910) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Spence v. State, 20 Ga. App. 61, 92 S.E. 555, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 712 (1917). Basic requirements for expert. — Generally, nothing more is required to qualify an expert than that one has been educated in a particular trade or profession. Southern Ry. v. Cabe, 109 Ga. App. 432, 136 S.E.2d 438, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Bowden v. State, 239 Ga. 821, 238 S.E.2d 905, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1343 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 937, 98 S. Ct. 1513, 55 L. Ed. 2d 533, 1978 U.S. 699 General Consideration (Cont’d) LEXIS 1234 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Brown v. State, 245 Ga. 588, 266 S.E.2d 198, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 867 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Dennis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 142, 279 S.E.2d 275, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2149 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Morris v. State, 159 Ga. App. 600, 284 S.E.2d 103, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2717 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); IntaRoto, Inc. v. Guest, 160 Ga. App. 75, 286 S.E.2d 61, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2887 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). An expert witness need only be competent as an expert in the witness’s own ﬁeld, and the witness need not have legal expertise. Watkins v. State, 259 Ga. 648, 386 S.E.2d 132, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 525 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Formal training is not a prerequisite for expert status. Brown v. State, 245 Ga. 588, 266 S.E.2d 198, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 867 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Special knowledge necessary to be an expert may be derived from experience as well as study. Southern Ry. v. Cabe, 109 Ga. App. 432, 136 S.E.2d 438, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Martin v. Newton, 129 Ga. App. 735, 201 S.E.2d 31, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1130 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Bowden v. State, 239 Ga. 821, 238 S.E.2d 905, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1343 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 937, 98 S. Ct. 1513, 55 L. Ed. 2d 533, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 1234 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Brown v. State, 245 Ga. 588, 266 S.E.2d 198, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 867 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Dennis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 142, 279 S.E.2d 275, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2149 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Morris v. State, 159 Ga. App. 600, 284 S.E.2d 103, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2717 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); IntaRoto, Inc. v. Guest, 160 Ga. App. 75, 286 S.E.2d 61, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2887 24-7-702 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Failure to object constitutes waiver. — In rate increase request hearings, when the power company failed to object to an expert witness’s qualiﬁcations either before or during the witness’s testimony, any objection it might have had was waived. Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 196 Ga. App. 572, 396 S.E.2d 562, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 960 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C1546, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 483 (Ga. Oct. 23, 1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert can express an opinion on a matter which lies within the domain of the profession or calling which the witness pursues. Martin v. Newton, 129 Ga. App. 735, 201 S.E.2d 31, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1130 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Application of knowledge to speciﬁc problem not necessary. — When one has been formally educated in a particular trade or profession, additional experience by application of that knowledge to a speciﬁc problem is not necessary in order to sustain one as an expert. IntaRoto, Inc. v. Guest, 160 Ga. App. 75, 286 S.E.2d 61, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2887 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Standard for admissibility of expert testimony was governed by former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702), which provided if scientiﬁc, technical, or other specialized knowledge would assist the trier of fact in any cause of action to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualiﬁed as an expert may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: (1) the testimony was based upon sufficient facts or data which were or will be admitted into evidence at the hearing or trial; (2) the testimony was the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness had applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Levine v. SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 740 S.E.2d 672, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 344 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1255, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 774 (Ga. Sept. 23, 2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Qualiﬁcation as an expert not satisﬁed. — Trial court did not err in refusing 700 to qualify the employees’ witness as an expert because the witness’s testimony provided no evidence, let alone expert testimony, that would preclude summary judgment in favor of the Georgia Department of Human Services, and under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(d) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703), the trial court had discretion in determining whether expert testimony was necessary; any use of the witness as an expert in the case was wholly unnecessary because the areas of the expert’s specialized knowledge were not issues beyond the ken of lay persons. Forrester v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs., 308 Ga. App. 716, 708 S.E.2d 660, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 270 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1146, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 622 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Plaintiff’s witness was not qualiﬁed to testify as an expert in a medical malpractice claim based on injuries and the death of an elderly patient because the witness was completely lacking in recent experience working with the type of patient at issue in the case since the witness never worked in a mental health unit or at any type of extended-stay facility housing elderly patients, and over the prior nine years, the witness had worked in neonatal or pediatric facilities, except for one year when the witness was working in intensive care units. Sanders v. United States, No. CV 109-164, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155970 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2011). In a deceased patient’s family’s action against a hospital arising out of an alleged failure to properly treat decubitus ulcers (pressure sores), the expert affidavit failed to comply with O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-9.1(a) and 24-7-702(c)(2); the expert was a coroner with a specialty in forensic pathology and not engaged in the treatment of decubitus ulcers. Hendrix v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 330 Ga. App. 833, 769 S.E.2d 575, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 69 (2015). After the pre-trial detainee died in an isolation cell, and the plaintiffs ﬁled a civil action alleging that the medical defendants committed malpractice, because the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in ﬁnding that the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert witness was insufficient to satisfy the statutory qualiﬁcations for 24-7-702 an expert witness, the plaintiffs failed to meet the threshold requirement of ﬁling an affidavit of an expert competent to testify and their medical malpractice claims failed as a matter of law; thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the medical defendants. McKuhen v. TransformHealthRX, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 354, 790 S.E.2d 122, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 458 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0102, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 278 (Ga. Apr. 17, 2017), cert. denied, No. S17C0103, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 264 (Ga. Apr. 17, 2017). Plaintiffs’ expert witness was not sufficiently qualiﬁed to render an expert opinion in support of their medical malpractice claims because, in contradiction to the expert’s affidavits, the expert admitted in the expert’s deposition that during the ﬁve years prior to the pre-trial detainee’s death, the expert did not teach anyone how to monitor or treat inmates going through alcohol withdrawal; that, in Massachusetts, the expert did not provide daily or even regular patient care, and the expert could not estimate the amount of time the expert spent actually caring for patients; and that, in Nevada, the expert admitted the expert did not directly supervise any nurse in a correctional healthcare setting. McKuhen v. TransformHealthRX, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 354, 790 S.E.2d 122, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 458 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0102, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 278 (Ga. Apr. 17, 2017), cert. denied, No. S17C0103, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 264 (Ga. Apr. 17, 2017). Appellate court vacated the trial court’s orders admitting the worker’s other expert’s testimony as the trial court did not evaluate that expert’s qualiﬁcations to give certain opinions, including whether the power company was legally responsible to the worker or failed to warn. Ga. Power Co. v. Campbell, 360 Ga. App. 422, 861 S.E.2d 255, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 369 (2021). Applicability of former law. — Because former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703), which governed expert witness testimony in civil actions, did not apply to probation revocation hearings, the trial court’s ruling to permit the expert’s testimony re- 701 General Consideration (Cont’d) garding the presence of marijuana in a joint seized from the probationer was not erroneous as the state was not required to comply with Daubert to prove the expert’s qualiﬁcations. Carlson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 595, 634 S.E.2d 410, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 682 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C2099, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 215 (Ga. Feb. 26, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703) was a procedural, not substantive statute because the former statute did not change the standard of care to be applied in a medical malpractice action or the measure of a plaintiff’s recovery; thus, the requirements of the statute were properly applied retroactively in a medical malpractice action in which a patient suffered injuries prior to the effective date of the former statute but ﬁled suit after former § 24-967.1(c) became effective. Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 654 S.E.2d 121, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 857 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Construction with other law. — Upon a proper appeal from a ﬁnal order, while neither former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703) nor O.C.G.A. § 9-11-16 required that a complaint be dismissed or stricken for failing to comply with the terms of those statutes, unlike the Anti-SLAPP statute, codiﬁed at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, because the trial court did not enter a ﬁnal judgment within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 911-68(b)(1), attorney fees were properly denied; moreover, as to the claim that dismissing and reﬁling in another court constituted “improper judge shopping,” obtaining a different judge was simply the result of the action, not necessarily the reason for doing so. McKesson Corp. v. Green, 286 Ga. App. 110, 648 S.E.2d 457, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 712 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1602, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 656 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Federal interpretation on practice area of defendant and expert’s qualiﬁcations related thereto. — Following the federal practice on the issue of admis- 24-7-702 sibility of expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 as developed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U. S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.E.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny, the Court of Appeals concluded that the language “area of practice or specialty in which the opinion is to be given” in former O.C.G.A. § 24-967.1(c)(2), is dictated not by the apparent expertise of the treating physician, but rather by the allegations of the complaint concerning the plaintiff’s injury; the statute contemplates that “the expert may very well have a different area of practice than the defendant doctor”, and it is thus the expert’s qualiﬁcations, and not the defendant doctor’s area of practice, that control the admissibility of the expert’s testimony. Abramson v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 617, 636 S.E.2d 765, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1183 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0226, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 91 (Ga. Jan. 8, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Dispute on credentials goes to weight and credibility. — Trial court’s evidentiary ruling, denying a property owner’s Daubert motion for a hearing to determine the competence of a bank’s appraiser pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 249-67.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703), was not an abuse of discretion because disputes as to the expert’s credientials went to the weight and credibility of the testimony, but not to the admissibility. Vill. at Lake Lanier, LLC v. State Bank & Trust Co., 314 Ga. App. 498, 724 S.E.2d 806, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 220 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Federal interpretation on party bearing burden of establishing reliability of expert’s opinion. — The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly utilized federal authority, including Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), as permitted by former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f), when determining whether an expert’s testimony met the requirements of former § 24-9-67.1(b); such authority imbues trial courts with “substantial discretion in deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Citing Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. 271 (Ga. 2008), 702 and McClain v. Metabolife Intl., 401 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2005), the court noted that former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b) is based upon Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which places the burden of establishing the reliability of the expert’s opinion on the proponent. Butler v. Union Carbide Corp., 310 Ga. App. 21, 712 S.E.2d 537, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 495 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1620, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 857 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Use of deposition at trial subject to expert rules. — In a medical malpractice case, the patient’s survivor could not use the deposition of a surgery center’s representative taken under O.C.G.A. § 9-1130(b)(6) to establish the doctor’s standard of care without regard to O.C.G.A. § 247-702, governing the admissibility of expert testimony; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-32(a) allowed the use of such depositions for any purpose but required application of the rules of evidence. Yugueros v. Robles, 300 Ga. 58, 793 S.E.2d 42, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 709 (2016). Trial court should rule on admissibility before ruling on summary judgment. — Because the opinions of a homeowner’s experts, if admissible, would present a jury question on the issue of an exterminator’s breach of contract and the extent of the homeowner’s damages, a trial court erred in failing to decide the admissibility of these opinions under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702, 24-7-703) before granting summary judgment to the exterminator. An v. Active Pest Control South, Inc., 313 Ga. App. 110, 720 S.E.2d 222, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1014 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Summary judgment entered in favor of a sanitation company was vacated as to a citizen’s claim that the company negligently damaged a platform, created a tripping hazard, and caused the citizen’s injuries because the trial court had to rule on the admissibility of the citizen’s expert witness before the court of appeals could consider whether the company bent the landing and caused a tripping hazard; the company moved to exclude the expert’s testimony under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967.1, but the trial court never ruled on 24-7-702 admissibility. Burroughs v. Mitchell County, 313 Ga. App. 8, 720 S.E.2d 335, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1073 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Status of witness as lay or expert goes not to admissibility, but credibility. McLelland v. State, 203 Ga. App. 93, 416 S.E.2d 340, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 397 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0727, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 376 (Ga. Apr. 30, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert witness deﬁned. — An expert witness is one who through education, training, or experience has peculiar knowledge concerning some matter of science or skill to which the expert’s testimony relates. Tifton Brick & Block Co. v. Meadow, 92 Ga. App. 328, 88 S.E.2d 569, 1955 Ga. App. LEXIS 586 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Construction. — As the undisputed evidence showed that the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis was based on sound scientiﬁc theory and produced reliable results when proper procedures were followed, and the “direct sequencing” method employed in the prosecution of the defendant for murder was the only technique accepted and used by those who conducted forensic mtDNA testing, as the technique produced reliable results upon which any practitioner could draw conclusions, the trial court did not err in allowing that evidence. Further, former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67, and neither Daubert nor former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702 and 24-7-703) controlled the admission of evidence in criminal proceedings. Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 646 S.E.2d 212, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 419 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Applicable only in criminal cases. — Trial court was not required to consider a driver’s expert affidavits under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67 in a products liability action because by the former statute’s terms, the former statute applied to criminal cases, not civil cases. Udoinyion v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 313 Ga. App. 248, 721 S.E.2d 190, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1092 (2011), cert. dismissed, No. S12C1769, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 869 (Ga. Nov. 5, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). 703 General Consideration (Cont’d) Qualiﬁcations of expert witness are addressed to sound discretion of court. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sweat, 183 F.2d 27, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2905 (5th Cir. 1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert opinion must be helpful or necessary. — Expert opinion, like lay opinion, is received only in instances when the opinion is helpful or necessary. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1083 (1974), overruled in part, Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 122 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert opinion is admissible on any matter of scientiﬁc or technical knowledge. Southern Ry. v. Wessinger, 32 Ga. App. 551, 124 S.E. 100, 1924 Ga. App. LEXIS 548 (1924) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876). When based on facts supported by other witnesses and weight thereof is jury question. — Expert witnesses’ opinions, on questions of science, skill, trade, or like questions, shall always be admissible provided the opinions are based on facts supported by other witnesses and the weight thereof is a question for the jury, to deal with as the jury sees ﬁt, giving credence to the opinion or not. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sweat, 183 F.2d 27, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2905 (5th Cir. 1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). When an expert testiﬁed that the expert’s opinion was based upon the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the investigating officer’s report, diagrams of the accident scene drafted by the plaintiff, photographs of the plaintiff’s vehicle, and information regarding the speed of the plaintiff’s truck from its governor, it was a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned the opinion, and not a question of admissibility. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Brown, 236 Ga. App. 634, 512 S.E.2d 34, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 134 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C0857, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 566 (Ga. May 28, 1999), overruled in part, Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans, 306 Ga. 847, 834 S.E.2d 77, 2019 24-7-702 Ga. LEXIS 642 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert’s credibility is a jury question. — Defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession by ingestion of methamphetamine because the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness, a forensic toxicologist with a private clinical reference laboratory, called into question the validity of the state crime lab report, was rejected because the determination of the credibility of defendant’s expert and the effect of the expert’s testimony on the validity of the state crime lab report were for the jury. Poston v. State, 274 Ga. App. 117, 617 S.E.2d 150, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 679 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Opinion proper when on matter within scope of expertise. — Expert can express an opinion on a matter when the matter inquired about lies within the domain of the profession or calling which the expert pursues. Southern Ry. v. Cabe, 109 Ga. App. 432, 136 S.E.2d 438, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Opinions on matters outside scope of expertise. — Opinion of any witness, not on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions is inadmissible when all the facts are capable of being clearly detailed so that the jury may form correct conclusions therefrom. Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S.E.2d 214, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 367 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). While expert witnesses may give their opinions as to facts, principles, and rules involved in the science in which the witnesses are learned, the witnesses are not, as to questions lying out of the domain of the science, art, or trade in which the witnesses are experts, exempt from the restriction of the former statute, which required witnesses to state facts and not opinions. Southern Ry. v. Cabe, 109 Ga. App. 432, 136 S.E.2d 438, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 888 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Establishing variance from standard of care in legal malpractice cases. — Plaintiff may not establish variance from standard of care in medical or 704 legal malpractice cases without expert opinion testimony from which the jury could determine malpractice. This latter requirement is properly a prerequisite for the submission of a case to the jury. Savannah Valley Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Cheek, 248 Ga. 745, 285 S.E.2d 689, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 650 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Matter within scope of lay knowledge or experience. — Expert testimony is usually excluded when the question is whether the subject matter is within the scope of the ordinary layman’s knowledge and experience. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1083 (1974), overruled in part, Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 122 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible when the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; that is, the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 781 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in Gibbs v. State, 340 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2017) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert may not testify as to the expert’s opinion as to the existence vel non of a fact (in this case, whether a child had been abused sexually) unless the inference to be drawn from facts in evidence is beyond the ken of the jurors—that is, unless the jurors, for want of specialized knowledge, skill, or experience, are incapable of drawing—from facts in evidence—such an inference for themselves. Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 663 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Advocate for the victims of sexual assault at a rape crisis center did not testify as to a rape trauma syndrome; rather, the advocate properly testiﬁed that there was no typical or common behavior among rape victims and that alleged victims of sexual assault might delay reporting such crimes. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 24-7-702 284 (2005), cert. dismissed, No. S05C1805, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 758 (Ga. Oct. 24, 2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Whether a seat belt engaged properly or an air bag deployed are not matters of science and issues requiring the expert testimony of an engineer or a metallurgist, but are matters of skill and experience. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 267 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Whether someone suffers greater injuries in a car wreck when a seat belt does not work to restrain the person and the air bag does not inﬂate between the person and the steering wheel, windshield, and mirror are not matters of science and issues requiring the expert testimony of trauma physician or engineer, but are matters of skill and experience. Owens v. GMC, 272 Ga. App. 842, 613 S.E.2d 651, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 267 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Mixture of law and fact. — It is only when the drawing of the inference requires a mixture of law and fact that the question is not a proper one for opinion evidence. Gage v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 704, 266 S.E.2d 345, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1951 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga. App. 167, 270 S.E.2d 349, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2506 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Opinion of ultimate fact. — Expert opinions are advisory and are not binding upon a fact-ﬁnding tribunal when such opinions are as broad in scope as the question of fact at issue, such as the cause of death or disability. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). As a general rule, an expert witness is not allowed to express on the stand an opinion of ultimate fact or the very fact to be decided by the jury because to do so would invade the province of the jury. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1083 (1974), overruled in part, Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 705 General Consideration (Cont’d) 254, 526 S.E.2d 549, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 122 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Mitchell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 399, 268 S.E.2d 360, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2193, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011, 101 S. Ct. 567, 66 L. Ed. 2d 469, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 4104 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). An expert witness may testify as to the witness’s opinion on the ultimate issue in the case without invading the province of the jury so long as the subject is an appropriate one for opinion evidence. King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46, 268 S.E.2d 653, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1011 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga. App. 167, 270 S.E.2d 349, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2506 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). If witness is asked witness’s opinion as to a fact and not as to a mixed question of law and fact, the witness should be allowed to testify even though the witness’s opinion is as to the ultimate issue for the jury. Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga. App. 167, 270 S.E.2d 349, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2506 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). If the cause and manner of an injury is the ultimate issue of fact to be determined by the jury, an expert may nevertheless give the expert’s factual opinion but not the expert’s legal conclusion on this issue for the beneﬁt of the jury in their fact ﬁnding. Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga. App. 167, 270 S.E.2d 349, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2506 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert may state the expert’s opinion upon an ultimate fact, provided that all other requirements for admission of expert opinion were met. Baker v. State, 161 Ga. App. 670, 288 S.E.2d 280, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 1977 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Legal conclusions. — Expert cannot act as a member of the jury; nor, while on the stand, can the expert transcend the functions of a witness and, under the guise of giving testimony, state a legal conclusion. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 119 Ga. 455, 46 S.E. 678, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 24-7-702 232 (1904) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 197 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Gage v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 704, 266 S.E.2d 345, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1951 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Mitchell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 399, 268 S.E.2d 360, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2193, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011, 101 S. Ct. 567, 66 L. Ed. 2d 469, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 4104 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Whether a question calls for a legal conclusion or principally a fact which incidentally involves a legal word or phrase is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gage v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 704, 266 S.E.2d 345, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1951 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Although it is permissible for the expert to give the expert’s opinion to facts in issue or even the ultimate issue where such question is a proper one for opinion evidence, the expert is not permitted to state a legal conclusion as to the ultimate matter in issue. Nichols v. State, 177 Ga. App. 689, 340 S.E.2d 654, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2452 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony on calculation of damages. — When plaintiffs presented expert testimony on the calculation of damages, even though the trier of fact found that the defendant was not responsible for all the damages, the plaintiff showed with reasonable certainty the total amount of damages and the degree to which those damages were attributable to defendant, and the award was affirmed. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Green Int’l, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 419, 509 S.E.2d 674 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 249-67). Opinions of an expert alone are insufficient grounds on which to grant summary judgment. Lake v. Hamilton Bank, 137 Ga. App. 600, 224 S.E.2d 522, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2544 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Experiments. — Expert testimony can be based on experiments if the expert gives details of the experiment. Frank v. 706 State, 141 Ga. 243, 80 S.E. 1016, 1914 Ga. LEXIS 183 (1914) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048). Construction with § 24-9-65. — Former Code 1933, § 38-1710 dealt with expert testimony concerning science, skill, trade, or like questions, in which matters experts may give their opinion based on facts as proved by other witnesses, but former Code 1933, § 38-1708 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-7-701) dealt with opinions of lay witnesses. Mills v. State, 71 Ga. App. 353, 30 S.E.2d 824, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 366 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Appellate standard for admission. — When testimony of an expert accident reconstructionist was admitted by the trial court as expert opinion, the Court of Appeals erred by judging its admissibility pursuant to the standard appropriate for lay witnesses. Johnson v. Knebel, 267 Ga. 853, 485 S.E.2d 451 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Appellate court is not bound by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 LE2d 469 (1993) and has consistently refused to apply the Daubert standard; further, as Daubert involves the application of Fed. R. Evid. 702, which has not been adopted in Georgia, Daubert has not been adopted in Georgia either. Dailey v. State, 271 Ga. App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 83 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Past use of expert by other party. — Plaintiff’s questions regarding the prior employment of plaintiff’s expert by defense counsel, asked in an attempt to rehabilitate or bolster the expert’s credibility, were not admissible. Vaughn v. Protective Ins. Co., 243 Ga. App. 79, 532 S.E.2d 159, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 409 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1249, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 587 (Ga. July 14, 2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Exclusion of expert witness testimony on cross-racial eyewitness identiﬁcation not reversible error. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion or violate the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding expert testimony about cross-racial eyewitness identiﬁcation; based on 24-7-702 eyewitness testimony and the defendant’s confession, the jury could have resolved the issue of whether the victims recognized the defendant without the assistance of an expert witness. Crawford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 645, 642 S.E.2d 335, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C0937, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 442 (Ga. June 4, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Limiting questioning of expert. — Trial court did not err in limiting appellate counsel’s questioning of an expert witness at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial because there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to show what the expert’s testimony would have been had defense counsel called the expert as a witness; appellate counsel called the witness and questioned the witness about the techniques used to question young children and the reliability of a young child’s testimony, and the trial court decided to limit the testimony only when appellate counsel began asking speciﬁc questions about one of the interviews. Vaughn v. State, 307 Ga. App. 754, 706 S.E.2d 137, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 70 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Subject matter improper for expert testimony. — As the undisputed evidence showed that the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis was based on sound scientiﬁc theory and produced reliable results when proper procedures were followed, and the “direct sequencing” method employed in the prosecution of the defendant for murder was the only technique accepted and used by those who conducted forensic mtDNA testing, as the technique produced reliable results upon which any practitioner could draw conclusions, the trial court did not err in allowing that evidence. Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 646 S.E.2d 212, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 419 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). Expert on DNA testing. — No error resulted by admitting expert testimony on the issue of DNA testing and because the defendant did not contend that the expert’s testimony failed to meet the Harper standard, no basis for reversal on this ground existed. Carruth v. State, 286 Ga. 707 24-7-702 General Consideration (Cont’d) App. 431, 649 S.E.2d 557, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 800 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony on absence of DNA. — Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the testimony of an expert witness that the absence of the defendant’s DNA on a ski mask recovered from the scene of the crime did not rule out the possibility that the defendant wore the mask because the witness’s testimony was admissible as the opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions was always admissible; and counsel extensively cross-examined the witness on the witness’s conclusions, eliciting an admission from the witness that no studies supported the witness’s testimony, reiterating the absence of DNA evidence implicating the defendant, and introducing into evidence the expert’s report containing that ﬁnding. Mitchell v. State, 303 Ga. 491, 813 S.E.2d 367, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 204 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). No error in excluding experts’ affidavits. — Trial court did not err by denying a defendant’s request to admit testimony regarding the contents of affidavits used, in part, by the defendant’s expert witnesses as the basis for the experts’ opinions regarding the defendant’s mental status as, in applying former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7702, 24-7-703), the trial court ﬁrst found that the facts contained in the disputed affidavits were otherwise inadmissible hearsay, as the affidavits rested on the veracity and competency of persons not in court and did not come within any statutorily-recognized hearsay exception. The trial court then balanced the probative value of the affidavits against the prejudicial effect, noting that the affidavits were originally submitted in the defendant’s habeas proceeding, contained identical language thereby casting suspicion on the affidavits’ trustworthiness, contained conclusory statements and irrelevant and prejudicial information related to the defendant’s alleged alcohol and drug use and the crime of murder for which the defen- dant was convicted; and, therefore, the affidavits had little probative information and were cumulative of other evidence. Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 838 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1311, 128 S. Ct. 1882, 170 L. Ed. 2d 747, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3194 (2008), overruled in part, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1). Basis for Opinion 1. In General Facts that can form basis for opinion. — Expert opinions can be based upon facts which the expert has testiﬁed to, or heard others testify to, or which have been hypothetically stated to the expert. Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 1860 Ga. LEXIS 355 (1860) (decided under former law); Taylor v. State, 83 Ga. 647, 10 S.E. 442, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 129 (1889) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868). An expert witness may give an opinion based upon the witness’s own examination of a person, upon the witness’s observation of that person, or upon any state of facts, supported by some evidence in the case, which the witness assumes as true. Mutual Beneﬁt Health & Accident Ass’n v. Hickman, 100 Ga. App. 348, 111 S.E.2d 380, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 1014 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). Opinion of an expert on any question relating to the expert’s profession, trade, or business is always admissible, when given in response to a hypothetical question based upon the testimony of witnesses other than the expert, or if the expert has personally observed the facts, and gives the expert’s opinion based upon the expert’s own observation. Bullington v. Chandler, 110 Ga. App. 803, 140 S.E.2d 59, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 765 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). An expert may give an opinion based on facts which the expert personally observes, and when an expert personally observes data collected by another, the expert’s opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based, in part, on the 708 other’s ﬁndings. Millar Elevator Serv. Co. v. O’Shields, 222 Ga. App. 456, 475 S.E.2d 188 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 249-67). Expert witness’s opinion predicated on facts raised by others. — An expert witness’s opinion may be predicated upon facts placed in evidence by the testimony of other witnesses or by any other legal means. Mutual Beneﬁt Health & Accident Ass’n v. Hickman, 100 Ga. App. 348, 111 S.E.2d 380, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 1014 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Sutton, 136 Ga. App. 760, 222 S.E.2d 98, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1482 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). When an expert did not present sufﬁcient evidence to show a relevant point, given lack of support for the expert’s opinion, the lower court did not abuse the court’s discretion in excluding the expert’s testimony. Cromer v. Mulkey Enters., 254 Ga. App. 388, 562 S.E.2d 783, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 388 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Opinions must be based on established facts. — Expert opinions are admissible if based upon a state of facts which the evidence on behalf of either party tends to establish; but the jury should know upon what facts the opinion is founded, for its pertinence depends upon whether the jury ﬁnds the facts on which the opinion rests. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 658 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Matter not in evidence. — An expert witness was properly precluded from expressing an opinion based on a letter containing an inadmissible summary of matter not in evidence and not within the expert’s own knowledge. Loper v. Drury, 211 Ga. App. 478, 440 S.E.2d 32, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1568 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0519, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 524 (Ga. Feb. 21, 1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Witness’s opinion must be witness’s own; the witness cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of others. Thus, the opinion is incompetent if the witness has no general knowledge of the witness’s 24-7-702 own. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Brower, 106 Ga. App. 340, 127 S.E.2d 33, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 704, rev’d in part, 218 Ga. 525, 128 S.E.2d 926, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 552 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Stephen W. Brown Radiology Assocs. v. Gowers, 157 Ga. App. 770, 278 S.E.2d 653, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2011 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Personal observation of fact by expert. — Opinion of experts, on matters within their area of expertise, is admissible especially when the expert has personally observed the facts and gives the expert’s opinion based upon the expert’s own observations. Erwin v. Gold Kist, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 372, 246 S.E.2d 404, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2359 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert testimony as to illegal drug distribution trade is admissible. — Trial court did not err by allowing a district attorney’s investigator to give the investigator’s “guess” that a document found in appellant’s possession and introduced in evidence “was ‘the way people who are involved in the distribution of drugs keep records of who owes them money,’ ” because the testimony of the investigator involved a question of “trade,” particularly concerning the procedure used in the illegal drug distribution trade in keeping records of accounts due and owing. O’Donnell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 829, 409 S.E.2d 579, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1154 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1573, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony by an undercover ofﬁcer about how street drug dealers operated in three person units consisting of a seller, drug handler, and money handler, and why they did so, was admissible as not “beyond the ken” of the average juror and applicable to the facts of the case. Vaughan v. State, 251 Ga. App. 221, 553 S.E.2d 335, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 897 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). With respect to a particular scientiﬁc procedure or technique, the trial court makes a determination whether the procedure or technique in question has 709 In General (Cont’d) reached a scientiﬁc stage of veriﬁable certainty, based upon evidence, expert testimony, treatises, or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0554, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. Mar. 10, 1995), overruled in part, Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden, 303 Ga. 358, 812 S.E.2d 244, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 154 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert need not have gone to scene. — When an expert bases the expert’s opinion on facts within the bounds of evidence, the testimony is admissible notwithstanding the fact that the expert never went to the scene at all and based the expert’s opinion on an examination of photographs. Jones v. Ray, 159 Ga. App. 734, 285 S.E.2d 42, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2734 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Opinion based on ﬁndings of another. — When an expert personally observes data collected by another, the expert’s opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based, in part, upon the other’s ﬁndings. Cochran v. State, 151 Ga. App. 478, 260 S.E.2d 391, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2578 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Condemnor’s expert properly testiﬁed as to the necessity of a transmission line even though the condemnor’s opinion was based, in part, on another’s ﬁndings; further, the expert conducted the condemnor’s own study after the case was initially remanded and testiﬁed on remand that the transmission line was needed by 2007 to provide safe and reliable electric service to customers in North Georgia. Mosteller Mill, Ltd. v. Ga. Power Co., 271 Ga. App. 287, 609 S.E.2d 211, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 25 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert opinion may not be given on another’s opinion. — Expert may give an opinion upon the facts testiﬁed to by other witnesses, but not upon their opinions. Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237, 1859 Ga. LEXIS 185 (1859) (decided under former law); Taylor v. Warren, 175 Ga. 800, 24-7-702 166 S.E. 225, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 337 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); McCauley v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 706, 256 S.E.2d 19, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1998 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert opinion cannot be based on out-of-court representations by another. Flanagan v. State, 106 Ga. 102, 106 Ga. 109, 32 S.E. 80, 1898 Ga. LEXIS 29 (1898) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022). Opinion based on hearsay. — When an expert witness’s opinion is based on hearsay it is not error for the court to allow an expert to relate facts of which the expert has no direct personal knowledge, especially if the court gives the proper limiting instruction. White v. Georgia Power Co., 237 Ga. 341, 227 S.E.2d 385, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1481 (1976), overruled in part, DeKalb County v. Trustees, Decatur Lodge No. 1602, etc., 242 Ga. 707, 251 S.E.2d 243, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1337 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). It is axiomatic that an expert, in utilizing the expert’s expertise, may base the expert’s opinion as to value upon hearsay. Hoover & Morris Dev. Co. v. FDIC, 149 Ga. App. 855, 256 S.E.2d 140, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2056 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). When an expert’s testimony is based on hearsay, the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the expert does not mandate the exclusion of the opinion but, rather, presents a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned the opinion. King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46, 268 S.E.2d 653, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1011 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Cheek v. Wainwright, 246 Ga. 171, 269 S.E.2d 443, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1032 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Jones v. Ray, 159 Ga. App. 734, 285 S.E.2d 42, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2734 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). An expert’s opinion may be based in part upon hearsay, and when it is based thereon it goes to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not its admissibility. Avant Trucking Co. v. Stallion, 159 Ga. App. 198, 283 S.E.2d 7, 1981 Ga. App. 710 LEXIS 2547 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Provided an expert witness is properly qualiﬁed in the ﬁeld in which the expert offers testimony, and the facts relied upon are within the bounds of the evidence, whether there is sufficient knowledge upon which to base an opinion or whether it is based upon hearsay goes to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not its admissibility. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1336 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0554, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. Mar. 10, 1995), overruled in part, Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden, 303 Ga. 358, 812 S.E.2d 244, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 154 (2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). In an action against a utility and power company for damages arising from electromagnetic radiation, the trial court committed reversible error in admitting testimony of experts regarding a perceived consensus of opinion in the scientiﬁc community that magnetic ﬁelds from power lines are not a cause of cancer. Jordan v. Georgia Power Co., 219 Ga. App. 690, 466 S.E.2d 601 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Forensic pediatrician who examined a battered infant was properly allowed to testify about seizures noted in the baby’s medical records, and about a radiologist’s report that conﬁrmed suspicions about the extent of an injury, because the pediatrician’s opinion was not based solely on those records, but also on an examination of the baby. Nichols v. State, 278 Ga. App. 46, 628 S.E.2d 131, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 253 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1239, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 752 (Ga. Sept. 18, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). Investigating police officer basing opinion on hearsay statements. — Police officer who investigates an accident cannot base the officer’s opinion as to manner in which accident occurred upon hearsay statements which the officer receives during the officer’s investigation unless they are a part of the res gestae. Avant Trucking Co. v. Stallion, 159 Ga. App. 198, 283 S.E.2d 7, 1981 Ga. App. 24-7-702 LEXIS 2547 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Book learning. — Expert testimony was admissible even though based on book learning rather than knowledge gained from actual experience. Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40, 39 S.E. 897, 1901 Ga. LEXIS 558 (1901) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Miller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 245, 141 S.E.2d 223, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 935 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Opinion based on education and experience was not speculative. — Testimony of a ﬁrearms expert, that the expert would not expect to ﬁnd gunshot residue from the murder weapon, a semiautomatic pistol, was not speculative, was grounded on the expert’s education and experience, and was admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67. Tavera v. State, 279 Ga. 803, 621 S.E.2d 422, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 725 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Restatement of textbook opinion inadmissible. — While an expert witness may support the expert’s opinion by reference to books, statistical sources, and other learned sources, the witness’s testimony is inadmissible when it is merely a restatement of a textbook opinion rather than an independent expression of the witness’s own expert opinion. DOT v. Brand, 149 Ga. App. 547, 254 S.E.2d 873, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1926 (1979) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Medical records. — Opinion testimony based merely upon records and case history furnished the witness by other doctors and not a part of the evidence in the case was objectionable, but the error in the admission of the doctor’s opinion was harmless, since during the four-day trial of the case, an enormous amount of testimony was adduced concerning the recent medical history of the decedent, the testimony included ﬁndings of diagnostic tests made during the decedent’s ﬁnal days, a pathologic opinion as to the cause of death could not have been made without reference to the decedent’s records, and other opinion evidence based upon the records was admitted in evidence 711 In General (Cont’d) without objection. Andrews v. Major, 180 Ga. App. 393, 349 S.E.2d 225, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2149 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Speciﬁc article in medical journal. — It was not necessary for a doctor to have qualiﬁed as authoritative the speciﬁc article referred to in a medical journal in defense of a medical malpractice case, since the doctor did not limit the doctor’s assessment of the journal’s authority to the selective scope of the article. Pound v. Medney, 176 Ga. App. 756, 337 S.E.2d 772, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2416 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). Jury instructions. — Charge to the jury, that opinions of experts to be of any value, must be based upon facts believed, or proven to be true, was not an improper charge, nor did it have the effect of expressing an opinion on the evidence or tending to discredit the testimony of the expert witnesses in the case. Allen v. Allen, 71 Ga. App. 272, 30 S.E.2d 665, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 331 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). 2. Need to State Basis Expert and nonexpert compared. — Expert may give the expert’s opinion without stating the reasons therefor, but one who was not an expert may give an opinion only when accompanied with the reasons. Wallace v. State, 204 Ga. 676, 51 S.E.2d 395, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 323 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). Explanation unnecessary. — Opinion testimony by witnesses who qualiﬁed as expert real estate appraisers, as to the value of the condemnees’ land and as to the damages which the witnesses had suffered on account of the taking, is admissible without the necessity for the witnesses to state the facts upon which the witnesses based their opinions. Housing Auth. v. Millwood, 138 Ga. App. 610, 226 S.E.2d 766, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2252 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). An expert may give the expert’s opinion without stating the foundation therefor 24-7-702 and without a hypothetical question based upon other evidence if the expert’s opinion is based upon facts which the expert knows and has observed, or based upon facts in the record at the time the expert states the expert’s opinion, or based partly on ﬁrst-hand knowledge and partly on the facts or record. Thrift-Mart, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 154 Ga. App. 344, 268 S.E.2d 397, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2158 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Explanation permitted. — While it is not necessary that an expert witness state the facts upon which the expert bases the expert’s opinion, it is error to refuse to permit the expert to do so for the purpose of showing the basis of the opinion. It matters not whether the facts are sought from the witness while on direct or on cross-examination. State Hwy. Dep’t v. Howard, 119 Ga. App. 298, 167 S.E.2d 177, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1079 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Martin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 9, 258 S.E.2d 711, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2413, cert. dismissed, 244 Ga. 876, 263 S.E.2d 437, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1448 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Explanation necessary. — When an expert testiﬁes to a conclusion based on information furnished by others, then all the information utilized by that expert in forming an opinion should be presented to the jury to enable the jury to evaluate the expert’s testimony. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 268 S.E.2d 906, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 970 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Error to refuse to permit witness to state basis. — While it is not necessary that an expert witness state the facts upon which the expert bases the expert’s opinion, it is error to refuse to permit the expert to do so for the purpose of showing the basis of the opinion. Jordan v. Department of Transp., 178 Ga. App. 133, 342 S.E.2d 482, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1620 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Basis for opinion outside scope of expertise. — An opinion of a witness is inadmissible when the information upon which the opinion is based is not given. This is true, even though the witness is an 712 expert on some subject, when the opinion testimony related to a subject on which the witness is not qualiﬁed as an expert. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Brower, 106 Ga. App. 340, 127 S.E.2d 33, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 704, rev’d in part, 218 Ga. 525, 128 S.E.2d 926, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 552 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Explanation enhances weight of opinion. — When the facts upon which an expert bases the expert’s opinion are stated the opinion is entitled to greater weight. State Hwy. Dep’t v. Howard, 119 Ga. App. 298, 167 S.E.2d 177, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 1079 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Hypothetical Questions Admissibility of opinion. — Opinion of an expert on any question relating to the expert’s profession, trade, or business is always admissible, when given in response to a hypothetical question based upon the testimony of witnesses other than the expert, or where the expert has personally observed the facts and given the expert’s opinion based on the expert’s own opinion. Yates v. State, 127 Ga. 813, 56 S.E. 1017, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 483 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Cranshaw v. Schweizer Mfg. Co., 1 Ga. App. 363, 58 S.E. 222, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 245 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Fincher v. Davis, 27 Ga. App. 494, 108 S.E. 905, 1921 Ga. App. LEXIS 230 (1921) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Taylor v. Warren, 175 Ga. 800, 166 S.E. 225, 1932 Ga. LEXIS 337 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Wallace v. State, 204 Ga. 676, 51 S.E.2d 395, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 323 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Trial court did not err by allowing an expert to respond to the state’s hypothetical question during redirect examination because the hypothetical was supported by the evidence; the expert was asked to consider a scenario based on the defendant’s version of the facts and photographs of a crib in order to determine whether the victim’s injury was consistent with the defendant’s story. Elrod v. State, 316 Ga. App. 491, 729 S.E.2d 593, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 593 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). 24-7-702 It is not necessary that question be propounded hypothetically when an expert testiﬁes to the expert’s opinion based upon facts which the expert has observed. Jones v. Ray, 159 Ga. App. 734, 285 S.E.2d 42, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2734 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). When hypothetical question is appropriate. — Proper mode of examining a physician or expert, when the physician or expert is not testifying from one’s own knowledge, is to ask the physician or expert hypothetical questions. Kimball v. State, 63 Ga. App. 183, 10 S.E.2d 240, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 29 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). When an expert is asked to give an opinion on facts not coming within the expert’s own knowledge, the question should be hypothetical. Evans v. DeKalb County Hosp. Auth., 154 Ga. App. 17, 267 S.E.2d 319, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2031 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Factual basis for hypothetical question. — When the testimony is based upon a hypothetical question, the facts assumed to be true should be such as the evidence on behalf of either party tends to establish. Flanagan v. State, 106 Ga. 102, 106 Ga. 109, 32 S.E. 80, 1898 Ga. LEXIS 29 (1898) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 202 Ga. 391, 43 S.E.2d 329, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 449 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Ellis v. Southern Ry., 89 Ga. App. 407, 79 S.E.2d 541, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 977 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Garrett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 366, 265 S.E.2d 304, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1811 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). Opinion of an expert witness may be given in response to a hypothetical question based upon facts placed in evidence by the testimony of other witnesses or by competent evidence of any nature. Altamaha Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Godwin, 137 Ga. App. 394, 224 S.E.2d 76, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2460 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); DuBois v. Ray, 177 Ga. App. 349, 339 S.E.2d 605, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2600 (1985) (decided 713 Hypothetical Questions (Cont’d) under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67); Horton v. Eaton, 215 Ga. App. 803, 452 S.E.2d 541, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1385 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0626, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 547 (Ga. Apr. 6, 1995), overruled in part, Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 681 S.E.2d 147, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 395 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967); Rowe v. State, 266 Ga. 136, 464 S.E.2d 811, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 7 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). When reliance is made upon circumstantial evidence alone for proof of one of the essential facts assumed in the framing of a hypothetical question, the trier of fact may consider the answer to the question only if it has ﬁrst determined that the assumed fact has been satisfactorily established. Bowers v. State, 153 Ga. App. 894, 267 S.E.2d 309, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2024 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Reliance can be made upon circumstantial evidence to establish a basis for framing a hypothetical question; the question of whether the circumstances were sufficiently proven to establish the fact contained in the hypothetical question is an issue for the trier of fact. Stoneridge Properties, Inc. v. Kuper, 178 Ga. App. 409, 343 S.E.2d 424, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1663 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). That the testimony was circumstantial would not affect the viability of a hypothetical. Whether there was insufficient knowledge upon which the expert could render the expert’s opinion goes not to the admissibility of that opinion, but to the credibility of the witness. Apac-Georgia, Inc. v. Padgett, 193 Ga. App. 706, 388 S.E.2d 900, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1638 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Method of asking question. — Attorney would be limited in framing the hypothetical question to the expert witness by the same parameters which would limit own testimony. Altamaha Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Godwin, 137 Ga. App. 394, 224 S.E.2d 76, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2460 24-7-702 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Weight of testimony in response to hypothetical question. — Opinion testimony of an expert can be based upon hypothetical questions and though the jury is allowed to receive the testimony of experts the jury is not bound by such testimony; such testimony is not conclusive or controlling and is submitted for whatever the jury considers it to be worth. Woods v. Andersen, 145 Ga. App. 492, 243 S.E.2d 748, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2021 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Weight of Opinion Evidence Expert testimony is weighed and judged like any other; its weight and value is determined by the jury considering its nature and the layman’s knowledge thereof. Buckhanon v. State, 151 Ga. 827, 108 S.E. 209, 1921 Ga. LEXIS 393 (1921) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); see also Mitchell v. State, 6 Ga. App. 554, 65 S.E. 326, 1909 Ga. App. LEXIS 381 (1909). Trier of fact not bound by expert testimony. — While competent expert testimony is entitled to great weight, the testimony is not so authoritative that either court, jury, or commission is bound to be governed by that testimony, since the testimony is advisory merely and intended to assist the court, jury, or commission in coming to a correct conclusion. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold, 88 Ga. App. 64, 76 S.E.2d 20, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1009 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); see also Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 543 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Miller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 245, 141 S.E.2d 223, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 935 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Hughes v. Newell, 152 Ga. App. 618, 263 S.E.2d 505, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 3065 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 732 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60, 714 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2962 (1980), overruled in part, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 326 (1993) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). While direct and positive testimony cannot arbitrarily be rejected by a jury or other trier of facts, this rule does not apply to the opinion evidence of physicians or other experts. Accordingly, it was a question for the board’s determination as to whether the board would accept the testimony of one physician, which authorized the award for the claimant, or the testimony of two other doctors, which would have authorized an award denying compensation. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Doyle, 96 Ga. App. 745, 101 S.E.2d 600, 1957 Ga. App. LEXIS 682 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert testimony is not absolutely obligatory on the jury, even if uncontradicted. Smith v. Godfrey, 155 Ga. App. 113, 270 S.E.2d 322, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2481 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Probative value of opinion evidence is for the jury. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, 8 Ga. App. 514, 70 S.E. 65, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 13 (1911) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); McDowell v. State, 78 Ga. App. 116, 50 S.E.2d 633, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Ford Motor Co. v. Hanley, 128 Ga. App. 311, 196 S.E.2d 454, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1468 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Arnold v. State, 155 Ga. App. 569, 271 S.E.2d 702, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2678 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Weight given to discredited tests in expert community. — Trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony of the psychologist who interviewed the children even though defendant presented expert testimony that one of the tests used by the psychologist had been discredited in the psychological community; the conﬂicting expert opinions on test results went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the testimony. Hanson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 45, 587 S.E.2d 200, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1088 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Quality of expert opinion must be considered. — An expert opinion while 24-7-702 very valuable in many situations, nevertheless has a limited weight-carrying capacity. The “quality” of such testimony must be considered. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 363, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12178 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d 158, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9695 (5th Cir. 1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Jury can consider expert’s credentials in assessing weight. — Whether an examining physician is or is not a psychiatrist is a matter which may affect the extent of the physician’s expertise in evaluating a mental condition, and therefore may affect the weight of any opinion or evaluation, a matter to be determined by a jury, but it does not affect admissibility, nor is admissibility precluded by the fact that the physician’s opinions and evaluations are based on conversations with the patient. Petty v. Folsom, 229 Ga. 477, 192 S.E.2d 246, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 657 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Jury can consider the expert’s credentials and then give such weight and credit to the expert’s testimony as jury sees ﬁt. McCoy v. State, 237 Ga. 118, 227 S.E.2d 18, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1167 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Positive factual testimony outweighs negative opinion. — Affirmative and positive testimony of witnesses as to the actual facts of a particular occurrence is not overcome by testimony which is negative in its character or consists of mere opinions. West v. State, 84 Ga. 527, 10 S.E. 731, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 368 (1889) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868). An expert’s opinion based on insufﬁcient factual foundation or hearsay affects the weight, but not the admissibility, of the expert’s testimony. Woods v. Andersen, 145 Ga. App. 492, 243 S.E.2d 748, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2021 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). When it is developed by examination that the opinion is based on inadequate knowledge, this goes to the credibility of the witness rather than to the admissibility of the evidence. Jones v. Ray, 159 Ga. App. 734, 285 S.E.2d 42, 1981 Ga. App. 715 24-7-702 Weight of Opinion Evidence (Cont’d) Cross-Examination LEXIS 2734 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Jury instructions. — Even if the testimony of the civil engineer as to the distance between named points, introduced by the defendant in support of an alibi sought to be established by the defendant, could be considered as expert evidence, the omission to charge the law in regard to expert testimony as set forth in the former statute, declaring that “the opinions of experts, on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions, shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses,” was not, as contended, an expression of opinion as to credibility of the witness and weight of the testimony; nor was it erroneous to omit to charge on that subject without request. Stone v. State, 180 Ga. 223, 178 S.E. 435, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 225 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Charge that opinion evidence could be accepted by the jury and considered along with all the other evidence in the case, but that the jury was not bound by the opinions of experts or nonexperts was not error. Allen v. Allen, 71 Ga. App. 272, 30 S.E.2d 665, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 331 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Jury charge upheld. — There was no reversible error, despite the defendant’s argument on appeal that the trial court’s charge to the jury on DNA evidence was incomplete and prejudicial as a matter of law because: (1) a review of the record showed that the charge given by the court tracked the language set forth in the pattern charge and was otherwise a correct statement of law with respect to the collection and testing of DNA; and (2) the defendant’s proposed jury charge was argumentative and composed primarily of evidentiary matters that were not proper for a jury instruction. Moreover, there was no request for the additional charge the defendant asserted was erroneously omitted present in the record. Stanley v. State, 289 Ga. App. 373, 657 S.E.2d 305, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 93 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Matters admissible on cross examination. — Matters the expert may have omitted from consideration in the expert’s appraisal of property were appropriate matters for cross-examination and rebuttal, and ultimately for the weight to be given the opinion by the jury. Brookhaven Supply Co. v. DeKalb County, 134 Ga. App. 878, 216 S.E.2d 694, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2205 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Reasoning the expert used in reaching expert’s opinion may be explored on crossexamination and need not be presented in toto as a condition precedent to admissibility. Woods v. Andersen, 145 Ga. App. 492, 243 S.E.2d 748, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2021 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Introducing inadmissible evidence by cross-examination. — Party should not be allowed to introduce in evidence an opinion of an expert witness based on hearsay by the method of cross-examining such witness when such evidence would have been entirely inadmissible on direct examination. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 658 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Volunteered testimony. — Testimony of an expert witness is not reversible error if the expert volunteered testimony during cross-examination which was substantially the same or similar to that later objected to. DOT v. Coley, 184 Ga. App. 206, 360 S.E.2d 924, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2171 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Illustrations 1. Opinions Admissible Experts were permitted to testify in the following cases. — See Hook v. Stovall, Dunn & Co., 26 Ga. 704, 1859 Ga. LEXIS 407 (1859) (physician on disease) (decided under former law); Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237, 1859 Ga. LEXIS 185 (1859) (willwright) (decided under former law); May v. Dorsett, 30 Ga. 116, 1860 Ga. LEXIS 48 (1860) (banking expert) (decided under former law); White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232, 1869 Ga. LEXIS 207 716 (1869) (physician on disease; ethnologist on question of race) (decided under former Code 1863, § 3792); Everett v. State, 62 Ga. 65, 1878 Ga. LEXIS 300 (1878) (physician) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3868); Taylor v. State, 83 Ga. 647, 10 S.E. 442, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 129 (1889) (physician on sanity) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868); Von Pollnitz v. State, 92 Ga. 16, 18 S.E. 301, 1893 Ga. LEXIS 5 (1893) (physician) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868); Perry v. State, 110 Ga. 234, 36 S.E. 781, 1900 Ga. LEXIS 348 (1900) (physician) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Wheeler v. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S.E. 126, 1900 Ga. LEXIS 23 (1900) (acoustics expert on whether conversation could be overheard) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 119 Ga. 455, 46 S.E. 678, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 232 (1904) (physician on death but not on contributing cause) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Macon Ry. & Light Co. v. Mason, 123 Ga. 773, 51 S.E. 569, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 597 (1905) (osteopath notwithstanding lack of physician’s license) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Bullard v. State, 127 Ga. 289, 56 S.E. 429, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 233 (1907) (physician) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Goodwyn v. Central of Ga. Ry., 2 Ga. App. 470, 58 S.E. 688, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 426 (1907) (railroad engineer) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 564 (1907) (physician on sanity) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770, 59 S.E. 792, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 579 (1907) (physician) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 62 S.E. 52, 1908 Ga. LEXIS 36 (1908) (expert on location of railroad and factory) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Cochrell v. Langley Mfg. Co., 5 Ga. App. 317, 63 S.E. 244, 1908 Ga. App. LEXIS 111 (1908) (experts on machinery) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5287); Garner v. State, 6 Ga. App. 788, 65 S.E. 842, 1909 Ga. App. LEXIS 470 (1909) (gun expert on caliber of bullet) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1022); West- 24-7-702 ern Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, 8 Ga. App. 514, 70 S.E. 65, 1911 Ga. App. LEXIS 13 (1911) (whether sight could have been saved by timely arrival of oculist) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Lanier v. State, 141 Ga. 17, 80 S.E. 5, 1913 Ga. LEXIS 290 (1913) (expert testimony on manner and cause of death) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Wilensky v. State, 15 Ga. App. 360, 83 S.E. 276, 1914 Ga. App. LEXIS 113 (1914) (jeweler as to symbol on watch) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Byrd v. State, 142 Ga. 633, 83 S.E. 513, 1914 Ga. LEXIS 484 (1914) (gun expert on wound) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Bates v. State, 18 Ga. App. 718, 90 S.E. 481, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 1221 (1916) (handwriting expert on authorship of papers) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Spence v. State, 20 Ga. App. 61, 92 S.E. 555, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 712 (1917) (accountant as to what books show) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1048); Holtzendorf v. McNeil, 25 Ga. App. 792, 104 S.E. 919, 1920 Ga. App. LEXIS 216 (1920) (dentist on value of extracted tooth) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Bullard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 31 Ga. App. 641, 122 S.E. 75, 1924 Ga. App. LEXIS 113 (1924) (physician on death but not on contributing cause) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Southern Ry. v. Wessinger, 32 Ga. App. 551, 124 S.E. 100, 1924 Ga. App. LEXIS 548 (1924) (railroad engineer) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Taber Mill v. Southern Brighton Mills, 49 Ga. App. 390, 175 S.E. 665, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 416 (1934) (expert on customs and usages of trade) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Pollard v. Page, 56 Ga. App. 503, 193 S.E. 117, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (1937) (physician on plaintiffs’ condition, after giving basic facts) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Southern Ry. v. Blanton, 59 Ga. App. 252, 200 S.E. 471, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 483 (1938) (railroad engineer on safety practices) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Sockwell v. Lucas & Jenkins, Inc., 71 Ga. App. 765, 32 S.E.2d 201, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 216 (1944) (building inspector on conformance 717 Opinions Admissible (Cont’d) to building code) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); McDowell v. State, 78 Ga. App. 116, 50 S.E.2d 633, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (1948) (undertaker on cause of corpse’s mutilation) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Central Truckaway Sys. v. Harrigan, 79 Ga. App. 117, 53 S.E.2d 186, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 598 (1949) (physician on permanency of patient’s injuries) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Eller v. Matthews, 216 Ga. 315, 116 S.E.2d 235, 1960 Ga. LEXIS 455 (1960) (teacher on emotional state of pupil) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); State Hwy. Dep’t v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 103 Ga. App. 18, 118 S.E.2d 293, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 844 (1961) (expert on damages to property) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); McGuire v. Davis, 437 F.2d 570, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 12528 (5th Cir. 1971) (physician on pain suffered by patient) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Altamaha Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Godwin, 137 Ga. App. 394, 224 S.E.2d 76, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2460 (1976) (plaintiff’s attorney on reasonableness of attorney’s fee) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Hall v. State, 138 Ga. App. 20, 225 S.E.2d 705, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2037 (1976) (ﬁngerprints) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Harris v. Atlantic Creosote Co., 142 Ga. App. 695, 236 S.E.2d 909, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1409 (1977) (expert on vehicle’s stopping distance) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga. App. 167, 270 S.E.2d 349, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2506 (1980) (expert on whether wound was selfinﬂicted) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 781 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in Gibbs v. State, 340 Ga. App. 723, 798 S.E.2d 308, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2017) (expert on battered woman’s syndrome) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Paxton v. State, 159 Ga. App. 175, 282 S.E.2d 912, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2537, cert. denied, 248 Ga. 231, 283 S.E.2d 235, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1121 (1981) (common origin of pubic hairs) (decided 24-7-702 under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); Inta-Roto, Inc. v. Guest, 160 Ga. App. 75, 286 S.E.2d 61, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2887 (1981) (expert on mechanical engineering) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710); Davis v. Williams, 165 Ga. App. 45, 299 S.E.2d 102, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 1758 (1983) (surveyor as to boundary line) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubbleﬁeld, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2164 (1984) (experts in automobile engineering and systems safety analysis) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67); Concrete Constr. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 176 Ga. App. 873, 339 S.E.2d 266, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2588 (1985) (expert in electric engineering familiar with the installation of gas lines) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67); Ingram v. State, 178 Ga. App. 292, 342 S.E.2d 765, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1635 (1986); Height v. State, 221 Ga. App. 647, 472 S.E.2d 485. (drug investigator on amount and manner of packaging of cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Battered women’s syndrome expert was properly permitted to testify as to why a victim would not have reported instances of abuse and why the victim dismissed a complaint for divorce and reconciled with defendant; further, the expert was properly permitted to testify as to the expert’s qualiﬁcations in the presence of the jury. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 999 (2004), overruled in part, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Fingerprint comparison expert. — State’s ﬁngerprint expert was properly permitted to testify as ﬁngerprint comparison evidence was not novel and was widely accepted in Georgia courts. Dailey v. State, 271 Ga. App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 83 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Contract terms. — If there was no applicable custom to determine, in a timber lease, the size of trees meant by the phrase “suitable for turpentine purposes,” opinion evidence would be admissible. It should be admitted, however, not to explain the meaning of descriptive terms in 718 the contract, but simply for the purpose of determining what class of trees or timber as to size would come within such description. Nor would the quoted phrase be varied in the phrase’s legal meaning because of the different methods of proof, for that would be the same whether a custom be shown or not, since any such custom, if existing, would presumably represent the standard of ordinarily prudent men. Dorsey v. Clements, 202 Ga. 820, 44 S.E.2d 783, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 534 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). Expert testimony on credibility of witness. — Generally, expert testimony as to the credibility of a witness is admissible if the subject matter involves organic or mental disorders, such as insanity, hallucinations, nymphomania, retrograde amnesia, and testimony concerning physical maladies which tend to impair mental or physical faculties. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1083 (1974), overruled in part, Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 122 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert’s testimony as to whether victims’ videotaped statements were coached. — Expert’s testimony as to whether victims’ videotaped statements were coached was inadmissible in a prosecution for child molestation since the jury saw the interviews for themselves and heard the victims’ direct and crossexamination as witnesses. Wright v. State, 233 Ga. App. 358, 504 S.E.2d 261 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). An expert on insanity may give an opinion based upon the expert’s own examination of a person, upon the expert’s observation of that person, or upon any state of facts, supported by some evidence in the case, which the expert assumes as true. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 658 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 381710). Opinion on ultimate fact. — Defendant’s claim that a doctor improperly gave an opinion as to an ultimate fact was rejected as the doctor did not testify concerning child neglect syndrome when the 24-7-702 doctor testiﬁed that the doctor’s overall impression was a possible child-neglect scenario, the syndrome had been recognized and expert testimony concerning the syndrome was admissible, and a treating physician could testify that the examination of a child raised a strong suspicion of child abuse. Revells v. State, 283 Ga. App. 59, 640 S.E.2d 587, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1321 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony by examining nurse. — In a prosecution on charges of both child molestation and aggravated child molestation, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in allowing an examining registered nurse to give an opinion that a child sex abuse victim’s injuries were consistent with ones caused by penetration by a ﬁnger when, prior to testifying, the nurse outlined the nurse’s relevant background including completion of a sexual assault nurse examiner’s program, advanced pediatric training under the supervision of a doctor involved in child abuse cases, and training and experience in performing numerous pelvic examinations on child abuse victims. Rodriguez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 129, 635 S.E.2d 402, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1018 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude a nurse’s testimony, stating that the victim’s normal physical examination was consistent with claims of molestation, as the nurse simply testiﬁed that the victim’s physical examination results were consistent with the allegations, and as such was a permissible expression of the expert’s opinion. Noe v. State, 287 Ga. App. 728, 652 S.E.2d 620, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1075 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Experts on toxicology. — As an expert witness was not a mere conduit for a toxicologist’s ﬁndings, because the expert reviewed the data and testing procedures to determine the accuracy of the toxicologist’s report, the expert’s testimony was properly admitted. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the testimony. Watkins v. State, 719 Opinions Admissible (Cont’d) 285 Ga. 355, 676 S.E.2d 196, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 163 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Psychologist’s hypothetical based on evidence adduced at trial. — When appellant was charged with sexually molesting his daughter, and appellant acknowledged that he had sexually molested his ﬁrst daughter by a previous marriage over a ten year period, the trial court did not err by admitting a psychologist’s testimony about the mathematical probabilities regarding the self-rehabilitation of pedophiles or persons with incestuous behavior, since the likelihood of a person with compulsive behavior rehabilitating himself without treatment was a subject matter not within the scope of the ordinary laymen’s knowledge and experience, and thus evidence regarding these matters was properly admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67. Harwood v. State, 195 Ga. App. 465, 394 S.E.2d 109, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 573 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Medical social worker. — Witness’s testimony that a baby’s injuries were inconsistent with the history of events the defendant had described was well within the witness’s purview as a medical social worker because the witness’s daily duties required consideration of medical evidence along with personal observations to determine whether factors were present which could indicate child abuse. Nichols v. State, 278 Ga. App. 46, 628 S.E.2d 131, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 253 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1239, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 752 (Ga. Sept. 18, 2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony of a mechanic was sufficient to prove the value of the damage to the victim’s car in a case charging second degree criminal damage to property. Wyche-Hinkle v. State, 268 Ga. App. 898, 602 S.E.2d 902, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1048 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony of pathologist in murder was not inadmissible because it might possibly give rise to inferences adverse to defendant. Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328, 304 S.E.2d 713, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 773 24-7-702 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Medical expert on murder victim’s fatal condition. — It was within the medical examiner’s expertise to testify, based upon the examiner’s observation of the blood stains at victim’s condo and the signiﬁcance of the blood loss indicated by those stains, that in the absence of immediate medical care victim was probably dead. White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 409 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). Medical examiner properly allowed to state opinion on cause of death. — County medical examiner was properly permitted to state examiner’s opinion, based on the facts contained in a 1979 autopsy report, that the victim died of a gunshot wound to the abdomen, and such opinion was not the restatement of the diagnostic opinion of another expert. Turner v. State, 273 Ga. 340, 541 S.E.2d 641, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 58, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 122 S. Ct. 93, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5836 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony from medical examiner on ﬁndings. — State was properly allowed to ask a medical examiner (ME) whether the defendant’s account of the homicide was consistent with the ME’s ﬁndings in the autopsy as: 1) the ME did not state an opinion as to the veracity of any witness or the defendant; and 2) the ME’s testimony did not go to the ultimate issue because the defendant admitted strangling the victim but claimed selfdefense. Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805, 716 S.E.2d 196, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 717 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-967). Forensic pathologist on single fatal blow. — Expert’s testimony regarding the possibility of death by a single blow, and the possibility of subsequent head movement following death in that manner, was admissible because it was based on facts in evidence and because this testimony pertained to conclusions jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves. Maxwell v. State, 263 Ga. 57, 428 S.E.2d 76, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 356 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony by pathologist instead of physician on injury was proper. — In 720 a prosecution for kidnapping and aggravated assault, the trial court properly allowed a pathologist instead of a physician to testify as to whether the holes in the victim’s shoe and an injury to the victim’s toe were caused by a bullet; the pathologist had experience in inspecting gunshot wounds on people and in clothing and footwear. (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony on bullet trajectory. — Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to conduct a pretrial consultation with an expert witness to utilize the evidence of the trajectory of the fatal bullet to support the defense because the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if counsel had made such a consultation as the undisputed evidence established that the defendant ﬁred the ﬁrst shot and was the aggressor who started the gunﬁght; and the fact that the defendant ﬁred the fatal shot while trying to get away from the gunﬁght the defendant started did not change the analysis regarding the lack of justiﬁcation as the defendant was the aggressor. Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 796 S.E.2d 277, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 1 (2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7707). Expert trained in behavioral science. — Expert in the areas of homicide investigation and crime scene reconstruction was allowed to testify regarding the reasons why a perpetrator might reposition and cover a victim since the challenged testimony was well within the expert’s range of training and experience and the average juror does not possess the experience necessary to discern the most common complex behavioral reasons for a perpetrator’s acting in such a manner. Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 34, 537 S.E.2d 659, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 773 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony on DNA proﬁle. — Expert’s testimony regarding the frequency in the population of the DNA proﬁle obtained from three rape victims was admissible given the expert’s credentials and expertise and the expert’s testimony as to the computer program which gener- 24-7-702 ated the statistical frequencies to which the expert testiﬁed. Collins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 784, 600 S.E.2d 802, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 813 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). No error resulted by admitting expert testimony on the issue of DNA testing, and because the defendant did not contend that the expert’s testimony failed to meet the Harper standard, no basis for reversal on this ground existed. Carruth v. State, 286 Ga. App. 431, 649 S.E.2d 557, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 800 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony on pancreatic injury. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in allowing the state’s expert witness to testify to the cause of certain of the victim’s injuries because the expert testiﬁed that one of the victim’s injuries was caused by blunt force trauma without opining on how such trauma occurred; the opinion offered by the expert regarding the cause of the victim’s pancreatic injury was one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion was beyond the ken of the average layman. Amador v. State, 310 Ga. App. 280, 713 S.E.2d 423, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 541 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1648, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 127 (Ga. Jan. 23, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Pediatrician’s opinion that a child had been molested was one of fact and one which the jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves, and was admissible even though the testimony indirectly involved the child’s credibility. State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 871 (1986), aff’d, 181 Ga. App. 589, 353 S.E.2d 855, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1494 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Defendant had no ground to contest the trial court’s decision to allow a pediatrician to give opinion testimony to show that the victims’ recitation of events was consistent with child abuse because the state proffered the pediatrician as an expert in the ﬁeld of child sexual abuse, and with no objection from the defense, the trial court so qualiﬁed the pediatrician. Ledford v. State, 313 Ga. App. 389, 721 S.E.2d 585, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1081 721 Opinions Admissible (Cont’d) (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert’s opinion that child molested. — Expert’s testimony that in expert’s opinion the child had been molested without comment as to whether the defendant was the molester was not testimony as to the ultimate issue in the case and was not objectionable. Karonen v. State, 205 Ga. App. 852, 424 S.E.2d 47, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1533 (1992), cert. denied, No. S93C0222, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 6 (Ga. Jan. 7, 1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Child abuse syndrome. — Trial court properly allowed a psychologist, who had examined a child molestation victim, to testify as to the psychologist’s conclusion that the victim suffered from child abuse syndrome, since the testimony was not a conclusion that the victim was in fact abused and that issue was left to the jury to determine. Cooper v. State, 200 Ga. App. 560, 408 S.E.2d 797, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1081 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Trial court properly admitted an expert’s testimony as to child sexual abuse syndrome as: (1) it was helpful to the jury; and (2) laymen could not understand this syndrome without expert testimony, nor would laymen be likely to believe that a child who denied a sexual assault, or who was reluctant to discuss an assault, in fact had been assaulted; further, the expert offered no opinion as to whether the victims were being truthful, but left that determination for the jury. McCoy v. State, 278 Ga. App. 492, 629 S.E.2d 493, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 351 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony of burglary investigator. — Testimony of a sheriff’s department’s burglary investigator as to whether, based on his training and experience, items are sometimes sold when items are stolen and whether the crime lab would process ﬁngerprints taken from a burglary crime scene was admissible. Hestley v. State, 216 Ga. App. 573, 455 S.E.2d 333, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 220 (1995), cert. denied, No. S95C1054, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 620 (Ga. 24-7-702 May 19, 1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony on blood samples based on electrophoresis procedure. — Expert witness may testify concerning identiﬁcation of blood samples based on procedure known as electrophoresis, the statistical or mathematical probability of certain enzymes being found in the blood of the general population. Graham v. State, 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3368 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Evidence of source of DNA. — Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to make a meritless objection based on the state’s expert’s testimony as to the source of the DNA on a sock as the possible mechanisms by which epithelial cells ended up on a sock were beyond the ken of the average layman; since the evidence at issue was admissible, defendant’s trial counsel was not required to object. Eley v. State, 266 Ga. App. 45, 596 S.E.2d 660, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 295 (2004), overruled in part, State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony of police officer on cocaine use admissible. — Knowledge of the amount of crack cocaine one would generally possess for personal use or the amount which might evidence distribution was not necessarily within the scope of the ordinary layman’s knowledge and experience. Therefore, the testimony of a veteran police officer on the subject would have been properly admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67. Davis v. State, 200 Ga. App. 44, 406 S.E.2d 555, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 762 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Police officer’s opinion testimony that the amount of cocaine seized in the execution of a search warrant upon defendant’s residence would typically be intended for distribution by the defendant rather than for the defendant’s personal use was properly admissible. Wise v. State, 257 Ga. App. 211, 570 S.E.2d 656, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1110 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Unqualiﬁed testimony of a police officer offered to show intent to distribute 722 cocaine, based on the amount of cocaine and the officer’s knowledge of defendant, was not competent evidence of an intent to distribute. Stephens v. State, 219 Ga. App. 881, 467 S.E.2d 201 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Crime lab chemist qualiﬁed regarding street value of drugs. — It was not error for the trial court to permit the state expert, a crime laboratory chemist, to testify concerning the “street value” of conﬁscated drugs, where the chemist testiﬁed that the chemist had accumulated knowledge of the street value of cocaine as a result of the chemist’s experience over years of comparing the prices paid by undercover officers during their undercover purchases with that which was supplied to the chemist for analysis. Robinson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 759, 417 S.E.2d 404, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 618 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0913, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 460 (Ga. June 4, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Although a print card was not admitted as a business record, it was relevant as the basis for an expert’s conclusion that defendant’s print matched that taken from the victim’s vehicle; despite defendant’s hearsay objection, the expert’s testimony connected defendant to the crime, and the admissibility of the expert’s inculpatory testimony did not depend upon the admission of the print. Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 586 S.E.2d 651, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 795 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Officer is an expert on narcotics investigations. — Arresting officer should have been qualiﬁed as an expert in “narcotics investigation”; although the trial court allowed the officer’s testimony over objection. Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 572, 434 S.E.2d 132, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 971 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Officer’s testimony on effects of alcohol on body. — At the time of a defendant’s driving under the inﬂuence (DUI) trial, the arresting officer had over four years of law enforcement experience, had been trained in DUI detection and ﬁeld sobriety testing, and had been involved in over 100 DUI arrests. Based on the offi- 24-7-702 cer’s training and experience, the officer was qualiﬁed to testify about the effects of alcohol consumption on the body. Lanwehr v. State, 265 Ga. App. 359, 593 S.E.2d 897, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 113 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Dock signals expert. — Trial court did not err in permitting witness to testify as an expert for procedures where hand signals or sight alone is insufficient in a personal injury action brought by longshoreman against state port authority. Georgia Ports Auth. v. Hutchinson, 209 Ga. App. 726, 434 S.E.2d 791, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 999 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1810, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 1081 (Ga. Nov. 4, 1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Romberg sobriety test subject to Harper standard. — Admissibility of the Romberg test is subject to the Harper standard as the signiﬁcance of eyelid tremors or an individual’s internal clock, how they may be affected by the consumption of alcohol, and particularly whether a range of ﬁve seconds above or below the actual passage of 30 seconds establishes impairment, are not matters of common sense or experience, nor are they obvious to the average lay observer. Mitchell v. State, 301 Ga. 563, 802 S.E.2d 217, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 545 (2017), overruled in part, State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 827 S.E.2d 865, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 320 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7707). Testimony by polygraph examiner. — Trial court did not err by allowing a polygraph examiner to testify that the defendant showed deception to questions concerning an armed robbery because the defendant, by stipulation, voluntarily consented to admission of the polygraph test results. Therefore, the defendant agreed to the admission of the examiner’s opinion testimony concerning the polygraph examination, and the trial court did not err by overruling the defendant’s objection to the qualiﬁcations of the examiner, or by allowing the examiner to testify as an expert concerning the polygraph test which the examiner administered on the defendant. Jones v. State, 309 Ga. App. 723 Opinions Admissible (Cont’d) 886, 714 S.E.2d 590, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 480 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony not objectionable. — Trial court did not err in denying a defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to an expert’s opinion testimony because the record did not support the defendant’s argument that the expert’s testimony was objectionable; the expert’s testimony was limited to describing how the expert and doctors in the medical community generally performed genital examinations of female patients and did not touch on whether either the defendant or the victim was telling the truth on whether the defendant committed aggravated sexual battery, and the expert’s testimony regarding the typical medical examination of a preadolescent girl’s genitals was relevant to the issues raised by the defendant’s defense. Lee v. State, 300 Ga. App. 214, 684 S.E.2d 348, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1125 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony on interviewing techniques in child abuse case not improperly restricted. — Trial court did not improperly restrict the testimony of the defendant’s expert because the expert was permitted to testify at length on the propriety and effect of interviewing techniques in child sexual abuse cases; the defendant did not point out how the trial court’s decision to sustain the state’s objection to the expert’s statement unfairly restricted the expert’s testimony when the expert went on to provide the expert’s criticisms of how the victim’s interview was conducted. Rayner v. State, 307 Ga. App. 861, 706 S.E.2d 205, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 96 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0922, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. May 31, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony of ﬁre investigation expert. — In a negligence action arising from a school bus ﬁre, the trial court erroneously excluded the opinion of defendant’s ﬁre investigation expert as the expert stating that the opinion was the best scientiﬁc guess makeable was simply the 24-7-702 expert’s recognition of the fact that the exact cause of the ﬁre could not be determined with absolute certainty. Early v. Morgan Fleet Services, Inc., No. A23A0148, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 203 (Ga. Ct. App. May 16, 2023). Fire marshal’s testimony regarding arson. — After being qualiﬁed as an expert witness, the ﬁre marshal’s testimony that the ﬁre at the victims’ residence was intentionally set did not invade the province of the jury in deciding whether the defendant had committed arson because the testimony did not address other elements of the crime of arson or directly implicate the defendant as the perpetrator of that crime; and the conclusion that the ﬁre was intentionally set was not one jurors would ordinarily be able to draw for themselves. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 236 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Testimony by expert on geo-cell phone analytics. — Testimony by the state’s expert witness on geo-cell phone analytics was admissible as the defendant could not affirmatively show that the alleged error in admitting the evidence probably affected the outcome below and, thus, constituted plain error because the expert’s testimony was used to indicate how the police were able to determine that, on the day of the murder — but the day before the victim’s body was disposed of by being burned — the defendant’s cell phone was located about 14 miles from where the victim’s burned body was found; and ample evidence actually placed the defendant at the murder scene and the location where the defendant and an individual attempted to cover up the crime. Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 785 S.E.2d 886, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 353 (2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707). Forensic analyst of telephone records. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in qualifying the forensic analyst as an expert or in admitting the forensic analyst’s testimony regarding the telephone calls between those involved in the drug transactions because the forensic analyst was examined extensively on speciﬁc training as an analyst of telephone records and the specialized 724 computer programs used in law enforcement data compilation, and because the correlation and analysis of large numbers of cellular telephone calls, using specialized computer programs and other tools and resources speciﬁc to forensic analysis, was a matter beyond the ken of the average layperson. Maldonado v. State, 325 Ga. App. 41, 752 S.E.2d 112, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 960 (2013), cert. denied, No. S14C0489, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 386 (Ga. May 5, 2014) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707). 2. Opinions Inadmissible Testimony was inadmissible as expert testimony in the following cases. — See Wylly v. Gazan, 69 Ga. 506, 1881 Ga. LEXIS 403 (1881) (meaning of “more or less” in deed) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868); Central R.R. v. DeBray, 71 Ga. 406, 1883 Ga. LEXIS 194 (1883) (whether employees were required to get on or off moving train) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3868); Carter v. Carter Elec. Co., 156 Ga. 297, 119 S.E. 737, 1923 Ga. LEXIS 241 (1923) (damage to business from use of similar name by competitor) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5876); Davies v. Blasingame, 177 Ga. 450, 170 S.E. 477, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 199 (1933) (soundness of property title) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710); United States v. Roberts, 192 F.2d 893, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2811 (5th Cir. 1951) (continuing total disability a matter of law and fact) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Expert testimony on credibility of witness. — If the characteristic of a witness attacked does not involve some organic or mental disorder or some impairment of the mental or physical faculties by injury, disease, or otherwise, or if there has been insufficient observation by the expert, expert testimony is usually excluded. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1083 (1974), overruled in part, Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 122 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Trial court erred by allowing a state’s expert to testify, over the defendant’s objection, that the expert did not believe the 24-7-702 victim made up the allegations against the defendant, as such was an ultimate issue of fact, and nothing suggested that the determination of the victim’s credibility was beyond the ken of the jurors; thus, to the extent that Smith v. State, 257 Ga. App. 88, 570 S.E.2d 400 (2002), allowed an expert to give an opinion on a witness’s credibility or to express an opinion on the ultimate issue of defendant’s guilt to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness whose veracity was attacked, it was overruled. Patterson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 168, 628 S.E.2d 618, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 268 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Expert testimony on transference theory. — Trial court’s refusal to admit eyewitness expert testimony was supported by extensive corroborating evidence because there was no factual basis for allowing testimony regarding the potential for misidentiﬁcation based on transference theory; the defendant presented no evidence indicating that the victim saw or could have seen any other person at the time the instant offenses took place. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 546 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Opinion based on out-of-court evidence. — Medical expert does not have the right to give in evidence an opinion based on information which the expert has derived from private conversations with third parties. Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895, 1966 Ga. LEXIS 658 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1710). Witness invaded province of jury. — Expert witness’s testimony that the childhood maltreatment syndrome or abused child syndrome was the “manner” in which the fatal injuries occurred, and that the fatal injuries occurred “in the process” of the childhood maltreatment syndrome, constituted the expert’s opinion that the fatal injuries in fact resulted from child abuse. Accordingly, as the jurors had the ability to reach this conclusion personally, the trial court erred by allowing the expert witness’s testimony. McCartney v. State, 262 Ga. 156, 414 S.E.2d 227, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 225 (1992), overruled in part, 725 Opinions Inadmissible (Cont’d) Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 700 S.E.2d 394, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 639 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). When testimony is not based on an expert opinion and is mere speculation, it is worthless and the trial court does not err in striking the testimony from the record. Gould v. State, 168 Ga. App. 605, 309 S.E.2d 888, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2865 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67); Welborn v. State, 174 Ga. App. 853, 331 S.E.2d 890, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2758 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Medical malpractice expert’s affidavit. — In a medical malpractice action, the trial court abused the court’s discretion in concluding that the parents’ expert affidavit was insufficient because reviewing the allegations of the complaint, the expert’s affidavits, and the trial court’s conclusions, the expert was not required to practice as a psychiatrist or have specialized knowledge of the standard of care of psychiatrists to satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-9.1 and 24-2702(c)(2)(C). Russell v. Kantamneni, 363 Ga. App. 899, 873 S.E.2d 458, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 245 (2022). Psychiatrist’s reliance on psychologist’s test results. — To the extent the state’s psychiatric expert relied upon the opinion of another psychologist expert not before the court, the expert’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay without probative value even in the absence of an objection. Brown v. State, 206 Ga. App. 800, 427 S.E.2d 9, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1791 (1992), cert. denied, No. S93C0586, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 339 (Ga. Apr. 8, 1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Psychologist’s opinion irrelevant. — State’s motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of a defendant’s psychologist was properly granted as the defendant claimed that defendant shot the victim in self-defense; the defendant’s psychological state was irrelevant. Lott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 373, 636 S.E.2d 102, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1106 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). School counselor’s opinion. — Admission of a school counselor’s opinion 24-7-702 that a child had been molested based on the child’s behavior and demeanor during the counselor’s interview of the child was reversible error. Hilliard v. State, 226 Ga. App. 478, 487 S.E.2d 81 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Medical examiner’s opinion on defendant’s demeanor admissible. — Trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of the deputy medical examiner in which the examiner related observations of the defendant during an interview of the defendant because the examiner stated the general observation of the defendant’s demeanor upon being told that the defendant’s child had died. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 85 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67). Opinion as to alcohol content drop in dead person. — Question propounded to a forensic chemist concerning whether or not the fact that a person might have died and it had been some days before the person was found would in any way decrease the alcohol content of the victim’s body was proper under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67. Cameron v.